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Peter Cheyne, Ars biographica poetica: Coleridgean Imagination and the Practical 
Value of Contemplation 
 
This thesis begins by examining how Coleridge Romanticizes Platonism. I argue that 
Coleridge creatively recasts Plato’s Divided Line analogy, and thereby finds a higher role 
for a radically re-thought imagination. Through this recast imagination, Coleridge 
develops a Romantic Platonism by elevating imagination and modifying Plato’s linear 
scheme into a polarity that harmonizes sense and reason.  
I argue that Coleridge’s philosophy develops in response to the Empiricist philosophy 
that dominated the British practice, and transcendental idealism that flourished in 
Germany. I argue that Coleridge’s philosophy is neither Empiricist, nor a mere translation 
of German idealism, as critics have sometimes suggested, but that it is quintessentially 
Platonic. Unlike Plato, however, Coleridge elevates the status of imagination, separating it 
from fantasy (or fancy, as he calls it), which retains the subordinate position it has for 
Plato. Attacking Empiricist philosophy, Coleridge argues that reason and its Ideas (and 
not the understanding) constitute and indeed exceed the apex of human thought, a 
distinction corresponding to Plato’s between noesis and dianoia. 
I present a view, developing from Coleridge and answering Plato, of how the 
practical and the contemplative lives can bring each other nearer to fulfilment, such that, 
to use Plato’s terms, contemplation can be perfected in the return to the cave, rather than 
be prevented there, as is often feared. I examine how Coleridgean imagination and reason 
operate as the higher, ‘spiritual mind’, balancing the lower ‘mind of the body’. While the 
lower mind desires and consumes, with fancy restlessly moving through ever-shifting 
mental images, the higher mind yearns, and contemplates, finding stillness in beholding 
value.  
I propose what I call the contemplative ars biographica poetica, suggesting not only 
that we should live our lives as the poetic art of life-writing, but also that we already do 
so. Usually we shape our lives unawares of any poetic task, yet we manage nevertheless to 
retrieve moments of strikingly beautiful meaning despite decades-long disasters prolonged 
by deliberate blindness and a pathological obstinacy that values mere repetition above 
reason. This art at its best, however, relates to philosophy as the former seeks in the latter 
a satiating vision, a wisdom to answer profoundest yearning.  
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Preface 
 
 
This dissertation was completed part-time, registered at Durham University, while 
living and working in Japan. It develops from my MPhil thesis, Mood and Self in 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre,
1
 which proposes a unitary existentialist conception 
of mood as disclosing value and transcendence in our lives. The present work extends 
the theme of contemplation as appreciative beholding, and progresses to consider the 
objectivity of the value disclosed. 
After completing my MPhil at the University of Kent at Canterbury, under Sean 
Sayers’ supervision, I moved to Japan and married my college sweetheart, Takako, who 
had a few years earlier returned to Japan after finishing her psychoanalytic studies, also 
at Kent. Working at Fukuoka University, I kept my enthusiasm for teaching English as a 
Second Language by using English poetry, and themes and stories from Philosophy, 
especially from Plato. I hoped to continue my philosophical research, and my MPhil 
suggested further research into what Coleridge calls the union of deep feeling with 
profound thought (Biographia I, 80). 
I was only dimly aware, through reading Warnock’s Introduction to Sartre’s Being 
and Nothingness, of Coleridge’s forward-reaching connections to phenomenology, or 
even those returning to Platonism through Neo-Platonism. Coleridge for me meant a 
few remembered quotations, and an air of mystery about the ‘Kubla Khan’ poem in a 
copy of The Readers’ Digest Book of Strange Stories, Amazing Facts: Stories That Are 
Bizarre, Unusual, Odd, Astonishing, Incredible - But True left to me by my grandfather, 
Vivien Smith, who died young. The story in that strange, heavy, dark-red, musty, 
clothbound, hardback book that so captured my seven-or-eight-year-old imagination 
retold the mystery of ‘Kubla Khan’ as a vision in a dream that was left apparently 
unfinished because its composition was interrupted by ‘a person on business from 
Porlock’. 
In Fukuoka, with first child, Maria, on her way, I wished to strengthen my 
academic credentials to get a teaching position elsewhere in Japan before my eight-year 
limited contract at Fukuoka University expired. I hoped to develop my interests in Ideas 
in the Arts, and I believed that specializing in the German, French, or Danish 
philosophers of my MPhil thesis suited future job-hunting less well than researching a 
great literary and philosophical artist and thinker famous for masterly compositions in 
the English language. This answers the question ‘Why Coleridge?’, who is overlooked 
by today’s philosophers, despite his bright flashes of philosophical insight arising from 
and developed by long and deeply-mulling powers of discernment. When put this way, 
one might see why Coleridge, above all other philosophical artists,
2
 could help centre 
my interests in the problems that also attract Plato, Plotinus, and Proclus; the English 
Platonists and Renaissance poet-philosophers, especially Shakespeare; and Kant, 
Schelling, Schiller, et al, all of whom being the same authors informing Coleridge’s 
researches.  
I enrolled part-time at Durham University in early 2003, agreeing with my 
supervisor, David Cooper, to spend my long vacations at Durham. Over several 
supervisions we discussed the shape of a thesis on the meaning of life informed by 
                                                 
1 Submitted to the University of Kent Philosophy Department in 2002. 
2 T. S. Eliot, for example, whose PhD thesis on Bradley’s profound ethics and ontology, and his 
influential poetry and criticism, would have allowed a study of Ideas in the Arts, but would not 
have satisfied my desire for a philosophy of contemplation. 
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Coleridgean concerns. Very soon, however, a profound concern with the meaning of 
life struck my young family.  
After Maria Matsumi was born, my thirty-two-year-old wife, Takako, was 
diagnosed with Stage IV stomach cancer, receiving a six-months terminal prognosis 
from Fukuoka University Hospital oncologists. Their prognosis was accurate. Takako 
never complained of her condition. Intense pain repeatedly came and passed, but her 
gentleness always remained. She stayed mostly at home, not hospital, and I remain 
deeply grateful to John Hatcher and Yukiko Ōshima of Fukuoka University English 
Department for arranging six months paid compassionate leave so I could look after my 
wife in our final months together. We were still in the honeymoon of our short 
marriage, and Takako was always thankful for her share of life. 
Being a single father to a toddler and teaching nine periods a week at Fukuoka 
University, plus up to three weekly sessions at Kyushu University, meant postponing 
my studies. By 2009, David Cooper had retired from teaching at Durham, and he 
recommended that Andy Hamilton supervise my resurrected thesis. Andy’s 
understanding of the fine line between philosophy and intellectual history has been very 
valuable. Andy has helped most with his deep thinking into philosophical aesthetics and 
his continued calls to rewrite with a feel for style as well as clarity so that the 
philosophical critic never forget that he or she too, and not just the artists and 
philosophers one writes about, is engaged in an art, and not a business.  
Hamilton’s aim therefore converges with Coleridge’s, insofar as both agree that all 
technique and creative effort be used ultimately for humane cultivation. Very generous 
with his time, and well beyond the call of duty, Andy twice visited me in Japan. First in 
rural Miyazaki, then in central Kyoto, we spent several weeks and many cups of tea 
discussing the importance of style in philosophy. Where this thesis is stylistically 
deficient, it is certainly not for want of my supervisor’s efforts. 
In 2012 I remarried, and without my wife Sachie’s support I might not have 
finished this thesis. For all the current work’s faults, in Sachie’s presence I found the 
steady guide of renewed purpose that I have tried to maintain throughout the final 
writing stages. We have a second child, Angus Keita, who scurries to my notebook 
computer to help edit the final pages. He and Maria are joined by a sister, whose happy 
delivery comes a few weeks before this thesis will be respectfully submitted to the 
University of Durham Humanities Faculty prior to its examination by philosophers 
Michael McGhee and David M. Knight. 
 
*** 
I thank the British Library for permission to reproduce Coleridge’s autograph sketch of 
his System of the Mental Powers in Tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie (see 
Appendix A).  
 
For encouragement, advice, and valuable comments I thankfully and humbly 
acknowledge my debts to the generosity of Coleridge scholars Jim Mays, Raimonda 
Modiano, Luke Wright, Alan Gregory, Anya Taylor, Douglas Hedley, David Vallins, 
and Kelvin Everest; scholar of literature, philosophy, and religious studies Joseph S. 
O’Leary; philosophers David Cooper, Andy Hamilton, and Simon James; and scholars 
of classical and later Hellenistic philosophy Phillip Horky, and Michael Chase.  
 
Peter Cheyne 
Kyoto, Japan 
20
th
 January, 2014
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Introduction 
 
This thesis reads the works of S. T. Coleridge (1772-1834) as a hub for thoughts on 
contemplation and imagination in the Platonic tradition and a broader, perennial 
philosophy including Eastern wisdom traditions. I understand perennial philosophy, East 
and West, as a concern with powers of thought and concentration not for their own sake, 
but because of the necessity of careful thought to rest on what thought seeks, namely 
value and its source. Thus Western philosophies focus on, e.g., perception, feeling, belief, 
opinion, understanding, charity, contemplation, and wisdom, and Eastern philosophies 
focus on, e.g., non-thinking, attention, concentration, compassion, insight, and wisdom.  
My thesis therefore pursues Coleridge’s philosophical quest by sharing the same 
ends. Those ends I take to be the Ideas pursuable by what he calls the energies of reason 
(Statesman’s Manual, 29), which in the human mind become attention, reflection, 
concentration, discernment, and insight, which are real powers and of central interest to 
philosophers East and West for millennia because of their relation to wisdom. These 
energies of reason require a mentally strenuous pursuit. Their objects are so nearly alike 
to their methods, that losing track of the one means temporarily losing the other. As 
Coleridge describes intellectual effort: 
 
in the philosophy of ideas our words can have no meaning, for him that uses and for him 
that hears them, except as far as the mind’s eye in both is kept fixed on the idea . . . . If the 
ray of mental vision decline but an hair’s breadth on this side or on that, it is instantly 
strangled in darkness (Opus Maximum, 226) 
 
Underpinned by inquiry into the intellectual energies of reason, this thesis also 
examines how Coleridge develops a philosophic system in response to two traditions: the 
Empiricist philosophy that in his day dominated the British practice, and transcendental 
idealism that flourished in Germany. I argue that Coleridge’s philosophy is neither 
Empiricist nor a mere translation of German idealism, as critics sometimes suggest, but 
that it is quintessentially Platonic. Unlike Plato, however, Coleridge elevates the 
imagination’s status, separating it from fantasy (or fancy, as he calls it), which retains the 
subordinate position given to it by Plato. Attacking Empiricist philosophy, Coleridge 
argues that reason and its Ideas (and not the understanding) constitute and indeed exceed 
the apex of human thought, a distinction that corresponds to Plato’s between noesis and 
dianoia. 
Considering Coleridge’s theory of the mental powers, this thesis explores 
imagination’s preparatory role in leading to contemplation. Imagination gives aesthetic 
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access to Ideas, and thus allows Ideas to have meaning in our lives. Ordinarily, people 
slowly become only dimly aware of the Ideas that profoundly influence their lives, and 
this via art, religion, laws, and other such intellectual products. I argue throughout this 
thesis that Ideas must be consciously approached with attention, concentration, and 
imagination if we are to be responsibly in charge of our lives and not doomed to repeat 
the same mangled and obscurely felt patterns year after year, generation after generation. 
I argue for noetic enlightenment, and for guidance by people in this state. Thus I require, 
with Plato, that the philosopher return to the cave, and, in Zen Buddhist terms, that those 
who attain satori descend the mountain, metaphorically speaking, to share their 
enlightenment.  
A main argument of this thesis is that if society is to improve, the philosophical 
teacher, politician, or generally engaged citizen must strive to unite contemplative and 
practical life through aesthetic engagement in the classroom, workplace, and wider 
society. With this argument, I echo Coleridge’s call for a decisively vocational clerisy 
(clergy, scholars, and teachers), which influential and practical notion Knight (2004, 154) 
glosses as follows: 
 
In medieval times, the clergy were the educated class – a clerisy – with a duty to pass on 
learning and provide leadership; now, Coleridge urged, those same duties belonged to the 
educated, who should see themselves as a clerisy. Ordained ministers would only be a part 
of this clerisy . . . in a new, liberal, and comprehensive vision of a national church. 
Coleridge’s views resonated down the century. 
 
Before shaping society, however, one must be shaped oneself. This is why Plato argues 
that philosophical study proper, which includes dialectic – dangerous in young and 
untrained minds (Republic, 539d) – not commence until age thirty; social offices not be 
held until thirty-five; and that social leadership not be undertaken until age fifty. And at 
fifty, Plato’s discalced elite would still be in training, alternating periods of socially 
beneficial work with contemplative philosophy. Then they must be:  
 
made to raise the radiance of their soul and look at that which brings light to all. And when 
they have seen the Good itself, using that as their model [paradeigma] they must each in 
turn put the state and its inhabitants and themselves in order, spending the majority of their 
time on philosophy, but when their turn comes, they must each labour at their civic duties, 
govern in the interests of the state, and carry out their work not as something fine, but as 
something essential. They must constantly educate others to be like them and leave the 
guardians for the state and then go off and dwell in the Islands of the Blessed. (540a-b).  
 
My thesis, Ars biographica poetica, proposes that in order to lead well by both 
design and by example, we should first form our lives in the poetic art of life-writing. I 
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also propose that we already do this, but almost always without due reflection. I thus 
repeat Socrates’s call to the examined life, adding that the examination must be poetic as 
well as logical. Usually we shape our lives unawares of any poetic task, yet we manage 
nevertheless to redeem moments of strikingly beautiful meaning despite decades-long 
disasters prolonged by deliberate blindness and a pathological obstinacy that makes do 
with mere repetition above reason. Life’s art at its best, however, relates to perennial 
philosophy as those who aim to live well seek, century after century, a satiating vision, a 
wisdom to answer profoundest yearning.  
Moreover, and so long as one can be brought to understand one’s current ignorance, 
even the suggestion that genuine wisdom is possible can decelerate the unsatisfying 
cycles of repetition generated by falsely assuming that the answer to human yearning lies 
in social climbing, material acquisition, and the diversions of sensuous pleasure. The 
descriptive part of my title is: Coleridgean Imagination and the Practical Value of 
Contemplation. Nowadays, the word practical describes being hands-on, in a down-to-
earth way, such as someone being good at banking, carpentry, etc. This is not the sense 
meant here. However, I am using a sense related to that.  
The New Testament story of Martha wanting to serve Christ food and drink, to run a 
bath, and so on, is traditionally understood as illustrating the practical life (Luke, 10:38-
42). It is valuable, but lesser, according to this contemplative tradition, than her sister 
Mary’s choice, which was to sit near Jesus and listen. My thesis holds that contemplative 
life is the better part, but I also emphasize that each brings the other nearer to fulfilment, 
such that, in Platonic terms, contemplation can be perfected in the cave, rather than be 
prevented there, as is often feared. 
Besides an important general intellectual influence, I also argue for Coleridge a place 
in the canon of English-speaking philosophy.
3
 Although Coleridge studies are flourishing 
in English departments around the world, a nineteenth-century British philosopher 
allowed to peruse almost any twentieth or early twenty-first century philosophy textbook 
might wish to inquire into The Curious Case of the Disappearing Coleridge. Mill (1840), 
for example, sees him as equalled only by Jeremy Bentham in the English-speaking 
philosophy of his day. For Mill, these two great minds shape nineteenth-century British 
thought in opposite though complementary directions. 
                                                 
3 As do Mill, 1840; Muirhead, 1930; Barfield, 1971; and Skorupski, 1993. 
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Moving beyond Mill’s high philosophical and cultural esteem for Coleridge, it is 
easy to survey the explicit history of Coleridge’s much-documented influence on the 
minds of his age and those of the following (Skorupski, 1993; Parker, 2000; eds Vigus 
and Wright, 2008; and Shaffer, in ed. Burwick, 2003, 696 ff.). He introduces Kant to a 
wide British audience;
4
 is an early Anti-reductionist, becoming an eloquent and 
persuasive opponent of Empiricist zeal (Gregory, 2003, 1; passim). He meets Emerson 
who visits him in a bereavement-induced spiritual quest to Europe in 1832, and who then 
exports Coleridge’s Romantic philosophy across the Atlantic to initiate American 
Transcendentalism with his 1836 essay, Nature.
5
 In Anglican church history he is a 
leading inspiration of the Broad Church movement, greatly influencing socialist Maurice, 
Liberal Gladstone, and conservative Catholic Cardinal Newman, and thus Coleridge also 
influences the Oxford Movement (cf. Wright, 2010). He is widely acknowledged as the 
preeminent modern literary critic (Read, 1949, 18; Watson, 1962, 111-30),
6
 and in the 
first sentence of The Sacred Wood (1921, 1), Eliot asserts that: 
 
Coleridge was the greatest of English critics, and in a sense the last.  
 
Appreciation of Coleridge as a philosopher within Philosophy departments has 
diminished throughout the Analytic-style, Anglo-American, linguistic era. In Literature 
departments, his reputation as a philosopher has fared better, albeit with warnings to 
students not to emulate his Catherine-wheel-like brilliance. That is, the brilliance of his 
thought is admired, but his stacks of unfinished, though seminal, projects are used to 
frighten young postgraduates. Thus Hamilton (ed. Newlyn, 2002, 170) poses and answers 
the question of Coleridge the philosopher: 
 
Is Coleridge philosophically interesting? His philosophical output was prodigious and 
remarkably untidy. 
 
Beyond literature departments, and among philosophers proper, we find that Scruton 
(1983, 2009) adopts Coleridge’s imagination-fancy distinction; Hedley (2010, 271) 
champions him as ‘both a learned and innovative Platonist, acutely aware of medieval 
and modern forms of Platonism’; the Coleridgean notion of Idea finds aesthetic use in 
Diffey’s  (1977) understanding of art as something beyond the conceptual; and Warnock 
                                                 
4 The physician Thomas Beddoes, in 1793, gives perhaps the first English-language account of 
Kant’s First Critique. He later introduces Kant to Coleridge, encouraging him and Wordsworth 
to visit Germany (Knight, 2004, 14). 
5 Emerson’s Transcendentalism is, however, too pantheistic to be straightforwardly Coleridgean.  
6 Read esteems Coleridge as ‘head and shoulders above every other English critic . . . due to his 
introduction of a philosophical method of criticism’. 
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(1974) finds in him a proto-phenomenologist with striking similarities of interest and 
approach to Sartre. He also receives book-length philosophical studies by Muirhead 
(1930); and Barfield (1971); and receives treatment as a highly influential philosopher in 
Ch. 1 of Skorupski’s survey of English-language philosophy (1993). Indeed Skorupski 
(2014) now locates in Coleridge, and his influence on Mill, an important position that lies 
at the root of the ‘Analytic-Continental divide’. In this, Skorupski follows Engell and 
Bate’s Editor’s Introduction, who assert that ‘Coleridge seeks to expand the philosophical 
vocabulary of the British, to make it less materialistic, and to introduce to British thought 
the key words of Continental (especially German) thought’ (Biographia, cxxii).  
In Coleridge we find a highly influential thinker’s traditionalist, syncretic 
philosophy, seminal in style, intent, and result. It would seem helpful to summarize the 
standard interpretation of Coleridge’s philosophy and literary criticism, and then to 
offer my alternative. However, there is no standard interpretation, an observation 
already made fifty years ago: 
 
The achievement of Coleridge is rightly held to be supreme among the English critics, but no 
one seeking to expound it can face [the] task with much confidence. Existing expositions . . .  
bear so little resemblance to one another that it is difficult to believe they are about the same 
thing  (Watson, 1962, 111) 
 
Comparing different interpretations of Coleridge, Watson notes that for Wellek, 
Coleridge is merely a ‘mediator’ between German philosophy and his English audience; 
that Richards’ interpretation seems to bear little relation to Coleridge’s text; and that 
‘worst of all, the very nature of Coleridge’s text forever defies clear analysis’ (Watson, 
1962, 111).  
In part, Coleridge’s resistance to clear analysis is accounted by the fact that some of 
his lectures have been lost; that his notebooks are, being notebooks, unpolished; and 
that important and insightful remarks are scattered throughout his journalism (e.g. in 
The Morning Post, and The Courier), self-produced periodicals (The Watchman, The 
Friend), letters, marginalia, and beyond, including, most importantly, his poetry. For 
various other reasons, and I will outline three, there is therefore no generally accepted, 
standard interpretation of Coleridge’s philosophical thought.  
First among these reasons is that Coleridge ultimately aims to bring the reader to a 
contemplative theoria. His work is thus eminently seminal in an educational, 
transformative sense. As Barfield (1971, 11) observes,  
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he was so seminal a thinker that his insights and apercus tend to ‘sprout in the brains’ 
with a fertility that is positively dangerous. 
 
Indeed, Coleridge usually and deliberately does not address the everyday modes of 
understanding of his readership. Instead, he addresses their capacity for reason, the 
imagination, and sense, through the understanding when need be, but reception by 
discursive analysis, though a necessary station on the way, is not the intended and 
eventual destination. Such educational work, then, aims to initiate and develop thinking 
in the reader, against which explicating any particular view, rather than eliciting 
intellectual vision itself, is a useful exercise, but not the ultimate aim. 
Secondly, Coleridge’s thought develops from deep reading in classical and modern 
sources, and scholars so widely read in the Humanities are rare. Chiefly influential among 
his sources are Plato; the Gospels; the Church Fathers and medieval thinkers; Romans 
such as Horace; the Neo-Platonists, especially Plotinus, and Proclus; Renaissance Italian 
and English literature and philosophy;
7
 modern philosophers, especially Spinoza, Locke, 
Hartley, and Paley; and then the Germans who powerfully enter his thoughts: Leibniz, 
Wolff, most crucially Kant, then Fichte, Schiller, the Schlegels, and Schelling. It is easy 
to become distracted in following his sources, although even then the circuit should be 
profitable, so long as attending to the details enriches the contemplation of the leading 
Ideas. 
A third reason is that his philosophy must be found throughout the fifty physical 
volumes of his corpus, comprised of thirty-four physical volumes of the fifteen numbered 
titles in his Collected Works (CC, 1969-2002); the five heavy volumes of his Collected 
Notebooks, each ‘Text’ volume with a companion volume of editor’s ‘Notes’ (Notebooks, 
1957-2002); and the six volumes of his Collected Letters (Letters, 1956-71). That there is 
so much to read and balance makes for another strong reason why there is no consensus 
on What Coleridge Thought, to quote the title of one notable and influential attempt 
(Barfield, 1971) to provide just that.  
The aforementioned relation of Coleridge’s philosophy to German idealism raises the 
question of plagiarism, a charge first made shortly after his death by De Quincey (1834, 
511). The editors of the most recent Biographia edition (1983) indicate that he translates 
from Schelling, without proper citation, three or four pages, mainly in Chapter XII. 
                                                 
7 He learns Italian as a colonial legislator in Malta, being under-secretary, then acting public 
secretary to Sir Alexander Ball (Kooy, 2012), and learns German to attend philosophy lectures, 
translating Schiller’s Wallenstein on returning to England; he studied Greek and Latin since 
schooldays. 
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Whatever notions, such as truth as a divine ventriloquist,
8
 that Coleridge mentions in 
Biographia, might be brought for exoneration, it is nevertheless an unfortunate incident 
arising amid a truly creative endeavor, and it cannot be seen as exemplary for scholarly 
practice, or composition generally.  
Coleridge mentions by author and title the works to which the accusations relate, so 
it should be clear that this is no straightforward charge of pilfering. Moreover, we should 
note Schelling’s opinion on the matter:  
 
I grant him with pleasure the borrowings from my works that were sharply, even too 
sharply criticized by his countrymen. . . .  One should not hold such charges against a really 
congenial man [Einem wirklich congenialen Mann sollte man dergleichen nicht 
anrechnen]. (1857, 198) 
 
Fruman (1971, 344) certainly goes too far in claiming that Coleridge, when he writes of 
Mount Amara in the first draft of ‘Kubla Khan’, should have cited Milton’s Paradise Lost 
as a source. The published version, however, has the Abyssinian maid ‘Singing of Mount 
Abora’, which poetic line in no way requires a footnote acknowledging Milton’s similar-
sounding mountain.  
Moving beyond Coleridge, the man and his ideas, this thesis moves towards a 
Coleridge-inspired theory of contemplation, drawing from his theory of imagination, 
Idea, and the meditative practices described in his Notebooks and Letters, and 
exemplified in much of his poetry, especially the Meditative Poems. My chapter (4.2) on 
the Notebooks is about flow, and I describe Coleridge walking and thinking, seeing into 
and listening for the heart of the matter. This chapter suggests a promising connection to 
Daoist accounts of the Way as flow, although I then give grounds for taking this 
connection only so far. Throughout this dissertation, my notion of the con-templum 
operates explicitly or implicitly, and it is in the Notebooks chapter that I gather my 
thoughts on contemplative beholding as a steady act of appreciative attention, a stretching 
to hear. 
I find in intellectual effort activities that essentially comprise training in spiritual 
progress, and such effort produces and sustains attention, discernment, concentration, 
holding-together and holding-apart, mental retention and release. I therefore see training 
in the liberal arts of mathematics, music, poetics, composition, history, and intellectual 
education generally, as strengthening rational freedom. Beyond the purview of the 
                                                 
8 Ficino’s phrase (De furore divino, 1457), used by Coleridge, Biographia I, 164. 
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examination process, the educational goal is not so much to grasp thoughts as attaining to 
thinking itself. Thus Coleridge, in his periodical The Friend, writes, 
 
By THOUGHT I here mean the voluntary production in our minds of those states of 
consciousness, to which, as to his fundamental facts, the Writer has referred us: while 
ATTENTION has for its object the order and connection of Thoughts and Images, each of 
which is in itself already and familiarly known. Thus the elements of Geometry require 
attention only; but the analysis of our primary faculties, and the investigation of all the 
absolute grounds of Religion and Morals, are impossible without energies of Thought in 
addition to the effort of Attention. THE FRIEND will not attempt to disguise from his 
Readers that both Attention and Thought are Efforts, and the latter a most difficult and 
laborious Effort (Friend I, 16-17) 
 
Imagination is a species of creatively active and attentively perceptive intellection 
that energetically unites thought with images in aesthetically expressing Ideas, which 
require such expression if they are to have meaning in human life. Contemplation is the 
attending to Ideas imaginatively approached, requiring the active creation of both the 
space to receive Ideas and the aesthetic forms in which to convey them. The purely noetic 
aspect of this mental or spiritual act, considered supreme in Plato, Aristotle, the 
Bhagavad Gita, Aquinas, and so on, gives a space (a con-templum) in which the Ideal can 
be approached. This Ideal is the ‘beyond being’ of the good and the beautiful.  
The Ideality of the beyond being can be discerned in the understanding that an ought 
cannot be derived from an is, an understanding which philosophers usually develop from 
Hume’s Treatise (1739-40, III.i). For Hume, however, the radical separation between the 
Ideal (which is sometimes called the normative, or that principle towards which our 
standards conform) and the observed demonstrates the impossibility of ethical reasoning 
(and perhaps the unreality of the Ideal). I argue, in contrast, that the is-ought distinction 
demonstrates only that value, though informing perception, is itself inaccessible to 
observation, being the measure of the world, and thus unworldly and supernatural, to 
paraphrase Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 6.41 (cf. Culture and Value, p. 5). Value’s proper 
place, for us, is in thought and in the aesthetic modification of perception in accordance 
with thought, and, by extension, in traditions and cultural practices, which cultivate and 
preserve, in often unconscious and habitual forms, conscious and reflectively considerate 
thinking. Contemplation, then, is the experience whereby Ideas are appreciated as the 
transcendent meanings and values applicable to our lives.  
Coleridge argues for the necessity of imagination in thinking Ideas, directing the 
mind not towards phenomena, but their underlying principles. For him, works of fancy 
and mere understanding in art and discourse (e.g. philosophy) engage in abstraction and 
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generalization, rather than aiming at values and ideals, which are not phenomena but give 
significance to phenomena. Fancy, then, has an arbitrariness unconstrained by truth and 
reality. This arbitrariness is not always a bad thing, and it is involved in producing self-
consciousness, which is one among several benefits that fancy, in Coleridge’s view, 
confers. One aim of this thesis is to examine the validity of the imagination-fancy 
distinction, and the insights it affords.  
Coleridge emphasizes the role of imagination in grasping Ideas (which are directed 
not towards phenomena, but their underlying principles) and believes that works of fancy 
and mere understanding in art and philosophical discourse are dominated by abstractions 
and generalizations, rather than values that alone give significance to phenomena. I 
investigate Coleridge’s theory of Ideas and relate it to the very different respective 
theories of Plato, Plotinus, and Kant on this subject. In the process, I challenge the 
opinion that Coleridge abandons his passionate interest in the imagination in order to 
focus on what some see as the drier subject of Ideas. In my interpretation, not only 
Coleridge’s philosophy but also his poetry revolves around the three key notions of 
imagination, Idea, and contemplation. In this thesis I explore their articulation in his 
Notebooks, philosophical writings, and his meditative poems. I interpret some of his 
Meditative Poems in Blank Verse from Sibylline Leaves, and some other of his poems in 
order to show Coleridgean theory in poetic practice. 
In the final chapters I propose a poetic art of living that relates imagination, Idea, and 
contemplative activity. This ars biographica poetica sees living a life as a poiesis, a 
poetic creation of values, aims, and constraints that develops through awareness of poetic 
technique (rhyme and reason) and, to paraphrase Coleridge, by possession of Ideas rather 
than being possessed by them. I propose a model of contemplation that is an imaginative, 
non-conceptual attending to an Idea, or Ideas. In this notion of contemplation a space is 
opened so that attention can be given, without distraction, to what is contemplated.
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Part One.  Coleridge’s Romanticized Plato 
 
This Part makes two main claims for Coleridge: (1) that he has a philosophical lineage to 
Plato through the Neo-Platonists, the Italian Renaissance thinkers Ficino and Bruno, and 
the Cambridge Platonists;9 and (2) that his system modifies Plato’s epistemology and 
ontology to yield a philosophical frame for Romanticism. Part One, then, examines how 
Coleridge Romanticizes Platonism. I examine Plato’s Divided Line analogy (Republic, Bk 
VI), central to his epistemology and ontology, and argue that Coleridge creatively recasts 
this schema, by finding a higher role for a radically re-thought imagination. Through this 
recast imagination, Ideas affect the understanding. Without imagination, the understanding 
is unenlightened, remaining with abstracted concepts as though they were the end and 
apex of thinking. Coleridge’s elevating imagination and modifying Plato’s linear scheme 
into a polarity, and thereby bringing out the harmony between sense and reason, results in 
a maturely developed Romantic Platonism.  
The Divided Line passage schematizes Plato’s theory of knowledge and being. I 
show Coleridge to modify this schema in creating his polar order of the mental 
faculties, which we can envision with reason at the north pole, and sense the south.  
Arguing for Coleridge’s Platonic pedigree, I will show how he reformulates imagination 
from eikasia and aisthesis and elevates it above the understanding, or Plato’s dianoia. I 
will also argue that his modifying imagination from Plato’s view of it conforms to 
Plato’s actual use of poetic description, symbol, and myth.  
By reorganizing Plato’s Divided Line (see fig. 1, end of Part One) to balance the 
faculties into a holistic polar system, Coleridge brings out a harmony between the 
extremes of intellectual reason and aesthetic sense, and thus returns a dignity to 
aisthesis, or sensory intuition. Much of Romanticism’s appeal lies in this dignity 
returned to imagination. Although for Coleridge, sense remains, as in Plato, the lowest 
extremity of the mental order, in his Romantic system extremes now meet in a kind of 
harmony. Thus reason is intuitive, as sense intuits; and sense connects non-conceptually, 
as noesis connects beyond concepts. Coleridge’s romanticized aisthesis becomes 
reason’s unselfconscious counterpart, able to feel beauty in the sensible, and to 
unreflectively, pre-intellectually seek for meaning and value in what feels right. 
                                                 
9 In supporting this claim, I am allied to Coleridge himself (Biographia), and to Hedley (2000, 
11-23). Coleridge claims his position develops within Platonic, perennial philosophy, and that 
his interest in German idealist philosophers (esp. Kant, Fichte, and Schelling) deepens with their 
reinterpretation of Platonic notions. 
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1.1 Views on Platonic muthos 
A Romantic reading of Plato is possible in two complementary ways. There is the Plato 
read through and interpreted by Romantic philosophers and poets. There is also the 
proto-Romantic Plato, anticipating nineteenth-century Romanticism by over two 
thousand years and influencing them directly. Besides Plato’s direct influence, his 
proto-Romanticism becomes amplified, as we will see, through the Neo-Platonists, such 
as Plotinus and Proclus, both of whom are already strong influences on Coleridge 
before he reads Plato. Proto-Romantic Platonism is further amplified through Italian 
Renaissance humanists such as Ficino, who invents the notion of Platonic love and first 
leads the Platonic Academy (also called the Florentine Academy). Further proto-
Romantic Platonist influences are the Renaissance humanists Mirandola, whose 
syncretism is a model for Coleridge’s own, and Bruno, whose polar philosophy deeply 
impresses Coleridge. Then follows the German mystic, Böhme, whose vision of the 
eternal through ordinary things like sunlight in a pewter dish profoundly affect William 
Blake and Coleridge. The list of Proto-Romantic Platonists who influence Coleridge is 
too long to detail, but a last mention should at least include the Böhme-inspired 
Cambridge Platonists, most notably Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, as well as the 
English and Scottish divines, Jeremy Taylor and Robert Leighton. All of these profound 
thinkers are tributaries to the often-underground Platonic river. Their confluence in 
Coleridge builds a pressure such that: 
 
A mighty fountain momently was forced: 
Amid whose swift half-intermitted burst 
Huge fragments vaulted like rebounding hail, 
Or chaffy grain beneath the thresher’s flail: 
And mid these dancing rocks at once and ever 
It flung up momently the sacred river. (‘Kubla Khan’, ll. 19-24) 
 
In Coleridge, Plato’s mantic poet is no ancient myth but walks (and how he walks!), and 
talks, (and oh he talks!) among us. 
 
And all who heard should see them there, 
And all should cry, Beware! Beware! 
His flashing eyes, his floating hair! 
Weave a circle round him thrice, 
And close your eyes with holy dread 
For he on honey-dew hath fed, 
And drunk the milk of Paradise. (ll. 48-54) 
 
Just as the vaulting fragment ‘Kubla Khan’ contrasts the ‘sacred river’ that runs 
‘through caverns measureless to man’ (ll. 3-4) (and thus deeper than all humanism and 
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relativism) against a ‘twice five miles’ patch of civilization ‘with walls and towers 
girdled round’ (ll. 6-7), Plato has often been read as part transcendent mystic and part 
dry and dialectical logician. And just like ‘Kubla Khan’, the truth lies not in their 
separation, but in the fertility of their union, in ‘gardens bright with sinuous rills / 
Where blossom’d many an incense-bearing tree’ (l. 9). A proto-Romantic strain, a ‘deep 
romantic chasm’ (l. 11), is interpretable throughout the dynamic, creative tension 
between Plato’s rational, intellectual philosophy and its impassioned, imagistic poetic 
expression. As Lovejoy says, ‘it is evident that there had always been present in the 
Platonic tradition a principle tending towards Romanticism’ (1936, 297). I will show 
how Coleridge adapts Plotinian approaches to Plato in order to develop an unmediated 
sensual-ideal defence of poetry within a Platonic vein. 
I identify a divisionary approach to Plato in authors such as Crombie (1963), Hare 
(1982), and Perkins (1997) who argue for reading ‘two Platos’. Such readings rightly 
discern a creative tension in Plato between (1) the search for definitional clarity and 
metaphysical precision, and (2) his poetic turns when gesturing towards ineffables such 
as the contemplation of the Forms, confrontation with Beauty, and the encounter with 
daimonic conscience. However, talk of two Platos, misleads. That binary phrase is not 
subtle enough to express the creative tension in Plato, a dynamic necessarily present in 
the nature of the problems he pursues.  
This divisionary approach is avoided by Coleridge, who sees Plato’s poetry, the 
‘music in his soul’ (Biographia II, 20),10 not as divergent from his philosophy, but as 
impelling it towards contemplative perfection:  
 
For Plato was a poet of such excellence as would have stood all other competition but 
that of his being a philosopher. His poetic genius imported in him those deep impressions 
and a love of them, mocking all comparison with after objects, leaves behind it thirst for 
something not attained, to which nothing in life is found commensurate and which still 
impels the soul to pursue. (Phil. Lects I, 183) 
 
Republic 376-7 has Socrates distinguish between true and false story types, and 
then make the startling claim that education, at least of the very young, should begin 
with false stories. When pressed, he clarifies that he is talking about mythos, which, he 
says, is false in general, but contains some truth (377a). Those myths conveying moral 
truth have pedagogic value. In contrast, Socrates criticizes excerpts of Hesiod’s 
Theogony that portray the gods not as divine paragons, but as wicked beings indulging 
                                                 
10 Also, ‘Dejection’, l. 60: ‘What this strong music in the soul may be!’ 
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in cannibalism, impiety and patricide. Such myths are censured not only because they 
wrongly portray divinity, but also because they establish bad models. 
Nevertheless, myth can be an exemplary transmitter of values to young minds. 
Coleridge echoes Plato’s esteem for the educational benefit of truth in myth:  
 
Should children be permitted to read Romances, & Relations of Giants & Magicians, & 
Genii?—I know all that has been said against it; but I have formed my faith in the 
affirmative. —I know no other way of giving the mind a love of ‘the Great’, & ‘the 
Whole.’—Those who have been led by the same truths step by step thro’ the constant 
testimony of their senses, seem to me to want a sense which I possess—They contemplate 
nothing but parts—and all parts are necessarily little—and the Universe to them is but a 
mass of little things. (Letters I,  210) 
 
Coleridge adds to Socrates’ esteem of truth in myth a notion that myths and 
romances inspire a love of the infinite and universal that could not be communicated in 
sober accounts of actual events. The Ideal, then, can be stirringly though unclearly 
communicated through imaginative tales where strictly factual accounts fail. Classicist 
Murray supports this view that at least in some passages, Plato employs muthos (myth) 
not just for gentle persuasion, but because his meaning cannot be communicated 
through analytic, conceptual description: 
 
Here the status of the myth . . .  seeks to embody truths which analytical language cannot 
capture, truths which can only be presented pictorially: the graphic and at times bizarre 
detail which is so striking a feature of Plato’s mythical writing reinforces the sense that 
what is being portrayed is an imagined world in which he wants us to believe, but which 
cannot be literally described. (2011, 188) 
 
Consonant with my position that Plato’s earlier, confrontationally elenchtic dialogues 
aporetically reveal that Ideas cannot be conceptually defined and that an imaginative 
approach is therefore needed, Murray argues that: 
 
Unlike the sophists who use myth for illustrative purposes or as exegetical tools, Plato’s 
myths are integral to his philosophy. (189) 
 
Tracing Plato’s influence on Coleridge, Vigus (2009) argues that Coleridge’s 
Platonism is genuine, to which I add that he modifies Platonism, sometimes in the light 
of Plotinus, and sometimes via Kant and Schelling, as he shapes British Romanticism. 
Geuss propagates what I believe to be the mistaken view, which he calls post-
Romantic, that interprets Plato as championing ‘a highly specific kind of propositional 
knowledge’ to have ‘virtually unlimited value’ regarding ethical and practical life (2004, 
156; see also 2003). This must be mistaken, because for Plato the highest form of 
knowledge, noesis, or noetic contemplation of the Forms, is ultimately non-
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propositional, despite the epistemological ascent to this position through conceptual 
dianoia and logical dialectic.  
Repeatedly, Plato’s Socrates shows that everyday conceptual and definitional 
discourses are in fact rationalizations that thinly coat a veneer of logic to gloss and 
defend opinions that remain uncorrected. Nietzsche, Geuss, and other post-Romantic 
critics fail to appreciate how Plato’s examination of opinion and commonplace 
constitutes a genuinely radical thinking that uproots false opinion where their own only 
truncates it to be grafted with another. Socrates’ examination of taken-for-granted 
opinions reveals them as ultimately aporetic, i.e. self-contradictory and leading 
nowhere. Only once the aporia have been recognized can the mind reject hollow opinon 
and be stirred by its newly discovered sensation of intellectual emptiness to feel a 
genuine hunger for knowledge. The Socratic solution to aporetic lostness is the way-
finding of dialectic, described as aporia’s positive opposite, i.e. as poreia (journey) 
(Republic, 532b). 
I can only, therefore, partly accept Geuss’s position that Plato considers poetry ‘not a 
reliable vehicle for correct knowledge’ and that the: 
 
Romantics tried to reverse Plato’s specific account of poetry and its valuation, claiming 
that it was an important kind of knowledge (2004, 152) 
 
The reality is not so simple, considering (a) Plato’s consummate use of elevated, poetic 
language to convey the otherwise ineffable views that the high points of his dialogues 
indicate, and (b) that in the Republic (e.g. X, 607a-d);  and in the Laws (e.g. VII, 817d) 
Plato commends certain possibilities of poetic achievement as edifying. 
The poetry of Diotima of Mantinea’s (Mantinea evokes mantikē, prophecy) 
instruction to Socrates on the anabasmoi, in the Symposium; the Phaedrus’ charioteer 
driving winged horses symbolizing the soul’s spirited ascent to contemplation of the 
Forms as an ascent occasioned by the encounter with Love and Beauty; the allegory of 
the prisoners in the cave to show the illusory, shadowy nature of appearance taken for 
reality; the myth of the demiurge in the Timaeus to convey the theoretical role of the 
Forms not as creating the world, but as needed for the order experienced in it. These are 
passages of the greatest poetic genius. While Plato knew he ought to use the clearest 
propositional language as far as it could take him, he was equally certain that 
propositional explication could not take us all the way. As Kahn writes, 
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Plato is the only major philosopher who is also a supreme literary artist. There is no 
writer more complex, and there is no other philosopher whose work calls for so many 
levels of interpretation. (1996, xiii) 
 
One of Coleridge’s key modifications to Platonism is to place his Romantically 
reconceived imagination between Plato’s levels of noesis (reason) and dianoia 
(mathematical and scientific understanding). The dividing lines are not to be conceived 
strictly, and we do well to recall Coleridge’s aphorism that:  
 
It is a dull and obtuse mind, that must divide in order to distinguish; but it is a still worse, 
that distinguishes in order to divide. (Reflection, 33) 
 
My aim is to show first a Platonic model of mind, knowledge, and being, and then to 
show how Coleridge modifies Plato to create a Romanticized Platonism. I will therefore 
need to examine some relevant themes in Plato before returning to Coleridge to see how 
he adapts and modifies his Platonic heritage. 
A creative tension between the mystical and the logical is evident in Plato’s 
writings. This tension is doubtless partly related to his attraction to Pythagoreanism, 
with its tendency to number mysticism, the belief that number is the fundamental 
constituent of the universe, and that the harmony of the spheres is the result of the 
mathematico-musical order held to be found in the cosmos. The Pythagorean School 
holds that number is mystical. Another mystical current in Plato is the example of 
Socrates’ daimon, a divine conscience, inducing a trance that led him to corrective 
contemplation before he unintentionally offended the divine. Thus his daimon brought 
him to that stillness required for beholding and respecting genuine value, sometimes 
causing him to pause mid-conversation for hours.  
Mystikos’s original meaning is ‘closed lips and eyes’, later denoting an initiate into 
sacred mysteries; it literally means a tacit response to the ineffable. Coleridge relates the 
non-discursive aspects of mystical response to the contemplative approach towards 
Ideas, which, being praeter-conceptual,
11
 are not amenable to conceptual (empirical or a 
priori constitutive) adequation with phenomena:
12
 
 
MYSTES, from the Greek μύω––one who muses with closed lips, as meditating on Ideas 
which may indeed be suggested and awakened, but cannot, like the images of sense and 
conceptions of the understanding, be adequately expressed by words. (Constitution, 165) 
 
                                                 
11 My term for values and noemata beyond conceptual understanding. 
12
 Cf. Aquinus (Summa I, Q.16 (Truth), A.2) writes that  ‘Veritas est adaequatio rei et 
intellectus’, outlining a correspondence theory of truth as the intellect making itself adequate to 
the thing, which notion he attributes to the Neo-Platonist Isaac Israeli. 
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He then provides a much-needed and clear distinction between mysticism, whose 
proponents contemplate Ideas without which no perfectible guiding standard is possible, 
and pseudo-mysticism, a false attempt to justify undisciplined flow with the currents of 
fantasy, unreflective thought, and desire: 
 
Where a person mistakes the anomalous misgrowths of his own individuality for ideas, or 
truths of universal reason, he may, without impropriety, be called a Mystic, in the abusive 
sense of the term; though pseudo-mystic, or phantast, would be a more proper 
designation. Heraclitus, Plato, Bacon, Leibniz, were Mystics, in the primary sense of the 
term: Iamblichus, and his successors, Phantasts. (Constitution, 165) 
 
Plato is also keen to distinguish philosophical attention to Ideas from cynical 
attempts to persuade opinion and emotion. The Ion explores rhapsodic influence as a 
pre-philosophic persuasion that irrationally transfigures the audience through technical 
mastery of an at least metaphorically physical force (animal magnetism) and not a 
philosophical ordination of mind according to ultimate Ideas. Socrates’s daimonic 
trance is of a higher level, and Plato shows it to be purer and more mysterious than 
rhapsodic technē. While rhapsodic persuasion can be understood as human magnetism, 
or hypnotic compulsion, Socrates’s morally intuitive daimon awakens him to the Good 
intuited by reason. The Socratic trance is mystical, but is not thereby mystifying, as it 
does not obscure clearly expressible notions. 
Hare, with a lightness of touch that barely avoids satire, interprets the tension 
between the mystical and the logical as indicating two Platos: Pato and Lato. Although 
Hare’s book is no authority to most scholars of Classical Greek Philosophy, it derives 
from a clearly argued, but I think wrong, opinion given by Crombie, whose work is still 
well regarded. I suppose that Hare first finds his notion of two Platos in Crombie’s 
serious analysis of Platonic doctrines (1963). Kuang-Ming Wu finds a shortcoming in 
Crombie’s division, namely that: 
 
Crombie did not raise the question whether poetry had any philosophical significance, 
why there are two Platos, whether the one Plato helps or hinders the other, and if so how.
 
(1990, 268) 
 
I agree entirely with Wu’s suggestion of a deeply philosophical significance in poetic 
expression and insight. Hamilton recognizes the same importance of poetic resonance in 
philosophical expression when he finds that Analytic-style re-descriptions of 
Wittgenstein’s condensed and pregnant aphoristic prose fail to convey the thinker’s 
original insights and the liberating directions of his wrangling concentration. As 
Hamilton sees it: 
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Wittgenstein’s aphoristic remarks have a power derived from the extreme compression 
and resonance found in the greatest poetry; this is lost when translated into Analytic-style 
plain argument. (2014, Ch. 10.2, forthcoming) 
 
To this I add that the power of the poetic expression and the logical confidence in its 
objects both stem from the theoria (Gk. gazing at), or clarity of contemplative wisdom 
(seeing with the mind’s eye, as Shakespeare says), 13  or at the very least from the 
philosophical approach thereto. Thus, as my thesis argues, the concentrated, attentive 
power of discernment is a spiritual quality whose propaedeutic is meditative practice, 
which need not be rigidly systematic, and whose end is contemplation, and that this 
power is the root of philosophic and poetic genius. Moreover, it follows that when 
connection to the root is severed or denied, neither philosophical nor poetic genius can 
flourish or be recognized.  
On the force of compression of expressed thought and poetical resonance, Hamilton 
continues: 
 
To many philosophers, such considerations are irrelevant, a distraction from the business 
of philosophy.  But other readers have found this a supreme virtue of Wittgenstein's 
writing, and its aphoristic quality is one that has attracted artists and writers.  This highly 
compressed expression of thoughts is fundamental to his philosophical thinking.
 
 (2014, 
Ch 10.2, forthcoming) 
 
Hamilton here implies that there are for some, especially for Analytic-style 
philosophers, two Wittgensteins, with the poetic one readily disregarded, or, if the 
poetical, stylistic Wittgenstein is mentioned, it is only for it to be dismissed as gnomic. I 
would add, to Hamilton’s insight into the place of poetry and style in philosophy, that 
Wittgenstein’s highly compressed expression of thoughts is the very principle of his 
philosophical thinking. I mean that there are not two Wittgensteins, nor two Platos, but 
rather that where we encounter philosophical genius concentratedly expressed through 
style and organization describing a view, there we find a love of wisdom that is so close 
to becoming wisdom itself that its very expression initiates philosophy in the audience. 
In the penultimate page of Crombie’s two-volume examination of Plato’s doctrines, 
he identifies two Platos, the poet, and the rationalist. Thus, 
 
                                                 
13
 Hamlet, I.ii. Coleridge borrows this phrase to describe reason (Friend I, 157) after calling it 
the ‘organ of the supersensuous’ (156). Cf. Republic, 533c, describing noesis as ‘the eye of the 
soul’ (cf. 518-9). See also St Gregory (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): ‘The contemplative life is 
sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and 
discovers the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind.’ 
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He had an almost unequalled stylistic gift . . .  He could be absolutely lucid . . .  however 
. . .  He thought perhaps that an undue attention to the exposition of an argument or to the 
precise words which were chosen to convey an opinion would distract attention from the 
realities which were under discussion; and he thought also that an eye fixed steadily on 
realities was the only sure defence against the deceptions of words. (1979, 568) 
 
This description is sound, probably alluding to statements in Plato’s putative Seventh 
Letter, the Phaedrus, and elsewhere, that the most important truths – the Fifth, or the 
quintessence, the thing itself which is known and truly exists, beyond the Four of (1) 
name, (2) account, or definition, (3) image, and (4) knowledge – exceed discursive 
explication (Letter VII, 324a-e). 
However, and I argue he goes wrong here, Crombie then dismisses the poetic style, 
so often used by Plato, as philosophically unessential. As Crombie states his opinion: 
 
it is commonly the case that he uses his unique gift of prose-poetry to set them in a 
certain emotional atmosphere. 
 
From this position it is natural, though unfortunate, that Crombie asserts that: 
 
For this reason there is not one Plato but many; you find in him to some extent what you 
are looking for, and if the plain sense of the words does not support your interpretation, 
perhaps you will be able to base it on the general feeling of the passage, or vice versa. 
(1979, 568) 
 
From this position, with some positive understanding of Plato, and, I argue, some 
serious misunderstanding, views like Hare’s arise that multiply Platos beyond necessity. 
For Hare, one Plato, whom he calls Pato, is an eternity-inspired mystic advocating 
ascetic contemplation, eschewing worldly opinion and ambition. This interpretation 
traces much further back than Crombie, and goes back to the Gnostics, whose view 
Plotinus attacks as a simplistic and reductive interpretation of Plato as proposing that 
the phenomenal world is a dreary prison for the divine spark that is soul (II.9). 
Hare suggests that his mystical Pato ‘would have been at home in a Zen Buddhist 
monastery’ (1982, 26). The ‘other’ Plato, Lato, pursues Analytic philosophy, and seeks 
definitions and linguistic meaning, skilfully employing dialectic to unravel ethical, 
ontological, and epistemological problems, revealing their aporia (Gk: ‘without 
passage’, ‘impassable’, or ‘pathlessness’). This analytic Plato is more often than not 
content to leave a problem unsolved but more clearly circumscribed, than to propose 
theories or to be otherwise dogmatic.  
Hare presents a breezy account of two Platos and thereby obscures the point of the 
one Plato working within a creative tension of currents and against the inherent limits of 
the written word. By proposing that the pursuit of definition and the exploration of 
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positions through dialectic is that of a rational, analytic Plato separate from what one 
might call the vestigial prose-poetry of contemplative vision, Hare and others falsely 
multiply Plato, refusing to accept the poetical passages as genuine philosophy.
14
 Thus 
they miss dialectic’s aim, which is: 
 
like the wind, wherever our discussion leads us, that is the way we must go. (Republic, 
394d) 
 
Where dialectic leads is not always comfortable, and this dialectic is no dry, 
professionally academic process that excludes the possibility of spiritual journey 
(poreia) and vision (theoria). 
Developing his view of Philosophy as a Way of Life, Hadot (1995) describes 
Platonic elenchos as a ‘spiritual exercise’, borrowing Ignatius of Loyola’s term, within 
that way. Elenchos, or cross-examination, sometimes benumbs the participant, exposing 
aporia in definitions and making one feel stung by a stingray, as Plato has Meno say 
(Meno, 80a). Socratic elenchos, reveals aporia and a newly recognized ignorance, which 
acknowledgement of lack creates a desire for genuine examination.
15
 Awakened desire 
is thus transformed into a sound pedagogic principle through the Socratic challenge.  
Elenchos and dialectic are spiritual exercises that constitute a philosophical pilgrim’s 
progress that is necessarily deeply personal. Coleridge adopts this awakening strategy in 
his lectures and, as he explains in an 1819 letter, he aims: 
 
to keep the audience awake and interested . . . and to leave a sting behind––i.e., a 
disposition to study the subject anew, under the light of a new principle. (Letters IV, no. 
924) 
 
To understand and accept one’s ignorance one must first struggle against it, and 
then, eventually, welcome this revelation because at last one now sincerely craves truth 
over opinion. Philosophy is thus maieutic, and cannot truly produce its most valuable, 
transformative effects solely through lecturing and publishing. The proper 
understanding of philosophical problems is radically personal because they are at root 
persons, body and soul, who must undertake to understand. Socrates is supposed to have 
said that written philosophy is secondary, and Plato adopts this view in his Seventh 
                                                 
14 On falsely dividing Plato, cf. Boethius, [c.524] 1999, I.iii.7 (p. 7), criticizing the mobs of 
Epicureans, Stoics, et al, who try to plunder inherited wisdom and kidnap personified 
Philosophia, but succeed only in shredding her hand-woven gown, each declaring their own rag 
the whole of Philosophy. 
15 Kingsley (2003, 150-6) discusses elenchos in Parmenides philosophical poem, whereby, as 
with Socrates, our state of ignorance is exposed, evoking an unbearable longing for truth and 
the absolute. 
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Letter, arguing that philosophy only really occurs in the face-to-face elenchos, or ironic 
questioning, that reveals aporia and ignorance. 
Philosophy constantly renews its movement towards the first principles that Plato 
calls the archē. Plato notes, in Republic Book VI, that, mathematicians, geometers, and 
others working in specialist fields proceed from assumed hypotheses, whereas 
philosophers work best when working towards first principles, and never from 
hypotheses and assumptions. Philosophy, then, seeks to renew the movement towards 
first principles. In doing so, it addresses individual thoughts, opinions, propositions, 
arguments, theories, and views. Thus seeking truth, it simultaneously remedies or 
removes fallacious thoughts, opinions, etc., from individual minds and discursive 
consciousness.  
Challenging a modern-postmodern view that construes Plato as philosophy’s villain 
who turns rationality into absolute power and inflicts an ideal of universals and grand 
narratives, Perkins (1997), following Bernstein (1992), identifies recent anti-Platonism 
with a twentieth-century move against logocentrism exemplified by Derrida. 
Coleridge’s ‘other Plato’, Perkins argues, warns against atomizing experience into mere 
phenomena. Thus Coleridge champions the Plato who, with ‘unmitigated hostility, 
pursues the assumptions, abstractions, generalities, and verbal legerdemain of the 
sophists!’ (Friend I, 482). This ‘other Plato’, like Hare’s Pato, understands, in Perkins’ 
divisionary view, that the objects of noesis cannot be represented, because any 
representation would involve concepts, images, and abstractions, and thus fall short of 
the noesis. Hence the ‘other Plato’ often discusses the movement towards the noemata 
(the Ideas) with self-consciously poetic symbolism, allegories and similes. 
Perkins attributes negative postmodernist opinions of Plato and Coleridge to a 
philosophical collective unconscious that, since the seventeenth century, has separated 
reality: 
 
into a ‘really real’ which is phenomenal, and directly experienced . . . on the one hand, 
and a parallel but entirely subjective reality, on the other. The latter may be emotionally, 
aesthetically and morally significant but has no claims to universality. (1997, 33) 
 
Platonism is hence prone to be dubbed ‘otherworldly’, and Coleridge is sometimes said 
to have been better off ‘confining his metaphysical meanderings to poetry’ (1997, 33).16 
Contrary to this opinion, Coleridge holds that he pursues a Platonic realism, regarding 
principles as logically antecedent to phenomena. 
                                                 
16 Perkins opposes this view, as do I. 
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The notion of two Platos at first seems useful for distinguishing currents within the 
dialogues, but ultimately it must be seen as superficial. Within the so-called analytic 
Plato operates the current aiming towards ultimate knowledge, via a process that 
requires aporia to be contemplated, ignorance to be recognized, and stubborn, cherished 
opinions to be abandoned as the participants negotiate the rational and spiritual obstacle 
course of dialectic.  
Within the so-called mystical Plato are quite logical arguments asserting, for 
example, that sensibles proposed as examples of Justice are flawed, and can also be 
shown to be unjust. Any particular police officer, lawyer, or law can suggest Justice, but 
can also lead to injustice in some case or other. This is not to make the trivial 
observation that particulars are not universals, but rather that if we wish to know what, 
say, ‘intelligence’ is, observing examples of intelligent individuals will provide an 
initial guide, but can also lead us astray until we progress from observing sensibles to a 
more general approach dealing with abstracts. Again, from the abstracts, with their 
theories, schemata and axioms taken for granted in their sciences, one can dialectically 
progress towards noesis. 
The Phaedrus discloses the beauty pursued by the so-called ‘other’, poetic Plato. 
Introducing the Laws, Plato’s nineteenth-century English translator, Benjamin Jowett, 
praises this poetry as:17  
 
the higher art of the Phaedrus, in which the summer’s day, and the cool stream, and the 
chirping of grasshoppers, and the fragrance of the agnus castus [chaste tree], and the 
legends of the place are present to the imagination throughout the discourse. (Jowett, in 
Plato, 1875, p. 5) 
 
 
Here, Socrates attempts to better Lysias’ speech on love, and temporarily succumbs to 
superficially rational rhetoric over single-minded philosophy. He basically adopts and 
improves Lysias’ argument that a youth should choose a suitor who is calm, rational, 
and not really in love.
18
  
                                                 
17 Jowett contrasts the Phaedrus’s idyllic scene by the R. Illisos with the gloomy Cretan cave 
temple in the Laws. 
18 The Phaedrus not only discusses rationally self-interested seduction versus love the beloved 
more than oneself, but it embodies the contrast. Enthusiastic young Phaedrus has something (a 
scroll of Lysias’s speech on love and madness) that Socrates desires and pursues. Likewise, 
Socrates has a critical reflection and a love of wisdom that Phaedrus desires. Phaedrus seduces 
the civic philosopher into the riverside scene where naiads might enchant his reason by stirring 
his emotions. Socrates first tries to upstage his rival Lysias’ speech, thus failing to transcend 
rational self-interest. His daimonic sign, however, inspires his second speech, which again sees 
love as madness, but a divinely bestowed madness that can only be thought deficient from a 
lower level. 
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It cannot be over-stressed, though I have never seen it adequately discussed at all, 
that the Phaedrus dialogue not only discusses cynical and rationally self-interested 
seduction versus that love which esteems the beloved over the lover, but also 
exemplifies the contrast by embodying it. Enthusiastic young Phaedrus has something 
(a scroll of Lysias’s speech on lovers, denouncing love as madness and promoting 
cynical erotic arrangements) that Socrates desires and pursues. Likewise, Socrates has 
habits of critical reflection and an experienced love of wisdom that make Phaedrus 
desire his assistance to discover the truth about love.  
Phaedrus seduces the civic philosopher, reluctant to leave the city walls, into the 
riverside scene where naiads might enchant his reason and nymphs stir his emotions. 
Here, in competitive flow, Socrates attempts one-upmanship, succeeding in upstaging 
Lysias’ speech, growing eloquent against erôs and in support of the non-lover. Yet with 
this minor social success he fails to escape the rationally self-interested, egoistic 
horizons that encircle his rival. Fortunately, however, this flow is stilled by his daimon. 
The divine gift inspires an apology to Love itself, as he realizes that the previous 
arguments were ‘clever, but not wise’. After his palinode, he begins his second speech, 
again seeing love as madness, but now – in contrast to Lysias’ trammelled vision – 
love’s madness is beheld as divine, a sublime marvel that can nevertheless only be seen 
as deficient from the lower level. 
Then follows the celebrated account of love as theia mania, divine madness.
19
 Plato 
relates this inspired wisdom beyond cleverness to his theory of the Forms. The genuine 
lover, described as a charioteer driving a pair of winged horses, forces the appetitive, 
unruly, Earth-bound horse to follow the noble, heaven-bound horse. In the Platonic 
account, beyond heaven, all is without shape and can only be seen, in the vision 
(wisdom) of theoria, with the intelligent mind. In this state, such Forms as Justice, 
Sôphrosunê or Self-possession, and Beauty can be contemplated. In the analogy, 
experiencing beauty in another person is a spur to contemplation of the Form of Beauty, 
hence it is argued as unwise either to eschew beauty or to give way to it only sensually. 
Without the grace of divine madness, the Forms are to be approached by dialectic. 
What Plato actually means by dialectic is a topic of perennial debate. Popper (1962) 
considers Plato’s dialectic to be based on a doctrine of mystical intuition and dismissed 
him as a mystic with totalitarian tendencies. By dialectic, does Plato mean an apparently 
                                                 
19 For an excellent reading of Plato’s theia mania, see Pieper, [1989] 1995. 
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irrational connection to knowledge of Reality, through intuition of the Forms? Or is the 
movement of dialectic wholly logical, advancing by refutations and modifications, a 
prototype of the very method Popper himself holds as enabling progression in science? 
Evidence for both of these interpretations can be found in Plato’s writings, and the 
creative tension described above works between these meanings. The mystical noesis 
inspired by the daimon in the dramatic dialogues shows a proto-Romantic side to Plato, 
who then expresses this inspiration with poetic analogies. 
Coleridge raises the status and function of imagination in general culture, and 
within the Platonic tradition. From Plato; through Plotinus and post-Plotinian 
philosophers, especially Proclus – an influential source for Hegel, as well as for 
Coleridge, who reads him, when not in Greek, through Thomas Taylor’s translations; 
through Renaissance Platonist philosophical artists such as Dante, Shakespeare, and 
Spenser; and then through eighteenth-century Platonizing aestheticians such as 
Shaftesbury; to the Romantics, the role of imagination grew in importance, finding its 
high point in Coleridge’s system.  
This growth results in a Platonism more receptive to exploring and communicating 
ideas in and through the arts than Plato is traditionally interpreted as advocating. This 
Romantic, art-friendly Platonism (cf. Perkins’ ‘other Plato’) is ideal for Romantics from 
Schelling to Shelley. Plato explores questions of the highest philosophical and 
intellectual order through dramatic dialogue, rather than first-person, scholarly 
exposition. This method follows the Socratic intuition that philosophical education, as 
educare, or drawing out, is more akin to midwifery, the profession of Socrates’ mother, 
than being an attempt to fill minds with knowledge. 
Plato recognizes the philosophical need for wonder, amazement, being shocked and 
dumbfounded. Far from denigrating human emotion in favour of a pure, mathematical 
reason, Plato presents a higher synthesis of a sensible world that has intelligibility 
insofar as it has a formality through the Ideas. For Plato, spiritedness, receptiveness to 
sensual love and beauty, and the mood of wonder are important motors for the highest 
noesis of the philosophical attitude. Hence the appeal of Plato to the Romantics who 
seek to unite deep feeling with profound thought. 
Discussing Wordsworth’s particular genius, Coleridge writes that, 
 
it was the union of deep feeling with profound thought, the fine balance of truth in 
observing, with the imaginative faculty in modifying the objects observed. (Biographia I, 
80) 
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Wordsworth describes reason in passion in much the same terms as Plato uses in the 
Phaedrus and the Symposium, with the Lakeland poet hymning ‘passion, which itself / 
Is highest reason in a soul sublime’ (‘The Prelude’, Bk. V, ll. 40-41). Seeking wisdom 
with love, and sensual intelligibility, Coleridge calls, 
 
O for some Sun that shall unite Light and Warmth. (Notebooks 1, 467)  
 
The Romantics thus embrace Platonic themes such as the unity of Truth and Beauty 
explicit in John Keats’ ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’. Shelley translates Plato’s Ion and 
Symposium, and calls Plato ‘essentially a poet’ in a tract embodying the Platonizing 
Romantic spirit: 
 
The distinction between poets and prose writers is a vulgar error. The distinction between 
philosophers and poets has been anticipated. Plato was essentially a poet—the truth and 
splendour of his imagery, and the melody of his language, are the most intense that it is 
possible to conceive . . . . All the authors of revolutions in opinion are not only 
necessarily poets as they are inventors, nor even as their words unveil the permanent 
analogy of things by images which participate in the life of truth; but as their periods are 
harmonious and rhythmical, and contain in themselves the elements of verse; being the 
echo of the eternal music. . . . Shakespeare, Dante, and Milton (to confine ourselves to 
modern writers) are philosophers of the very loftiest power. 
 
A poem is the very image of life expressed in its eternal truth.
 
(A Defence of Poetry, § 8-
9, written 1821, [1840, posthumous], 1977) 
 
The Romantics are drawn to the unity of opposites they read in Plato: the 
epistemology written in dramatic form; the spirited synthesis of reason and passion; the 
poetic passages continuing where rational argument with literal concepts gives way to 
the symbolic. Coleridge’s scheme of the mental faculties (see Figure 1, p. 65 below, end 
of Part One; see also Appendix A), his counterpart to Plato’s Divided Line, harmonizes 
the extremes and the middle sections. Thus in Coleridge’s writings it is explicit that 
reason is present in sense such that sense is more akin to its opposite in the scale 
(Reason) than to its neighbour (Fancy). Such harmonies are never explicit in Plato’s 
system.  
Hence I see Coleridge’s scheme as modifying Plato’s to afford two new 
possibilities: 
 
    1.  That artistic activity may co-operate with the highest intellectual activity. As 
Schelling’s Romantic philosophy argues: 
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If aesthetic intuition is merely intellectual intuition become objective, it is self-evident 
that art is at once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy, which 
ever and again continues to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external 
form. . . . Art is paramount to the philosopher . . . . [I]t is art alone which can succeed in 
objectifying with universal validity what the philosopher is able to present in a merely 
subjective fashion . . . . Philosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the infancy of 
knowledge 
20
  
 
 
 2.  That phenomena may appear from natural laws (which are part of Ideal reality) 
without conceiving phenomena as comprising a second world. This point allows for a 
discussion of the Plato of the Romantics and whether the Romanticized Plato might be a 
modification of Plato or an exploration his proto-Romantic aspect.  
What I call the Romantic return to Platonism is both a correction to Empiricism and 
a progression from Kant. Coleridge’s polar diagram shows the major difference between 
Romanticized Platonism and Plato’s scheme in the Divided Line as the elevated place of 
imagination in the former. The table shows Plato’s Divided Line above Coleridge’s 
harmonic polarity of the mental powers that he sketches out on the inside back cover of 
a copy (now in the British Library) of Tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie, 
volume VIII (see Appendix A, below). He calls this schema, ‘The simplest yet 
practically sufficient order of the Mental Powers’ (Marginalia V, 798; Appendix A, 
below). I propose that Coleridge’s scheme modifies Plato’s Divided Line, developing a 
Romantic scheme from Platonism. 
In the tables or scales drawn in his Tennemann, Coleridge sketches the order of 
mental powers twice, in opposite directions, emphasizing the harmonies between the 
poles. 21  This relation of Coleridge’s scheme to Plato’s Divided Line has not been 
previously made in the secondary literature, nor was it mentioned as related to the 
Divided Line by Coleridge, but I believe it is an important tool in both showing and 
exploring how Coleridge fashions his Romanticism out of a proto-Romantic Platonism. 
Coleridge finds Platonism in need of modifications, such as the elevation and 
redefinition of the imaginative faculty, in order to become appropriate for an anti-
empirico-mechanistic, post-Kantian Romanticism. 
                                                 
20 As Schelling argues: ‘If aesthetic intuition is merely intellectual intuition become objective, it 
is self-evident that art is at once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy, 
which ever and again continues to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external 
form. . . . Art is paramount to the philosopher . . . . [I]t is art alone which can succeed in 
objectifying with universal validity what the philosopher is able to present in a merely 
subjective fashion . . . . Philosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the infancy of 
knowledge’ (1978, 231). 
21 The harmonies in Coleridge’s polar system are well explained in Barfield, 2006, 127-130. 
  35 
1.2 Modifying Plato to Romanticism: Coleridge’s Plotinian direction  
Plotinus’s modifying the Platonic understanding of imagistic representation prompts 
and prefigures the Romantic direction, strongly influencing Coleridge. Plotinus quietly 
passes over Plato’s imitative theory of poetic-artistic representation, proposing his own 
theory that poetic-artistic creation springs from the same forming principles, or laws, as 
nature itself.22 Plotinus argues that the aesthetic contemplation of art and nature leads 
beyond merely discursive reason towards the Ideas, or forming principles. Hence: 
 
Sense-perception is our messenger, but Intellect is our king. (Ennead V, 3.3) 
 
He does not reject outright Platonic mimesis, but reserves it for imitative art producing 
dim and feeble copies, or eidola, as so many ‘toys not worth much’ (Ennead IV, 3.10). 
He aligns painting and sculpture with dancing and mime as arts of outward 
appearance in contrast to music’s higher art, which conveys forming principles: 
 
But if any artistic skill starts from the proportions of [individual] living things and goes 
from there to consider the proportions of living things in general, it would be a part of the 
power which also in the higher world considers and contemplates universal proportion 
[logos] in the intelligible. And certainly all music, since the ideas which it has are 
concerned with rhythm and melody, would be of the same kind, just like the art which is 
concerned with intelligible number.
23
 (Ennead V, 9.11) 
 
He also raises architecture and carpentry above painting, sculpture, dance, and 
mime, because these productive arts are based on the Ideal principles of proportion 
(Ennead V, 9.11). Moreover, they do not aim at appearance alone. Their models are 
Ideal, creating the purposes, functions, and essential properties, of buildings, beds, etc. 
Here he echoes Plato’s notion of the carpenter’s bed being less removed from reality 
than the doubly mimetic bed of the painter (Republic, Book X, 596-8).  
Plotinus maintains that his position continues the spirit of Plato, and this is genuine 
even when Plotinus advances his Platonism in ways that might seem to contradict Plato 
to some readers today. Audrey Rich collates Plotinus’s material that describes his 
distinctly Neo-Platonic contribution to aesthetics (Rich, 1960). The Plotinian artist 
works to no material model, but contemplates the Ideal and its seminal principles. Rich 
cites Plotinus’ example of Pheidias, whose celebrated Zeus statue showed no human 
model, intending, rather, to convey how Zeus might manifest himself (Rich, 235). Thus, 
                                                 
22 A. H. Armstrong translates logoi spermatikoi (which Plotinus adapts from the Stoics), as 
‘forming principles’, Stephen McKenna as ‘reason-principles’, and also as ‘seminal 
reasons/principles’. 
23
 Logos also means musical ratio/proportion. Hence, supremely developed artistry unites one 
with a contemplated music of the Forms. 
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for Plotinus, art contemplates Ideas and gives them aesthetic expression. If this formula 
seems to prefigure Kant’s aesthetic Ideas, it should not be surprising to find Kant using 
a very similar example to illustrate his notion: Aquila, Jupiter’s eagle, with ‘lightning in 
its claws’, aesthetically expresses divine power, and thus an aesthetic Idea conveys the 
rational idea of ‘the sublimity and majesty of creation’ (CJ, §49, 183). 
Plotinus’s model of poiesis is less one of imitating appearances than of creatively 
paralleling its subject’s reason-principles. The artist draws together the model’s 
objective principles, and uses them to create an imaginatively generated artwork with a 
different material setting. However, we should not force this notion of artistic creation 
as parallel creation, because for Plotinus: 
 
an uglier living man [is] more beautiful than the beautiful man in a statute (Ennead VI, 
7.22, 30-31)  
 
Nevertheless, we can see that in his view, artistic production is more imaginative than 
imitative. 
Some will consider it erroneous to judge Plato’s statements regarding imagistic 
reproduction and stylization as referring to what we, and Plotinus, call art, because Plato 
did not have our concept of ‘Art’. 24  Nevertheless, art has existed as a practice 
philosophically considered from Plato, through Plotinus, to Coleridge’s theory of the 
imagination, and all three (with other perennial philosophers between) contemplate 
poietic (Gk: poiētikos creative, from poiētēs maker) principles beyond those required 
for skilfully depicting outward forms. The division that Platonism conceives between 
skilfully depicting appearances and poietic intimation of non-sensible intelligibles 
repeats a dynamic tension already present in Plato, and heightened by his more dramatic 
and poetic passages. The most relevant to consider here is when Socrates is seduced 
from his wonted urban environment to follow Phaedrus beyond the city walls and 
discourse along the river bank between a cypress and a plane tree.  
Socrates is seduced by the chance for philosophical discussion as Phaedrus holds 
the scroll of a speech on love recently given by Lysias. Yet to the proposal to discuss 
this in the countryside, where he fears his reason may become enchanted by river 
nymphs, he objects:  
 
the landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me, only people do. (230d) 
                                                 
24
 See Kristeller, 1951, which presents the still widely misrepresented and modest thesis that art 
for the Hellenics was not exactly the same as our modern, eighteenth-century-devised system of 
painting, sculpture, architecture, music and poetry. 
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Nevertheless, Socrates is persuaded beyond the city walls, where we witness his 
transition from clever, cool logic to an elevated logos inspired by his daimonic warning 
sign. His initial argument offended the gods by favouring the instrumentally rational, 
worldly non-lover over the divinely inspired lover. After a repentant act, he begins 
afresh, now arguing for a spirited love, a divine madness akin to poetry and prophecy. 
The daimon that chided his first, too-coldly-logical, speech therefore inspired his paean 
to love and poetry. Here we have the proto-Romantic Plato of Schelling, Coleridge, 
Keats, and Shelley, which Romantic reading the next chapter will proceed to elucidate 
in terms of Plato’s model of thought and knowledge and Coleridge’s modification 
thereof. 
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1.3 Plato’s Model of Thought and Knowledge 
Before I can outline how I see Coleridge developing his Romantic Platonism from a 
proto-Romantic Plato, Plato’s theory of the mental powers must first be surveyed. 
Plato’s model of thought and knowledge, often implicit, becomes most explicit when he 
directly discusses epistemology. In the Republic’s Analogy of the Divided Line; the 
Phaedrus’s Analogy of the Chariot; and Diotima’s anabasmoi, or Steps to Love in the 
Symposium, Platonic epistemology and ontology are presented simultaneously. The 
Theaetetus, in contrast, pursues the nature of knowledge more purely, because the 
epistemological discussion is here abstracted from an ontological setting and other 
theoretical concerns. It is Plato’s purest epistemological exploration. The argument 
progresses through Socrates playing midwife to the young Theaetetus in seeking to 
clarify what knowledge is and is not. 
The dialogue considers three theories of knowledge: as mere perception; as true 
judgment; and as true judgment with an account – the famous ‘justified true belief’ 
(JTB) theory of knowledge.
25
 Firstly, Socrates criticizes Theaetetus’ Protagorean, 
relativistic theory that knowledge is perception. He objects that holding contradictory 
perceptions and opinions as equally valid, truth would disappear for us. Without truth 
there could be no knowledge, therefore it could not be true that knowledge is 
perception. 
Knowledge is next considered as true judgment, but this is also dismissed, because 
one might by pure luck be possessed of a true judgment without being able to 
distinguish it from false beliefs. Eventually, the definition of knowledge as ‘true 
judgment with an account’ is found unsatisfactory, because defining ‘an account’ as 
‘knowledge of the distinctions of the thing to be known’ makes the circular argument 
that ‘knowledge is knowledge’. 
The Republic’s Divided Line passage is a simple but profound rendering of Plato’s 
epistemology as it relates to his theory of Forms ontology. This passage may thus be 
                                                 
25
 Despite Gettier ’s (1963) statements to the contrary, Plato never accepts justified true belief 
(true belief with an account) as the formula for knowledge, and Socrates clearly dismisses it in 
the Theaetetus. Gettier says in a footnote that ‘perhaps Plato accepts JTB in Meno 98’. 
However, against Gettier’s reading, the Socrates character says that ‘there is a difference 
between right opinion and knowledge’ and that this difference ‘is not at all a conjecture with me 
but something I would particularly assert that I knew: there are not many things of which I 
would say that, but this one, at any rate, I will include among those that I know’ (Meno 98). 
Later, the Republic holds pistis, or belief, to be a different species than knowledge (pistis is 
doxa, not episteme), whether that belief be true or not. Dianoia, or theoretical understanding, is 
presented as thinking that provides conceptual accounts, but even that is deemed an insufficient 
form of knowledge compared to noesis. It is unfortunate that Gettier’s false account is still too 
often glibly cited. 
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read epistemologically and ontologically. The Divided Line represents four stages 
towards knowledge: from shadows and reflections; to the visible three-dimensional 
things that cause these images; through concepts abstracted from these, and 
mathematical notions refining these concepts; to knowledge of the Forms, the only true 
knowledge.  
Read epistemologically, the Line moves from aisthesis and doxa (sense perception 
and belief) about eikasia and pistis (images and opinions relating to perceived objects), 
through dianoia (logical reasoning and scientific, abstracting, empirical approaches) 
involving mathematika (mathematical concepts and empirical generalizations), and 
finally to dialectical or contemplative knowledge of the Forms. Following the 
epistemological direction, the line starts from shadowy acquaintance with images. It 
then moves through common sense belief and opinion regarding perceptions. Next, 
conceptualization and empirical generalizations produce the schemata required by 
science and the technical arts. Finally, through dialectic and sustained contemplation, is 
noesis, or rational intuition of the Forms, and ultimately the Good, the Form of Forms. 
Read ontologically, the movement is reversed, as knowledge and being are two 
aspects of one polarity. In the ontology there is no laborious, diachronic ascent towards 
knowledge through stages. Being’s unfolding from the Good beyond being is immediate 
and simultaneous, inspiring Plotinus’s metaphor of emanation from the One. To read 
the divided line ontologically is to see it model reality and its appearances, with 
reflections and shadows cast into corresponding levels of mind.  
Our usual thinking traces backwards from what is most obvious and apparent 
(phenomena) to what is not phenomenal at all, and is the source of appearance. We 
usually infer truth from appearances. Thus we move inductively from appearances to 
concepts and rules. In the order of being, however, Plato’s dynamic moves the other 
way: from the higher forms, through mathematical and then empirical concepts,
26
 to 
physical objects and then their images, shadows, and reflections.
27
 From sun, that is, to 
shadow. While the epistemological movement can properly be described as having the 
                                                 
26 It is debatable whether or not Plato includes concepts and hypotheses in the order of being. 
27 Cf. Galen, On the views of Hippocrates and Plato: ‘In the Philebus and the Phaedrus, he 
[Plato] shows that for the constitution of the technical arts, the theory of division and synthesis 
is most necessary, and he recommends that one should be trained in it in two ways: by 
descending from what is first and most generic to the things that are no longer susceptible of 
division, by means of the intermediary differences, by which he had shown in the Sophist and 
the Statesman that definitions are constituted, and contrariwise, ascending from the many most 
specific things to the first genus, via synthesis. For the path is the same for both, but the journey 
is twofold, going alternately from one of the first things to the other.’ 
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movement or progression outlined because the transitions between epistemological 
states described therein are necessarily temporal, the ontological movement should be 
understood only metaphorically as movement and transition, because what is being 
described is not truly susceptible to chronological treatment, being synchronic reality, 
and not a temporal and incremental ascent to it.  
No doubt Plotinus understands this, in delimiting his concept of emanation as 
metaphorical. I find my view that emanation as a description of the appearance of the 
sensible world from the intelligibles and ultimately, or rather originally, from the One is 
metaphorical, to be supported by Plotinus himself, and my reading him thus is 
supported by recent scholarship by Emilsson and the considered opinion of Armstrong. 
That Plotinus intends the language of emanation metaphorically is supported at Ennead 
VI 4-5, where, as Emilsson (1994, 88) accurately describes, he: 
 
goes very far in rejecting the language of emanation and even that of reflection as mere 
metaphors liable to mislead us.  
 
In his Introductory Note to Ennead VI, 4-5, Armstrong (Ennead VI, 1988, 271) also 
says that for Plotinus: 
 
the unity and omnipresence of spiritual being . . . leads to a powerful critique of 
emanation-images [in VI, 4.7], which makes it clear that for Plotinus emanation was an 
inadequate, though necessary, metaphor. 
 
Emanation means a spreading out from, so when we use this English to translate 
Plotinian próodos, we must always be aware of the chronological import in the 
spreading out connoted in using the word. Indeed, Plotinus’s own use of próodos also 
brings with it a connotation of temporal, diachronic proceeding. Although unavoidable 
in expression, however, Plotinus cautions that any implied chronology in his 
descriptions of emanation is purely metaphorical. Plotinian emanation, or próodos, is 
atemporal. Even talk of it being a process is metaphorical. The transcendent X that it 
describes, however, is for Plotinus and many philosophers perhaps before him and 
certainly since, a reality and no metaphorical invention.  
By the English word emanation, in this context, we really wish to say something 
like: X, whereby X = an instantaneous something that is neither an effect, nor an 
unfolding, nor an emitting, nor phenomenally understood or imaged emanation (e.g. 
water spouting from a showerhead; or light rays irradiated by a star). Reflections, to 
mention another Plotinian metaphor for próodos, are phenomena, and they also have a 
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chronology, although we do not think about the diachrony of emitted and reflected light 
in our everyday dealings, tending to think loosely of light transmission as instantaneous.  
The Platonic and Plotinian distinction between the sensible and intelligible is not 
metaphorical, but its expression, conveyance, and explanation is. The term emanation, 
to reiterate, is metaphorical, but not what it intends and ultimately denotes in Plotinus’s 
contexts. Próodos, and English equivalents like emanation, proceeding, and spreading 
out are the inevitably metaphorical expressions of what itself is no metaphor but 
ultimate reality.  
As Emilsson glosses, Plotinus says that he uses unavoidably diachronic images of 
emanation, such as reflection (and we can add to that images of radii stemming from a 
hub, and so forth, also employed by Plotinus) because language, accustomed as it is to 
describing phenomena, cannot say anything clearly and unambiguously true about 
ultimate reality beyond the bounds of experience, as Kant later argues, but from within 
a different philosophical frame or priorities. But where Kant says we cannot take 
concepts seriously when they attempt to proceed beyond phenomena, Plotinus implies 
that this is where we should be very serious, and must eventually proceed in 
contemplation beyond how far concepts can convey us. In such discourse, we can now 
say the phrases as it were and so to speak to qualify almost every word we use,
28
 when 
we wish to be scrupulously truthful and avoid misconstrual.  
Reflection, to return to the example, is an image that usefully goes quite far in 
conveying Plotinian emanation, or próodos, or rather what he means by it, but it only 
goes so far, and the analogy breaks down, as do all others. Any phenomenon is 
chronological, and hence any image employing a phenomenon (and there is probably no 
other kind of image we can use here, especially when the purpose is to convey the 
intellectual by reference to the sensible) will break down after taking us so far and only 
so far. By which time or point, however, the reader, or listener should be able to discard 
the imagery, it having served its useful but limited purpose. One would, nevertheless 
require metaphoric imagery to communicate reality to people who do not grasp that 
phenomena are not the only reality. 
The terms Here and There that Plotinus uses now need explaining. Discussing 
appearance and reality, and the many and the one, someone might say, ‘Here, my friend, 
is where the terms Here and There come into their own’. Two philosophers discussing 
                                                 
28 As Plotinus employs ‘hoion’ (‘as if’, or ‘so to speak’) in Ennead VI.8.13. 
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the truth of this or that meaning, construal, disagreement (or some other point involving 
the use of language and imagery to convey intended meaning) illustrate talking within 
Plotinus’s sense of Here. What they are talking about, however, is what is There. Much 
or what we say about There is prone to being misconstrued because we must employ 
words and phenomena in our images to attempt to convey what is beyond phenomena, 
and even ‘beyond’ is used metaphorically here. Using the adjective ‘metaphorical’ 
about the words we use (Here) to describe reality does not imply that the ultimate 
referent (There) is a figment of fancy or imagination.  
Such a figment is involved in the expression, however, and the communicant 
approaches the metaphor-carrying image under the communicator’s guidance. When 
this mirage is reached, the figment should be taken for what it is: something no longer 
needed but which helped the mind concentrate and progress. By this stage, the 
communicant has drawn that much closer to becoming a contemplative of what is 
There, and is beginning to appreciate the aletheic limits as well as the pedagogic uses of 
terms like Here and There. 
Forms do not become concepts, then objects, and then images, in Plato’s system, 
although concepts and phenomena (veridical or confused) depend upon the Forms. 
Thinking about thinking about being (epistemology), with Plato, involves studying 
ever-closer approximations to truth from shadowy acquaintance, through doxic and 
conceptual comprehensions, to noesis. Thinking about being (the exercise of ontology) 
will always be off balance, and external to where it intends to be, because it is thinking 
about being instead of being it. This is so until, that is, noesis is attained, and the 
contemplation of the Idea unites with the Idea contemplated.
29
 Whereas a concept is a 
class of thing separate from the thing itself, providing philosophers with the 
epistemological gap, such a gap does not exist, according to the theory, between the 
Platonic Idea and its apprehension or contemplation.  
As with Plato, Coleridge’s writings are much concerned with thinking about 
thinking. Coleridge’s typology of thought from fancy, through lower and higher 
understanding, then imagination, and finally to reason provides a model that I read as a 
Romantic recasting of Plato’s scheme outlining epistemological development from 
eikasia to noesis. Plato’s model is a polarity between perceiving changeable images and 
                                                 
29
 ‘Idea’ troublesomely translates eidos. ‘Form’ is no better, both words having familiar, but in 
this context irrelevant, English meanings. Platonic Idea is not a purely mental occurrence, as 
when someone ‘has an idea’. 
  43 
thinking stable intelligibles. Thus he conceived a disparity between sensible objects in 
flux and stable universals. Coleridge’s scheme similarly conceives a polarity between 
Ideas and phenomena.  
In Coleridge’s system the intelligible Forms include, besides Plato’s eide, natural 
laws as non-phenomenal reality. For example, in gravitation, gravity itself is never seen, 
it is a Law, not a phenomenon, yet it gives rise to phenomena such that understanding 
the law helps to understand the phenomena. The understanding (dianoia) can grasp and 
apply the Law (as a hypothesis thought descends from), but only contemplative or 
imaginative reason can think it as ultimate reality, as Idea (as what thought proceeds 
towards). 
‘Plato treats principally of the truth, as it is manifested at the ideal pole, as the 
science of intellect’, Coleridge notes, whereas Bacon applies himself, ‘to the same truth, 
as it is manifested at the . . . material pole, as the science of nature.’ Coleridge is 
impressed that Plato writes of ‘Living Laws’, and that Bacon terms, ‘the laws of nature, 
Ideas’ (Friend I, 492). By including laws, Coleridge thus provides a refreshing view of 
Plato’s Theory of Ideas, appealing to those engaged in a mathematical study of the laws 
behind phenomena that could not themselves be phenomena. 
While in Plato affinities between eikasia and noesis are neither obvious nor 
elucidated, in Coleridge the harmony of sense and reason becomes a central topic. 
Indeed, Coleridge holds that reason is detectable in sense, although this is not self-
conscious reason, and his examples of this include illustrations of reason sleepwalking 
in nature, such as instinct being reason asleep but stirring. Hence, for Coleridge: 
 
Plants are Life dormant; Animals = Somnambulists; the mass of Mankind Day-dreamers; 
the Philosopher only awake. (Friend II, 75, n.3) 
 
 Like Plotinus, Coleridge appreciates the traces of reason in the phenomena of 
aisthesis. Such harmony may be implicit in Plato but is not discussed by him in his 
extant writings. I have not surveyed Plato’s Academic successors, or the Middle 
Platonists, or the Neo-Pythagoreans, to find such discussion there, but it certainly 
appears in Plotinus. It is not surprising that Coleridge the contemplative Romantic poet 
expressively explores this harmony as he poetizes sense experience to unite with 
philosophical concerns.  
Many might remain unconvinced by the assertion that Plato believed in a harmony 
between aisthesis and noesis. Indeed, in the Timaeus myth, Plato presents an ultimate 
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failure of harmony between ikhnê (traces of the Forms) and the khôra, a mysterious 
entity between the intelligible and the sensible about which debate is still vigorous,
30
 
and which the character Timaeus describes as ‘a receptacle for all becoming, a sort of 
wet nurse’ (Timaeus, 49b). 31  Primal Anangkê (necessity, brute fact, the given) is 
ordered, through ikhnê (traces of Forms), by a demiurge. Crombie says that Anangkê is 
correctly translated as necessity, but because the word connotes to modern readers 
‘logical necessity’, or ‘the force of reason’, which is in fact the very opposite of what 
Plato seems to mean, Crombie suggests that ‘the given’, or ‘brute fact’ is a more 
appropriate translation.  
That Crombie uses the phrase ‘brute fact’ to translate a word that he says is 
correctly translated by that phrase’s opposite, ‘necessity’, is justifiable, but also 
highlights the need for care here. Crombie does not mention that brute fact is 
understood as contingency,
32
 nor that care must be taken in using these terms because 
contingency is the opposite of necessity in some important uses of that latter word. I 
think that Crombie’s sense of Anangkê as brute fact can be conveyed less graphically, 
because more abstract, but without the ambiguity I identify, with the formula 
‘contingent necessity’.33  
Contingent necessity can then be explained by Crombie’s illustration of the 
carpenter planing timber with two senses of reason: (1) his reason for planing is because 
he has a purpose for smooth wood, and (2) the wood, in his plan, needs, or has necessity 
of, planing by reason of the wood’s natural contingent necessity in being rough and 
crooked. This second reason is a brute fact, a given, and inexplicable in the final 
analysis because only further contingencies can be stated, in terms of molecular 
analysis, for example, but without any final why (Crombie, 216). So, Plato tells us (via 
Timaeus telling Socrates) of ‘things made by the craftsmanship of reason’, which we 
can take to refer to the Forms, in which sensible things and we participate, before 
moving to ‘that which comes about through Anangkê’. 
Timaeus describes brute fact, or contingent necessity recalcitrant to reason, as a 
‘wandering cause’, which Crombie insightfully glosses as moving around and about 
without rhyme or reason (216). My thesis argues, and most fully in Part Four, that 
                                                 
30 Agamben (1999, 218), for example, calls it ‘nonplace’, Crombie ‘space’ (1979, 216). 
31 Significantly, Socrates rests after his disquisition, the Republic, and is entertained with 
Timaeus’s account, the Republic’s sequel. Timaeus then proceeds not exactly with philosophy, 
but with a likely story (eikos logos, 29d). 
32 For readers familiar with Sartre, this can be understood as basically equivalent to facticity 
33 Cf. Anscombe (1958), arguing that so-called brute facts are relative to institutional practices. 
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ordinary life illuminated and guided by reason, such as occurs after serious reflection on 
our usually taken-for-granted, usually unexamined, pursuits and enjoyments, is the 
correct goal of all good practice. Serious reflection on and questioning of our tastes and 
preferences, and our often unreflected-upon directions is therefore a prime desideratum 
for aesthetic education.  
Aesthetic education itself is thus the most important aspect of an education that is 
to bring out the best potential in people and to elucidate the best that is available for 
communities, because this conscious elucidation of usually obscure and unreflected 
directions in taste and in general pursuits is available to all, and not only to 
philosophers. The general availability of reason can be intimated through attention to 
the sensuous objects and media under examination in the light of reason clear and 
available to all, which is readily admitted once intuited, or grasped, as Socrates and 
Kant both argue, and in which force of reason their unfailing confidence lies. 
From this position I will suggest, again in Part Four, and because further ground is 
yet to be covered, an ars biographica poetica, or an art of poetic living as life-writing, 
that is as writing life in the fabric of life. The end of this ars biographica poetica is 
contemplation of the Good and of ultimate values through which communities are 
cultivated and lives are lived through appreciating, enjoying and more-fully consciously 
respecting rhyme and reason in a way that is both guided from without and poetically 
created from within, that is to say, imaginatively. Before the circle turns to that point, 
then, we return now to Plato in the khôra. 
Although the demiurge in the Timaeus creates a more or less intelligible cosmos, an 
intractable element of Anangkê, or inexplicable (given) and contingent necessity, 
remains in sensible objects and in our feelings related to them. The particulars of this 
contingent necessity cannot be collected, or universalized, under rational general terms 
that serve to explain their being and their properties. Strong hints of harmony between 
Platos’s eikasia and noesis exist in the Symposium, where Socrates refers to anabasmoi: 
the stages or steps in the myth he recounts that Diotima told him in initiating him into 
the profoundest mysteries.
34
  
There, Beauty is distinguished as a chink through which the intelligible Forms 
illuminate the sensible presences, giving the shimmer of the Ideal, as Plotinus later 
expresses it. The Forms are intelligible, not sensible, yet Beauty adds a shimmer to the 
                                                 
34 Anabasmoi means steps, denoting the philosopher’s long ascent to Beauty itself. 
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brute, given, sensible. This shimmer, which becomes pulchritude (‘that which pleases 
on being seen’) for Aquinas (1956, 77-79), is, Plato tells, through Socrates, through 
Diotima, through the Eleusinian Mysteries, the aesthetic, sensual first step progressing 
through love of wisdom, and the contemplation of order, genera, virtues, laws, higher 
purposes, and then the vision of Beauty resplendent in itself and by itself, next to Truth 
and indicating the Good. 
The story’s retelling itself exemplifies Diotima’s lesson. Socrates is described in his 
youth. If he was ever handsome, it was then. The old woman is wrinkled, with grey 
hair: not a typical beauty in Classical Greece. Yet young Socrates hangs on her words. 
Diotima is unsure if Socrates can assimilate the sacred lesson. The youth, enthralled by 
the old woman, learns from the beauty in her story that ascending to contemplate 
unseen Ideals is to progress towards an Ideality far greater than the erotic beauty that 
prompted and provided the first foothold on the ladder.  
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1.4 Eikasia 
Eikasia is acquaintance with the world as image. This is the state attending to the 
eikones, composed of colour, shape, sound, and other sensations taken at face value. As 
such, it is naïve; Plato calls it a state of ignorance. Eikasia is neither true nor false, 
being derived from aisthesis, our raw aesthetic experience. The sophist in Theaetetus 
claimed this aisthesis to be all that there is to knowledge. In some ways a classical 
counterpart of Hume, Theaetetus, influenced by the theories of Heraclitus and especially 
Protagoras, argues that the only possible knowledge is what can be apprehended by the 
senses.  
We can think of aisthesis as cognition based only on images, and as an intuitive 
process that occurs prior to existential judgment, considering no reality beyond its own 
feelings. Eikasia is the beholding of images, and is fixated on images in dreams, 
memories, reveries, or reflections, shadows, and painted, poetic, or other likeness. 
Eikasia is fixated insofar as it never considers the image may be merely the image of 
something else, because for eikasia, the image is the only ‘reality’ and therefore reality 
is not a category it ever thinks about. 
There is discussion in the secondary literature debating whether eikasia is an 
illusory misapprehension of the images of things for the objects themselves, or whether 
something different is supposed to be going on. Hardie suggests that eikasia means 
‘conjecture’ in general, so that people in eikasia, like the prisoners in the cave, make 
conjectures and likely stories about what is going on, without necessarily making 
conjectures regarding any supposed originals the existence of which accounts for the 
appearances (Hardie, 61). 
I read eikasia as similar to Heidegger’s fascination (Faszination): immersion in the 
inherited and unquestioned concerns of everyday life ([1927] 2008, 149). In eikasia, we 
are held by the appearances and by the images. The scintillation of surface beauty, and 
the unreflective acceptance of superficial meaning can pull the mind into this level 
where one becomes caught up in concerns without looking to the reality beyond these 
appearances. The charms of eikasia involve phantasia, the accepting of images and 
appearances woven into stories, carefully described by Coleridge as the ‘willing 
suspension of disbelief that constitutes poetic faith’ (Biographia II, 6). 
There is neither truth nor falsity in eikasia, but rather a kind of reverie. In this dream-
like state, what appears are gignomena, the things which tumble about between being 
and not being. Eikasia in Republic, Book VI has a broader reference than the aisthesis 
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discussed in the Theaetetus. Aisthesis in the Theaetetus is a ‘passive affection of the 
mind’ (184-7), and refers to sense impressions, whereas eikasia refers to sense 
impressions of images, and also to mental images, such as those experienced in dreams, 
delirium, and madness. 
Eikasia’s objects are shadows, reflections, dreams, and human productions of 
likenesses:  a painting of a house is a mimema, conveying ‘a sort of dream created by 
man for those that are awake’ (Sophist, 266c). Eikasia takes images at face value, 
whereas pistis takes everyday objects and opinions about them at face value. Eikasia is 
a primitive, pre-conceptual experience. Noesis is an advanced, praeter-conceptual 
experience. Everyday understanding, as well as the understanding of science and 
mathematics, lies between these epistemic extremes. Within Coleridge’s polar scheme 
is a harmony between sense and reason such that reason exists unconsciously within 
eikasia, which for Coleridge becomes sense and fancy.  
For Coleridge, there is reason in sense, although this reason is ‘sleeping’ or 
‘dreaming’. It is difficult to express this meaning clearly, and that obscurity is at least 
part of the Romantic point. Modifying Plato, Coleridge’s Romantic scheme sees reason 
not as the absolute opposite to sense, but rather as its harmonic opposite. Describing the 
harmony from the other perspective, now looking for sense in reason, is easier because 
the Platonic understanding of reason at the end of dialectic is of a direct intuition 
without the mathematika, the conceptual intermediaries. For Coleridge: sense intuits 
phenomena; reason intuits Ideas. For Plato: noesis intuits Ideas; dianoia imagines, or 
mentally images, Ideas, employing geometrical diagrams, hypotheses, etc., never 
reaching them directly . 
Coleridge’s sense of the harmony between aisthesis and Idea allows for a Romantic 
impression of the artist as working through and with Ideas while simultaneously 
remaining within the aesthetic, sensory pole of eikasia. This Romantic Platonism is 
familiar by now, and an example can be seen in Thomas Mann’s Der Tod in Venedig 
(1912). This example alludes to Plato’s Phaedrus and the Symposium, describing the 
eidos of beauty as accessible to sense as well as to intellect. In the novella, von 
Aschenbach, a famous author, hopes to recuperate his staid passions and tired mind 
with a vacation to Venice. A beautiful youth, Tadzio, fascinates his imagination, and 
while on the beach, fully dressed in his suit and hat, the author, having contemplated the 
Forms of Beauty, Life, Joy, and Goodness in the classically beautiful youth before him, 
believes he is being beckoned by these transcendences in and through this boy. As 
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Aschenbach dies, the youth points to the sea, thus alluding to the Symposium’s ultimate 
aesthetic-epistemic vision, described by Plato as: 
 
drawing towards the sea of beauty, and creating and beholding many fair and noble 
thoughts in boundless love of wisdom; until at length he grows and waxes strong, and at 
last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty 
everywhere. (210d
 
) 
 
Because Coleridge’s Romantic Platonism highlights the harmony between sense 
and reason, he can have an explicit account of how the Idea can bring pleasure through 
aesthetic expression, and how the artwork can inspire intellectual enjoyment. This 
account can support the argument in the Symposium that beauty is an eidos, yet one that 
can be seen by the eye as well as by the intellect. 
I suggested a sense of aisthesis or eikasia can be detected in Heidegger’s 
‘fascination’, the state of being held captive by the everyday comings and goings and 
the common interpretations of history, reality, and morality found around us and taken 
for granted. Eikasia’s unphilosophical stance is equally an example of the unexamined 
life. This mode unquestioningly accepts moral codes as ready-made values, accepting 
them at face value. This stage is therefore pre-ethical, despite working with apparently 
moral ready-mades. The condition of the prisoners in the cave, described in the 
Republic just before the Divided Line passage, outlines the trapped, fascinated, aspect 
of eikasia. The prisoners are fascinated by the shadows on the wall and have no 
intellectual tools to criticize their own perspectives and theories of reality.  
For Coleridge, this sensory flux is then further dispersed by the fancy, as it 
generates streams of association. Plato and Coleridge both stress the impermanent 
character of the objects of consciousness considered at the naïve pole of experience. 
Plato opposes the relativistic position that knowledge can only come from and be of the 
objects of the senses. Coleridge thus argues against the modern Empiricism of Locke, 
Hume, and Hartley, a position he describes as held by those who: 
 
alike pre-assume, with Mr Locke, that the Mind contains only the reliques of the Senses, 
and therefore proceed with him to explain the substance from the shadow, the voice from 
the echo: they can but detect, each the others’ inconsistencies. (Statesman’s Manual, 111) 
 
 The sophist in Theaetetus, as much as the Empiricists in and preceding Coleridge’s 
day, often argues that the only kind of knowledge possible was that of the senses, and 
the only possible object was the phenomenal object that Plato describes as the object of 
eikasia, whose object is the polar opposite of the Idea approached in noesis. 
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While Plato and Coleridge argue against Empiricist positions, Plato diminishes the 
importance of the sensory along the pole of knowledge on his Divided Line, whereas 
Coleridge Romanticizes this scheme to show that a harmony can be detected between 
the poles. Coleridge thus finds intimations of reason in non-discursive aesthetic 
experience, and in the intuitions of reason he finds the immediacy usually associated the 
sensible. 
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1.5 Pistis 
For Plato, pistis’ objects are things made by God or humans: animals, plants, and 
artefacts. These are distinguished from shadows, reflections, dreams, painting, and other 
images. Pistis’ objects are the things of the ordinary world considered apart from their 
reflections and other images of them. 
While eikasia is fascinated, docilely accepting all with neither prejudice nor 
concern for contradiction, pistis is characterised by judgment. The judgments of pistis 
arrive at doxa, or opinions, by the process of ‘the soul debating with herself,’ affirming 
and denying (Theaetetus, 190a). This process is akin to the presence of (unenlightened) 
negative reason in the lower understanding of Coleridge's scheme. Although pistis 
arrives at judgments by comparing and relating perceptions, it does not subject these to 
any critical analysis. 
Indeed, in the Theaetetus, this mode of doxa is said to contain both an element of 
aisthesis and an element of pure thinking (194b). The counterpart of the element of 
aisthesis in Coleridge's lower understanding, which I take to be Coleridge’s counterpart 
to pistis, are the fixed and definite thoughts fashioned by the fancy and associated from 
the stream of sense. For Coleridge, these fixed and definite units of thought work like 
pre-concepts, or counters: pebbles from the stream of sense experience from whence 
they were lifted.  
Within Plato's scheme, the inclusion in pistis of the principles of affirmation and 
denial, corresponding to the presence of negative reason as the principle of 
contradiction in Coleridge's lower understanding, the categories of reality and unreality 
arise in distinction to the level equality of unprejudiced experience in eikasia. The 
prejudice and existential affirmation necessary for judgment arises in pistis, thus 
completing the dynamic of doxa. Within eikasia, distinction between reality and 
unreality is impossible, since no appearance is judged according to anything else. 
Eikastic presentations are, on the other hand, constantly subject to associative relations 
to other phenomena, none of which are distinguished in themselves as being either 
objective or subjective. Objectivity requires the judgment to distinguishes subject from 
object, perception from perceived, quality from qualified, and this is lacking in eikasia. 
Pistis’ judgments include much empirical knowledge. It judges a posteriori, 
asserting that this follows that without necessarily involving any theoretical framework 
or thinking as to why something is the way it is or follows the process it does. Pistis is 
pragmatic, as in the farmer who has true opinions regarding when to sow and when to 
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harvest coming from a posteriori judgments. Such opinion may well be true, by 
accident or experience, but is unconcerned with theoretical accounts. 
Aisthesis/eikasia presents the qualia that the Empiricists would later call secondary 
qualities. The secondary quality is neither more nor less than exactly as it appears, being 
pure appearance. On the other hand, pistis makes judgments, requiring experience in 
dealing with the objects. Hence pistis, being object-directed, obtains a level of 
objectivity not present in eikasia. This objectivity deals with objects relative to purposes 
and points of view. When grasping the object in its objectivity is the goal, then the thing 
is set apart by measuring, counting, and weighing (to metrein kai arithmein kai istanai: 
Republic, 602d). 
At this point, we leave the level of pistis and progress to dianoia. Thus the object 
becomes amenable to mathesis, that is, it can be taught and learned according to its 
mathemata rather than only be experienced according to its pathemata. By postulating 
an object set apart from the subjective experience of it, these measurable and calculable 
qualities allow for the possibility of affirmation and denial; for the judgments of truth 
and falsity; and for those of reality and unreality. 
Pistis segues into dianoia, with the experiential counters of actual entities in our 
ordinary world of sense-perception being exchanged for intellectual, empirically 
abstracted concepts derived from pistic experience to enable the level of thought 
specific to dianoia. To experience the entities of pistis as actual objective entities in 
distinction from the presentations in eikasia, wherein the objective actuality or not of 
something corresponding to the presentation is not considered, requires a degree of 
thought which becomes refined in dianoia. 
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1.6 Dianoia 
The genealogy of dianoia is apparent not only from pistis but also from 
aisthesis/eikasia. Plato suggests, in his Divided Line, that as eikasia dreams of actual 
objects which are forever beyond its ken,
35
 dianoia dreams of being (Republic, 476c). 
Dianoia is a way of thinking and knowing that has been built up from earlier stages. 
Following the Divided Line thus far from ingenuous, imagistic consciousness of 
shadows, reflections, and other images towards higher mathematical reasoning and 
ergon logistikou (602e), then dialectically approaching Ideas, we see an epistemological 
theory of consciousness developing from the unstable ground, or so it appears, of 
sensation. Plato’s epistemology is the main focus while Socrates explains the Divided 
Line to Glaucon,
36
 but it is secondary to his ontology, which moves in the other 
direction, i.e. from the Form of the Good, then the Ideas,
37
 then material objects, and 
ending in reflections, and shadows, which, as the ontology shows, do not really provide 
a ground at all. 
Following the divided line epistemologically, moving from naïve consciousness to 
empirico-scientific and mathematical thinking, everything seems to be constructed from 
the empirical ground of sense perception and its appearances, which are omnipresent 
and dominant in eikasia. Thus far this epistemological model is being built from the 
ground up, from sense perception, through conventional, ‘animal faith’ beliefs and 
opinions, to conceptual and mathematical thinking in dianoia, before the movement 
toward the Forms and the Form of the Good in noesis. Thus far, Plato shows no chance 
of a mystical access to Ideas with a capital ‘I’ from some secret world behind the 
scenes. 
For Plato, the philosopher may contemplate the Forms, and the Form of the Good, 
only after long progress through necessary stages. The chained prisoners cannot reach 
the Forms by some lucky guess extrapolating from the shadows and echoes that 
constitute their world. As argued in the Theaetetus, any lucky conjecture could not be 
known as to be true, because it would possess in itself no principle to differentiate true 
                                                 
35 It is pistis which grasps actual objects in its waking, workaday way. 
36  Here Socrates and Glaucon seek the best method of education, so the attainment of 
knowledge is the foremost topic here. 
37 I think, though this is controversial, that the mathematika, being hypotheses, exist only in the 
epistemology, as transitional constructs, and are not emanations (or any other kind of beings) in 
his ontology. If correct, this might help explain why the divisions of dianoia and pistis are the 
same length on the line, and that this sameness is deliberate. 
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from false conjectures. True belief backed up with an account is therefore not 
knowledge. 
Plato contends that before knowledge is reached, we must progress from the 
phantasia of imagery in eikasia to the confidence of everyday dealings in pistis. From 
here, the first step into knowledge thinks through problems with concepts and 
mathematical forms. Dianoia is, literally, thinking through, but instead of thinking the 
Forms directly, it uses the diagrams given by representational concepts and geometry. 
Hence, dianoia is a form of episteme, but remains a shadow of noesis. Coleridge retains 
this slow build-up towards knowledge in his model, working up thinking from sense 
and fancy, through the higher and lower understandings, until reason, the counterpart of 
noesis, is reached.  
When it comes to achieving self-conscious reason, Coleridge is cautious, saying 
that the progress is slow, with unavoidable steps along the way. However, Coleridge 
adds a Romantic concern with his distaste for divisions made merely in order to 
distinguish (Reflection, 33).
38
 His aim, then, is not to create a clear-cut faculty 
psychology but to present a dynamic model emphasizing the faculties’ all-in-each 
aspects. Hence, there is sense in reason and reason in sense, and the work of fancy, 
understanding, and imagination run throughout, though in different degrees of 
consciousness. Whether a particular instance of thought is to be considered 
understanding or imagination depends on what aspects are conscious and what remains 
unconscious. Thus he makes room for the Romantic notion of a presentiment of mystery 
and beauty, of truth and the Forms, that is accessible, though unreflectively so, through 
sensory and aesthetic experience. 
Plato is too-often misrepresented as an idealist arguing that matter is an illusion and 
that everyday concrete objects are merely shadows cast by the Forms. This 
misinterpretation follows a shallow reading, especially of the Prisoners in the Cave 
allegory. Our understanding (or rather pre-understanding) while in states of doxa 
(eikasia and pistis) is indeed ‘shadowy’, but the objects of opinion and belief are not 
always mere shadows (although they are sometimes literally shadows), they are indeed 
material objects (or their external images, including shadows). 
In the Timaeus, Plato describes the demiurge as using the Forms as models to 
create an ordered world out of the chaos of matter that preceded the cosmos. Although 
                                                 
38 Coleridge notes that the converse, distinguishing in order to sow division, is yet worse. 
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in this creation myth, a creation of order, not a creation ex nihilo, the demiurge employs 
the Forms of the Platonic solids, built up from triangles, to order the world, the matter 
thus ordered was already in existence. The same matter exists before and after the 
ordering. The Platonic point that is often confused is that the objects of sense-
experience are material, but because they are and always coming-to-be and passing-
away, they can be understood to be less real than the laws and Ideas responsible for 
their essential patterns and appearances. 
Think of a small eddy in a river. It is fascinating to observe, perhaps calming even.  
Imagine a naïve passer-by who finds it so alluring, so beautiful, that they want to take it 
home. They try to catch the eddy in a bucket and are disappointed when in the bucket 
all they seem to have caught is still water, while the eddy remains swirling just 
downstream of the rock in the river. Of course the eddy is a material phenomenon, 
manifested only in material fluids. But the matter in which the eddy is manifest is 
something quite interchangeable and inessential.  
To really know the eddy, the observer needs to appreciate, first by induction, 
through observation, the commonalities in such patterns of liquids and gasses. From this 
the essential features can be separated from the interchangeable. Observations, 
conjectures, experiment, concept-building all work together until what one is really 
thinking of are no longer particular instances. What one approaches in getting to know 
the eddy are not less-vivacious sense-impressions (memories), nor hieroglyphic images 
working as conceptual counters, but Ideas.  
Knowing the eddy eventually amounts to knowing the bodiless, invisible laws or 
principles that Plato calls Ideas, which obtain even when the material to instantiate 
those laws is absent. To the question, would the law of gravity (and the laws resulting in 
the Coriolis Effect governing eddies) still obtain were all mass annihilated, the Platonist 
would answer that it would. This amounts to understanding that the laws responsible for 
phenomena are not themselves phenomena. Plato argues that because these laws, or 
Forms, are originary and eternal, they are the reality that phenomena indicate. To 
understand this, focus on the thought that the eddy essentially has more to do with the 
laws governing how fluids behave when a solid partially interrupts the flow, than with 
the particular matter that instantiates the eddy phenomenon at any one time. 
The eddy is a possibility whose laws always obtain, even if the phenomenon is, at 
any particular time, nowhere instantiated. What accounts for this eternal factor (the 
‘always’ in the possibility of the appearance’s coming-to-be) is the set of laws or 
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principles that account for (epistemologically) and are logically and chronologically 
prior to and responsible for (ontologically) the phenomenon. 
A ground-up reading of Plato’s Divided Line as epistemological progression 
understands ‘ground’ as the starting position of the experiencing subject commencing 
the journey to knowledge (episteme) from interconnected imagery (eikasia). ‘Ground’, 
in this context, cannot mean something foundational, that is to say logically originary, 
because the originaries, or archai, are the Ideas or Forms themselves, which are the 
starting point when the Divided Line is read in the other direction, ontologically, the 
direction that Plotinus later calls emanation. 
The epistemological reading, which is the way Plato primarily intended the Line to 
be read, given the context in the discussion on education, describes the path to 
knowledge by perceiving subjects who have the ability to reason. The epistemological 
reading retains sense perception, belief, and opinion as early stages, but proceeds 
beyond them. This is what Coleridge also does when he retains the theory, but not the 
conclusions, of the Mechanists and Associationists (such as Hartley and Locke) within 
the lower levels of his broader scheme.  
As Plato sees sense-perception and opinion as gathering a store of images and 
recognizable objects and patterns which are then operated on by deduction and 
abstraction into mathematizable concepts that can be processed in the absence of their 
phenomenal manifestations, so Coleridge acknowledges the place of the empirico-
associationist account of conceptual knowledge being built up from the ground of 
experience through sense awareness. 
The mechanisms of sense-perception and association are not disputed by Coleridge, 
but are retained as the mechanisms of sense and fancy, the pre-rational processes of re-
arranging impressions which can be then worked into concepts, allowing for thought 
processes about general events and object-kinds in the absence of both the phenomena 
and the memories of the phenomena. Up to this point in the essentially parallel schemes 
of Plato and Coleridge, there is nothing that Protagoras and Theaetetus (representing the 
relativism and empiricism of Plato’s day) or Locke and Hartley would contest. 
Coleridge’s system is synoptic. In a sense he is a traditionalist and a hoarder, 
loathing to abandon what has been and still can be useful. In his twinned essays on 
Bentham and Coleridge, Mill (1840, 214) describes the ‘two great seminal minds of 
England in their age.’ Mill continues,  
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Bentham was a Progressive philosopher, Coleridge a Conservative one . . . To Bentham it 
was given to discern more particularly those truths with which existing doctrines and 
institutions were at variance; to Coleridge, the neglected truths which lay in them. (Mill, 
1840, 214) 
 
Mill criticizes Bentham for his ‘want of imagination’, and finds Coleridge, as Skorupski 
(2014) glosses, ‘less superficial, more insightful’. Where Bentham always asks of 
antique or received opinion, ‘Is it true?’, Mill finds Coleridge’s hermeneutic depth more 
appealing, as the latter asks, ‘What is its meaning?’ Where the one calls to abolish the 
old institutions, the other aims for their true realization, ‘reasserting the best meaning 
and purposes of the old.’ This appraisal by his later contemporary would have appealed 
to Coleridge, who writes,  
 
I regard truth as a divine ventriloquist: I care not from whose mouth the sounds are 
supposed to proceed, if only the words are audible and intelligible. (Biographia I, 164) 
 
With his accreting and correcting synoptic system, Coleridge can retain empirico-
associationist mechanisms to explain (1) memory formation; (2) how concepts can be 
initially shaped as abstractions; and (3) how fancy can occur in poetic works and 
fevered brains. Associationist explanation could be retained from the levels of sense to 
conceptual understanding without retaining Empiricism’s metaphysical and 
epistemological conclusions, such as Hume’s that aesthetic and moral values are merely 
projections of pleasurable and painful sensations; that knowledge is nothing more than 
sense-perception; or Aquinas’s Aristotelian dictum, central to Locke, that ‘there is 
nothing in the mind that was not first in the senses’ (De veritate, q. 2 a. 3 arg. 19), 
which Coleridge could only accept with Leibniz’s (1765, Bk II, Ch. 1) codicil, ‘. . . 
except the mind itself.’  
In the same paragraph, Leibniz subtly tells how Locke’s position is self-
contradictory in that this exception of the mind reflecting on itself presents something 
mental that does not originate not in the senses. In discovering this inconsistency in 
Locke, Leibniz can therefore argue that his own anti-Empirical position ‘concurs 
substantially with Locke’s Essay which attempts to infer many of the ideas from the 
reflection which the mind undertakes upon its own nature.’ Earlier in the same work, 
Leibniz (1765, Preface) highlights Locke’s contradiction, made in Book Two of 
Locke’s Essay, where the British Empiricist: 
 
admits . . . that ideas, which do not have their origin in sensation, must come from 
reflection. But reflection simply means focusing upon what is already in us; the senses, 
however, do not furnish us with what we bear within us. If we accept this, we can surely 
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affirm that our spirit contains a great deal that is innate, since we are innate to ourselves, 
so to speak. 
 
The mind’s native potencies and potentialities become for Coleridge the human 
side of reason, dynamically manifested as energies of thought yearning for fulfilment in 
contemplating both Ideas to direct our living ends, and the Laws that govern 
phenomena. He argues, then, that the presence of reason to the lower understanding is 
the human mind first awakening to reason. Prior to this, reason is present, but we are 
not awake to its presence. The universal applicability of the law of contradiction 
impresses the mind with the force of reason. The point is that the law of contradiction is 
understood as being neither inductively derived from experience, nor formulated from 
concepts abstracted from sense perception, and yet it is universally applicable.  
He argues that a mind’s being impressed with this logical, universal applicability 
that is not derived from experience constitutes a dawning moment. This is the moment 
the understanding ceases to be mere understanding. Coleridge argues that an 
appreciation of reason’s scope and force slowly, and at first negatively, awakens in us. 
On the other side the Empiricists argue that not only a conceptual armoury but also the 
logical techniques of wielding it are fashioned and evolved out of sense perception and 
its traces. 
A recurrent theme in Coleridge is that natural laws have an objective, ideal nature. 
Laws of nature account for phenomena, without themselves being phenomena. 
Coleridge therefore asserts that he subscribes to: 
 
the doctrine of Ideas, or Knowledges that are supersensuous and yet truly Objective 
(Marginalia V, 776) 
 
As such, they lie behind, as it were, phenomena, being prior to them in the order of 
thought rather than appearances. Laws as objective realities, like gravitation, yet 
obviously not phenomenal, like apples, can help argue to the mind of empirical, 
scientific bent the reality of a fundamental order of being that is non-phenomenal, and 
thus evading the Empiricist’s net. For Coleridge, this opens the door on the physical 
side for understanding natural laws Platonically, i.e. as objective, universal, and 
effective Ideas. Hence Coleridge points out that Plato sometimes refers to Ideas as 
‘living laws’ and that Bacon, in the New Organon, sometimes describes his notion of 
natural laws as ‘living Ideas’ and, very often, as ‘Forms’. 
Returning to my example of the eddy, when the observer notices general effects, 
such as warm and cold water eddies swirling in opposite directions, and those directions 
  59 
reversing according to hemispheric location, the classification of evidence, the 
application of concepts, and the generation of theories remains within the sphere of 
dianoia, or for Coleridge, the higher understanding. When the thinker stops taking the 
axioms and concepts for granted, and inquires into their logical foundations, then the 
dialectical movement to episteme begins. 
Plato’s first example of a science exemplifying dianoia is geometry (Republic, 
510c-511b). Geometers assume hypotheses rather than investigating them, because the 
hypotheses of geometry cannot be used to investigate themselves. Coleridge follows 
Plato here, writing in a footnote that: 
 
In works of pure science the definitions of necessity precede the reasoning, in other 
works they more aptly form the conclusion. (Friend I, 177n) 
 
In a footnote to this footnote, Coleridge continues with what reads like a perfect gloss of 
dianoia’s theoretical constructs (the mathematika): 
 
In the severity of logic, the geometrical point, line, surface, circle, and so forth, are 
theorems, not ideas. (Friend I, 177n) 
 
Besides geometry, Plato’s other examples of sciences reliant on and remaining within 
dianoia are arithmetic, harmonic theory, and astronomy. Plotinus adds architecture and 
carpentry. Dianoia creates technical subjects, treating of its various fields with 
abstracted concepts and visual aids, derived from the objects in pistis, which are to be 
understood in terms of number, space, and time. Arithmetic, geometry, music, and 
astronomy are therefore taken to be the highest sciences subject to or accessible to 
dianoia.  
Dialectic takes the study a stage further, working from hypotheses towards the 
Forms themselves and their first principle, the Form of the Good. Dianoia is the form of 
all ratiocination until one reaches the Forms. It is therefore the method we have to use 
in both the upward/inductive and downward/deductive path. Dialectic is a method, and 
dianoia the cognitive faculty that uses it.  
In its dependence on images, dianoia resembles eikasia:  
 
These very things they are forming and drawing, of which shadows and reflections in 
water are images, they now in turn use as their images and aiming to see those very 
things which they could not otherwise see except in thought. (510e) 
 
Not examining its first principles, dianoia cannot reach beyond its hypotheses. Hence 
while people in dianoia: 
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dream about reality, it is yet impossible for them to see the waking vision while they use 
assumptions which leave these topics (geometry and what follows from it) undisturbed, 
for they cannot offer an explanation. You see, where the starting point is not known and 
the end and what comes between is woven together out of what is not known, what means 
are there that such a set of premises can ever become knowledge? (533c) 
 
A difficulty in this presentation is that the Simile of the Divided Line is itself a 
conceptual model, and therefore an example of dianoia, with its respective 
insufficiencies. At the beginning of the Divided Line passage, Socrates tells Glaucon 
that: 
 
There’s certainly a great deal I’m missing out . . . I think there’s quite a lot . . . Anyway 
. . .  I’ll not miss anything out on purpose. (509c) 
 
In practice, then, the Divided Line is a pedagogical model that uses dianoia’s 
schematizing capacities to explain the four major epistemological faculties. 
Dorter (1996, 290) proposes that Plato’s Divided Line was a ‘disappearing ladder’ 
that ‘vanishes as soon as we try to grasp hold of it’. He proposes that Plato is aware of 
the shortcomings in presenting a conceptual schema to explain a theory that itself 
indicates the epistemological limitations of theoretical models, abstracted concepts, and 
images. I add to Dorter that Plato’s demonstrating the limits of schemata and images 
with a schematic image is too perfect an irony for it to be a mere shortcoming of which 
Plato is nevertheless aware. This irony, it seems, is itself material presented for 
philosophical reflection. Just before the Divided Line is described, Socrates asserts that 
what follows is his best opinion, and not knowledge. Plato’s use of poetic description 
and conceptual models to indicate (rather than fully explicate) philosophical positions 
that involve the praeter-conceptual leads authors such as Hare and Perkins to write 
about ‘two Platos’ or ‘the Other Plato’. 
We do not, however, need two Platos once we recognize that his models and poetic 
descriptions continue where dianoia’s concepts alone cannot progress. The Republic’s 
opening phrase,  
 
I went down to the Piraeus yesterday . . . 
 
is traditionally interpreted as an important metaphor of the philosopher descending from 
contemplation to pursue educational duties.
39
 The opening movement would thus allude 
to Socrates’ return from noesis, through dianoia, pistis, and eikasia, that is, to the 
                                                 
39  This traditional allegorical interpretation of the Republic’s first line occurs in the fourth 
preliminary of Proclus’ commentary on the Republic’s sequel, the Timaeus. 
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prisoners in the cave. Socrates’ return has an educational goal, namely to try to teach 
from his philosophical perspective in a way that can nevertheless be understood, or at 
least approached, through the lower epistemic and imaginative levels. The aim is to 
educe a desire from the audience to make the ascent for themselves. As much as the Sun 
cannot properly be described to lifelong prisoners chained to stare at shadows, true 
knowledge, and its perspective, cannot be transmitted to the student in its own terms. 
Socrates, in this educational role, has to use the tools of eikasia, pistis and dianoia 
to indicate a truth and perspective beyond those levels. It is fitting that this descent back 
into the cave is made in the Republic, a political work primarily on Justice, one of 
whose main theses is that the philosopher, even though inclined to remain apart from 
the political mainstream in order to contemplate the Forms, has a duty to go down and 
educate – draw out – the inhabitants of the cave of models and shadows. 
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1.7 Noesis 
As dianoia was described as descending from assumed hypotheses towards conclusions, 
noesis begins from the same hypotheses but ascends towards the first principles, 
through the Forms and ultimately to the principle of the Forms’ unity: the Form of the 
Good. Noesis is not content to take for granted any concept, diagram, or hypothesis just 
because it is practically useful. 
Brumbaugh (1991, 102) asks,  
 
In what sense . . . is the Platonic form of the good ‘non-hypothetical’? 
 
He then answers for Plato:  
 
It is so in two important ways. In the first place, it must actually (not merely 
hypothetically) exist as the cause of attraction we feel toward ‘the good.’ The notion that 
the actual and evident attraction which the good and its allied forms exert on us (which 
we experience as ‘desire’) could be itself the effect of something which was not ‘actual’ 
is rejected by Plato. There does seem a legitimate analogy here between ‘attraction’ in a 
physical and in a psychological field; if we find very strong lines of force, we assume 
that there is something actually (not just possibly or ideally) causing them; and 
analogously, the attraction of the good testifies to its actuality. 
 
Although perhaps unpersuasive to many modern readers, this line of argument offers 
the Form of the Good as the ideal substantive. The second sense in Plato’s describing 
the Form of the Good, and all subsequent Forms, as non-hypothetical is one that 
Brumbaugh suggests is very logical: 
 
In the second place, the good is non-hypothetical because any use of reason presupposes 
it. We may hold that every general proposition we know is merely probable, only an 
hypothesis; yet we still assume that the best hypothesis is the truest, that our hypothetical 
method is a good one, and that what is reasonable is also what is real. 
 
I add a third sense of the Good being non-hypothetical. Any discourse (including 
those of dianoia with its empirical, experientially abstracted concepts) will include the 
notion of a definitional standard used as a rule against which the appropriate use of any 
term can be judged. Plato holds that dianoia employs these pragmatic standards in its 
use of concepts, but noesis, at least when pursued as dialectic, makes its business the 
examination and contemplation of these standards themselves as ideals or perfect 
models. In this way, noesis approaches first principles. From this point, noesis is in a 
position to do two things.  
Firstly, the noetic thinker contemplates the Forms as a rational, architectonic unity, 
with each Form unifying its many participants, and all the Forms finding their unifying 
principle in the Form of the Good. The philosopher attracted to this contemplative ideal 
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must be compelled to descend from it if he or she is to educate others. As Plato has 
Socrates say: 
 
don’t be surprised that those who go there [i.e. achieve this beatific vision] are not willing 
to engage in human affairs, but their souls constantly hurry upwards to spend their time 
up there (517c-d) 
 
Although the philosopher must be compelled to descend from contemplation, this 
should not be an utterly difficult task, considering that the philosopher’s noetic desire 
concentrates on virtue, i.e. the principles of the Good, and therefore intends the general 
good beyond the intellectual enjoyments of contemplation. 
Secondly, therefore, the thinker in noesis may return from first principles to 
eikasia, pistis, and dianoia. Much of this insight-sharing, pro bono educational work 
necessarily involves allegories, because dianoia, pistis, and eikasia cannot progress if 
addressed solely at their own level; the living value within them must be maieutically 
educed. If concepts are given, concepts are returned; and the same goes for beliefs, 
conjectures, and images. Socratic dialectic must therefore proceed by showing 
contradictions that lie within the epistemic and doxastic levels preceding noesis.  
Plato usually demonstrates noesis through dialectic. The participants typically try to 
define the meaning of a single term, usually a virtue with which they are professionally 
acquainted, such as courage, piety, beauty, friendship, and knowledge, and then proceed 
by illustrations, questions, and answers to Socratic cross-examination. The original 
definitions and assumptions typically lead to contradictions. Socrates then leaves his 
formerly self-assured companions to face their newly admitted ignorance. With the 
aporia now dumbfoundingly apparent, his interlocutors, if humble and sincere, become 
invigorated with a genuine hunger for knowledge. In the middle and later dialogues, this 
model continues to advance by a series of tacks, pushing against contradictions, 
eliminating hypotheses, and drawing towards necessities. This procedure follows the 
argument wherever it will lead. 
So Plato describes noetic two modes: one proceeding positively to contemplate the 
Forms, the other proceeding at first negatively, using dialectic elenchos to reveal 
aporia, and fosters genuine intellectual curiosity, which moves toward ever finer 
definitions until first principles may positively be reached. It seems like Pato and Lato 
again, one in mystic contemplation, the other an analytic philosopher finessing 
distinctions and definitions. The dialectical mode is primarily governed by the law of 
contradiction as way of showing the self-evident aporia in assumptions and arguments. 
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Invariably, Socrates’ procedure appears ironic, as if he is speaking in one realm, e.g. 
pistis, while thinking in another, noesis.  
This Socrates often needs recourse to parables, similes, analogy, and symbol to 
convey noetic insights indescribable in the terms and counters of eikasia, pistis, or 
dianoia. Socrates must keep his inner eye on the object of noesis, and his outer, 
demonstrating focus on the respective theoretical development of those in the 
discussion. Naturally enough, Plato describes noesis as the ‘eye of the soul’ with its 
own objects, the Forms, appropriate to its own methods of apprehension (518-9). Plato 
says that the Form of the Good enlightens the soul, the ‘eye of the mind’ (533c) is ‘sun-
like’, and those who have reached the goal ‘raise the radiance of their soul and look at 
that that which brings light to all’ (540a). 
The notion of a part, or function, of the soul resembling the Forms appeals to the 
Romantics, for whom the Kantian critique holds hope for contact with noumenal reality. 
Kant’s critiques, of course, disappoint by barring actual encounter with this reality for 
any rational creature whose cognitive encounters can only be of phenomena, the 
projected categories necessary for intuition, and the rational but subjective Ideas needed 
to regulate such intuitions. Post-Kantian Romantic thinkers, however, revise Kant so 
that the transcendental Ideas become objective, mind-independent, transcendent 
realities. Just as the ocular eye must be somehow sun-like if it is to see, reason must be 
Form-like, and resemble the Good, the argument goes, if it is to contemplate noetically. 
Coleridge quotes Plotinus on this point: 
 
‘how beautiful is the countenance of justice and wisdom; . . . in order to view it aright . . . 
the beholder should have made himself . . . similar to the object beheld. Never could the 
eye have beheld the sun, had not its own essence been soliform’ (Ennead I, VI.4 & 9, in 
Biographia I, 114-5) 
 
Coleridge parenthetically explains this soliformity as:  
 
(i.e. pre-configured to light by a similarity of essence . . .) (115) 
 
Plato describes two modes of noesis, and Coleridgean reason corresponds to both. 
There is the mode of dialectic, examining propositions and definitions in dialogue, 
moving from hypotheses and aiming toward first principles, or the archē. The other, 
exalted mode of noesis is the contemplation of the Forms. This mode does not lend 
itself well to verbal description, and has been described, especially by the Neo-
Platonists, as ultimately ineffable. Perhaps for this reason more than any other, Plato 
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had recourse to analogy, etc., stimulating him to write most of the poetic passages in the 
dialogues.  
For Plato, the highest level of noesis, the end-point of dialectic, is beyond what can 
be put into words, and it can be induced, but not presented through dialectic. This is 
philosophy as maieusis, or midwifery. Plato affirms the ultimate ineffability of the 
noemata in perhaps the deepest single statement in his corpus, a superlative and utterly 
transcendent description of the Form of the Good. At Republic 509d10, Socrates asserts 
that,  
 
the Good is not being but superior to and beyond being in dignity and power.  
 
The Good, which for Plato is the Form of Forms, is essentially ideal. It is not an existent 
being, but its reality is known through its power. 
What is this power? There is a clue in a later dialogue, the Sophist, wherein the 
visiting Stranger is debating with the materialist Theaetetus, a bright young student of 
Mathematics and other higher studies, about materialism and anti-materialism.
40
The 
Stranger, championing an anti-materialist cause, proposes that he must only get his 
opponents to admit the reality of any entity, no matter how trivial, i.e., bodiless, in order 
to defeat the hard materialist position that the only things which exist are material 
bodies, or somata. Thus:  
 
If they can concede that there is something or other, even a trifle, which we can 
characterize as asomata, then that is already enough. (Sophist, 247d)  
  
Here the Stranger invites discussion about what it is to be, and the notion that 
whatever is must have a power (dunamis) to effect, to exert a causal influence (Sophist, 
247e). He argues that bodiless forms such as Justice, and their contraries, such as 
injustice, turn out to be powers, real movers, real and Ideal, whether adjectival or 
substantial. Justice, wisdom, and the soul in which they become manifest are realities 
that are themselves neither visible nor touchable. This clue from the Sophist shows 
Plato arguing that power is to be understood as a causal influence, so the power of the 
Good which surpasses being can be seen as an ideal, the contemplation of which has a 
real and pre-eminent power to influence reason, and hence choice, behaviour and ethical 
consideration. Beyond this position, Plato argues that the Forms themselves, and hence 
                                                 
40
 The Stranger from Elea has authority regarding wisdom. Plato sees Elea as the fount of 
Parmenidean monism. In Herodotus’s Histories, Solon is a stranger who visits foreign places to 
disseminate wisdom, and this topos can be found in early and classical Greek literature. Culture-
seeding by wise individuals is also a fascinating central thesis in Kingsley, 2003. 
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the law-like behaviour of the universe, are ultimately derived from, and find their unity 
and rationality in, the Form of the Good.  
Comparing Plato’s Divided Line and Coleridge’s harmonic polarity provides a 
schema for appreciating how Coleridge Romanticizes Platonism. The assimilation of 
Platonism to Romanticism requires certain changes to allow a modified Platonism to fit 
well with the Romantic program. In Coleridge’s scheme, eikasia’s place is given to 
sense and fancy. Plato’s eikasia is often been translated as ‘imagination’,41 and Plato 
accords it the lowest position, representing an insubstantial, illusory ‘shadow-world’ 
that is a state of virtual ignorance.  
While Coleridge sets fancy at this level, he places imagination proper on the other 
side of the polarity, which in Plato would be the side of episteme. Coleridge places 
imagination above the higher understanding and below reason. Thus imagination, for 
Coleridge, becomes that art necessary for episteme, drawing down reason and its Ideas. 
Imagination’s symbols allow access, in Coleridge’s Romantic modification, to Ideas 
that remain inaccessible to the conceptual understanding alone. 
Fancy, in the lower pole, is mimetic, aping shape and other properties accessible to 
sense. It alters by association, addition, subtraction, contiguity, similarity, inversion, 
and other basic operations that can be supported by the mechanical model. On the other 
hand, the Coleridgean imagination never simply produces with external shaping 
processes. It operates with a greater depth than that required for external and superficial 
shaping. Imagination creates towards a symbolic unity, manifesting principles and not 
merely resemblances. 
Coleridge expresses this point about imagination in stronger terms, describing, 
 
the living educts of the imagination; of that reconciling and mediatory power, which 
incorporating the reason in Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of 
the Senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the reason, gives birth to a 
system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths, of 
which they are the conductors. (Statesman’s Manual, 29) 
 
Reid (2006, 274) notes that these symbols are indeed the products of acts and energies, 
and that they should not be misconceived as reified relations and structures as though 
they were used allegorically, or as picture-language. 
By the consubstantiality of its symbols, Coleridge means that imagination:  
 
                                                 
41  E.g., Jowett, [1871] 1991, and Grube, [1935] 1980, although Reeve’s revision of Grube 
translates eikasia as ‘imaging’ rather than ‘imagination’. 
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always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the 
whole, abides itself as a living part in the Unity, of which it is the representative. 
(Statesman’s Manual, 30)  
 
This higher role of imagination operates beyond the representational use of perceptions, 
memories, mental images, and fancy’s recombinations. As such, Coleridgean 
imagination widely diverges from the Platonic scheme whereby imagination, as eikasia, 
is an unenlightened state of mind that takes the unexamined sensible appearances of the 
world at face value.  
I maintain that Coleridge’s higher imagination is a major contribution to 
formulating a Romantic philosophy. In this view, Romanticism modifies Platonism and 
continues the Neo-Platonic momentum. Neo-Platonism influenced the creation of 
Romanticism as a modification of Platonism. In his tract ‘On the Intelligible Beauty’ 
(Ennead V.8), Plotinus gently criticizes Plato’s position on art as mimesis, while 
proposing a more originary model of poetic and artistic creation. 
Elsewhere in the Enneads, Plotinus raises no objections to the doctrine of 
representation as mimesis, and even endorses the view. At Ennead V, 9.11, Plotinus 
classifies the arts and asserts that ‘painting and sculpture, dancing and mime’ are 
mimemata, i.e. mimetic arts that ‘use a model perceived by sense’. Music is contrasted 
against these arts as higher in origin because its model is not something sensible but is 
rather the symmetry and order of the intelligibles. With music, perhaps surprisingly, 
Plotinus ranks also architecture and carpentry, because their use of necessary 
proportions connects them, without the intermediary of a sensible model, to Ideal 
principles.  
The various connotations of the word logos, such as proportion, and musical 
relations pertaining to harmony, can help explain how Plotinus might have come by this 
interesting and I think intuitively appealing insight. The deductively provable axioms of 
geometry, key to architecture and carpentry, are emblematic of what Plato considers as 
dianoia-type knowledge, which conceptual knowing is lower than noeisis of the Forms, 
but is still episteme rather than doxa. To reiterate, noesis is to dianoia as pistis is to 
eikasia, thus the Divided Line represents a ratio of two ratios: 
 
 Noesis : Dianoia :: Pistis : Eikasia.  
 
Noesis and dianoia are forms of episteme, whereby dianoia is hypothetical and noesis is 
contemplative, in my interpretation. Certainly noesis is anhypothetical knowledge, that 
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is, it cannot be deduced from other propositions, and is rather a direct grasp of first 
principles. 
The different forms of knowledge and of opinion create their respective arts. 
Plotinus’s ranking music, architecture, and carpentry as higher arts that model at least 
the mathematika (for example the axioms of Geometry) and hence rank as genuine 
knowledge, as opposed to painting, sculpture, dance, and mime does not contradict 
anything in Plato. Although in the Divided Line Plato places painting in the category of 
eikasia, along with natural images such as shadows and reflections, he does not mention 
anything of music, architecture, or carpentry in this passage. Nevertheless, on the 
argument that these arts derive from use of the mathematicals, we can see how they can 
be placed along the Divided Line as an application of dianoia.  
On the same theme, but now much later in the Republic (in Book X), Plato 
compares the bed of the carpenter with that of the painter, and it is almost certainly this 
that Plotinus has in mind when he ranks carpentry as a higher art, next to music. While 
Plato argues that the painting is two removes from the archē, or original, of the bed, the 
carpenter’s bed, which is itself the model for the painter, is only one remove from the 
‘Idea’ of the bed. Plato says this Ideal bed is divinely made, and therefore a Form, the 
Bed, while the sensible-object bed of the carpenter is a bed, and though it may be a very 
good bed, it will inevitably fall short of ideal and universal perfection.
42
 
I take the Bed passage to be a didactic analogy to illustrate the differences between 
originals and imitations, so that Socrates can maintain his argument for the censorship 
of poetry. This is an argument that the Romantics, especially Coleridge, would no doubt 
wish to modify, and Plotinus’s modification regarding intelligible beauty would allow 
poetry, as itself using music, to have the status of noetic contemplation, and not merely 
that of eikasia, although its roots would still be in eikasia. Because aesthetic exploration 
and contemplation stem from the same forming principles as the object contemplated, 
the work of imagination can, according to Plotinus, lead towards ideal noesis just as 
mathematics for Plato leads to noesis without entering into it. 
In Coleridge’s system, sense (aisthesis in Plato) harmonizes with reason (noesis). 
While Plato’s Divided Line is dynamic and may be read in both directions (starting 
from images reading epistemologically, and starting from Ideas reading ontologically), 
                                                 
42
 Plotinus avoids the problem of the Ideal Bed, and whether there are Forms of artifacts, by 
arguing that architects’ and carpenters’ products come from intelligible principles available to 
dianoia’s mathematical thinking, and not directly from the Forms. 
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Coleridge’s model adds the further dynamic tension of polarity, and it is this which 
brings out the aforementioned harmonies. Thus Coleridge shows how sense rhymes 
with reason. Sense itself cannot be mistaken, although opinions (doxa) about it can, and 
sense and reason each have an intuitive immediacy that is absent from the levels in 
between. 
Configuring the line (in his ‘order of the mental Powers’, Marginalia V, 798, and 
Appendix A, below) as a polarity, Coleridge dignifies sense by bringing out its affinities 
with reason. This move is significant in Coleridge’s Romanticizing Plato. With a clearly 
polar harmony, reason can now be judged as more like its polar counterpart, sense, and 
less similar to understanding, despite understanding being a nearer neighbour along the 
pole. An appropriate similitude would be to say that Antarctica is more alike to the 
Arctic, its polar counterpart, than it is to New Zealand, its linearly nearer neighbour.  
Coleridge’s tweaking of Plato’s Divided Line into a harmonic polarity also stirs 
some lines of speculative inquiry that appeal to the Romantic imagination. If reason is 
more present, although somnambulant, in sense than in understanding, we might ask if 
some Ideas can be intuitively felt in aesthetic experience, in aisthesis. Could this 
provide a way of framing an explanation of how moral and other non-sensible qualities 
can seem to be felt almost palpably? 
Such questions pursue the aesthetic route to contemplating Ideas. Although Plato 
argues for dialectic as the best way to proceed to the Forms, there are other ways: 
prophecy; divine madness; love; contemplation of beauty. Dialectic is best for Plato 
because its method is transparent, requiring rational assent with every step. Aesthetic 
ascent also seeks assent, but the yes of pleasure is not the yes of reason. Being irrational, 
the aesthetic way can lose the intellectual sense of proportion (ratio), although it adds a 
balance of significant feeling towards the aspect of enjoyment in contemplation. 
Regarding the balance of aesthetic with intellectual agreement, one may assent to 
pleasure’s affirmation only if that pleasure is felt, while, correspondingly, one may 
assent to reason only if that reason is understood.  
Do pleasure and reason not both persuade towards their respective kinds of 
pathemata, of subjective experiences? As those who would proliferate their pleasure 
seek smiles, those who would have their reasons ratified seek nods of agreement. The 
Romantics seek higher truth and aesthetic-intellectual intensity in uniting deep feelings 
with profound thoughts. For Plato, poetry and heightened, spirited states of feeling can 
also ascend to the heights much as thought can. For him, however, poetry and 
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heightened feeling are of a lower value than philosophical thought because they are at 
best gifts, albeit divine gifts, that have been conferred gratuitously rather than hard-won 
through meritorious exertion of thought towards reason. Promethean, philosophy’s 
greater value lies in its costing so much more, and though essentially incomplete, it is 
an excellence far harder-won than any more perfect gift that, though wondrous, comes 
at little or no human cost. 
Plato’s poetic descriptions exemplify and express, rather than explain, the ultimate 
convergence of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.  But is poetry for Plato just a medium for 
indicating what he noetically encounters in purer form? Or, are Plato’s poetic flights as 
necessary, or at least helpful, for his own ascent as they are for his students and 
readership? Poetry, love, madness, and prophecy can also ascend to the Forms, as Plato 
has Socrates argue in the Phaedrus. But they retain a sensuality, a lower soul 
(comprised by spirit (thumos) and appetite (epithumia, or the less noble orexie), but not 
noûs, the higher soul),
43
 as he puts it, attached to sensation.  
Is there an aesthetic access to the Good? Can people be good without being 
rationally so? To help illustrate the question within a familiar setting, we can see Kant 
answering it in the negative. For Kant, only a rational being can be ethical, because only 
a rational being can be free from the sway of sensuality and choose its own law, the 
moral law that is demonstrably non-contradictory if universalized. Hence only a rational 
being can have autonomy. Could there nevertheless be a dialectic of the heart? Or, a 
dialectic of the lower soul, of spirit and appetite? If so, could its dynamic be anything 
other than the heteronomous use of sensation by reason?  
The heart does not announce its procedure step-by-step with logically connected 
propositions. But then, why should it? It is not the reason. Inasmuch as the mind may 
look down on the heart’s apparent naivety, it cannot look down on its contradictions. 
The heart does not have contradictions, and this is because only propositions can 
contradict one another. The heart could just as well feel the mind’s impotence and 
irrelevance to the experienced situation as the mind deduces the heart’s seemingly 
incommensurable methods of finding the truth. 
Coleridge’s Romanticizing the Divided Line into a harmonic polarity provides a 
schema that expands Plato’s model to accommodate some of Plato’s own views on 
beauty. The divine madness that Plato describes in Symposium and Phaedrus is a state 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., Republic, X, 602-5. This distinction is also made in Gorgias and Phaedrus. 
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in which one ‘intuits Beauty itself’ (Symposium, 211E), inspired to this vision by the 
attraction felt towards the appearance of a beautiful person. The Romanticization of 
Plato is itself descended from Platonism, and is a call to listen to both sides at once, that 
is, to all in each. 
The Ideas are not renounced as illusory, merely metaphysical, creations to be 
committed to the flames in favour of the purely phenomenal, as the Empiricists 
champion. The Romantic value of the Ideal remains, but it gains aesthetic nuance 
through Coleridge’s powerful polar harmonization of sense with reason. Coleridge even 
moves Plato's phantasia, a large portion of eikasia, well above the division between 
opinion (doxa) and knowledge (episteme) and beyond dianoia, or the higher 
understanding, to become reason’s intermediary, its nearest neighbour and ally. 
We can pursue further this notion of reason rhyming and resonating in sense yet 
absent to the understanding. Disgust, aversion, revulsion, as much as admiration, etc., 
are aesthetic impressions that have an intuitively moral feel. However defeasible the 
knowledge claims in these experiences are, moral qualities in people’s characters tend 
to be experienced as things felt. A person can be experienced as creepy, slimy, as Sartre 
([1943] 1996, 610-2) analyses, shifty, chilling, as well as firm, dependable, and warm. 
Indeed, in the conviction of feeling, these qualities are taken for direct intuitions as 
much as when perceiving someone as tall, blond, or loud.  
The harmony between reason and sense can also be recognized when we reflect that 
the intuitions of aisthesis are direct, because the objects are immediate. The red patch I 
intuit in sense is precisely as it appears, no more and no less. Whether or not it is a 
representation of something inaccessible to sense is irrelevant to saying that the red 
patch as such is exactly as it appears. This directness and immediacy of the state of 
mind to its object is a harmony between sense and reason in Coleridge’s schema. 
Whereas belief, opinion, and conceptual understanding involve an inevitable 
distance between the thing thought and the thinking, this epistemological gap does not 
exist in Plato’s account of noesis. In noesis, the mind directly contemplates the Idea. 
Indeed, even that formulation implies a distance or difference that is not intended in 
Neo-Platonist accounts. For them, it is more accurate to say that in the act of 
contemplation (‘vision’, or theoria), the One (to Hen, Plato’s Form of the Good), the 
Intellect (Noûs, constituting the Ideas), and the Soul (Psyche) unite. There is no Idea on 
one side with the thought of it on the other. This does not mean, however, that a 
Platonic Idea is an idea in the ordinary sense of the word, denoting something mental 
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that can only exist in a mind. Translating eidos with ‘Idea’ can lead to such mistakes, 
and the alternative translation, ‘Form’, is similarly prone to being misunderstood. 
I have argued for a proto-Romantic Plato who is sometimes at odds with his own 
more linear, logical expositions, but I avoid supporting ‘two Platos’ readings. The 
proto-Romantic, poetic Plato is not merely an interpretation of Plato by the Romantics, 
but can be justified by tensions within Plato, and within single dialogues, between his 
poetic passages and his more straightforward expositions and discussions. Plato sees the 
need for a poetic vision allowing aisthesis to experience beauty as ideal and astonishing.  
This position is most prominent in Phaedrus, Symposium, and Republic Book VII, 
and for some commentators it contrasts with his most thoroughly logical explanations 
and arguments in dialogues such as the Theaetetus and the Parmenides, and perhaps his 
Academy lecture on the Good, going on Aristotle’s bemused account of it, when the 
audience expected an ethical theme and received a discussion of abstruse 
mathematics.
44
 The poetry and the mathematics, however, do not seem so incongruous 
when we remember that the apex of Plato’s system was the praeter-conceptuality of 
reality’s Ideal referents. 
Initially influenced by Plotinus, and with some details regarding symbolism 
developed from Procus’s symbolon (see below, page 105 fn.), Coleridge shapes a 
Romantic Platonism that modifies imagination’s place and role in his own system. For 
Plato imagination occupies the lowest level of thought, being a kind of fascination, 
whereas for Coleridge it represents the only form through which the mind can access 
Ideas, considered as intellectual objects beyond concepts. Coleridge develops the 
perennial philosophy, especially the Plotinian approach to Platonism, which runs 
through the ‘spiritual, platonic old England’ of the Renaissance Platonist Shakespeare, 
Spenser, and Milton; the Cambridge Platonists Henry More and Ralph Cudworth; the 
‘English divines’ such as Jeremy Taylor and Robert Leighton;45 and the Romantics: 
 
Let England be Sir P. Sidney, Shakespere, Spenser, Milton, Bacon, Harrington, Swift, 
Wordsworth; and never let the names of Darwin, Johnson, Hume, furr it over! – If these 
too must be England, let them be another England / –– or rather let the first be old 
England / the spiritual, platonic old England / & the second with Locke at the head of the 
Philosophers and Pope of the poets, with the long list of Priestleys, Payleys, Hayleys, 
                                                 
44 Aristotle’s account is recorded by his associate, Aristoxenus of Tarentum, the earliest-known 
Greek authority for music, in Elements of Harmony, II, 30–31. 
45 Aids to Reflection is a series of aphorisms and reflections on the intellectual, moral, and 
contemplative importance of reflection. Coleridge refers throughout to Archbishop Leighton’s 
writings, which, Coleridge elsewhere says, exemplify a faithful and powerful concentration on 
‘the august objects of his habitual contemplation’, Letters V, 198-9. 
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Darwins,
46
 Mr Pitts, Dundasses, &c &c be representative of commercial G Britain / these 
have their merits but are as alien to me, as the Mandarin Philosophers and Poets of China 
(Notebooks 2, 2598 ) 
 
This Platonic strain argues that there is a universal logos discernible in the workings or 
laws of nature, as well as in the laws of thought and the thinkable, often challenging the 
concepts of everyday thinking, and leading its thinkers to contemplate praeter-
conceptual principles and ideals.  
                                                 
46 The Darwin is Erasmus, not his grandson Charles, who was not born until 1809, four years 
after this note was written.  
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 Plato’s Divided Line 
           Ousia (being)                  Genesis (becoming) 
              Noeton                Doxaston (opinable) or Horaton (visible) 
            Intelligible                         Sensible  
 
          Higher Forms/ Ideas               Mathematical ideas/ Concepts                            Sensible things         Images of things 
        
Goodness, Truth,                    Circle, triangle    Horse-ness,                         Horses, dogs,             copies of things  
                      reflections, 
Beauty, Justice                     line, numbers   dog-ness,                    tables, specific things    shadows, paintings, 
             table-ness            poetic imagery
  
   
 
        Intelligence                  Logical understanding                        Belief                      Imagination 
 Reason                              Science  & rational thinking                           Illusion 
    Noesis          Dianoia                   Pistis    Eikasia 
                                                    Knowledge                                                       Opinion   
             (Episteme)                       (Doxa) 
 
 
 
Coleridge’s ‘order of the Mental Powers’ (see Appendix A) 
 
Highest    
        Reason                Imagination         Higher  Understanding ––––––––Lower Understanding           Fancy                      Sense 
 
 
lowest 
         Sense                   Fancy                Lower  Understanding –––––––– Higher Understanding          Imagination             Reason 
Figure 1: Plato’s Divided Line and Coleridge’s Order of the Mental Powers 
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Part Two. Neo-Platonic, Kantian, and Coleridgean Ideas. 
 
Part Two reads Coleridge’s notion of Ideas as a Romantic development of Plato’s 
Forms, interpreted through his reflections on Plotinus and Kant. I will situate my 
reading with reference to different traditional and contemporary positions and 
interpretations. I continue to advance the thesis that Coleridge interprets and recasts key 
Platonic notions to provide a philosophical framework for the Romanticism of which he 
was a first-generation founder. As Part One argued that Coleridge revises the Platonic 
scheme with regard to the nature and role of imagination, Part Two will show how he 
rethinks the nature and role of Ideas. For reasons of limited space, and because Plato’s 
Theory of Ideas has been discussed in Part One, Part Two will commence with 
Plotinus’s Neo-Platonic Ideas as our next step in approaching the important role that the 
contemplation of Ideas has in Coleridge’s philosophy.47 
Coleridge’s Romantic system presents a dynamic philosophy of Idea, imagination 
and will. Elevating the role of imagination allows a reassessment of Ideas of reason to 
be made. This is mainly due to his re-positioning of imagination as a faculty through 
which Ideas could be reached not through empirically generated and abstracted 
concepts, but through symbols and metaphors that point beyond themselves. This 
pointing is not a pointing towards phenomena within experience, or of generalizations 
from experience, but towards that which explains and underlies phenomena, and is 
therefore not itself phenomenal. 
 
2.2 Plotinus’s Neo-Platonic Ideas 
Reflecting on his studies, Coleridge says he ‘soon found that [he] had read Plato by 
anticipation’ (Table Talk I, 98-9, 31 March, 1830), having first read the Neo-Platonists. 
We will see how Coleridge Romanticized Plato via Plotinus in forming his philosophy. 
As Hedley (2000, 100) relates it, Plotinus ‘uses conceptual reflection with the goal of 
reaching an experience which transcends conceptuality’. This careful attempt 
philosophically to approach and convey the praeter-conceptual is a central notion in the 
account of contemplation that I am developing in this study of Coleridge’s thought. 
                                                 
47 A chapter on what Ideas are for Plato has been written, and will be included in a later version 
of this thesis, developed for a book. 
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Despite contrary interpretations, I find reason to consider Plotinus as opposing 
Two-Worlds views as representing the ultimate and only reality.
48
 My reasoning is 
similar to that pursued in the Indian Védānta (divine wisdom texts, comprising the most 
philosophical texts of the Upanishads) which hold that all is ātma, and there is, in the 
strictest and ultimate sense, no māyā (illusion or appearance).49 I read Plotinus himself 
to express frustration that Plato’s style could be taken as implying a separationist Two-
Worlds theory.
50
 Plotinus, like Plato, sometimes has things to say about different stages 
of epistemological progress, so he describes objects in sense, opinion, and conceptual 
understanding as Here, whereas noesis contemplates intelligible reality There.  
An important note arises here concerning uncertainty. Eikastic, pistic (both are 
doxa) and dianoetic thought correspond to mediated, and not ultimate, reality. Eikasia 
being fascinated means it connects directly to what truly is; pistis having conviction in 
its objects and their events convince it of its objects’ solid reality. Nevertheless, pistis 
also has a belief unavailable to eikasia, often superstitious, in invisible forces, be they 
natural, psychological, or supernatural. Unlike eikasia, pistis admits uncertainty, and its 
convictions can thereby be stronger or weaker. Dianoia more clearly comprehends and 
formulates is own provisional, hypothetical nature, and hence is aware of degrees of 
uncertainty. 
As I read Plotinus, he says that when one noetically contemplates intelligible 
reality, one is There: returned or returning to a metastasis (Intellect) transcendent to 
mundane sensibles. This contemplation cannot be made in the One, because that would 
imply a reflective duality within the One.
51
 The way I express my view on Plotinus’s 
talk of Here and There might make henôsis, his term for mystical union with the One 
seem too easy, as if one simply has to switch gaze. I do not intend to make it sound so 
effortless, but then, effortlessness is not always so easily achieved. That said, I will 
later, in Part Four, consider the merits and limits of Daoist and other accounts that 
emphasise passivity, flow, being natural, and a striving for ataraxia.  
The position I present regarding Plotinus’s use of Two-Worlds language is 
embryonic, but I find reasons to develop it. These reasons I find in Plotinus, and in my 
                                                 
48
 For clear interpretations of Plotinus as a Two-Worlds thinker, see Menn, 2011; and 
Hathaway, 2002, which explicitly argue that Plotinus maintains a dualism of separate realms. 
49 For discussion, see ed. Gregorios, 2002, passim. 
50 See Ennead VI.5.8, quoted below, this chapter. 
51 There is scholarly debate as to what exactly happens in Plotinian mystical experience, and 
even whether it is rightly called mystical. Brisson for example, says it is not. Does the mystic 
achieve union with the One, or only with the Intellect? Hadot argues for the latter, and I agree, 
believing that henôsis is the experience of the part of soul undescended from Intellect. 
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own experience. In my late teens and until my early thirties, I had two, three, or four 
experiences that I find entirely natural to describe as mystical, and my every atom, 
thought, and tendency radiated effortlessly in all directions throughout the universe and 
either made, or made me aware of, profound interconnection. The interim periods of 
ordinary life seemed comparatively mundane, although they were enriched because of 
the intense experience irradiating through them.  
Another occasion was not one of emanating from within, but of being touched, 
seized in fact, from without, as if by an intelligent ray of light, yet there was nothing 
visual in the experience. I responded attentively and emotively to its import, and 
wavered between fear, renewed confidence, and feeling comfort from that transcendent 
but connecting power. Other occasions were of a heightened sense of the repercussions 
of actions, even apparently minute ones, including acts of attention, discernment, and 
perception. They imparted an intense realization of the seemingly infinite significances 
and moral weight of how we comport ourselves to face, perceive, and act (and action 
includes thinking and spiritual movements here) with respect to our immediate 
surroundings; the wider, historical world; and the cosmos as metaphysically understood.  
Ordinary life is transformed thereafter, but a normality returns, of lesser intensity 
than these extraordinary experiences. The gradual return to normality is now revealed, 
however, as a less intense mode of the connectedness and meaningfulness experienced 
in the powerful, elevated modes, and it is therefore difficult to count or separate 
mystical experiences, at least in the terms that my account suggests.
52
 I suggest that 
periods of forgetfulness of the experiential intensity can be used to count extraordinary 
experiences one from another, but it seems that they are connected below the surface, 
and that ordinariness is like the sea that only apparently separates islands in an 
archipelago. 
Like ripples, the experiences of universal connectedness felt closer to ultimate 
reality, but still a way off, and they impressed me with (a) the sense that I have much to 
learn; with (b), which is more profound, the reason to believe that there is indeed much 
to learn; and with (c) the conviction that it all matters, even in the apparently slightest 
details. Those experiences felt like they were the more real, and I therefore realised that 
the mundane experiences were necessarily a part of them. The ripple analogy still holds 
here, and I find coincidences with Plotinus’s accounts: the mystical experiences are the 
                                                 
52 N.b. I do not say I had one, two, three or four mystical experiences. If I were to talk about one 
experience, it would be to say that all of life’s episodes are of one mystical experience. 
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wave crests of the liquid that is rippling, and the periods of mundane living are the 
plateaus.  
Normality and ordinariness notwithstanding, the plateaus have their ripples too: 
fine, far-spreading, and shimmeringly beautiful. Moreover, there is nothing lesser about 
their substance and identity compared to the very same particles that rise with the 
ripples.
53
 There are similarities between my account, and Plotinus’s account of mystical 
experience, or henôsis (union with the One). Plotinus says, 
 
But one must go along with the words, if one in speaking of that Good uses of necessity 
to indicate it expressions which we do not strictly allow to be used, but one should 
understand ‘as if’ [hoion] with each of them. (Ennead VI, 8.13, 48-50) 
 
I have no objection to my description of this experience or series of experiences 
being criticized. It struck me as very odd that most people do not talk about these 
experiences, because, I could not help thinking, surely everybody is part of it. Plotinus 
has the same thought when he asks, 
 
Why then, when we have such great possessions, do we not consciously grasp them, but 
are mostly inactive in these ways, and some of us are never active at all?  
 
And he answers his own question, saying that most are too busy, never still. Indeed, he 
says, 
 
They are always occupied in their own activities, Intellect, and that which is before 
Intellect, always in itself, and soul, which is in this sense ‘ever-moving’. (Ennead V, 
1.12.1) 
 
It seems now that in the lengthening plateau periods, one ought to be bringing up, 
educating and orienting, as Plato puts it, the Here where and when one is, and by that I 
mean not just one’s children, students, neighbours, and community, but just as 
importantly, and often first of all, oneself, especially in terms of one’s feelings, aesthetic 
sense, sense of humour, of enjoyment, desire, and fun, so that nothing remains that may 
escape the cultivating light of reason and thence be improved in the direction of the 
Good. This is how one prepares most generally for contemplation.  
I hope this short personal account helps to explain some reason behind my position 
against separatist Two-Worlds interpretations of Plato and Plotinus, rather than crudely 
and murkily mystify it.
54
 I have hardly mentioned these experiences before this 
                                                 
53 Describing mystical experience, it is good to be reminded that one could say as it were and so 
to speak after almost every uttered word (even and, in, the, and is). 
54 This question approaches the heart of the two-worlds / non-two-worlds views that differently 
interpret existence and transcendence in Indian Philosophy, Plato, the Neo-Platonists, and even 
  79 
dissertation. I always felt they were too holy, and that it would be blasphemous to talk 
of them unless proper respect and caution be given. I found an ally in Socrates, who 
Plato represents as praying, in the Phaedrus, not to offend the gods again before he 
discourses sincerely on love, after having first spoken of it only cleverly. There are 
many philosophical questions that arise from examining that attitude of feeling that it is 
not just insufficient, but apparently morally wrong, to talk lightly of something so awe-
inspiring. 
Two Plotinian features modifying Platonism influence – or are at least consistent 
with – the Romantic outlook. Firstly, the aforementioned account of poietic imagination 
in the Enneads surpasses Plato’s theory of mimesis. Plotinus’s dynamic, contemplative 
artist creates with the same Forms as nature itself. Dynamic, non-mimetic artistic 
creation also hallmarks Coleridge’s Romantic organicism. For Plotinus, poiesis is a 
parallel creativity, rather than reproduction further removed from its model. In this Part 
(Part Two) I further discuss the role and place of imagination and the treatment of Ideas 
in Plotinus. 
Plotinus’s second modification of Platonism relates directly to his elevating art and 
imagination. In the spirit of the Phaedrus and Symposium, Plotinus accounts for 
accessing intelligibles through sense perception. Imagination, for Plotinus, is therefore 
the border (methorion) between the sensible and the intelligible. Thus Imagination 
[phantasia],  
 
possesses all things in a secondary way, and not so perfectly [unlike Intellect], it becomes 
all things, and since it is a thing belonging to the frontier between [methorion] the worlds, 
and occupies a corresponding position, it moves in both directions [i.e. between the levels 
of nature and Intellect]. (Ennead IV, 4.3) 
 
Imagination thereby allows the aesthetic contemplation of Ideas. Goethe and Coleridge 
follow this path in their respective theories of symbolism. Moreover, the Plotinian notion 
of imagination as the middle position moving up and down between Sense and Reason is 
a direct ancestor of the Coleridgean imagination. Blake succinctly and compellingly 
represents contemplating the intelligible through the sensible: 
 
If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear to man as it is, infinite. 
For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro’ narrow chinks of his cavern. 
([1790] 1994, 184) 
                                                                                                                                               
Kant, and it bears deeply on the theory of contemplation that I develop in this thesis, and I 
cannot yet formulate a satisfactory and explicit position on the matter. This matter also, I 
believe, relates to Coleridge’s semi-attraction to pantheism and his commitment to the Christian 
notion of divine transcendence mediated by Christ as incarnate Logos. 
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Likewise, Augustine pays homage to the beauty experienced in contemplation of the 
Ideal in and through the aesthetic world, which he calls ‘all these things in my external 
environment’: 
 
My question was the attention I gave them, and their response was their beauty ([398] 
1991, X, vi, 9) 
 
Plotinus’s account of artistic creation distances itself from Plato’s mimetic theory. 
He describes creative imagination as a process informed by the seminal principles 
relevant to what is contemplated. Addressing the forming principles of the object 
negates the separation, i.e. Plato’s removes between subject and model. Plotinian 
poiesis parallels nature, rather than standing two or three removes from it, and thereby 
achieves genuine originality. Thus,  
 
music in the world of sense is made by the music prior to this world. But if anyone 
despises the arts because they produce their works by imitating nature, we must tell him, 
first, that natural things are imitations too. Then he must know that the arts do not simply 
imitate what they see, but they run back up to the forming principles, from which nature 
derives; then also that they [the artists] do a great del by themselves, and, since they 
possess beauty, they make up what is defective in things. (Ennead V, 8.1) 
 
Coleridge agrees that genuine, original art participates in Ideas, thereby deriving 
value. He interprets his task as upholding this position against concept-giddy, utilitarian, 
empirico-mechanistic philosophy. Almost two centuries since Biographia’s publication, 
his project is still relevant today as high-profile conceptual art is displayed and 
applauded and the essentially axiological aesthetic presentation of the Ideal is derided. 
Ideas can only be presented aesthetically, according to the Plotinian-Coleridgean view, 
representing the universal in the particular presented experience. Thus, 
 
if anyone does really make according to wisdom itself, let us grant that the artists are like 
this. (Ennead V, 8.5.4-5) 
 
Plotinus probably does not mean, however, that all artists always produce from wisdom 
itself. The beautiful individual, through which the Ideal is contemplated, is itself 
aesthetically contemplated in any particular artwork, and is appreciated as original. 
Diametrically opposed to aesthetic particularity, conceptual artwork is essentially 
substitutable. Not only are conceptual artworks substitutable, as when Tracy Emin’s 
‘My Bed’ was installed in Tokyo, New York, and London with different beds, it can 
also be conveyed by, say, a sociological essay without important loss of aesthetic 
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content and message. Opposing a sense of poiesis as conceptual rendering, Plotinus 
understands it as essentially praeter-conceptual and aesthetic. 
Plotinian poiesis works from the inside out: extricating intellectual beauty into 
concrete expression, thus lending the physical object and its details an apparent 
necessity. Plotinian poiesis’ unifying process foreshadows Romantic organicism. What 
Plotinus sees as an artwork’s intellectual unity leads Kant to find in art purposiveness 
without purpose. Aesthetic response thus attributes unifying vision to such art. For 
Plotinus, an artwork’s creative unity is internal, evolving from a principle, rather than 
being externally forced by a conceptual plan. The artist thus,  
 
goes back again to the wisdom of nature, according to which he has come into existence, 
a wisdom which is no longer composed of theorems, but is one thing as a whole, not the 
wisdom made into one out of many components, but rather resolved into multiplicity 
from one. (Ennead V, 8.5.5-10) 
 
He explicitly signals poetry and music as authentic paths to contemplation and 
genuinely deep insight. The artwork’s unity and beauty conveys that of the Intellectual 
Principle. Indeed any artwork for Plotinus is essentially a musical contemplation that 
appreciates beyond discursive concepts. The artist, and not only the Platonic 
philosopher, contemplates and conveys the Ideal. Schelling (1978, 231) extrapolates 
from this view, declaring art ‘the only true document of philosophy’. 
Through Plotinus, then, comes Romanticism’s ideal of poetic wisdom. In Schelling 
art becomes the real driver of intellectual progress, working through philosophical 
stances produced through its concrete documents. These artworks are at once available 
to the senses and symbolic conveyors of Ideas. Coleridge describes,  
 
poetic wisdom [and its . . .] results and symbols of living power as contrasted with lifeless 
mechanism––of free and rival originality as contradistinguished from servile imitation . . . 
instead of a true imitation of the essential principles. (Lit. Lects I, 494) 
 
Coleridge expresses the artwork’s Plotinian internal unity in terms of organic form. 
Organicism first becomes a Romantic precept in A. W. Schlegel (1846). He then 
contrasts organic form with mechanism, with the latter forcing unity from without, 
while the former develops from internal necessity. Through imagination, the 
Coleridgean artist conveys Ideas of reason that are: 
 
essentially one with the germinal causes in nature. (‘On Poesy or Art’, ed. Shawcross 
Biographia Literaria, 1907, 253-63) 
 
On the other hand, as he says in his 1812-13 ‘Lectures on Belles Lettres’, 
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The form is mechanic, when on any given material we impress a pre-determined form, as 
when to a mass of wet clay we give whatever shape we wish it to retain when hardened. 
The organic form, on the other hand, is innate, it shapes as it develops from within, and 
the fullness of its development is one and the same with the perfection of its outward 
form. (Lit. Lects I, 495)
55
 
 
Plotinus’s first hypostasis, the One, corresponds to Plato’s beyond being of the Form of 
the Good, or Form of Forms. By the same principle that the One is beyond being, 
Intellect, or Noûs, is being. Intellect is an emanation from the One, but this is not meant 
to describe any temporal procedure, and Plotinus states, at Ennead VI, 4 and 5, that the 
language and images he uses to describe emanation is metaphorical.
56
 O’Connell (1963) 
elegantly states the problem that Plotinus addresses here as being that: 
 
we conceive of the relation of the superior world (which includes the soul, the ideas, and 
God) to the inferior world, in terms drawn from sense, in terms appropriate to concrete 
sensible reality and to the working of our imagination, rather than to intelligence in its 
genuine operation. Put another way, we do not draw our principles from the appropriate 
intelligible realm, but from the inferior, corporeal realm. 
 
By the term próodos (progress, or proceeding), Plotinus describes the principle by 
which the One denotes the unity of the Forms, whereas Intellect denotes Forms 
considered in plurality, allowing for intelligible structure. Intellect’s highest activity 
contemplates the One as the unity of the Forms. 
Correspondingly, Soul is a further emanation, whose external activity is nature and 
whose internal activity is the affective and conative activity. As Intellect has its Forms, 
Soul has seminal formative principles: the seeds of things, or spermatic reasons, being 
the principles shaping nature (Ennead IV, 4.39.7). Despite speaking of Here and There, 
Plotinus is, I argue, no separationist Two-Worlds (or Three-Worlds, for he discusses the 
three hypostases of the One, the Intellect, and the Soul) theorist. Yes, on the discursive 
dianoetic level, there is the One, there is the Intellect, and there is the Soul, but on the 
level of ultimate truth, there is only the One, but even the word is misleads here. Plotinus 
explicitly denies separation, or chôrismos, and criticizes, as we will soon see, Plato’s 
formulations that allow such readings.  Plotinus reasons that,  
 
Nothing is separated or cut off from that which is before it. (Ennead V, 2.1.22-3)  
 
                                                 
55 Paraphrasing Schlegel’s definition of organicism: Schlegel, [1809-11] 2007, 340. 
56 Cf. Emilsson, 1994, 88. 
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Unlike a painting, which is separate, once produced, from its painter, Plotinian Intellect 
and Soul, in which subsists material Nature, are more like light from a torch: always 
connected to its source:  
 
just as the image of something, like the weaker light, if cut off from that from which it is, 
would no longer exist . . . these powers also which came from that first could not exist cut 
off from it. (Ennead VI, 4.9.36-43) 
 
Plotinian emanation, however, not only proceeds from its source, in what me might call 
the prolonging path of meditation, but it also can pause, turning to contemplate its 
source, and thereby perfect its essence by reflectively gazing on its Form, which itself 
proceeds from the One. Soul, then, of which body is a part, may also return to its source, 
unlike the light from a flashlight, but something closer, superficially imaged, to current 
controversial cosmologies that theorize a Big Crunch after every Big Bang (Ellis, et al, 
2012, 146–7). 
We can also image Plotinus’s system as internally stacked matryushka dolls; as 
ripples emanating from a drop; or, a Plotinian favourite, radii expanding from a hub. 
Ennead V, 5.9.30-4 explains that the hypostases are not separate locations: 
 
But Soul is not in the universe, but the universe is in it: for body is not the soul’s place, 
but Soul is in the Intellect and body is in Soul,
57
 and Intellect in something else; but there 
is nothing other than this for it to be in: it is not, then, in anything; in this way, therefore, 
it is nowhere. Where then are the other things? In it.  
 
Thus he aims to avoid anyone taking misleading spatial formulations too seriously. He 
writes, then, as carefully as he can of phenomena understood as in Soul; of Soul in 
Intellect; and Intellect in the One, which is in nothing and is nowhere, beyond being. 
On Plotinus’s aforementioned frustration at Plato’s formulations that seem to invite 
Two-Worlds readings, Sara Rappe observes that,  
 
we catch glimmers of Plotinus’ critique of linguistic practices that characterized . . . the 
prior philosophical tradition. . . .  [He] criticizes the Platonic language of abstraction and 
along with it the entire Platonic dualist ontology. (Rappe, 2000, 113) 
 
Thus Plotinus says, 
 
the ideas are not placed separately and matter on one side a long way off on the other and 
then illumination comes to matter from somewhere up there: I am afraid this would be 
empty words. For what could ‘far off’ and ‘separately’ mean in this context? (Ennead VI, 
5.8) 
 
                                                 
57 Armstrong notes that body being in soul is a Platonic doctrine; see Timaeus, 36E. 
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Plotinus is frustrated not at the participatory theory of Forms and particulars, but with a 
way of speaking that puzzles many of Plato’s readers. 
Plotinus’s stance against separationist Two-Worlds theories coheres with his 
aesthetics of the experience of beauty as the proper response to ‘the One Life’, 
Plotinus’s phrase for how the One is present to the universe it contains. At the end of 
Ennead VI 5.11, he says, 
 
Form is certainly in some way present to everything. 
 
He continues, beginning Ennead VI, 5.12:  
 
How then is it [Form] present? As one life: for life in a living being does not reach only so 
far, and then is unable to extend over the whole, but it is everywhere.
58
  
 
Coleridge describes his aesthetic response with the same phrase, in ‘The Eolian Harp’: 
 
O! the one Life within us and abroad, 
Which meets all motion and becomes it soul,  
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light, 
Rhythm in all thought, and joyance every where–– 
 
From his own One Life standpoint, Plotinus argues against Gnostic Two-World-ism 
(Ennead II, 9, ‘Against the Gnostics’). He opposes the doctrine that the sense-world is 
evil. Gnosticism, he charges, disregards virtue and fails to understand the intelligible 
within the sensible: 
 
But every soul is a child of That Father. . . . How can this universe exist if it was 
cut off from that other world? . . . [B]ecause they despise . . . [what is so nearly 
akin to the other world] . . . they do not know the higher beings either but only 
talk as if they did. (Ennead II, 9.16) 
 
And at Ennead III, 2.3, he says, 
 
And it is not proper for anyone to speak ill of even this universe as not being 
beautiful or the best of all things which have body . . . [This universe is] a whole, 
all beautiful, and self-sufficient and friends with itself and with its parts 
 
At Ennead V, 9.13.13-18, he asserts that: 
 
Everything then that a soul . . . has here below is there in the intelligible world, so that  . . . 
there are not only the things in the sense-world there, but more  
 
He describes the tips of radii stemming from their hub, the One. Illustrating the Forms’ 
unity in the One, the radii show how individuals need not be separate, and that: 
                                                 
58 Parallels of meaning and context, on top of Coleridge’s enthusiasm for Plotinus, persuade me 
that this is Coleridge’s source for his notion of ‘the one Life within us and abroad’, in ‘The 
Eolian Harp’. 
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every centre will not be cut off from that one first centre . . . but all of them are one 
together. But if we likened all the intelligibles to many centres all going back to and 
united in one centre, but appearing as many because of their lines – the lines do not 
generate them but show them – the lines might serve our purpose at present by providing 
an analogy to the things by contact with which the intelligible nature appears to be 
present as many and in many places. (Ennead VI, 5.5.12-23) 
 
His One Life Neo-Platonism, which later helps to shape the Romantic aesthetic, 
describes intelligibles as accessible within sense experience. Plotinus reasons that 
aisthesis must itself be capable of approaching the Ideas, and even below that, one can 
begin the ascent from the sexually generative soul: 
 
But if someone is unable to grasp this kind of soul which thinks purely, let him take the 
soul which forms opinions, and then ascend from this. But if he cannot even do this, let 
him take sense-perception which acquires the forms in broader extension and sense-
perception by itself with its powers which is already in the forms. But if someone wants 
to, let him descend to the generative [gennōsan: reproductive] soul and go right on to 
what it makes, and then ascend from there, from the ultimate forms to the forms which 
are ultimate in the opposite sense, or, rather, to the primary forms. (Ennead V, 3.9) 
 
Because the Forms determine sense perception and its objects, the latter are not utterly 
cut off from the former. For Plotinus, although sense perception might not be the royal 
road to Ideas, it is nonetheless suffused with them. 
He implies a sensuous infinitude in experience of the kind that Bradley (1893) 
understands as an infinitude of relations towards an ever-encompassing reality (esp. Ch. 
15: ‘Thought and Reality’). Similarly, Coleridge describes ‘the plenitude of the sense’ 
(Reflection, 375; Statesman’s Manual, 69). Plotinian sense-experience is rich, with 
sense-experience touched by the Ideas, and the radii in his analogy proceed from and 
relate back to the centre. Rich experience, however, is pre-discursive; it is mute. As 
such, it has a polar harmony with noetic contemplation. 
While noesis is praeter-conceptual contemplation, sensuous experience pre-
conceptually intuits reality as appearance. Noesis contemplates Ideas, whereas in sense 
perception this possibility is, for Plotinus and Coleridge, latent. Hence for Coleridge, 
‘Reason is indeed much closer to Sense than to Understanding’ (Reflection, 223), which 
likeness he illustrates by paraphrasing from Hooker’s Lawes of Ecclesiatical Polity 
(1682, Bk II, §7):  
 
Reason . . . is a direct Aspect of Truth, an inward Beholding, having a similar relation to 
the Intelligible or Spiritual, as SENSE has to the Material or Phenomenal. (Reflection, 223-
4)  
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This position echoes the Plotinian affinity between sensation and intellection, with the 
one converting to the other:  
 
so that these sense-perceptions Here are dim intellections, but the intellections There are 
clear sense-perceptions. (Ennead VI, 7.7, 30-32)  
 
The formulation recalls St Paul’s: 
 
Now we see through a glass darkly; then we shall see face to face. (1 Corinthians, 13:12) 
 
Inverted, and removed of its polarity, one can find the opposing Empiricism of Hume, 
that thoughts are but ‘less lively and vivacious’ sensations (Enquiry, II.2). Plotinus 
implies a continuum between sense and reason. This continuum also exists in 
Coleridge’s system, and both authors describe an aesthetic access to Ideas that occurs 
through imaginative creativity.  
Plotinian contemplation of Ideas through aisthesis accords with his theory of non-
mimetic poiesis. The tract On the Intellectual Beauty describes the artist creating from 
Idea to appearance (Ennead V.8). His artist contemplates the Idea and aesthetically 
translates its seminal-principle into material art. Thus poiesis is a parallel creation, and 
not a thrice-removed copy.  
In fancy, Coleridge finds the production of superficial similes and mechanical, 
fanciful constructions, such as combining a human torso with the body of a horse.
59
 In 
the least valuable occurrences of fancy, there is: 
 
an ‘Incredulus odi’60 which it leaves on the mind––the imperious sense of the Absurdity of 
the arbitrary fiction. (Marginalia IV, 596-7, note to Scott’s The Monastery) 
 
Fancy never departs from ‘fixities and definites’ which are its ‘counters’, being ‘no 
more than a mode of Memory’ (Biographia I, 305) and ‘Always the Ape, too often the 
adulterator and counterfeit of our memory’ (II, 235). Fancy deals in association’s ready-
mades. In contrast, imagination is ‘a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of 
creation’, which ‘struggles to idealise and unify.’ Imagination’s apex is reached in the 
creativity of the secondary imagination, which: 
 
is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. (I, 202) 
 
Engell (1981, 348) comments, in an observation equally suiting Plotinus, that Coleridge: 
 
                                                 
59 To borrow Horace’s example, Ars poetica, l. 1. 
60 Latin: ‘I discredit and abhor’, from Horace’s Ars poetica, l. 188. 
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combines the classical concept of art as an imitation of nature with the newer premium on 
originality and imagination. In imitating nature, the artist imitates and appropriates the 
process of nature. He creates a language, a series of symbols, which reflect and represent 
this dynamic process. 
 
Engell highlights that Coleridge’s artist takes nature’s process, rather than its products, 
as model. This imaginative creation of a symbolic language is a dynamic parallel to 
nature, so speaking of imitation here risks missing an important point. The series of 
symbols are not so much representations of this dynamic process as artistic instances of 
it.  
Genuine artworks parallel natural phenomena coming-to-be. Plotinus understands 
art as original, contemplative creation. Artworks are thus dignified as more than mere 
copies, shimmering with what Hadot’s commentary, drawing on Félix Ravaisson, 
identifies as grace (1993, 50-51). In this shimmering, the Idea of the Good overflows its 
aesthetic expression. 
Understanding beauty as the overflow of Idea evoked by the object in nature or art 
later impressed Kant when he explored the aesthetic presentation of Ideas. Kant’s 
aesthetic Ideas present the sublimity or beauty that he relates to the morally good. Any 
presentation of an aesthetic Idea stimulates much thought, and this ‘much thought’ never 
fails to overflow the concepts of the understanding. Appreciating art is to recognize an 
Idea, a transcending principle, in the presentation. This Ideality is art’s extraordinary 
quality. 
This is not to say that so-called ordinary objects cannot also shimmer with beauty. 
Plotinus remarks that:  
 
Here below also beauty is what illuminates good proportions rather than the good 
proportions themselves, and this is what is lovable. For why is there more light of beauty 
on a living face, but only a trace of it on a dead one, even if its flesh and its proportions 
are not yet wasted away? (Ennead VI, 7.22, 25-29) 
 
That beauty’s shimmer signifies something tremendous is an aesthetic insight Kant and 
Plotinus shared, despite their otherwise very different systems. The tremendous is 
encountered in experiences of magnitude or power as sublime, or with something so 
subtle and delicate as to constantly elude even thoughtful sensitivity. We now turn to 
Kant’s theory of aesthetic Idea. 
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2.3 Kant’s Ideas of Reason and Aesthetic Ideas 
On finding an ally to develop a more comprehensive philosophy than the British 
Empiricism of his day, Coleridge describes Kant as having taken ‘possession of me as 
with a giant’s hand’ (Biographia, I, 153). Because eighteenth-century Empiricists hold 
imagination to reorder impressions mechanically for a passive and fragmentary self (if 
one exists at all, and here Hume is sceptical), their philosophy has no place for truly 
creative poetry. With Kant, however, Coleridge hopes to work out a theory of 
productive mind, and not of reproductive mechanism. Kant’s unified mind actively 
constructs its world, in contrast to Locke’s mind being like ‘white paper, void of all 
characters’, an ‘empty cabinet’ (Locke, [1690] 1975, II.1.2, 33; I.2.15, 11); or Hume’s 
‘heap or collection of different perceptions’ ([1739-40] 1978, I.4.6, 207).  
For Locke, the: 
 
senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; and the mind by 
degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names 
got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by degrees 
learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with 
ideas (I.ii.15) 
 
With this mechanical model of mind founding Empiricist epistemology, knowledge 
becomes an unverifiable, passive conformity of mental impressions with objects. Kant’s 
revolution proceeds by reversing this relationship and having objects conform to the to 
the limits and modalities of our experience. Kant, however, does not refute Hume’s 
scepticism, but relocates it, finding: 
 
it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith. (CPR, Bxxx) 
 
Certainty is lost as phenomenal presentations are constructed from mental concepts and 
forms of intuition. Instead of requiring cognition to conform to objects, Kant suggests 
to: 
 
try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the 
objects must conform to our cognition. (CPR, xvi) 
 
In the Theaetetus, Plato already opposes the Protagorean thesis that knowledge lies 
in sense experience’s conformity with objects. As we have seen, Plato argues that 
knowledge involves the access of Ideas by thought. Ideas are standards by which 
general categories and universals can replace sensory particulars, making experience 
intelligible and allowing argument to advance by dialectic, accepting self-contradiction 
as grounds for refutation. 
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To reiterate, Platonic Ideas are not mind-dependent entities. Kantian Ideas, 
however, are, and here lies Coleridge’s fundamental and ultimately irreconcilable 
distance from Kant: 
 
The Subjectivity of Reason is the great Error of the Kantean system. (Marginalia V, 757) 
 
By Subjectivity of Reason, Coleridge indicates that for Kant the Ideas of reason are not 
objective realities but regulative principles in a human faculty. Although Wellek 
simplistically conceives that Coleridge misunderstands Kant (Wellek, 1931), Coleridge 
in fact grasps that, regarding the restriction of knowledge to phenomena, Kant moves 
towards another reductionism. Kantian Ideas are attributes or forces of mind, whereas 
Platonic Ideas are mind-independent realities.  
That rational ideas for Kant are not objective, mind-independent powers or 
ultimates is at least the usual interpretation of Kant. However, of Plato, Kant writes, 
 
He knew that our reason naturally exalts itself to forms of knowledge which so far 
transcend the bounds of experience that no given material object can ever coincide with 
them, but which nonetheless must be recognized as having their own reality, and which 
are by no means fictions of the brain. (CPR, A314) 
 
Moreover, the Second Critique (CPrR), now that the First Critique (CPR B, Preface) 
‘limits science to make room for faith’, finds a higher place for rational ideas in 
regulating conduct according to universalizable maxims that can be willed to be 
universal without contradiction. Further, in the Third Critique (CJ), an arguably higher 
place still can be found for the rational ideas in the contemplation of beauty (in aesthetic 
judgment) and of the purposes of created nature (in teleological judgment).  
Modern philosophy thus returns to a contemplative attitude with Kant’s CJ. Here 
the Ideas of reason, which in the First Critique serve the architectonic organization of 
the sciences, find a positive role in shaping aesthetic response. Kant’s contemplative 
experience, at the end of CPrR, of awe and wonder at the starry heavens above him and 
the moral law within indicate the transcendent in the power of its beauty and sublimity, 
which theme becomes a central concern in the Third Critique, the CJ. Contemplation in 
aesthetic experience is very different from the propositional reasoning of metaphysics. 
For Kant, the former was a legitimate, the latter an illegitimate use of reason and Ideas. 
Kant held the metaphysical use of reason to make knowledge claims about transcendent 
reality to be illegitimate. 
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The CJ, however, provides a legitimate use of the Ideas beyond scientific 
architectonic and ethical postulates, namely aesthetic Ideas responding to the sublime 
and beautiful. In aesthetic contemplation, a space is cleared for values. Without this 
space, there can be no beholding, no appreciation of any experiences having special 
significance or resonance in our lives. Such beholding is a poetic, contemplative activity 
making no illegitimate claims to factual knowledge. Contemplating rational Ideas, 
which for Kant are not objective, creates an axiological space for ethical and aesthetic 
concern. 
For Plato, however, Ideas constitute objective knowledge. For Kant, what we derive 
in knowledge is in large part what we put there, in terms of our concepts and categories, 
in the first place. Thus Kant sails close to the reef of psychologism, although he might 
be salvaged by attempts to distinguish transcendental arguments concerning experience 
from psychologism, or the belief that the laws of logic are ultimately dependent on how 
the mind’s is constituted such that what is called truth is a construct of concepts.61  
Plato avoids this reef because for him, Ideas are accessible but, unlike for Kant, 
mind-independent. Platonic Ideas are unchanging, ultimate references of truth, the laws 
of phenomena that remain however phenomena change, even if phenomena entirely 
disappear. For Kant, however, our knowledge of phenomena ultimately refers back to 
the ‘our’ in ‘our knowledge’, and for Kant this means the categories of the 
understanding. 
For Coleridge, a fundamental division of types of mind exists between those for 
whom Ideas are mind-independent powers, and those who conceive Ideas to be qualities 
or attributes of mind (Table Talk I, 269, July 2, 1830). In contrast, and despite arguing 
that knowledge is more than the mechanical ordering of sense impressions, Kant sided 
with those for whom Ideas are attributes of mind. Coleridge’s Understanding is a facility 
with concepts abstracted from experience, and reason is no faculty, and is hence not a 
subject for anthropology or psychology. For him, reason has access to Ideas; indeed, it is 
Ideas. Thus he holds that reason is: 
 
identical with its appropriate objects. Thus God, the soul, eternal truth, etc., are the objects 
of reason; but they are themselves reason. (Friend I, 155-6) 
 
Kant’s pure, a priori concepts of the understanding are not, unlike his empirical 
concepts, abstracted from experience. Experience, he essays to deduce, is the manifold 
                                                 
61 For more on Kant’s proneness to the charge of psychologism, see Appendix XI, ‘On 
Psychologism’, in Brentano, [1874] 1995, 238-43. 
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of sense intuition organized according to pure concepts, which he proposes as the 
categories to which any possible experience must conform. The twelve pure, non-
empirical, categories consist of four moments: quality, quantity, modality, and relation, 
each standing over a further three categories.
62
 Kant’s twelve deduced categories were 
adapted from Aristotle’s logical division into ten categories of all possible, actual, and 
potential objects of thought. Such categorization attempts to cover, a priori, all space and 
time and perhaps, logically, beyond.
63
 Kant’s table of categories attempts to exhaustively 
subsume any presentation to experience, and in his system it is through these filters that 
experience must be formed. Once underway, experience is further differentiated by 
accrued empirical concepts, which are not a priori, but are created in media res, and 
usually by cultural inheritance. 
Kant distinguishes pure concepts not only from empirical, a posteriori, concepts, 
but also from Ideas of reason, with the pure and empirical concepts on one side, and 
Ideas of reason on the other. Concepts and categories apply to phenomena, and their 
applicability remains within experience alone. The pure concepts are not experientially 
derived, and we can never lay our hand on causality, or on absence. Regarding pure 
concepts’ confinement to phenomena, Kant writes, 
 
Everything that the understanding draws out of itself, without borrowing it from 
experience, it nevertheless has solely for the sake of use in experience. (CPR, A235, 
B295)  
 
For Kant, then, experience is the only legitimate field for the understanding’s concepts, 
and much of what the concepts understand is what they themselves initially and 
synthetically configured – out of intuited sense and conceptual thought – into 
experience.
64
 They cannot apply to objects considered apart from their appearance. The 
categories impose their structures onto the manifold given to the senses, imposing 
welligibility of their on manufacture. 
The CPR describes the pursuit of metaphysics as objective knowledge as the 
employment of pure concepts beyond their legitimate applicability, i.e. beyond sense 
experience. Such metaphysics would allow the free play of the Ideas of reason, but this 
                                                 
62 For his table of categories and its deductive setting, see CPR, A71. 
63
 Organon I: ‘Categories’, where he attempts to list all predicate types: substance; quantity; 
quality; relation; place (or location); time (or occurrence); position (or posture); having (or 
state), condition; action; being-affected (or passive undergoing). 
64  Hence, as Nietzsche argues, the Kantian understanding comprehends only what it itself 
projects (How the Real World Became an Illusion, in TI, [1895] 1990). The purely intuited in 
the experience, for Kant, remains non-conceptual and hence irreducibly mysterious, although, as 
his Second and Third Critiques suggests, evocative of rational Ideas. 
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would conclude with the impasses of the antinomies. Kant’s polarized antinomies, e.g. 
‘the universe has a beginning in time’ versus ‘the universe could have had no temporal 
beginning’, demonstrate that there is a problem with the pure reason of metaphysics. 
The problem arises, for Kant, from the illegitimate use of pure concepts beyond the 
bounds of experience, where they have no traction, and thus the antinomies 
symptomatically arise. For any conclusion of pure reason, e.g. ‘the universe must have 
had a beginning in time’, an opposing conclusion can also be reached, in this case, ‘the 
universe could not have had a beginning in time’, with no method or higher court 
existing to decide between the antinomies.  
The antinomies demonstrate the impotence of treating Ideas of reason as if they 
were like empirical concepts of the understanding. With no experiential content to 
grasp, Kant’s Ideas might appear to forever lack application. However, as third-order 
non-empirical concepts they apply to pure concepts, having legitimacy in regulating 
concepts and their products by systematically unifying empirical knowledge. Kant’s 
Ideas of reason thus regulate the understanding, guiding empirical research into an 
architectonic, systemic knowledge. He asserts that, 
 
Human reason is by its nature architectonic (A474, B502) 
 
and this owes to the superordinate nature of the Ideas which organize our experiences 
and thoughts. Aiming towards a complete system of knowledge, each transcendental 
Idea functions as a focus imaginarius (A699, B697). Thus, however unconsciously, 
empirical investigation and practical interests eventually converge towards a higher 
unity.  
Kantian reason, then, systematically regulates all knowledge yet provides none. 
What have been called the Moral Sciences and the Humanities, have been guided and 
unified by the Idea of the soul. The Natural Sciences are similarly unified by the Idea of 
cosmos, a universal whole. Soul and world themselves are yet more generally unified, 
for Kant, under the Idea of God, guiding Theology. So, in the First Critique, Kant 
deduces legitimate and illegitimate bounds for rational Ideas. Defining the illegitimate 
use proved fatal for speculative metaphysics. The legitimate use shows Ideas as 
intellectual focal points, creating a demand for system and the architectonic tendency of 
knowledge.  
In the Second Critique, a further legitimate role for Ideas of reason was explored. In 
the practical realm, Ideas provide postulates for moral thinking and allow the moral law 
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to be taken as the principle for ordering our moral actions and judgments. This 
regulating, law-giving, capacity of reason works ethically in Ideas generating postulates 
for morality, generating moral principles and testing whether we can willingly 
universalize them without contradiction.  
In the Third Critique, aesthetic Ideas, excited by the sublime and the beautiful, 
intimate aesthetically that the mind is not confined to sensuous experience. The 
aesthetic pleasure in art and nature is not merely that of sensation, although perception 
is necessary in the experience. The aesthetic pleasure is rather one of reflection. These 
aesthetic Ideas can never be ‘completely compassed and made intelligible by language’ 
(CJ, §49). They are, he continues,  
 
the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which conversely is a concept to which no 
intuition (or representation of the imagination) can be adequate. 
 
These aesthetic Ideas are presented by an ‘animating principle of the mind’, Geist, 
which spirit or genius is, ‘nothing other than the faculty for the presentation of aesthetic 
ideas’ (CJ, §49). 
The aesthetic Idea presents ‘much thinking’, on the occasion of a representation of 
the imagination,  
 
without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., a concept, to be adequate to it. 
(CJ, §49) 
 
With the rational Idea and the aesthetic Idea, Kant covers all possible presentations 
transcending the concepts of the understanding. It follows that rational and aesthetic 
Ideas, intimate the supersensible without any intuitions of it. Rational Ideas present 
concepts to which no intuition, or representation of the imagination, can be adequate. 
Covering the other side of transcendence, aesthetic Ideas convey imaginative 
representations stimulating much thought that cannot be contained by concepts. Hence 
discursive language cannot make aesthetic Ideas conceptually intelligible, despite the 
‘much thought’ generated. Aesthetic Ideas present something ineffable, i.e. beyond the 
discursive concept’s capacity. Contemplating beauty or the sublime in experience 
stimulates the ‘much thought’ beyond the conceptual.  
Kant argues that it is, ‘precisely in the poetic art that the faculty of aesthetic ideas 
can show itself to full advantage’ (CJ, §49). Geist accounts for the difference between 
the aesthetic qualities of genuine poetry and compositions that are ‘exact and well 
arranged’, ‘neat and elegant’, ‘solid and at the same time elaborate, but without spirit’ 
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(CJ, §49). In the latter works, there is no animating Idea; without Geist’s aesthetic 
Ideas, the work never transcends concepts. Although neat, elegant compositions might 
impress an audience, genuine aesthetic experience is only provoked by the imaginative 
presentation of Ideas. 
In both editions of the First Critique, Kant described imagination as a ‘hidden art in 
the depths of the human soul’ (A141, B180-1). Although referring to imagination as the 
active faculty in the transcendental schematism, responsible for uniting intuitions with 
concepts, it applies equally to the imaginative creativity of the fine arts considered in 
the Third Critique. Here Kant describes Geist, spirit or genius, as profoundly obscure. 
Even the creating artist: 
 
does not know himself how he has come by his ideas. (CJ, §46)  
 
Nevertheless, genius may convey aesthetic Ideas to other artists, or pupils, if ‘nature has 
endowed them with a like proportion of their mental powers’, such that they may in suit 
creatively develop aesthetic Ideas (CJ, §47). The artist’s public is also inspired by the 
aesthetic Ideas, but are not necessarily able to develop those aesthetic Ideas themselves.  
Kant’s poet can thus:  
 
interpret to sense the rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell, 
eternity, creation, etc. (CJ, §49) 
 
These exemplify the rational Ideas that Kant argues find their proper purview in ethics 
as practical reason, and which stray out of bounds when they are employed as concepts 
in the exercise of speculative metaphysics. This application of aesthetic Ideas is as close 
Kant brings his Idea to the Platonic Idea, as that ‘maximum’ toward which imagination 
aims in encountering the praeter-conceptual excess of any transcendent intimation. 
Kant’s comment on the Platonic Idea can be applied forward to his own aesthetic Idea, 
 
Plato employed the expression idea . . . [for] . . . something that not only is never 
borrowed from the senses, but that far surpasses even the concepts of the understanding 
. . . inasmuch as nothing congruent with it is ever found in experience. (CPR, A313, 
B370) 
 
He suggests that aesthetic Ideas are best employed with ‘death, envy, and all vices, as 
also love, fame, and the like’, which the poet offers as, ‘transgressing the limits of 
experience’. Here, poetic imagination provides: 
 
the display of reason in its attainment of a maximum, to body them forth with a sense of 
completeness. (CJ, §49)  
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Thus Kant’s aesthetic Ideas originating from examples within experience but 
transgressing it, death, envy, love, etc., are Ideas of Imagination, emulating, or 
paralleling, Ideas of Reason. Coleridge would later say that the Ideas presented by 
Imagination are aesthetically conveyed through symbols.  
As Gasché (2003, 46) comments, Kant’s aesthetic Ideas: 
 
resemble rational ideas ([which] . . . cannot be sensibly represented) given that it is 
impossible to discursively exhaust them or conceptually pin them down. . . . They are the 
concepts in view of which genius creates beautiful art . . . whose presentation and 
expression make up works of genius. 
 
 Because the aesthetic Idea presents something less definite than any concept of the 
understanding, I would say aesthetic Idea where Gasché says concept. Nevertheless, 
Kant’s aesthetic Idea often augments an empirical concept, and thus deepens and 
enriches its referential meaning and resonance. Hence someone may remark that they 
never thought the same way about concept X since they read novel Y, or heard music Z. 
We have concepts for death, envy, love, and the like, but there is always an 
important remainder beyond the understanding’s conception of the experience. This 
remainder feels profoundly important, and the mind wishes to encircle and ponder it. 
Thus imagination is set in free play, contrasting with the understanding’s rules of 
applying a concept. In providing a maximum, such as the Ideal of death, of love, etc., 
experience is imaginatively embodied with a sense of completeness. This attempt, Kant 
suggests, is poetry. 
Imagination’s attempts at shaping aesthetic Ideas to embody more fully 
transgressing presentations in experience begin with the concept yet add to it ‘a wealth 
of thought’ beyond any definite concept and give ‘aesthetically an unbounded 
expansion to the concept itself’ (CJ, §49). Thus imagination provides the aesthetic 
attributes of the object. More thought is generated here than can be expressed ‘in a 
concept determined by words’ (CJ, §49). While in the First Critique imagination was 
subordinate to the understanding in the production of knowledge about phenomena, in 
the Third Critique the ‘understanding is at the service of imagination and not vice versa’ 
(CJ, §22) in the capacity for aesthetic experience and the construction of aesthetic 
judgment.  
The ‘more thought’ generated runs for assistance to the rational Ideas, unable to 
appeal to any determinate concept of the understanding. The thinking mind is here 
broadened by contemplation, aiming to complete the experience that transcends 
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conceptual understanding. The understanding, faced with death, envy, love, and the like, 
leaves imagination to comprehend the experience aesthetically where conceptual 
understanding is struck dumb. Imagination, in this poetic aspect, ‘stirs up a crowd of 
sensations and secondary representations for which no [conceptual] expression can be 
found’ (CJ, §49). 
Facing the transcendence of the Idea, unable to conceptualize, the understanding is 
very much like the person subject to Socratic elenchos, with the transcendence of the 
aesthetic Idea playing Socrates. The one under elenchos, for example Meno discussing 
whether virtue consists in teachable knowledge, finds all definitions and concepts fail to 
stabilize and define the central matter under examination. When this failure is 
recognized, the questioned one, perhaps previously self-deemed an expert in the field, is 
newly perplexed as if cast under a spell, and struck by a stingray (Meno, 79e-80d). 
Socrates educational purpose was not, however, to cripple intellectual activity, but to 
stimulate thought by inducing his companion to realize that where the matter was 
presumed to be well known, there is in fact ignorance.  
McGhee (2000, 102) suggests that aesthetic Ideas stimulate oscillation between the 
original concept, e.g. grief, ‘and the possibilities of responsiveness to it.’ He highlights 
the vibrancy in the encounter, beside the ‘much thought’ it stimulates. Far from 
presenting a schematic rule for a concept, the aesthetic Idea interprets the experience as 
cosmically significant in a way that transcends conceptual meaning. He points out that 
the aesthetic Idea can run through: 
 
a cascade of particulars intimating or showing the nature of a universal, and in so doing 
showing the structure of sense. (McGhee, 2000, 104) 
 
This showing the nature of a universal is the modus aestheticus of conveying a 
maximum, as Kant puts it. Hence McGhee calls the aesthetic Idea, 
 
an image with evocative power, an image which carries some of the charge of the 
universal even in its particularity. (2000, 105) 
 
Genuine art, in this view, works Ideas into aesthetic form. Art, then, is the product 
of genius, i.e. of soulful, praeter-conceptual communication. This spirit creates from 
genius, and not only from talent. Kant’s Geist animates imagination to move talent 
beyond concepts and through Ideas. In one aspect, Kant’s aesthetic Idea echoes 
Plotinus’s non-mimetic theory of artistic creation whereby the artist presents material 
unified and guided by the same principles as those behind natural phenomena. This 
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aspect is expressed clearly when Kant states that imagination uses aesthetic Ideas to 
create, ‘another nature, out of the material which the real one gives it’ (CJ, §49). Kant’s 
productive Imagination seeks to order aesthetic experience under a concept, but fails to 
achieve this task of cataloguing. Neither the empirical concept, nor the pure concept of 
the understanding, can contain what overflows here, namely the transcendence 
intimated in the experience.  
With his unfailing powers of descriptive drama, Sartre considers such concept-
overflowing experience in his novel Nausea. When the protagonist Antoine Roquentin 
sits on a park-bench at dusk, he observes the root of a chestnut tree and senses an 
overflow of being that transcends the concept ‘root’. The conceptual understanding of a 
tree root as a pump for taking in water and nutrients cannot comprehend the sense of 
transcendent existence he encounters. Thus he begins to understand the previously 
inexplicable feelings of nausea that are increasingly overcoming him: they express the 
feebleness of human language and understanding to come fully to terms with the 
superfluity of being. 
Roquentin spirals into a dizzy whirl occasioned by this epiphany of the 
ungraspable, yet felt aspects of existence. Where Sartre finds this overflowing in 
existence as such, Kant addresses it in the beautiful and the sublime. Sartre’s 
overflowing, or superfluity, his de trop, takes the same form, I suggest, as the Kantian 
excess of Idea over concept. Plotinus, too, says the overflow is experienced as 
shimmering, and as a kind of grace. This grace also implies excess, a gratuity, with the 
shimmering providing an ecstasis (standing-out) of extraordinary beauty. Beauty’s 
shimmer often calls for an attending stillness, saying that here is something more 
special, perhaps sacred. A space is created for this beauty in our attending to it, whether 
in a gallery, or in the sense of the beautiful ecstatically standing out from its 
surroundings. This space is what I term the con-templum, the space offered in the act of 
contemplation.  
Examples of the hushed gallery, concert hall, temple or cathedral must not evoke 
notions of merely outward form and shows of sobriety, for the con-templum experience 
is not one of putting on a pious expression, but one that shimmers in beholding 
something beyond oneself.  
My daughter has just been born, and it is her first week at our Kyoto home after the 
maternity hospital. We walk, mother-in-law too, to Imamiya Jinja, a nearby Shinto 
shrine. Baby Martha’s grandmother prays to the local deities for thanksgiving and 
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safekeeping. We walk through a large concrete torii to enter the shrine, where old Pine 
trees and an ancient Camphor tree remain sacred. Torii are symbolic gates, marking the 
entrance into a sacred site. Straddling either post of some torii sit stone lion-dogs, the 
left mouthing Ah, the right a closed-mouthed Mm. We walk through the centre, 
embodying the Uu in the middle of the efficiently expressive holy word, Aum.  
There are many torii in and around this shrine. Some stone or concrete, with moss 
growing on their north sides. Some unvarnished, dark wood, others taller, gaudily 
painted in vermillion and black. Each marks a transition into the sacred. A young 
woman parks her Honda Cub scooter, removes her helmet, and walks through the torii. 
She will ring the clattering copper bell to signal her prayer to the local kami, or gods, 
then return, again through the transitional torii, to her bike and her daily round. An old 
couple leave as we enter. As they step over the threshold, returning to the city street, 
they turn to face the shrine through the torii they just stepped through, then bow to the 
kami, in quietly offered respect. The torii is what the Greeks called a temenos: the sign 
of a site, a temple, cut off for contemplation. 
The site has several small shrines and one main one. Each has its own torii, and 
some shrines elsewhere have several torii, sometimes scores, in succession, 
emphasizing a special degree of transit into contemplative space. Yet ordinary concerns 
are not put down and set aside. The mood of concern is transformed. Ordinary human 
concerns are given space to be revealed more purely, in this traditional site of the local 
kami. After stepping through the torii, visitors cleanse their hands and mouths, ladling 
water from the mouths of copper dragons. And then another transitional step: a short 
walk to stand before the shrine; clap three times; then shake the clattering, copper bell 
by pulling on its long, thick, braided rope to rattle one’s votive presence to the kami. 
And then pray. Something short. Bow, then make way for the next person.  
This Shinto scene describes a clear example of the con-templum, where a space is 
reserved for purer considerations, beholding, and appreciation. The thing contemplated 
is often something ordinary, but unwrapped, and held up in silence: hope for a job; a 
new baby (extraordinary in one marvellous sense, ordinary as rain in another); a 
looming exam; a wish for love; concern for someone’s health. Bells semi-randomly 
clatter and tinkle. Is this how our thoughts and concerns sound to the gods? Yet these 
sounds and movements cannot annoy here. Theirs is a gentle, little motion within the 
greater stillness of the place. How sympathetically soft-clattering sound and motion are 
held, in this contemplative site.  
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There must be many sober pleas made here for promotion, for romance, worldly 
success, and all hopes that easily find their frame in petitionary prayer. Little wishes are 
briefly begged of the gods, with the petitioner’s motorcycle boots firmly on the ground, 
helmet ready for return to the busy day. But even still, a space has been set aside. And 
others bring humble thanksgiving. Stillness. Silence echoes silence, enveloping all little 
clatters, deepening the caverns for its own resound. Reserving the space and time for 
contemplation, one becomes more receptive to the epiphanies it returns. Only a 
humbling hollowing of the self can create a chamber that may begin to repeat, still 
insufficiently, the profounder response to our softly clattering calls. The hollowing 
holds onto no firm concepts and learns to let drop self-concerned, material wishes.  
This movement beyond concepts leads Sartre, Kant, and others to epiphanic 
intimations of value in a vision of things unmediated by concepts As Plotinus writes, 
recalling Plato’s theia mania, one power of Intellect is conceptual and soberly examines 
objects and situations, but another transcends sober examination and its concepts with 
direct awareness. That is: 
 
Intellect . . . has one power for thinking, by which it looks at the things in itself, and one 
by which it looks at what transcends it by a direct awareness and reception, by which also 
before it saw only, and by seeing it acquired intellect and is one. And that first one is the 
contemplation of Intellect in its right mind, and the other is Intellect in love, when it goes 
out of its mind ‘drunk with the nectar’; then it falls in love, simplified into happiness by 
having its fill; and it is better to be drunk with a drunkenness like this than to be more 
respectably sober. (Ennead VI, 7.35, 19-27) 
 
This still, adoring ecstasy provides no determining concept. Rather, it reflects and 
contemplates, leading to higher courts of appeal among the Ideas of reason, whereby it 
may relate to moral principle, or principles of totality, universality, and value. Strictly 
speaking, the natural phenomena exciting the feeling are not themselves sublime. They 
are thought so because they evoke the indefinite, unbounded quality of the Ideas of 
reason, which for Kant include the kingdom of ends, God, the soul, and the cosmos. 
These phenomena evoke Ideas of reason because their presentations cannot be grasped 
by casting about among empirical concepts or the concepts of the understanding, and 
thus they are referred to regulative Ideas rather than to empirical or constitutive 
concepts and categories. 
The thrill of the sublime arises from a potentially threatening sense of power in the 
presentation incapable of being fully subsumed under a concept. The pleasure from the 
sublime, however, arises from realizing that the only things comparable to this 
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unbounded presentation are our own (for Kant)
65
 Ideas of reason. Hence we receive an 
intimation of the supersensible and praeter-conceptual. In this experience, the 
supersensible, praeter-conceptual self is reflected and symbolized.  Kant asks, 
 
Who would want to call ‘sublime’ shapeless mountain masses towering above one 
another in wild disorder with their pyramids of ice, or the dark raging sea, etc.? Yet the 
mind feels itself elevated . . . judging of such things, when, without regard to their form, 
it abandons itself to the imagination and to Reason––which, although placed in 
combination with the imagination without any definite purpose, merely extends it––it yet 
finds the whole power of the imagination inadequate to its ideas. (CJ, §26) 
 
He shows that differently sublime presentations recall different Ideas of reason. The 
mathematical sublime recalls Ideas of totality, cosmos, eternity, and infinity. Then there 
is the sublimity of power, of action, evoked by the dynamically sublime. This 
dynamically sublime presents the awesome power of nature against our own physical 
fragility. Reflective consciousness stimulated by the sublime into contemplation 
recollects moral principles as the proper field of rational Ideas. 
An essential feature of the phenomenology of aesthetic experience lies in the 
awareness that concepts fail to properly apply here, thus discursive thought cannot even 
begin. This is very different from metaphysical speculation, which not only begins with 
discursive thought, but also, once started, often finds it hard to stop. So while rational 
Ideas are misapplied in seeking metaphysical knowledge, their aesthetic application 
provides intimations, but makes no such knowledge claims. Deferring to Ideas brings 
implicit awareness of transcending the conceptual. The supersensible is therefore not 
presented as the object of facts to be constructed, but as implicit in principles regulating 
moral judgment, for example, and conduct, and which universalize the touchstones of 
moral value (freedom and dignity) that aesthetic experience suggests. 
Kant’s aesthetic genius: 
 
puts the mental powers purposively into swing, i.e., into such a play as maintains itself 
and strengthens the mental powers in their exercise. (CJ, §49)  
 
Aesthetic Ideas hence help us to: 
 
feel our freedom from the law of association (which attaches us to the empirical 
employment of imagination), so that the material supplied to us by nature in accordance 
with this law can be worked up into something different which surpasses nature. (CJ, §49) 
 
Kant’s Idea in many respects opposes the Platonic Idea, or any Neo-Platonic 
interpretation. Nevertheless, in both systems, Idea is no abstraction from nature or 
                                                 
65 For Platonists, however, Ideas are objective realities, and not ‘our own’. 
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experience. That would be the empirical concept, on the one hand, or sensible intuition, 
on the other, or its schema in the middle. Hence, for Kant, aesthetic ideas work on 
natural materials to surpass material nature. 
Arendt comments that the feeling of freedom given by aesthetic Ideas allows the 
mind to think again about the particular behind the concept. This feeling of freedom 
reunites us with the particular that is otherwise lost in the necessarily general concept. ‘If 
you say, “What a beautiful rose!” ’ observes Arendt (1982, 13), ‘you do not arrive at this 
judgment by first saying, “All roses are beautiful, this flower is a rose, hence this rose is 
beautiful.”’ As in Sartre’s point about the chestnut root, there is a transcendence, an 
overflow of particularity that seems to be of some important but inexplicable quality. 
The jolt provided by the aesthetic Idea helps remove conceptual thought’s film of 
familiarity that dulls experience and prevents authenticity. Remaining only within the 
bounds of the conceptual, and in consequence of a: 
 
film of familiarity we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel 
nor understand. (Biographia II, 7) 
 
Aesthetic Ideas provide a sense of freedom from that determinism which 
characterizes, after the arguments of the First Critique, the phenomenal. Thus for Kant, 
aesthetic contemplation: 
 
brings the faculty of intellectual ideas (the reason) into movement. (CJ, §49) 
 
This movement of the Ideas of reason is no longer an illicit move made by vain 
metaphysical speculation. It has a positive result in that it: 
 
Strengthens the mind by making it feel its faculty––free, spontaneous, and independent 
of natural determination––of considering and judging nature as a phenomenon in 
accordance with aspects which it does not present in experience either for sense or 
understanding, and therefore of using it on behalf of, and as a sort of schema for, the 
supersensible.’ (CJ, §53) 
 
Here Kant says that the mind, in presenting aesthetic Ideas, can consider nature as a 
phenomenon with aspects present neither to sense nor understanding. How can 
something be considered a phenomenon, and yet have aspects beyond sense and 
understanding? It cannot be that the phenomenon as such has these aspects. The 
imagination therefore takes aspects, which might be overwhelming, for example, and 
makes into a schema for the praeter-conceptual supersensible. 
This sort of schema of the supersensible can then be used as currency, equivalent to 
a concept, or as a pendant, as Kant wrote, for those intimations beyond the bounds of 
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sense and conceptual understanding. Aesthetic Ideas are taken as symbols in artworks or 
natural phenomena indicating Ideas. For Kant, art therefore intimates freedom, 
sometimes immortality, cosmos, the limitless, excess, moral value as something real, 
beauty, and sublimity. 
The experience of beauty primes the mind for moral reasoning in providing a sense 
of freedom from concepts, the phenomenal chain of determinism, and the law of 
association. Kant explicitly relates contemplation of nature with moral feeling, 
maintaining, 
 
that to take immediate interest in the beauty of nature (not merely to have taste in 
estimating it) is always a mark of a good soul; and that, where this interest is habitual, it at 
least indicates a temper of mind favourable to the moral feeling that it should readily 
associate itself with the contemplation of nature. (CJ, §42) 
 
Kant’s conviction that natural beauty, and its reproduction in the fine arts, has an ethical, 
edifying aspect was by no means unique in its time. His contemporary, Reynolds (1797, 
198), goes further, suggesting that the artist’s thoughts, and not only those about nature: 
may be so far diffused as to extend themselves imperceptibly into publick benefits, and 
be among the means of bestowing on whole nations refinement of taste; which if it does 
not lead directly to purity of manners, obviates at least their greatest depravation by 
disentangling the mind from appetite.  
Art primes morality by revealing freedom, and Kant argues that the experience of beauty 
indicates moral goodness. Aesthetic judgement is, he says, 
 
purposive in reference to the moral feelings. The Beautiful prepares us to love 
disinterestedly something, even nature itself. (CJ, §29) 
 
He argues for more than the edifying effect of a good hike in the country and a breath of 
fresh air. Only a free being with ideal standards can experience beauty, and so it is that 
in aesthetic experience we also recognize our moral calling. Hence, 
 
the mind cannot ponder upon the beauty of nature without finding itself at the same time 
interested therein. But this interest is akin to moral, and he who takes such an interest in 
the beauties of nature can do so only in so far as he previously has firmly established his 
interest in the morally good. If, therefore, the beauty of nature interests a man 
immediately, we have reason for attributing to him at least a basis for a good moral 
disposition. (CJ, §42) 
 
Aesthetic appreciation, for Kant, can prime the mind for moral reflection. 
Correspondingly, the universal moral law can itself be aesthetically appreciated: 
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Two things fill the soul [Gemüt] with ever new and increasing admiration and awe 
[Achtung], the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above 
me and the moral law within me. I do not seek or conjecture either of them as if they 
were veiled obscurities or extravagances beyond the horizon of my vision; I see them 
before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. 
(CPrR, Part Two, Conclusion) 
 
Our discussion will now progress from Kant’s poetic vision of the meeting of 
metaphysics and ethics as they concern realities clearly discerned by frequent and 
steady reflection, to examine Coleridge’s Platonism of Ideas as comprising objective 
reality itself. 
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2.4 The Coleridgean Idea 
We have already discussed Coleridgean imagination as bridging understanding and 
reason. This imaginative access to Ideas stimulates the mind’s potential as living 
process, without which it would remain only a mechanical processor of experience. 
Coleridge expresses his Romantic notion of an imaginative access to Ideas, derived from 
the Neo-Platonists,
66
 accounting for the transcendent in lived experience, arguing that 
Ideas: 
 
correspond to substantial beings, to objects the actual subsistence of which is implied in 
their idea, though only by the idea revealable. (Constitution, 47n) 
 
These Ideas,  
 
constitute humanity. For try to conceive a man without the ideas of God, eternity, 
freedom, will, absolute truth, of the good, the true, the beautiful, the infinite. An animal 
endowed with a memory of appearances and of facts might remain. But the man will 
have vanished, and you have instead a creature more subtle than any beast of the field, 
but likewise cursed above every beast of the field (Constitution, 46) 
 
Against Kant, his Ideas are not just regulative principles impressing and 
encouraging an orderly, unified system of knowledge. Coleridgean Ideas are not the 
rational concepts of Kant, because they are not concepts at all, but ‘energies of reason’ 
(Statesman’s Manual, 29). The Coleridgean Idea: 
 
is deeper than all intelligence, inasmuch as it represents the element of the Will and its 
essential inderivability. (Cited in Dorothy Emmett, 1952, (offprint: p. 9)) 
 
To ask for a conception of an Idea is like asking: 
 
for an image of a flavour or the odour of a strain of music. (Cited in Dorothy Emmett, 
1952, (offprint: p. 9)) 
 
It would be all too easy to infer that Coleridge denigrates conceptions, but that would 
mislead. He recognizes that concepts, these mind-dependent entities, are organs of 
meaning and discernment, and that: 
 
Every new term expressing a fact, or a difference, not precisely and adequately expressed 
by any other word in the same language, is a new organ of thought for the mind that has 
learnt it. (Constitution, 167) 
 
Ideas, however, are not mind-dependent for Coleridge, but are objective realities 
                                                 
66  Especially Plotinus, but also Proclus’s notion of the symbolon, which physical object, a 
miniature idol or even a pebble, is introduced into an Orphic sacramental ritual and becomes, 
supposedly through participation, or communion, a shard of divine, Ideal, reality. In this 
symbolon, we can find close affinities with Coleridge’s Romantic notion of the symbol. 
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that minds might approach. For Kant, however, Ideas are subjective components of 
rational beings’ faculty of reason. Coleridgean reason, in contrast, is not merely a 
human faculty; it is not a faculty at all. Hence, reason is: 
 
present to man, but not appropriated by him. (Marginalia VI, 300) 
 
This sense of reason as an objective principle beyond personal appropriation is 
illustrated well in the explicit rationale of Doyle’s fictional detective, Sherlock Holmes: 
 
‘No, it is not selfishness or conceit’, said he, answering, as was his wont, my thoughts 
rather than my words.
67
 ‘If I claim full justice for my art, it is because it is an impersonal 
thing – a thing beyond myself.’ (1892, 281, The Adventure of the Copper Beeches) 
 
For Coleridge, the objective Ideas of reason are reason. They comprise a thing beyond 
oneself. To discuss Ideas of reason as external or internal to mind misses the point, 
because they are not actually separate from material beings and their phenomena, as 
misconstrued Two-Worlds interpretations presume. In the Platonic view, material 
beings and their phenomena are not separate from Ideas and their correlative Laws, but 
subsist in them, which they instantiate. Neither, for Coleridge, are the Ideas static 
entities as Platonic Ideas have often been misinterpreted. For Coleridge, Ideas are 
always powers, and thus dynamic, and in another aspect, the Ideas are what we think of 
as the Laws of Nature.
68
  
The highest term in Coleridge’s system is reason. Imagination is central to his 
system, mediating between understanding and the mind-independent Ideas of reason. 
While imagination is our most divine attribute for Coleridge, reason is not exactly a 
human attribute, but is something higher, towards which imagination aims. Thus in 
Coleridge, opposed here to Kant, reason is not our faculty, and Ideas of reason are better 
considered gifts. Siding with Plato, he contrasts Kantian Ideas as mental entities with 
Plato’s objective view, 
 
Kant supposed the Ideas to be oscillations of the same imagination, which . . . produces 
the mathematical intuitions, line, circle, etc., a sort of total impression made by 
                                                 
67 Cf. Bacon, [1605], Ch. XXV, 17: ‘our Saviour Christ . . . not being like man, which knows 
man’s thoughts by his words, but knowing man’s thoughts immediately, He never answered 
their words, but their thoughts.’ See Matthew, 12:25: ‘And Jesus knew their thoughts, and said 
to them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house 
divided against itself shall not stand.’ 
68 It is nowadays clearly accepted, as it was too in Coleridge’s day, that Laws of Nature are 
dynamic and, though unchanging, not static entities. Coleridge suggests that we think of Ideas 
in the same way, and that this is consistent with Plato’s main arguments. This interpretation 
opposes those who read Platonic Ideas as static, lifeless entities, and cannot see them as ‘living 
laws’ and ‘energies of reason’. 
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successive constructions, each denied or negatived so soon as made, and yet the 
constructive power still beginning anew. Whereas, according to the true Platonic view, 
the Reason and Will are the Parent . . . and the Idea itself, the transcendent Analogon of 
the Imagination or spiritual intuition. (Marginalia V, 750-1) 
 
In the history of ideas, although imagination has been neglected, its existence has 
never been expressly denied. Reason, however, as outlined by Coleridge, and as Plato’s 
noûs, is a contested notion, and has often been denied. This contested reason is 
conceived as a mind-independent power analogous to natural laws. Attempts to 
explicate the reason referred to by Coleridge, reason distinguished, that is, from 
understanding go back to the Parmenidean distinction between Truth and Appearance; 
Heraclitean logos; Plato’s dianoia-noesis distinction; to Plotinus; Boethius; and 
Spinoza’s natura naturans, which notion Chapter 2.6 below will discuss in relation to 
the Coleridgean symbol. Heraclitus, observing that all use the same logos, yet each 
opines it as something individual shows the contradiction in denying reason’s 
universality: 
 
Although this Logos is eternally valid, yet men are unable to understand it . . . although 
all things come to pass in accordance with this Logos, men seem to be quite without any 
experience of it . . . unaware of what they do when awake as they are when asleep. 
(Fragment 1) 
 
And,  
We should let ourselves be guided by what is common to all. Yet, although the Logos is 
common to all, most men live as if each of them had a private intelligence of his own. 
(Fragment 2) 
 
Heraclitus is here concerned with a universal logos upon which all individual instances 
of reasoning are dependent, consciously or otherwise. He is one of the founders of that 
Ancient Greek tradition that sees logos not simply as the operation of a thinking mind, 
but as the principle of order exemplified throughout the universe’s very fabric, so that 
even the Sun cannot overstep its measure, or if it does, it will be rectified by the 
Erinyes (Furies), the handmaids of Justice (Fragment 29). It is to this notion of Idea 
understood as the Laws of Nature that we now turn. 
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2.5 Coleridgean Idea as Correlate of Natural Law 
Coleridge argues that Laws of Nature are correlates of the Ideas of reason. Regardless of 
whether or not contemporary science has perfectly expressed any law, natural laws are 
principles that account for phenomena without themselves being phenomenal. Thus 
phenomena are explicable only by non-phenomenal laws, for which the phenomena 
count as evidence. As scientific inquiry approaches laws, we approach Ideas in aesthetic 
experience, in moral consideration, in other modes of contemplation. 
The scientist, working with phenomena, tries to go through phenomena to the 
explanatory, formative principles. This ‘beyond phenomena’ is for Coleridge Law and 
Idea. He construes both as objective, with Law anteceding phenomena and considered in 
its being, and Idea the same considered as truth. As he puts it, 
 
The utmost we ever venture to say is, that the falling of an apple suggested the law of 
gravitation to Sir I. Newton. Now a law and an idea are correlative terms, and differ only 
as object and subject, as being and truth. (Friend I, 467n) 
 
Coleridge argues that the scientist,
69
 and not just the poet, painter, or Platonist, 
pursues Ideas, but under the aspect of Law. Thus, in his philosophical lectures, 
Coleridge describes Newtonian science in its purest pursuit, as labouring at a law, as 
theorizing in the contemplative sense: 
 
Nothing but the law was at all paid attention to; with the law dwelt power and prophecy, 
and by exclusive attention to the law it has been that late disciples of Sir Isaac Newton, 
Laplace, and others, have removed all the apparent difficulties in the theory of 
gravitation and turned them into the strongest confirmations . . . the progress of all great 
science is to labour at a law. (Phil. Lects II, 533) 
 
This Law is much studied, never directly perceived, and is the same quarry of 
imagination as Idea, employing symbol in its retrieval. Science strays, like art, when 
fancy takes the lead over imagination. Then, hypotheses become hypostatized into 
fixed emblems, such as ether, or invisible string, rather than remaining with symbols of 
Ideas. Thus, when fancy takes over, a visualizing model stands in for, and is easily 
mistaken for, the non-phenomenal principle. 
                                                 
69
 Although he didn’t use the term, he inspired its coinage by William Whewell, who reports 
from an 1833 meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science: 
‘Philosophers was felt to be too wide and lofty a term, and was very properly forbidden them 
[i.e. mathematicians, physicists, and naturalists] by Mr. Coleridge, both in his capacity as 
philologer and metaphysician; savans was rather assuming, besides French instead of English; 
some ingenious gentlemen [Whewell himself!] proposed that, by analogy with artist, they might 
form scientist, and added that there could be no scruple to this term since we already have such 
words as sciolist, economist and atheist, but this was not generally palatable’, Whewell, March 
1834. 
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The falling of an apple can symbolize, as a consubstantial instance, Newtonian, or 
Einsteinian formulations of gravitation. Solar rays curving around Mercury can 
symbolize Einsteinian gravitation, serving better than the apple in exemplifying an 
effect that Newton’s theory could not predict. Both symbolize gravitation, whether or 
not the ultimate scientific description of this law has been achieved. They symbolize 
with dynamic images of gravitation’s phenomenal effects. As Coleridge put it, they are 
consubstantial with the universal Idea, in this case a natural law, which they convey by 
a clear instantiation. 
Because a law has been well formulated, it does not follow that it is comprehended 
without residue or mystery. As Barfield comments, when Newton declared hypothesis 
non fingo, he: 
 
refused to seek ‘behind’ the law of gravitation for . . . explanations acceptable to a human 
understanding boggling at the impossible contradiction of ‘action at a distance’. He left 
that to inferior scientists; and the law of gravitation is one of Coleridge’s favourite 
illustrations of a ‘law of nature,’ as distinct from theory or hypothesis. Law differs from 
hypothesis, as idea differs from abstraction; just as an idea is not a notion ‘of’ . . . 
something other than itself, so a true law of nature is not a rule generated from particular 
observations of natural behaviour; it is nature behaving. An idea is neither an abstraction 
nor a thing, but a physical idea is at the same time a law of nature. We . . . therefore 
distinguish the idea or law itself from any uncontemplative notion of it. It is the notion of 
a law of gravity which gets fancied into invisible string. (Barfield, 1971, 125-6) 
 
Barfield could have further explained that if hypothesized ‘invisible string’ were 
discovered, we would still need an organizing principle, a law, to account for its regular 
behaviour. According to this view, which Coleridge attributes to Bacon, the universe’s 
intelligibility owes to those intelligibles referred to by Plato’s Forms, but in their aspect 
as laws. 
Gravity as a power, as a physical law, rather than its notion, remained mysterious 
to Newton. Having described gravitation, he concedes to acquiesce in its mystery, 
rather than posit any hypothesis or fanciful image that the understanding could 
comprehend. Similarly, while Einstein provides a more universal description of 
gravitational acceleration in modifying the concepts of space and time into curved 
space-time, he does not claim that he thereby provides a comprehensive understanding 
of what gravity is. 
Coleridge defines a conception as ‘a conscious act of the understanding’ that brings 
any object in sense or recollection into a class with other members of common 
character such that we comprehend the thing and relate it with other classes of thing 
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(Constitution, 13). An Idea, however, cannot be abstracted from phenomena, because it 
is the reality of their laws. Coleridge adds that an awareness of this reality: 
 
may very well exist . . . and powerfully influence a man’s thoughts and actions, without 
his being distinctly conscious of the same, much more without his being competent to 
express it in definite words. (Constitution, 12)  
 
Thus,  
 
it is the privilege of a few to possess an idea:  of the generality of men, it might be more 
truly affirmed that they are possessed by it. (Constitution, 13) 
 
Coleridge refers to this active, dimly conscious, or unconscious, sense of Idea 
throughout his writings. 
Coleridge’s correlating Platonic Idea with Baconian natural law adds a persuasive 
dimension to his notion of Idea. While the Platonic Idea has always been a contested 
notion, natural law is far more generally accepted. Although Coleridge never stresses 
this persuasive point, it works implicitly in his correlating the two. If one accepts the 
reality of laws as non-phenomenal, one has already, the inference would go, accepted 
the existence of intelligible, non-sensible Ideas that are laws’ correlates. Allying Idea 
with Baconian law, he distinguishes his notion of objective Ideas from Kant’s 
construing them as subjective, regulating concepts. 
Coleridge thus finds compelling support for Ideas in Baconian laws as objective, 
intelligible, and non-sensible:  
 
Hence too . . . Plato so often calls ideas LIVING LAWS, in which the mind has its whole 
true being and permanence; or that Bacon, vice versa, names the laws of nature, ideas; 
and represents . . . facts of science and central phaenomena, as signatures, impressions, 
and symbols of ideas. (Friend I, 492) 
 
Bacon identifies central phenomena as representatives of laws and as symbols of Ideas. 
Following Bacon, Coleridge describes hypothesis as a ‘symbol of an undiscovered law’ 
and ‘an exponential image or picture-language of an Idea’ (Friend I, 477). As with the 
Coleridgean symbol, the particular phenomenon concretely represents the universal. 
Within a year of Coleridge writing the above passage on Bacon’s notion of law as Idea 
pursued by scientific method, Goethe also writes about Bacon’s method as collecting 
particulars in order to ‘attain to Universals’:70 
                                                 
70 Baconian induction ascends, as Plato puts it in the Divided Line passage, collecting and 
synthesizing towards principles (archai). The very notion of method, meta hodós (Gk: after a 
way), is central to perennial philosophy, implying the progress, or procession, of Plato and the 
Neo-Platonists. N.b. Coleridge’s periodical, The Friend, was written and published between 
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In the range of phenomena all had equal value in Bacon’s eyes. For although he himself 
always points out that one should collect the particulars only to select from them and to 
arrange them, in order finally to attain to Universals, yet too much privilege is granted to 
the single facts; and before it becomes possible to attain to simplification and conclusion 
by means of induction (the very way he recommends), life vanishes and forces get 
exhausted. He who cannot realize that one instance is often worth a thousand, bearing all 
within itself; he who proves unable to comprehend and esteem what we called ur-
phenomena, will never be in a position to advance anything, either to his own or to others’ 
joy and profit. 
 
Goethe finds in Bacon’s inductive science the same purpose of attaining to the universal 
through the particular that Coleridge recognizes, although Goethe does not refer to 
Bacon as Platonist, or reverse-Platonist, as Coleridge does. Although, Goethe finds in 
Bacon an eminent precedent, he acknowledges this less enthusiastically than his British 
counterpart. Despite Bacon’s use of certain central phenomena to represent laws, his 
method gives a theoretically equal value to all facts as representatives of law, rather than 
privileging, as Goethe would, the central, or Ur-phenomena. 
For Goethe, this democracy of equal value among the range of phenomena in 
Bacon’s method lacks urgency. Certainly, the Living Law could in principle be among 
collections of single facts. However, treating all particulars at the same level risks, for 
Goethe, the ‘life’ in the living law that is more readily by selecting the most 
representative as ur-phenomena. Goethe thus acknowledges that all phenomena represent 
laws, but that some are more illustrative than others. Unlike Goethe, Coleridge is 
wholeheartedly excited by Bacon’s reverse Platonism of empirical, deductive science. So 
long as the sensible particular exemplifies law, then it symbolizes it too, although 
considered selection would find more elegant, simpler representatives. The Baconian fact 
can, nevertheless, symbolically represent the law because it is consubstantial with it and 
all its other instantiations. 
Coleridge suggests also that the Pythagorean harmony of the spheres born of number 
and ratio expresses his notion of Idea and law as correlates. He suggests this as key to 
understanding Pythagoras’ insight, first stimulated, legend has it, by his marvelling at the 
mathematical ratios sensibly intuited as musical notes when a blacksmith stuck a rod 
gripped at different intervals, with each musical chime perfectly harmonized in the 
listener’s mind with the mathematical ratio of the grip that divided the rod. The qualia 
and the Ideas of reason, 
 
                                                                                                                                               
1809 and 1810. Goethe’s Theory of Colour [Farbenlehre] was published in 1810. 
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must necessarily be of the same nature . . . with those of the universe which acted upon 
him and which he alone was capable of beholding . . . . He therefore supposed that what 
in men the ideas were, . . . those in the world were the laws; that the ideas partook 
according to the power of the man, of a constitutive character, in the same manner as the 
laws did in external nature. (Phil. Lects, 111-2; 107-8) 
 
It is widely admitted that there is an objective power or force corresponding, as 
something actual, to the description of a natural law. Therefore it is widely understood 
that this law is something real and not a convenient, temporary fiction of science 
functioning only as a conceptual placeholder. One can accept this while allowing that 
descriptions of scientific laws are defeasible; the final word on any particular law is 
likely still unwritten, nevertheless, the objectivity of the law as something described is 
generally accepted. Correlating Idea and law perfectly conveyed Coleridge’s sense of 
Ideas as objective realities, and denying this objectivity differentiates Kant’s Idea from 
Ideas in Plato, Plotinus, and Coleridge.  
As Coleridge more than once remarks, the same Idea in two minds is the same 
Idea, and not two different conceptions. The expressions, conceptions, images, and 
phenomena under the unitary Idea are many, just as the expressions, conceptions, 
images, and phenomena of gravitation are many. Yet it is readily accepted that despite 
the many and apparently various phenomena of gravitation, it is one, and it is objective. 
Grasp this unity and objectivity in terms of natural law relative to phenomena, 
Coleridge argues, and you grasp the unity and objectivity of Idea, as distinct from 
conception and image, and relative to its instantiations. As laws order and animate the 
world into a dynamic cosmos that is, in some degree, scientifically intelligible, Ideas 
animate phenomena and draw contemplative minds towards greater appreciation of 
existence and transcendent meaning, that is, of what is true, good, and beautiful. 
When Coleridge discusses Ideas as correlative of laws, it can be surprising to find 
him describe Bacon as the British Plato (Friend I, 488; Constitution, Introduction). The 
first destroyer of classical idols, advancing experimental method, is not usually 
considered a Platonist. Coleridge lays some reason for this at Bacon’s door:  
 
Lord Bacon . . . taught pure Platonism in his great work, the Novum Organon, and 
abuses his divine predecessor for fantastic nonsense which he [Plato] had been the first to 
explode.’ (Letters V, January 14th, 1820) 
 
Bacon, he proposes, invents a reverse Platonism of things, while Plato applies his 
method and system to words. Bacon’s scientific method is inductive, revealing laws 
exemplified in phenomena. Plato’s method moves towards Ideas, or to aporia if this 
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fails, also applying induction, but to conceptions and definitions emerging from 
discussion. As Wheeler (2001) notes, Bacon envisions science moving from 
phenomena to real, non-phenomenal law: 
 
Bacon’s term for this generalized noumenal law was ‘Form’, which at first glance 
appears to be a Platonism. It is, in the way that Marx was a Hegelian. . . . Form has had a 
chequered career among Baconians and historians of science but to ignore its foundation 
misses the force and novelty of Bacon’s invention, and the semiotic nature of his 
philosophy of scientific empiricism. ‘Form’ refers to implicit structure and is most 
familiar from Plato’s distinction between ideal Form and ‘appearances’. Bacon adapts it 
to refer to an empirical phenomenological scientific law.  
 
Wheeler conjectures that Bacon’s legal training leads him to this method, as ‘Bacon 
started from law rather than mathematics. He studied the deep structure of systems 
rather than motion and time-sequences.’ Bacon’s endeavour to uncover the natural, or 
unwritten law, operating as a principle throughout both written and case law parallels 
his reverse Platonism in seeking the non-phenomenal laws operating throughout 
phenomena. Thus Bacon seeks the: 
 
law behind the ruling in a judgment at the English ‘unwritten’ common law. Bacon’s 
science looks for that kind of ‘thingness’ in all departments of the environment, social as 
well as natural (Wheeler, 2001) 
 
Pursuing Bacon as a Platonist of things instead of Ideas, applying inductive method to 
phenomena instead of arguments, and definitions, Wheeler writes, 
 
The mind, Bacon said, sounding like Plato, is by its truest and deepest nature, the ‘form 
of forms.’ Hence if properly used it is potentially capable of decoding nature’s hidden 
‘abecedarium’. (Wheeler, 2001) 
 
According to this view, as civil and criminal law indicate a higher and logically prior 
unwritten law, the alphabet of nature is similarly amenable to inductive investigation. 
Bacon’s ideal of reading this alphabet holds poetic appeal for Coleridge. Part of this 
appeal lies in Bacon’s reference to the non-sensible, intelligible Form inductively 
sought through the empirical objects of observation. Thus Coleridge finds Bacon, like 
Plato, to hold, contrary to the Empiricists, that truth ‘may indeed be revealed to us 
through and with, but never by the senses’ (Friend I, 492).  
Another appeal might lie in Bacon’s turning Plato right side up again, to borrow 
Marx’s phrase, with respect to Laws of Nature, so that Form is sought through 
phenomena, as Plotinus also proposes (with respect to aesthetics), rather than through 
verbal discourse and dialectic. In this vein, Coleridge considers human freedom as 
aiming to view, 
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Through meaner powers and secondary things 
Effulgent, as through clouds that veil his blaze. 
For all that meets the bodily sense I deem 
Symbolical, one mighty alphabet 
For infant minds; and we in this low world 
Placed with our backs to bright Reality, 
That we may learn with young unwounded ken 
The substance from its shadow. (‘Destiny of Nations’, Poetical Works I.1, 291) 
 
Coleridge emphasizes that Bacon seeks the non-phenomenal laws behind 
phenomena. As such, he cannot be identified with an Empiricism that holds all we 
know and can know to be contained within sense impressions. Bacon’s sense of the 
Laws of Nature having objective reality is a model for Coleridge’s sense of the reality 
of Ideas. Baconian Law, like Coleridgean Idea, which reiterates Platonic and Neo-
Platonic formulations of Idea, is to be approached, and not to be hypothesized as some 
conception. As Bacon (The Advancement of Learning, Bk. II [1605], ed. Vickers, 2002) 
suggests, humbly and yet confidently avoiding mystification, we may ultimately find 
ourselves incapable of truly understanding laws: 
 
For knowledges are as pyramides, whereof history is the basis. So of Natural Philosophy, 
the basis is Natural History; the stage next the basis is Physic; the stage next the vertical 
point is Metaphysic. As for the vertical point, ‘Opus quod operatur Deus à principio 
usque ad finem’,71 the Summary Law of Nature, we know not whether man's enquiry can 
attain unto it. (Bacon [1605], ed. Vickers, 2002, 197) 
 
                                                 
71  Latin: Ecclesiastes 3:11, ‘[No man can find out] the work that God maketh from the 
beginning to the end.’ 
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2.6 Coleridgean Idea Conveyed by Symbol 
Coleridgean Ideas are best conveyed through symbols. For Coleridge, imagination’s role 
in the economy of thought is to approach Ideas of reason and present them to a thereby 
enlightened understanding. The imagination may create symbols in its own approach 
towards Ideas, and has recourse to nothing other than symbols to later convey those Ideas 
aesthetically, whether the expression be religious, in high art, popular culture, or in 
everyday aesthetic expression, such as in a love letter, a gift, and an the development of 
an individuals manners. Without symbols, the attempt to convey Ideas produces silence 
or mere gesture, either deeply felt but incoherent, or superficial and obviously 
inadequate.  
In poetry, and in aesthetic experience in general, imagination represents Ideas 
through symbols. Distinguishing what he means by symbol, Coleridge presents allegory 
as a product of mechanical understanding translating abstract notions into picture-
language. Coleridge defines allegory as: 
 
the employment of one set of agents and images to convey in disguise a moral meaning, 
with a likeness to the imagination, but with a difference to the understanding,––those 
agents and images being so combined as to form a homogeneous whole. (Lit. Lects: 
Lecture on Spenser) 
  
Abstract notions derive from sense experience and their allegorical representation 
merely rephrases them, lending nothing to their understanding. Thus for Coleridge, 
allegory is a ‘phantom proxy’ (Statesman’s Manual, 437) standing in for an equally 
shadowy show of phenomena with no principle sought to explain their unity or value. 
Coleridge contrasts allegory with the symbol in his classic Romantic definition: 
 
a Symbol (ho estin aei tautegorikon) is characterized by a translucence of the Special in 
the Individual or of the General in the Especial or of the Universal in the General. Above 
all by the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of 
the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself 
as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative. (Statesman’s Manual, 30) 
 
The parenthetic Greek means, ‘which is always tautegorical’. ‘Tauto’ means ‘the same’, 
so the symbol ‘gathers the same’. ‘Tautegorical’ is one of Coleridge’s neologisms. It 
distinguishes the symbol, which is tautegorical, from metaphor and simile, which are 
allegorical. Elsewhere Coleridge explains: 
 
The base of Symbols and symbolical expressions; the nature of which is always 
tautegorical, that is, expressing the same subject but with a difference, in contra-
distinction from metaphors and similitudes, that are always allegorical, that is expressing 
a different subject but with a resemblance. (Reflection, 206) 
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To consider what it means to assert the symbol as ‘always tautegorical’, and ‘metaphors 
and similitudes’ as ‘always allegorical’, we can begin by examining how this difference 
is sometimes misunderstood. Rosen and Zerner (1985, 26) defend Coleridge against 
Wellek’s charge that by being metonymical, but not metaphorical, Coleridge’s symbol 
was not a proper symbol. In asserting, against Wellek, that Coleridge’s symbol is indeed 
a metaphor, and ‘is clearly and intentionally both’, Rosen and Zerner nevertheless miss 
the point as much as Wellek does.
 
 
On the technical point of whether or not Coleridgean symbols are metaphors, Wellek 
has the advantage over Rosen and Zerner: The Coleridgean symbol is not a metaphor. 
Coleridge’s symbol always expresses ‘the same subject, but with a difference’, whereas 
the metaphor (Gk. meta phorein) carries meaning beyond that same subject to a different 
subject, which it nevertheless resembles. Wellek begs the question, however, in 
assuming that symbols must be metaphors. He thus fails to understand Coleridge’s points 
that metaphor and analogy belong to the same species, that their borrowed significances 
will inevitably diverge ad absurdum from their intended meanings, that they are opaque 
and unreliable proxies for what they represent, and that a true symbol is a part of that 
which it renders intelligible. Coleridge, like any writer, will often use metaphor and 
analogy, but he sees them as second best, a kind of pedagogical refreshment: 
 
Even as illustrations, pretended Analogies are deceptive. The best excuse would be to 
consider them as Flowers by the road side, which tho’ they delay the Traveller in each 
instance yet by refreshing his mind may accelerate his progress on the whole.–– 
(Marginalia V, 780) 
 
In Reflection, he describes the symbol as: 
 
a sign included in the Idea which it represents . . . an actual part chosen to represent the 
whole. (Reflection, 263) 
 
Among his examples are actual parts taken as synecdoches, such as a lower lip and 
prominent chin representing Man, and an example of a lower type taken to represent the 
higher, such as the instinct of bees or ants symbolizing the human understanding. His 
symbol always offers a simpler instantiation of a complex reality, with the particular 
offering an ascent to the more rarefied general. The symbol thus unites image and Idea in 
imagination. 
Unlike analogy or metaphor, which, to reiterate, Coleridge shows to be the basic 
type of analogy, the symbol needs no translation, being consubstantial with the Idea 
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represented. Again, unlike metaphor, ‘a Coleridgean symbol is not a sign, if we mean 
by sign . . . an arbitrary relationship, a unity of meaning agreed upon by convention’ 
(Cutsinger, 1987, 77-8). Thus, to take a poetic example from Burns that Coleridge twice 
references (see page 206, below), snow melting on a river is a symbol that transcends 
cultural boundaries, directly presenting momentary existence dissipating the instant it is 
seized.  Thus snow is seized and dissipated by a river; poppies by the hand that takes 
them; and fleeting pleasures by the understanding. Symbol, then, is universal and 
poetic, where metaphor is conventional and mechanic. Metaphor, reliant on dualistic 
understanding, requires a translator’s code, which cultures usually instil, and while 
many of these metaphorical codes are held in common, symbol transcends such codes 
altogether, in transcending such duality of meaning. 
In recent philosophy, appreciation of the importance of metaphor in understanding 
has increased. Wittgenstein’s On Certainty importantly exemplifies this appreciation of 
understanding as metaphorical, especially in its metaphor of the river-bed: 
 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. 
But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the 
bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. (OC, §97) 
 
The river-bed metaphorically represents more slowly evolving beliefs or propositions. 
These ‘foundational’ beliefs evolve slowly, that is, relative to the fast-flowing water and 
debris. The river-bed nevertheless interchanges particles with the river, so that all are 
part of the same fluidity. This, and many other examples, especially in the later 
Wittgenstein, gives a metaphorical understanding of understanding as metaphorical, 
medial, and perhaps necessarily shifting.  
In cognitive linguistics, too, Lakoff and Johnson argue the very strong position that 
understanding only ever occurs through metaphors (1980), and that this requirement to 
understand via analogized images is necessary because the human mind is an embodied 
mind (1999). Such recognition of complex and abstract thought requiring imagery in 
concrete terms is thoroughly consonant with Coleridge’s position. For Coleridge, 
however, appreciating the all-important role of allegorical thinking in the understanding 
is not enough, and, moreover, this insufficiency is dangerous.  
That the Coleridgean understanding is always allegorical, then, is a position that 
arguably finds support in Wittgenstein, and is very strongly and explicitly supported in 
Lakoff and Johnson. Coleridge, however, goes further than these modern thinkers, and 
argues how imagination and its symbols are always tautegorical, such that symbols non-
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metaphorically, because consubstantially, present (rather than represent) the object of 
thought. He argues that the understanding’s metaphorizing work adds an opacity to 
thought between the mind and its objects, and that merely paralleling phenomena, 
relations, and abstract notions (though even this is no mean task, but is in fact the 
essence of reflectivity) is just to restate appearances in another idiom, and not to get 
closer to their more fundamental reality. Understanding, then, half knows its objects by 
being able to think them in different terms. It is thus very rhetorical, being able to 
change its metaphors to use the kinds of images its different audiences already 
understand.  
While awakening imagination enlightens with Ideas, the understanding, lacking 
symbolic translucency, schematizes concepts that opaquely represent rather than 
translucently reveal. Moreover, conceptual understanding too easily falls into cliché, 
thus further concealing its objects with the film of familiarity. Unlike symbolic 
participation, conceptual understanding, in the manufacture of its analogical images, 
presents a distance between its cognition and the object or relation cognized. As Berlin 
(1999, 120) agrees: 
 
‘Understanding’ always presupposes the understander and the understood, the 
knower and the known, some kind of gap between the subject and the object.  
 
Restoring the freshness of enlivened perception is, then, the task of imaginative genius, 
which gains in directness and suggestive vividness while it loses in distinctness and 
conceptual clarity. 
Far from abandoning fecund imagination to focus on what some commentators 
view as the drier subject of Idea in his later writings, Coleridge calls upon the symbolic 
imagination as the very principle of intelligibility. I oppose the view, expressed by 
Whale (2000, 167), that Coleridge’s ‘subscription to the “Idea” puts a particular squeeze 
on imagination’.72 That the later Coleridge renounces imagination as he delves deeper 
into the driest deserts of metaphysics, as some might consider it, is most fully framed in 
Boulger’s (1961) argument that Coleridge wholly abandons imagination. This position 
is no longer tenable now that the Collected Coleridge is complete. One later statement 
of the later Coleridge’s maintaining his theory of imagination explicitly relies on his 
Fancy-Imagination distinction, namely the marginal note to Coleridge’s Copy B (see 
Marginalia IV, 593, for a physical description of this British-Library-held book 
                                                 
72  Vigus (2005, 86-7), also argues that Coleridge abandons imagination for Ideas after 
Biographia, 1817. 
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published in 1824) of Scott’s The Monastery in which Coleridge writes, 
 
This Chapter might be chosen by a philosophical Critic to point out and exemplify the 
difference between Fancy and Imagination. Here is the abundance of the former with the 
blankest absence of the latter. (Marginalia IV, 596) 
 
Unlike writers such as Boulger, Vigus and Whale, I hold, citing not only statements of 
Coleridge like the one just quoted, but also arguing from the important, if often implicit, 
role the Coleridgean theory of a symbolizing imagination that approaches and 
aestheticizes Ideas performs in the later Coleridge’s theory of Ideas. I argue, then, 
specifically that the imagination always retains an important role in Coleridge’s later 
work concerning Ideas, because imagination is necessary in framing the symbol, which 
is needed to approach and convey Ideas aesthetically. This constitutes a strong argument 
against the view that the later Coleridge abandons the imagination.  
A more straightforward and conclusive argument that Coleridge does not abandon 
his thoughts on the importance of imagination in his later years is that several entries in 
Notebooks 5, written in the last seven years of his life, refer to imagination as a higher 
mental faculty. One such entry of 1833 describes humour as: 
 
the power of making the Peculiar Universal . . . of giving . . . objective Value to a 
subjective individuality [or] anomaly. . . . It is the Organization of the Adlibitive by the 
Rational, and hence always implies the Imagination, as the modifying Power. (Notebooks, 
6995) 
 
 Another 1833 notebook entry emphasizes the imagination’s importance in a discussion 
of the superiority of subtle distinction over acute division: 
 
In Nature I find no Acuteness, no correlative to Wit; but infinite Subtlety, and every 
where Correlatives to Reason & Imagination. (Notebooks 5, 6740) 
 
These entries demonstrating that imagination retains its importance for Coleridge have 
been selected almost at random from the later Notebooks. Notebooks 4, 4692 is another 
such example. It is a pity that Notebooks 4 and 5 are not indexed by subject, but only by 
place, and author. Reference to these valuable texts, however is certain to be enhanced 
and increased when their digitization is complete. 
I have shown, then, from both (a) the theoretical necessity of imagination in 
approaching Ideas, and from (b) direct quotation, that imagination’s status in no way 
diminishes as Coleridge develops his philosophy of Ideas. We should therefore clearly 
see that Coleridge’s earlier work on imagination leads to and is retained in his theory of 
the symbol, whereby the aesthetic imagination that conveys Ideas through symbols 
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mediates between the objectively real Ideas of reason and the faculties of fancy and 
understanding, which are based in sense perception. The later Coleridge focus on Ideas 
is, by his own account, only achieved by means of the aestheticizing, poetic 
imagination, without which Ideas can mean nothing to us.  
Throughout Coleridge’s writings, imagination, with its aesthetic, value-interpretive 
perceptions and creative endeavours, is never superior to the Ideas of reason whose 
aesthetic and philosophical conveyance is imagination’s highest and only true end. 
Coleridgean symbols work not only in poetic composition, or in contemplating natural 
laws; they are active in aesthetic experience generally. In such experiences as looking 
around oneself while thinking, the things around us can take on a symbolic aspect, and a 
heightened sense of the vista can be felt through the ‘living educts of the Imagination’ 
(Statesman’s Manual, 28-9). 
Coleridge carefully describes this experience, noticing that when he looks at a 
flower, or a tree,  
 
And with particular reference to that undivided Reason . . . I seem to myself to behold in 
the quiet objects, on which I am gazing, more than an arbitrary illusion, more than a mere 
simile, the work of my own fancy. I feel an awe, as if there were before my eyes the 
same power as that of the REASON––the same power in a lower dignity, and therefore a 
symbol established in the truth of things. (Statesman’s Manual, 71-2) 
 
Here the symbolizing imagination allows an Idea to shine through sensuous appearance, 
lending beauty and poetic significance derived from the universal value (the Ideal) to be 
made apparent and relevant to human life through the particular.
73
 The symbolizing 
imagination thus uses the poetic visionary mode of translucence to see the Ideal in and 
through the phenomenal. Coleridgean symbols do not therefore stand for, or represent, 
Ideas or anything else. Rather, they remain what they are, but are seen now revealed as 
more fully what they are, and as being, and not just representing, instantiations or traces 
of values in the human or otherwise natural working out of the world in relation to 
Ideality. This Ideality can be conceived mathematically, or scientifically in terms of the 
Laws of Nature, or in Platonist terms of ethical and aesthetic values, ultimate standards, 
and perfections.  
The Coleridgean symbol, then, can be helpfully compared to what Suzuki (1934, 
256) calls ‘double exposure’, whereby one sees simultaneously (a) the surrounding 
world of ordinary things, filmed with their dust and patina, often quite humble, and 
                                                 
73 Halmi (2002, 86) proposes that the Romantic concern with symbolism lies in addressing the 
question: ‘how can we be sure that nature is naturally meaningful to humanity?’ 
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certainly showing many imperfections, and (b) an enlightened vision of profound and 
universal significance that leaves everything as it is. Although the Laws of Nature are 
not themselves phenomena, phenomena of nature are our only visible or otherwise 
sensible access through which we may think these Laws. The imaginative natural 
scientist, then, would see not only phenomena as naturally occurent behaviour, but, with 
nothing removed from the ordinary vision, would also see in and through these 
phenomena a scintillatingly beautiful, profoundly moving vision of Ideal reality. As 
Husserl straightforwardly proposes, in a passage that nevertheless suggests a kōan for 
appreciating the Coleridgean symbol as it applies to Laws of Nature, if there were no 
matter, there would still be a Law of gravitation:   
 
If all gravitating masses were destroyed, the law of gravitation would not thereby be 
suspended: it would merely remain without the possibility of factual application. For it 
tells us nothing regarding the existence of gravitating masses, but only about that which 
pertains to gravitating masses as such. ([1913, 149n.] 1970, 164) 
 
The Platonist point that Husserl makes here is that laws are still true and valid even if 
there is nothing for them to determine. Expressed plainly and soberly, laws are modal 
and support counterfactuals, so it is possible in principle for them to have no 
manifestations. This sober expression, however, leaves unanswered some very 
important, and perhaps unanswerable, questions. Ontologically, exactly what is a 
natural law? What is its mode of being? What is it that it rules over and how does it 
determine what is possible and what becomes actual? Such questioning can lead one to 
contemplate beauty beyond phenomenal being, in Ideality, in ways that Russell (1917, 
125-6) suggests when he says that: 
 
Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty . . . without 
the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern 
perfection such as only the greatest art can show. The true spirit of delight, the exaltation, 
the sense of being more than man, which is the touchstone of the highest excellence, is to 
be found in mathematics as surely as in poetry.  
 
We return to the double aspect of the Coleridgean symbol, having thought around 
the subject by looking at Suzuki’s double exposure; Husserl’s gravitation without 
matter; and Russell’s sense of mathematical beauty lying in its sternly mind-
transcending perfection, that is nevertheless appreciable by the human minds it 
transcends. To understand how the Coleridgean symbol reveals something beyond itself 
without representing anything, we should now consider the distinction between natura 
naturata and natura naturans.  
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This venerable distinction is supported by the insight, traceable to Plato, and 
through Bacon, Bruno, and Spinoza, that the laws of phenomena are not themselves 
phenomena.
74
 Bacon writes of the Form, or Idea, which he also calls Law, as natura 
naturans and the fons emanationis (Novum Organon, II, i). Robertson (1905, 18) 
comments that Bacon’s ‘natura naturans’ expresses ‘the relation in which the Form 
stands to the phenomenal nature which results from it.’ 
To Sense, Fancy, and unenlightened Understanding, natural phenomena are seen as 
natura naturata, as nature natured, and as fixed and dead relative to natura naturans. 
When observed, however, through imagination’s symbolic mode, primary imagination 
combines sensation not only with categorizing concepts, but also under the Idea of 
natura naturans, or nature naturing, which Coleridge explains as ‘Nature in the active 
sense’ (Phil. Lects, 370). Thus universal law is appreciated in imaginative experience 
that allows the particular to symbolize the universal, and thus transform the percept and 
its concept into the symbolic, experienced within the aspect of transcendence in virtue of 
being ‘symbols of Noumena’ (Notebooks 2, 2664). 
Kaiser (1994, 142-3) describes imagination’s symbolic movement as a process of 
mediation: 
 
Coleridge holds up the Imagination as the mediator between the material world of the 
senses and the immaterial world of Ideas apprehended by Reason, the mediator that joins 
these two worlds through symbols . . . . For Coleridge, symbols thus embody the physical 
particulars, and express the universal Idea at the same time; they ‘enunciate the whole’, as 
he puts it. 
 
Symbol holds a similar place in his aesthetic system as Geist in Kant’s aesthetic. To 
reiterate, Kant’s Geist animates the mind and gives life to the work. It is the ability to 
present aesthetic ideas that provoke much thought that cannot be adequately 
comprehended by the concepts of the understanding. Coleridgean symbol serves the 
same role in presenting symbols that convey Ideas of reason that remain beyond of the 
conceptual grasp and schematizing of the understanding. However, Coleridge also 
provides a frame for symbolic imagination to transform everyday aesthetic experience, 
and not just the works of artistic genius. 
He describes the symbol as forma informans, using the term from the Latinized 
Aristotle, for whom it referred to the soul as an informing form, giving form to the 
matter of the body. As forma informans, the Coleridgean symbol is always active. It 
                                                 
74 The terms are Latinized from Aristotle’s On the Heavens. 
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guides perception in primary imagination, adding – he says in 1814, a year before 
commencing Biographia – significances, purposes, and values to the experience of life, 
subjecting:  
 
matter to spirit so as to be transformed into a symbol in and through which the spirit 
reveals itself. (SWF, 353-386) 
 
Coleridgean aesthetic experience is imagination giving sensuous shape to Ideas. Indeed 
he holds that,  
 
an Idea in the highest sense of that word, cannot be conveyed but by a symbol. 
(Biographia I, 156) 
 
Thus imagination bodies the universal in the individual and, always evocative, the 
symbol continues to oscillate between the sensuous and the Ideal. 
Describing the symbolizing imagination as embodying Idea, he writes, 
 
Something there must be to realize the form, something in and by which the forma 
informans reveals itself: and these, less than any that could be substituted, and in the least 
possible degree, distract the attention, in the least possible degree obscure the idea, of 
which they (composed of outline and surface) are the symbol. (SWF, 377) 
 
Here is the secondary imagination as a shaping power, careful neither to distract with 
the sensuous, nor to obscure the Idea conveyed. Offering an image of a crystal held in 
the light as a symbol of what the symbol itself is doing, he writes, 
 
An illustrative hint may be taken from a pure crystal, as compared with an opaque, 
semiopaque or clouded mass, on the one hand, and with a perfectly transparent body, 
such as the air, on the other. The crystal is lost in the light, which yet it contains, 
embodies, gives shape to, but which passes shapeless through the air, and, in a ruder 
body, is either quenched or dissipated. (SWF, 377) 
 
Passing through air, the light cannot be held up and seen as light. Similarly, an Idea 
cannot be transparently conveyed. Attempts to convey an Idea transparently collapse in 
empty gestures, hand-waving and mumbles. Again, holding an opaque body in the air 
obscures the light at least shows there is light, by only by occluding it. The pure crystal, 
representing the symbol, is ‘lost in the light which yet it contains, embodies, gives 
shape to’ (SWF, 377). Thus the Idea, whose light would otherwise ‘pass shapeless 
through the air’, or be ‘quenched or dissipated’ ‘in a ruder body’, becomes meaningful 
for us through aesthetic form. 
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2.7 Idea in History:  Civilization and Cultivation 
 
In the unfolding and exposition of any idea, we naturally seek assistance and the means 
of illustration from the historical instance, in which it has been most nearly realized 
(Constitution, 35-6) 
 
 
 
Showing that Idea works through history, Coleridge argues that the permanency of a 
nation, its progressiveness, and the security of personal freedom are grounded in the 
necessary, antecedent condition of progressive cultivation. Civilization alone, however, 
might likely as not hinder personal freedom: 
 
But civilization is itself but a mixed good, if not far more a corrupting influence, the 
hectic of disease, not the bloom of health, and a nation so distinguished more fitly to be 
called a varnished than a polished people, where this civilization is not grounded in 
cultivation, in the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that 
characterize our humanity. (Constitution, 42-3) 
 
He makes the same argument in terms of education, and now showing the dangers of over-
civilization, saying that the young people of this highly civilizing age are becoming: 
 
most anxiously and expensively be-school-mastered, be-tutored, be-lectured, anything but 
educated; who have received arms and ammunition instead of skill, strength and courage; 
varnished rather than polished; perilously over-civilized, and most piteously uncultivated! 
(Friend I, 500) 
 
This crucial but easily overlooked distinction between civilization and cultivation 
becomes central in Romanticism, especially in anti-Utilitarian arguments. Before 
Coleridge, Burke (1790, §166) understands civilization to drive the Enlightenment ideal 
of inevitable progress:  
 
Without . . . civil society man could not by any possibility arrive at the perfection of 
which his nature is capable, nor even make a faint approach to it. 
 
In his aforementioned essay on Coleridge, Mill (1840, 141-2) takes Coleridge’s 
civilization-cultivation distinction to show how Romanticism is distinguished from 
utilitarian, bureaucratizing, Enlightenment tendencies: 
 
Take for instance the question how far mankind have gained by civilization. One 
observer is forcibly struck by the multiplication of physical comforts; the advancement 
and diffusion of knowledge; the decay of superstition; the facilities of mutual 
intercourse; the softening of manners; the decline of war and personal conflict; the 
progressive limitation of the tyranny of the strong over the weak; the great works 
accomplished throughout the globe by the cooperation of multitudes 
 
Mill then asks the reader to consider ‘the high price which is paid’ for ‘the value of 
these advantages’, 
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the relaxation of individual energies and courage; the loss of . . . self-relying 
independence; the slavery . . .  to artificial wants; their effeminate shrinkage from even the 
shadow of pain; the . . . monotony of their lives . . . and absence of any marked 
individuality . . . ; the contrast between the narrow, mechanical understanding, produced 
by a life spent in executing by fixed rules a fixed task, and the varied powers of the man of 
the woods . . . and the sufferings of the great mass of the people of civilized countries . . . 
while they are bound by a thousand fetters in lieu of the freedom and excitement which are 
its compensations. 
 
The high price paid is a diminished cultivation; increased bureaucracy and technocracy; 
and a reduction in the freedoms of self-realization, of independence, and of aesthetic 
explorations. 
On the Constitution of Church and State According to the Idea of Each (1829) is 
the work in which Coleridge traces: the development of nationality; permanence 
through landed interest; progression through personal interest of the mercantile, 
commercial, and professional classes; duties; and freedoms, as the realization of Ideas 
in history. His thesis here is strikingly Hegelian, which similarity I suggest stems from a 
shared disavowal of Kant’s transcendental Ideas as subjective projections, rather than 
objective, constitutive principles. Both see history as Ideas transforming the world. 
Perhaps drawing from Bacon’s inductive studies of legal precedence and case law to 
show that there is an unwritten, or only partially explicit, Natural Law that gradually 
becomes manifest in nations,
75
 Coleridge understands the British Constitution as an 
Idea. Hence, 
 
In the same sense that the sciences of arithmetic and geometry, that Mind, that Life itself, 
have reality; the Constitution has real existence, and does not the less exist in reality, 
because it both is, and exists as, an IDEA. (Constitution, 19) 
 
Although constitutional law is a rational object benefiting all, it unfolds gradually 
through the balance of different social groups. For Coleridge, powerful or influential 
groups and individuals have a duty to ensure a proper balance between progression and 
permanence, with the former advancing civilization, technology, and technicalities and 
the latter maintaining cultivation and the sense of humanity. Progress is ensured by the 
Constitution of the State, and deals with transience, of which property is a clear 
example; the Constitution of the Nation is discovered by reason, seeks the Ideals that 
secure permanence, and cultivates these Ideals in national character and soul. The 
changing but developing governments represent the State, and the Church represents the 
Nation.  
                                                 
75 Bacon ([1597] 1978) explains the principles of English law as deriving from common law, 
which may be understood, like Laws of Nature, inductively. 
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Coleridge adapts three lines from Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida for his 
epigraph to Constitution:  
 
There is a mystery in the soul of the State 
Which hath an operation more divine 
Than our mere chroniclers meddle with 
 
The mystery in the State’s soul is that it is drawn by guiding Ideas invisible to the lower 
understanding, the historians of which merely chronicle natura naturata, rather than 
recognize natura naturans in the principles connecting events. Kooy (1999) comments 
that: 
 
his historiography [is] the notion that ideas make history and that the way to get at these 
ideas is aesthetically. 
 
In Coleridge’s day, ideas as historical, movement-causing themes, begin to be seen as 
unstoppable motors of social and political change. Once Ideas become manifest in the 
network of history, they become laws. Indeed a Zeitgeist was pervading Europe, with 
Romantic Nationalism elevating, sometimes even inventing, folklore and traditions; 
sweeping into creation the states of Germany, Italy, Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary; and inspiring independence movements in European colonies around the 
globe. Thus Coleridge writes, 
 
Shall I compare thee to poor Poland’s Hope, 
Bright flower of Hope kill’d in the opening bud?  
(‘On Observing a Blossom’, Sibylline Leaves, 174) 
 
These lines most likely refer to Russia’s occupation of the pro-Napoleonic Duchy of 
Warsaw territories in 1813, after routing French Imperial troops, and thereby dashing 
Polish nationalist hope. 
Nevertheless, for Coleridge this progression of national civilization requires 
cultivation if it is to have moral and humane value. Cultivation of souls occurs with ‘the 
annunciation of principles, of ideas’ (Statesman’s Manual, 24), which is the true end of 
government. As Gregory (2003, 96) explains,  
 
For Coleridge, . . . [the historical conveyance of] ideas . . . awakens the mind’s germinal 
power to the consubstantialities of past and present, [and thus] contributes to the creation 
of social and political community. 
 
understanding, or ‘the Faculty of means to medial ends’ (Constitution, 59), advances 
Britain’s physical infrastructure in the first thirty years of the nineteenth century, in an 
unprecedented advance of organized civilization. Coleridge cites,  
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Inventions, Discoveries, Public Improvements, Docks, Rail-Ways, Canals, &c . . . in 
England and Scotland. . . . We live, I exclaimed, under the dynasty of the understanding: 
and this is its golden age. (Constitution, 59) 
 
Without, however, equal cultivation toward ultimate ends, comes cultural emptiness 
seeing medial ends only. 
 
Sea, and Land, Rock, Mountain, Lake and Moor, yea Nature and all her Elements, sink 
before them, or yield themselves captive! But the ultimate ends? Where shall I seek for 
information concerning these? By what name shall I seek for the historiographer of 
REASON? Where shall I find the annals of her recent campaigns? The records of her 
conquests? In the facts disclosed by the records of the Mendicity Society? In the reports 
on the increase of crimes, commitments? In the proceedings of the Police? Or in the 
accumulating volumes on the horrors and perils of population? (Constitution, 59-60) 
 
Coleridge identifies the imbalance of medial conceptions outweighing ultimate Ideals 
nineteen years earlier, in Friend, when he writes that: 
 
a nation can never be a too cultivated, but may easily become an over-civilized race. 
(Constitution, 49)
76
  
 
In Constitution (69), he recommends a national clerisy to disseminate the liberal arts 
and sciences as ‘an essential element of a rightly constituted nation’ to secure both the 
permanence and the progression of a nation. Coleridge is often cited as coining 
‘clerisy’, which he does, although Shaffer (2000, 148) implies he effectively translates 
Kant’s Klerisei. Although Klerisei is standard German for clergy, and no Kantian 
coinage, Kant does propose an idealizing church of Reason that frees faith from 
historical forms and directs it towards true moral law, and we can agree with Shaffer 
that this is very likely the source of Coleridge’s notion.77 Coleridge’s development of 
the clerisy idea in 1829, representing a stable intelligentsia to ensure a steady cultivation 
of humanity to counter-balance the technological progressions of civilization, echoes his 
three-decades earlier ‘Religious Musings’, composed in 1794 and finished in 1796:  
 
O’er waken’d realms Philosophers and Bards 
Spread in concentric circles; they whose souls 
Conscious of their high dignities from God 
Brook not wealth’s rivalry. (Poetical Works  I.1, 61) 
 
While his clerisy notion derives from Kant’s suggestion, Coleridge’s development of it 
coincides with the ascetically non-materialistic philosophical class of Plato’s Republic. 
Coleridge applies the notion in a trenchant critique of his age’s materialism and 
                                                 
76 Repeating a sentence from Friend I, 500. Cf., Friend I, 494, where Coleridge introduces his 
civilization-cultivation distinction. 
77 For Kant’s ‘church of Reason’, see his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone [1793]. 
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utilitarianism, and bemoans, for example, ‘lecture-bazaars under the absurd name of 
universities’ as ‘spurious’, and as feeding the disease they set out to cure (Constitution, 
69). A national education should come from the font of Ideas, and not from the ‘attempt 
to popularize science’, which might well ‘only effect its plebification’ (Constitution, 
70). Coleridge, with Plato, describes Ideas as, 
 
distinguished in kind from logical and mathematical truths (Constitution, 47) 
 
 Ideas, then, are:  
 
the truths of philosophy, . . . objects whose actual subsistence is implied in their idea, 
though only by the idea revealable. (Constitution, 47) 
 
Paraphrasing St John’s Gospel, Coleridge calls Ideas: 
 
“spiritual realities that can only be spiritually discerned” (Constitution, 47, Coleridge’s 
quotation marks) 
 
These are the cultivating Ideas, constituting humanity in its relation to: 
 
God, eternity, freedom, will, absolute truth, of the good, the true, the beautiful, the 
infinite. (Constitution, 47) 
 
As in Socrates’ convictions expressed in the Parmenides, the Ideas transcend our 
humanity and are constitutive of it, being the Form of all value. Thus our deepest 
feelings resonate with the highest intellectual principles, and Coleridge thus describes: 
 
deep feelings which belong, as by a natural right to those obscure ideas that are necessary 
to the moral perfection of the human being (Friend I, 106) 
 
These Ideas necessary for moral perfection are now given as: 
 
Being, Form, Life, the Law of Conscience, God, Reason, Freedom, Immortality (Friend 
I, 106) 
 
Contemplating these transcendental, non-abstracted Ideas one can: 
 
rightly appreciate, the permanent distinction and occasional contrast, between cultivation 
and civilization. (Friend I, 106) 
 
Like Hegel, Coleridge describes the oft-faltering development of Idea in history as 
unfolding from the bud. Coleridge’s first use of this image, six years after Hegel’s, is in 
his Shakespearean criticism, delivering a lecture in 1813. He describes education as a 
calling to growth, or a Socratic assistance in giving birth, and is thus: 
 
to educe, to call forth, as the blossom is educed from the bud. The vital excellences are 
within; the acorn is but educed or brought forth from the bud (Lit. Lects I, 585) 
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Hegel ([1807] 1977, 68) uses the image of ‘the bud’ ‘broken through’ by the blossom, 
which is itself ‘refuted’ by the fruit in showing these moments as a rational unfolding 
of an ‘organic unity’. With the same image, Coleridge describes, 
 
the full development and expansion of the mercantile and commercial order, which in the 
earlier epochs of the constitution, only existed . . . potentially and in the bud.’ 
(Constitution, 51)
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Part Three. The Coleridgean Imagination: its Role in Thought and its Relation to 
Reason.  
Part Three begins by examining Coleridge’s distinction (different from Kant’s) between 
reason and understanding, as a context for the development of his theory of imagination, 
which for Coleridge operates between the two. The initial focus will be on the 
discussion of the Kantian ‘necessary imagination’ (Strawson, 2008), and will argue that 
contrary to such commentators as Richards (1960) and Scruton (1983), Coleridge’s 
primary imagination is not Kant’s necessary imagination redescribed. Part Three will 
also argue that in Coleridge’s later works (e.g. Reflection [1825], and Constitution 
[1826]), the Ideas of reason do not occlude the place of the imagination.78 Rather, 
Coleridge’s position on the Ideas could only develop after first establishing the 
imagination’s important role. After these preparatory arguments have been established, 
Part Three will argue that, for Coleridge, the Ideas are the ultimate objects of 
contemplation and are accessible to mind through imaginatively created symbols.  
 
3.1 Coleridge’s Theory of Poetry: the argument against thoroughgoing Empiricism 
Coleridge’s theory of imagination is an organic part of his systematic philosophy. The 
locus classicus for Coleridge’s treatment of imagination is Biographia Literaria (1815, 
1817). Raimonda Modiano’s judges that: 
 
Biographia Literaria is without question Coleridge’s most controversial, most widely 
read and provocative work. Since its publication in 1817, the book has attracted polarized 
critical reactions, from extravagant praise to . . . mean-spirited ridicule, from awe to . . .  
contempt. While some have perceived the Biographia as ‘the greatest book of criticism in 
English’ (Arthur Symons) and its author as the ‘acknowledged “father” of theory itself’ 
(Trott 1998: 69), . . . F. R. Leavis . . . declared Coleridge’s ‘currency as an academic 
classic’ to be ‘something of a scandal’. (Ed. Burwick, 2009, 204-5) 
 
A crucial philosophical claim made in Biographia is that poetry’s very possibility 
proves Empiricism incomplete, and so for Coleridge it retains value only in capitulation 
to a broader system in which the imagination approaches Ideas and then conveys them 
aesthetically. Imagination is needed for awareness of reason in its positive aspect. 
Positive reason consists in Ideas, whereas negative reason is the Law of Contradiction 
working in the conceptual understanding (see below, pages 161-3). In 1818, Coleridge 
remarks that: 
 
                                                 
78 As suggested by, among others, Boulger (1961, 106-7); Whale (2000, 167); and Vigus (2005 
86-7). 
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Contemplation is what I call Positive Reason, Reason in her own Sphere, as distinguished 
from Negative or merely formal Reason. Reason in the sphere of the Understanding. 
(Marginalia V, 797) 
 
Negative reason, occurring in the understanding, is essentially clear, differentiating 
and distinguishing between logical objects and kinds. It is not wholly transparent, as its 
functioning depends upon medial images. It can be a civilizing force, creating complex 
systems of order and classification. However, its analytic focus on division emphasizes 
the very separateness Romanticism seeks to overcome, and it must therefore be 
balanced by a synthesizing approach to a good beyond selfish concern with lower 
pleasures and wants. 
Finding Locke’s and Hartley’s theories incapable of understanding poetic 
development, Coleridge’s enthusiasm for British Empiricism wanes, and he begins to 
develop his own theory of imagination. His argument that Empiricism and 
Utilitarianism can explain neither how poetry is possible nor how good poetry can be 
distinguished from bad persuades Mill to make his important distinction between higher 
and lower pleasures.
79
 Since his Christ’s Hospital schooldays, Coleridge held a 
conviction, instilled by headmaster James Boyer: 
 
that poetry, even that of the loftiest, and, seemingly, that of the wildest odes, had a logic 
of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult, because more subtle, more 
complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes. In the truly great poets, he 
would say, there is a reason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of 
every word
.
 (Biographia I, 9) 
 
Much of Coleridge’s work pursues this logic of poetry, leading to the conviction that: 
 
not the poem which we have read, but that to which we return with the greatest pleasure, 
possesses the genuine power and claims the name of essential poetry. . . . it would be 
scarcely more difficult to push a stone out from the pyramids with the bare hand, than to 
alter a word, or the position of a word, in Milton or Shakespeare, (in their most important 
works at least) without making the author say something else, or something worse, than 
he does say. (Biographia I, 23) 
 
Initially, Coleridge believed association to link body and mind, explaining how 
experience multiplies connections, naturally producing similes and metaphors. While 
associationism was just one aspect of Locke’s Empiricism, Hartley based his entire 
                                                 
79
 I do not think Mill goes far enough, however, in explicating his own account, though the 
attempt is valuable. As he says, it is better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied 
([1863, 1871] 2003, 188), yet, we can ask Mill, who could admit to a positive pleasure, 
ordinarily conceived, in being dissatisfied? What accords better, I suggest, with his term higher 
pleasure is an intellectual constancy to an ideal object, to draw on the title of a Coleridge poem, 
which can be a painful joy, a love, and a yearning, but cannot be a positively hedonic state. 
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system on association by contiguity and repetition. Although Hartley’s influence on 
Coleridge would not retain its central position, it was, in 1796, strong enough for the 
poet to name his first son after him.  
Coleridge was enthusiastic about Hartley’s sublimation theory, whereby sense 
material is spiritualized, and material objects become aestheticized: 
 
Some degree of spirituality is the necessary consequence of passing through life. The 
sensible pleasures and pains must be transferred by association . . . upon things that afford 
neither sensible pleasure nor sensible pain in themselves, and so beget the intellectual 
pleasures and pains. ([1749] 1834, 52) 
 
In ‘Religious Musings’ (1794-6), a 420-line blank verse poem, and his first critically 
acclaimed work, Coleridge hails Hartley as ‘of mortal kind / Wisest’, because he 
essayed to establish moral and spiritual value on a scientific materialist footing, and was 
the ‘first who marked the ideal tribes / Up the fine fibres through the sentient brain’ 
(Poetical Works I.1, 61). 
By 1819, Coleridge criticizes associationism forcefully,
80
 for its necessitarian 
implications, and for asserting ‘That sensation and thought are precisely the same’ 
(Phil. Lects II, 523). Nonetheless, he salvages elements of the theory. Associationism 
retains a humbled but necessary place in his system, with reason and sense at opposite 
poles, and a redeemed associationism subordinated to the sense end of the pole. 
Association remains at the mechanistic level and genuine thought emerges only through 
mental exertion beyond associative force. His proposed levels of thought and pre-
thought progress from nature, through sensation; fancy; lower, then higher 
understanding; imagination; and then reason, through which ultimate truth (divine 
logos) is reached.  
Maintaining his anti-reductionist stance, Coleridge criticizes associationism, as 
noted above, while retaining it in his system. Whereas association drives Hartley’s 
entire psychology, for Coleridge it operates only at the level of the fancy, which 
processes the sense materials for the lower understanding. Thus fancy provides the 
lower understanding with counters garnered from sense experience to be worked into 
concepts, similarly to Plato’s objects of pistis (belief) developing into the mathematika, 
the concepts of dianoia.  
Fancy operates with ready-made counters, which are proto-concepts taken from 
‘Memory emancipated from the order of time and space’ (Biographia I, 304). These 
                                                 
80 As he also does when writing Biographia, from 1815-17. 
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counters function like elements in a rebus and give an elementary structure to desire-led 
thought. In fact Coleridgean fancy shares three features with what Freud was to call 
primary process thinking in that (1) it operates with rebus-like signifiers; (2) is 
propelled by the energy of desire or instinct, and (3) its connections are made 
independently of voluntary guidance via a process analogous to a mechanical or 
hydraulic model.   
The understanding refines fancy’s imagistic thought process and abstracts from 
sense and fancy concepts proper, surpassing fancy’s rebus-like signifiers by creating 
tools for subtle  and skilful discourse. Understanding refines thought by giving it logical 
consistency. Unlike fancy, the understanding obeys the Law of Contradiction, and this 
is how it can regulate its conceptual schemes into a high degree of internal consistency. 
The understanding can then organize and articulate its conceptual world while 
remaining faithful to its sense intuitions, and thus it creates both logically and 
empirically consistent world-views. This process of creating conceptual worlds is 
initiated by desires, and is first activated by fancy’s proto-conceptual images, which 
Coleridge calls fixities. Through these fixities, thought first gains its concept of outness, 
as Coleridge terms, after Berkeley, the sense of externality.
81
 Thus the understanding is: 
 
The faculty by which we generalize and arrange the phenomena of perception (Friend I, 
156) 
 
Understanding outness, including that in our own thoughts and conceptions, we 
increase self-consciousness, but we also thereby conceive ourselves as detached 
individuals. Coleridge’s greatest philosophical achievement was his sustained 
commitment to showing that although understanding is necessary to human thought, it 
should not be mistaken for the mind’s highest mode. The understanding’s distinctions 
and divisions lead to the alienation that Romanticism opposes, and this alienation would 
be final were associationism the ultimate word in human psychology.
82
 
                                                 
81 Outness is Berkeley’s coinage (1709, 51): ‘the Ideas of Space, Outness, and things placed at a 
distance are not strictly speaking, the Object of Sight’. Cf. 149, and 184. Cf. Notebooks 1, 1387: 
‘Language & all symbols give outness to Thoughts / & this the philosophical essence & purpose 
of Language’. Also, Notebooks 3, 3325: ‘All minds must think by some symbols . . . which 
something that is without, that has the property of Outness (a word which Berkeley preferred to 
“Externality”)’. 
82 Wordworth’s The Tables Turned, ll. 25-8, formulates the Romantic suspicion of analysis for 
its own sake: 
Sweet is the lore which Nature brings;  
Our meddling intellect 
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:— 
We murder to dissect.  
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The sense of individuality presented by the understanding is a personal unity 
created negatively and negatively held together, by being divided from all others and all 
things. This individuality is the subjective remainder after the objective entities in 
experience have been abstracted. The individual thus conceived observes and acts upon 
nature only through being cut off from it. The Romantic, post-Rousseauvian gist of this 
caution is familiar: Within the realm of instinct and pre-reflective experience, the mind 
is at one with nature; with conceptual understanding comes the divorce. As Abrams 
(2012, 143) explains,  
 
To be estranged from the natural world was to Coleridge, as to fellow Romantics . . . to 
experience as a lived reality what he regarded as the post-Newtonian world-view, ‘the 
intuition’ in which, as he wrote in The Friend, we ‘place nature in antithesis to the mind, 
as . . . death to life’.  
 
Coleridge explains this alienation of mind from nature very clearly when he contrasts: 
 
the contemplation of reason . . . which arises when we possess ourselves as one with the 
whole . . . and . . . when . . . we think of ourselves as separated beings, and place nature in 
antithesis to mind, as object to subject, thing to thought, death to life. This is abstract 
knowledge, or the science of the mere understanding. (Friend I, 520-1) 
 
Coleridge senses the possibility of a higher reunion with nature whereby the ever-
mediating imagination conveys eternal Ideas of reason to the temporal understanding. 
Returning to Abrams’s recent commentary, in this reunion: 
 
alienation is annulled, and the human individual breaks through the barrier of self to 
achieve awareness of the one life that he shares with all human beings, and with all 
nature. (2012, 143) 
 
This reunion, displacing the sense of detachment with a higher order of attachment than 
pre-reflective experience, is the source of a great hope for Coleridge. This hope is both 
personal and one to remedy many ills of his time, which he is first to describe as the 
‘Age of Anxiety’ (Marginalia IV, 610).83  
For the French Mechanists and the British Empiricist philosophers, conceptual 
understanding is the apex of human intellectual ability. Coleridge, by contrast, cautions 
that taking the understanding to be the summit of human thought would describe only:  
 
a race of animals, in whom the presence of reason is manifested solely by the absence of 
instinct. (Friend I, 440) 
 
                                                 
83 In a marginal note to Scott’s Peveril of the Peak (1823), Coleridge writes: ‘His is an Age of 
Anxiety from the Crown to the Hovel––from the Cradle to the Coffin; all is anxious striving to 
maintain life, or appearances––to rise, as the only condition of not falling’.  
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In this system, negative reason allows the understanding to accrue knowledge through 
deduction and the universal principle of non-contradiction (see below, pages 161-3). 
Positive reason, however, develops by contemplating, philosophically or poetically, the 
perfections of universal standards and values, the Platonic Ideas. 
When one reflects on the principle of non-contradiction, the mind is impressed by 
its universal applicability over both phenomenal and non-phenomenal objects, and a 
glimmer of positive reason is thereby intuited. Positive reason in the mind is more 
clearly observed in the use of symbolism, whereby imagination presents the invisible 
Idea through a symbol, ‘a living educt’ (Statesman’s Manual, 28-9)84 for contemplation 
that is consubstantial, as Coleridge puts it, with the Idea itself. Hence his definition of 
an Idea as: 
 
an educt of the Imagination actuated by the pure Reason, to which there neither is nor can 
be an adequate correspondent in the world of the senses––this is and this alone = an 
IDEA. (Statesman’s Manual, 113-4) 
 
The philosophic imagination, bringing reason to the understanding, is that power of 
self-intuition whereby one can, as Coleridge writes in 1815: 
 
interpret and understand . . . the potential works in them, even as the actual works on 
them. (Biographia I, 167) 
 
I take this to mean that philosophic imagination involves the capacity to consider one’s 
thoughts, actions, emotions, and desires in a contemplative context as phenomenal signs 
of motivation towards the non-phenomenal. Our lives thus evolve and struggle through 
feeling and thought towards Ideas of love, the virtues, freedom, beauty, and God.  
Expanded by philosophic imagination, the enlightened understanding – which is not 
equivalent to reason, but is enlightened by it – cognizes and reflects upon mental acts. It 
is thus the faculty of reflection.  Being thus reflective, and allowing for thought to think 
itself, the enlightened understanding marks the transformation of the understanding into 
a faculty of self-understanding. As such, its development is the beginning of 
philosophy. The enlightened understanding has what we might call an instinct for truth, 
in that it can discern the difference between the operation external objects and internal 
drives on one’s mind. Discerning the effects of external and internal stimuli on the mind 
involves reflection on the actual, and the observed.  
The enlightened understanding can also, moreover, apply itself to Ideas, insofar as 
                                                 
84 He describes Biblical histories as ‘living educts of the Imagination’ unlike the histories, such 
as Hume’s and Gibbon’s, of his age’s empirico-mechanistic philosophy. 
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it strains towards them.  In enlightened understanding, one seeks to discern Ideas amid 
the flow of both wider history and one’s social and personal life. Much as enlightened 
understanding can now recognize and thus gain a degree of self-control over desires and 
drives, it seeks to know Ideas rather than unconcernedly and inadvertently misconstrue 
them. Insofar as enlightened understanding can reflect on Ideas, it does so by 
contemplating them as the potential working within the mind. For Coleridge, this power 
for psychological self-reflection, or ‘sacred power of self-intuition’, is ‘the highest and 
intuitive knowledge, as distinguished from the discursive’ (Biographia I, 241). This 
potential in the mind consists of intelligible, non-phenomenal values made aesthetically 
appreciable only through imagination. Imagination, then, fuses, dissolves, and otherwise 
recreates aesthetic material (perceptions, qualia, moods, social meanings, and so on), 
and thereby provides the understanding a tangible and enlightening access to Ideas that 
it otherwise only inchoately grasps.  
We approach Ideal value through intellectual interest and affinity and, more 
sensuously, through aesthetic impulse and a sense of the music and poetry subjectively 
appreciated in life contemplated in its perfect and objective potential. Noting in 
Coleridge ‘a peculiarly empirical transcendentalism’, or what we can call a sensuous-
transcendental approach, Wendling (1995, 12; 10) finds that his: 
 
continued awareness of the transcendental . . . occurs only through the sensible world and 
exists to improve experience of it. His transcendentalism is at once of this earth and 
demandingly otherworldly. 
 
The understanding in its negative form can only grasp that on which the actual 
works. Unenlightened by even a dim sense of Ideas (reason in its positive form), the 
lower understanding is blind to the working of the potential (the Ideal values) in itself 
and in phenomenal actuality. The imagination, philosophic or poetic, uses 
contemplation and symbolism to bring Ideas of reason to the understanding, 
transforming it into an intellectual understanding ‘employed in the service of Reason’. 
(Reflection, 346) 
With his theory of imagination and reason aiming at truth, Coleridge advances the 
general Romantic hope of a human reunion with nature and the source of the principles 
of the universe, the Logos of tradition, which contrast with the abstracted rules and 
concepts derived by the understanding from the senses. The reunion raising human life 
towards reason is a higher reunion because, for Coleridge, reason is present in nature 
but only, and not always, present to the understanding. This reason is a Logos implicit 
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in nature, and not just a human faculty of discourse. 
With the understanding achieving enlightened self-awareness through reason, a 
new horizon beyond fixed and definite concepts may be envisioned. Coleridge aspires 
to orient his age to the horizon of Ideas. In 1832, he diagnoses the intellectual malady of 
his day in observing that,  
 
The histories and political economy of the present and preceding century partake in the 
general contagion of its mechanistic philosophy, and are the product of an unenlivened 
generalizing understanding. (Statesman’s Manual, 28) 
 
Twenty three years earlier, he argues that Empiricism has created ‘the Epoch of the 
Understanding and the Senses’ and the ‘epoch of division and separation’. (Friend I, 
447) 
We have seen in this interpretation that Coleridge demonstrates Empiricism’s 
failure to account for the possibility of imaginative poetry. He persuasively argues that 
Empiricism can only account for works of fancy mechanically constructed from 
associative processes. By contrast, he finds in the imagination a higher, vital power that 
‘dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to create’, while struggling ‘to idealize and 
unify’ where fancy, the highest artistic faculty possible in an Empiricist system, can 
only manipulate ‘essentially fixed and dead’ images. (Biographia I, 304) 
Beyond his criticism of Empiricism, he describes an understanding enlightened by 
Ideas of reason translated by imagination. In contrast with Kant, for whom Ideas are 
subjective notions that ought not to be hypostatized or treated as independent of the 
human mind, Ideas always have objective reality for Coleridge, and are thus Platonic 
Ideas. He does not denigrate the mere understanding (i.e. understanding unenlightened 
by reason), but rather criticizes views that take this facility with concepts and 
calculative mental operations to be the supreme end and apex of the human mind.  
This lower understanding manipulates only the phenomenal and imagistic products 
of sense and fancy in favour of the enlightened, or higher, understanding, which is 
transformed from the merely conceptual understanding. Conceptual understanding  
develops into an enlightened one through an aesthetic appreciation or a philosophic 
contemplation that approaches Ideas as objective reality. The approach involves desire 
and is thus felt as a yearning towards spiritual growth, whereby the mind acknowledges 
itself to be incipient and incomplete on recognizing both the potential at work within 
itself, and that potential’s source as an eternally true pre-existence. It is to Coleridge’s 
theory of the harmonizing mind that we now turn.  
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3.2 Coleridge’s Order of the Mental Powers: harmonizing the empirical and the 
transcendent 
Coleridge’s sustained criticism of reductive mechanism and of the related Empiricism is 
undoubtedly influential, gaining the admiration of such later nineteenth-century thinkers 
as Mill, Maurice, Newman, and the Americans, Emerson, Thoreau, and James Marsh. 
His criticism arguably gains strength in being a syncretic surpassing of its target, 
proposing in its stead a system incorporating Empiricism, rather than tracelessly 
replacing it.
85
 Referring to his syncretising parts of systems whose ultimate views he 
opposes as too narrow and atomistic, Coleridge writes, 
 
Exclude Utility? No. My system of Moral Philosophy neither excludes nor rests on it: 
were it for this reason only that it includes it. (Notebooks 4, 5209) 
 
Mill (1859, 458-9) commends Coleridge’s ‘catholic and unsectarian’ spirit, and agrees 
that Utilitarianism and Empiricism are syncretized in Coleridge’s system, 
acknowledging it as: 
 
less extreme in its opposition, it denies less of what is true in the doctrine it wars against 
(Mill, 1859, 403) 
 
Having explained in detail the distinction between the higher and the lower 
understanding, we may turn to a fuller sketch of the mental powers that Coleridge 
describes, annotating (see Appendix A, below) in 1818 his copy of Tennemann’s 
Geschichte der Philosophie, to which he extensively though critically refers for his own 
lectures on the history of Philosophy.
86
  
                                                 
85 Newman (1852) relies on Coleridge’s notion of Idea as the ethos and essence of something 
Ideal, or, considered from the human side, something perfectible towards an Ideal standard that 
perhaps evades complete definition. Newman (1864, titled after a Coleridge poem) also holds 
that Coleridge lays the ‘philosophical basis’ for the Church of his age, and ‘while he indulged a 
liberty of speculation . . . installed a higher philosophy into inquiring minds, than they had 
hitherto been accustomed to accept. In this way he made a trial of his age, and succeeded in 
interesting its genius in the cause of Catholic truth’. 
86
 Coleridge refers to Tennemann’s History while preparing his philosophical lectures. He coins 
the term marginalia in a letter (1818 or 1819) describing his reading notes. A published use of 
the word by him occurs in Constitution ([1830] 1976), 166. Other interesting Coleridgeisms, 
perhaps especially impressive for philosophers, include: actualize, adaptive, after-effect, 
anthropic, artefact, associative, astoundment, atomistic, bi-polar, cyclical, darwinize, 
desynonymize, epoch-forming, existentially, experiential, factual, fatalistic, generic term, 
greenery, heuristic, historicism, intensify, interpenetration, negativity, neuro-pathology, 
humanism, otherworldliness, pessimism, phenomenal, post-prandial, precondition, 
preconfigure, productivity, protozoa, psycho-analytical, psychologize, psycho-somatic, realism, 
refuel, relativity, romanticize, selfless, self-realization, self-torture, sense of reality, sentience, 
soulmate, statuesque, subconsciousness, subjectivity, technique, telegraph-pole, and totalize, to 
show but a small sample of his lexical contributions to the English language. For a list of 700 
words coined by Coleridge, see McKusick (1992), which, refering to the OED first edition, 
1884-1928 cites Coleridge for 3,569 words (many of which he coins). 
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Here we may see at once the germ of Coleridge’s proposed system. This sketch 
outlines his philosophical scheme of the mental powers, or epistemological modes, and 
modifies Plato’s, as I argued in detail in Part One. The sketch allows an important 
comparison with Plato’s Divided Line schema (Republic, Book VI), a comparison that 
has been neither made nor suggested until the present study. In the marginal note, 
Coleridge writes that, 
 
The simplest yet practically sufficient order of the Mental Powers is, beginning from the 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fancy and imagination are oscillations, this connecting R.[eason] and U[nderstanding]; 
that connecting Sense and Understanding. (Marginalia V, 798, and Appendix A, below) 
 
The polarity is clear: The lowest order, sense, progresses to the highest order, reason. 
They are counterparts, as are fancy and imagination. The lower and higher 
understandings are also counterparts. Barfield (1971, 2006) notes, in a memorable 
image, that these complementarities are like octaves. There is more in common, or in 
tune, between reason and sense than between reason and understanding, even though 
understanding is closer to reason along the pole. Thus Coleridge says that:  
 
reason is an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the 
Eternal, and the Necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phaenomena. 
(Friend I, 155) 
 
This position, which I find to be a kind of rationalist intuitionism, acknowledges that 
sense and reason operate at opposite epistemological poles. It thus accords with Plato’s 
Divided Line. However, by bringing out the harmony between sense and reason, 
Coleridge simultaneously demonstrates their essential similarity. A precursor to this 
position of rationalist intuitionism is found in the Cambridge Platonism of John Smith 
(1660, 16), who argues that: 
 
Reason . . . is turn’d into Sense [when]: That which before was only Faith well built upon 
sure Principles (for such our science may be) now becomes Vision.  
 
The spiritual realism of Coleridge is more systematic than that developing in Cambridge 
Platonism (which should not surprise, as Coleridge’s system is more evolved, and gains 
lowest 
 
Sense 
Fancy 
Understanding 
Understanding 
Imagination 
Reason 
highest 
 
Reason 
Fancy 
Understanding 
Understanding 
Fancy 
Sense 
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support from the German transcendental idealism). Moreover, Coleridge qualifies his 
rationalist intuitionism by noting an asymmetry in the otherwise harmonic ends of the 
mental pole. The organs of sense, with their mental counterpart aisthesis, are very 
different from their objects, and hence necessarily convert their objects into their own 
kind, that is, by receiving them as physical stimuli to be converted into qualia.  
From the foregoing, we can deduce the Galilean
87
 philosophy of Locke (Essay, 
II.8), with its attention to primary qualities (solidity, figure, motion, extension, number, 
and situation) in the object; secondary qualities, also in the object, which are powers to 
affect the perceiving subject with ideas, i.e. qualia, via the sense organs; and tertiary 
qualities, or powers to effect change in another object’s primary qualities (secondary 
qualities are therefore just a species of tertiary qualities, in that the things effected are 
not any objects whatever, but neurons in the peripheral and central nervous systems. 
As noted above, Coleridge complains that the Empiricists of his day conceive the 
conceptual understanding as the apex of human thought and development. Yet at this 
point he draws a bar, just before the higher understanding. The high point of the 
Empiricist scheme is only the mid-point of the Coleridgean. In Biographia, he explicitly 
employs a geographical analogy to represent the empirical-transcendental boundary: 
 
As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-
Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and 
those on the other side of spontaneous consciousness. (Friend, I, 236) 
 
Elsewhere, Coleridge remarked that the genius of Aristotle’s conceptual understanding 
was a cloud preventing his being able to see what Plato indicated in his theory of 
transcendent Ideas: 
 
Aristotle was, and still is, the sovereign lord of the understanding—the faculty judging by 
the senses. He was a conceptualist, and never could raise himself into that higher state, 
which was natural to Plato, and has been so to others, in which the understanding is 
distinctly contemplated, and, as it were, looked down upon from the throne of actual 
ideas, or living, inborn, essential truths. (Table Talk, 2 July, 1830) 
 
This cloud is like the bar between Coleridge’s lower and higher understanding, marking 
the limit of empirical concepts. The higher understanding has been enlightened by the 
                                                 
87 The Assayer, [1623] (1957, 274): ‘I think that tastes, odours, colours, and so on, are no more 
than mere names so far as the object in which we locate them are concerned, and that they 
reside in consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be 
wiped away and annihilated.’ Galileo, however, is no Empiricist, as he is firmly committed to 
the overarching epistemological importance of experiment-independent Mathematics. Galileo’s 
view of subjective qualities already exists in Democritus: ‘By convention there are sweet and 
bitter, hot and cold, by convention colour, but in reality atoms and the void’, Fragment 9, cited 
by Sextus Empiricus, in Adversus Mathematicos II [Against Professors], Bk VII, §135. 
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Ideas of reason, which are reason in its positive sense. The lower understanding is 
unenlightened, and reason only in the negative sense of being able to employ the 
universal Law of Contradiction in forming and applying distinctions, itself an analytic 
(Plato’s method of division), negative procedure compared to the synthesizing powers 
of what Plato calls the method of collection, which is part of, for Coleridge, positive 
reason and its positive entities, the Ideas. The lines, then, that Coleridge draws in his 
note to a copy of Tennemann’s Geschichte, are thus the bars between reason’s 
transcendent Ideas (for Kant these are transcendental) and sense’s intuitions. These bars 
divide the understanding into higher and lower types. The octave-like harmony of 
corresponding points between the poles implies a simile: as sense intuits its stimuli, 
reason opens to Ideas.  
Hold your forefingers apart, and let one be reason, the other sense. Bring them a 
little closer, letting imagination and fancy occupy the next upper and lower positions, 
with imagination one down from reason, the apex, and fancy one up from sense, at the 
opposite pole in the mental system. Remember that this is a polarity, and not, strictly 
speaking, a hierarchy, so that faculty are not simply opposed, but also joined in 
harmony. Thus, as we shall see, sense has a strong affinity with reason in being its polar 
counterpart. An important thesis in the present dissertation is that we can understand the 
contemplated objects and principles of ultimate truth as the post-thought counterparts to 
the sensations and fluid associations of pre-thought mentality on the opposite end of the 
polarity. Moving the forefingers in one more time, we have the higher understanding 
and the lower understanding.  
In Coleridge’s system, these higher and lower faculties of understanding straddle 
the polar midline. Although his system risks being mistaken for a homuncular faculty 
psychology, Coleridge does not assume discrete faculties, but rather describes different 
kinds of mental processing. Pradhan (1999, 11) summarizes the judgment of several 
philosophers in saying that Coleridge’s: 
 
analysis of the ‘strengths and measures of the human mind’ is not a traditional ‘faculty 
psychology’ but . . . a transcendental analysis of the conditions which make experience 
possible. 
 
Thus for Coleridge, genuine creativity unifies the faculties, combining mental exertion 
with receptive appreciation. Thus he writes, 
 
The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity, with 
the subordination of its faculties to each other . . . He diffuses a tone, and spirit of unity, 
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that blends and . . .  fuses, each into each by that synthetic . . . power . . . imagination. 
This power, first put in action by the will and understanding,
88
 and retained under their 
irremissive though gentle and unnoticed controul . . . reveals itself in the balance or 
reconciliation of diverse powers (Biographia II, 15-7) 
 
A year or so later, Coleridge develops this notion, describing spirit (often contrasted by 
German authors with soul, Seele) as the free and intellectually unified exercise of the 
mental powers: 
 
What is precisely meant by Geist? Does it mean anything more than the whole man in the 
free and combined use of all his faculties, even as he uses his senses? (Marginalia V, 
801) 
 
Each process along the Coleridgean intellectual polarity, be it flight of fancy or 
confident deduction of reason, involves the whole in an organicism that opposes 
Empiricist or Mechanistic reduction. Even though individual minds are not equally 
aware of reason’s presence in every human act, reason is, nevertheless, always present, 
though often somnambulant. Coleridge clarifies: 
 
Every man must feel, that though he may not be exerting different faculties, he is exerting 
his faculties in a different way, when in one instance he begins with some one self-
evident truth, (that the radii of a circle, for instance, are all equal,) and . . . sees at once, 
without any actual experience, that some other thing must be true likewise . . . and so on 
till he comes . . . to the properties of a lever, considered as the spoke of a circle . . . [now 
empirically demonstrable to anybody] who had never seen a lever . . . but this one, that 
there is a conceivable figure, all possible lines from the middle to the circumference of 
which are of the same length (Friend I, 158) 
 
This theoretical demonstration preponderates in reason, and the attentive understanding 
strains to conceive the truths presented, aided sometimes by fancy-supplied images. 
Next, Coleridge compares this clarity achieved by mental exertion with practical, but 
epistemically less secure, experientially derived rules-of-thumb: 
 
as, for instance, whether it would be better to plant a particular spot of ground with larch, 
or with Scotch fir, or with oak in preference to either. Surely every man will 
acknowledge, that his mind was very differently employed in the first case from what it 
was in the second; and all men have agreed . . . the first class . . . [are] truths . . . 
impossible to conceive otherwise: while the results of the second class are called facts, or 
things of experience (Friend I, 158) 
 
Demonstrating the preponderance of reason in the former species of thinking, and of 
understanding in the latter, Coleridge understands his Hume.
89
 Still, he interprets the 
significance of distinguishing reason and logical principle differently from contingent 
                                                 
88 Here we know he describes secondary imagination, because the secondary is under greater 
voluntary control. 
89 I.e.  Hume’s fork (Enquiry, IV.i), which distinguishes relations of ideas from matters of fact, 
consigning all else to the flames. 
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fact and experience. Here, Coleridge demonstrates his understanding of Kant, to whom 
he is grateful for framing the Verstehen (Understanding) / Vernunft (Reason) 
distinction. However, this distinction already exists, with differently interpreted 
significance, in Plato’s progression from dianoia to noesis.  
As with Plato, the reason / understanding distinction for Coleridge is not what Kant 
makes it to be. For Coleridge and Plato, but not for Kant, reason is approached and 
intuited (though not sensibly) or contemplated, and then rendered to the understanding. 
Such rendering occurs, for example, when a physics or mathematics teacher 
demonstrates the geometrical properties of a circle by using a lever. When the pupil 
begins to understand the lesson, reason is acknowledged as the principle of the 
understanding itself.  Individuals who are not awake to the presence of reason are 
therefore likely to lack confidence in its universality, and errors of judgement, and 
timing, abound. Nevertheless, and under the same account, even the least awakened 
individual is not barred from intuiting the true, good, and beautiful in intimations and 
presentiments of reason present in perception and aesthetic expression. 
Because Coleridge’s mental system is a polar model, a fitting analogy is the bar 
magnet, no area of which is separate from another. Should the magnet be cut, we would 
have two bar magnets, and not separate north and south poles. Distancing his system 
from faculty psychology, he comments,  
 
When I make a . . . distinction in human nature, I am fully aware that it is a distinction, 
not a division, and that . . . every act of mind . . . unites the properties of Sense, 
Understanding, and Reason. Nevertheless, it is of great practical importance, that these 
distinctions be made and understood. (Friend II, 104) 
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3.3 Primary Imagination Distinguished from Kant’s Necessary Imagination 
Coleridge does not disparage the fancy and the understanding, although he cautions that 
they should not be overestimated by being mistaken for imagination and reason. Just as 
genius requires talent as its counterpart, reason and imagination depend on fancy and 
understanding, with the higher faculties using the materials of the lower. To reiterate, 
fancy was for Coleridge the offspring of association, providing ‘fixities and definites’ 
(Biographia I, 233) from experience that could be transformed into concepts. He 
cautioned that the transition from fancy to understanding has a higher counterpart in 
imagination’s movement toward reason.  
Coleridge’s fancy is the dynamism that formed early mythologies. This dynamism 
suggested, beyond antique memory, ‘Beings invisible’, emancipating the mind from 
‘the grosser thrall of the present impulse’, as he expresses it in his poem ‘The Destiny of 
Nations: A Vision’ (Poetical Works I.1, 279-299).90 Coleridge imagines how the dark 
mind of old was first unsensualized by fancy:  
 
                    . . . For Fancy is the power   
That first unsensualises the dark mind,   
Giving it new delights; and bids it swell 
With wild activity; and peopling air,   
By obscure fears of Beings invisible,   
Emancipates it from the grosser thrall   
Of the present impulse, teaching Self-control,   
Till Superstition with unconscious hand   
Seat Reason on her throne. Wherefore not vain,   
Nor yet without permitted power impressed, 
I deem those legends terrible, with which   
The polar ancient thrills his uncouth throng (ll. 80-91) 
 
In Coleridge’s system, fancy develops not only culture and myth, but also helps 
generate self-consciousness. However, commentators who hastily and narrowly 
interpret Coleridgean imagination as good and fancy as bad overlook such details. For 
instance, Richards, Engell and Bate (introducing their Bollingen Series edition of the 
Biographia), and others fail to stress that, for Coleridge, fancy converts perceptions into 
memories, streaming these together in spatio-temporal associations, thus generating 
consciousness. Scruton (1983, 127-136) also interprets fancy as entirely detrimental, but 
here he is developing his own view, and not aiming to provide a scholarly reading of 
Coleridge. Fancy, for Coleridge, is only to be denigrated when debased into its passive 
form, which leads to ‘the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude [by which] we have 
                                                 
90 Composed 1795, contributing to Robert Southey’s epic, ‘Joan of Arc’. Revised 1796-7, and 
1815, standing for itself in Sibylline Leaves. 
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eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not’ (Biographia II, 7). Passive fancy falsely reduces all 
possibilities to what can be concretely pictured, and the philosophical Empiricism that is 
based on the associationist model of mind that reduces all cognition to what Coleridge 
calls passive fancy is therefore an early form of eliminative reductionism. 
In my interpretation, fancy converts sense materials into memories, and the primary 
imagination shapes the significance of perceptions by evaluating what is sensed 
according to the Ideas of reason. Insofar as primary imagination synthesizes sense 
materials with the concepts of the understanding, it seems analogous to Kant’s faculty 
‘concealed in the depths of the human soul’ responsible for transcendental schematism 
(CPR, B180-1). While Kantian imagination synthesizes conceptual thought and sensible 
content into a categorially organized world of perception, the Coleridgean imagination 
infuses and illuminates this world with the moral and aesthetic values conferred by the 
Ideas of reason. Coleridge’s account of imagination should be contrasted with that of 
Kant. 
 The epigraph to Strawson’s (2008) essay on ‘Imagination and Perception’ is from 
Kant: 
 
 Psychologists have hitherto failed to realize that imagination is a necessary ingredient of 
perception itself. (CPR, A120) 
 
Strawson takes this notion of ‘necessary imagination’91 to mean that recognizing any 
object as falling under an empirical concept is a consequence of this faculty. For 
example, ‘my recognizing the strange dog I see as a dog at all owes something to the 
imagination’ (Strawson, 2008, 52). He notes that using the term ‘imagination’ to denote 
an influence over the processes of perception is not common. More often than not 
imagination is linked with pure invention, false beliefs, or misconceptions. For Kant, 
however, imagination provides the bridge between intuitions and concepts, making 
intelligible experience possible with its transcendental schematism.  
Crucially, Kant’s imagination is a bridge between intuition and concept, providing 
rules for applying concepts to the manifold. Thus the ‘great buzzing, blooming 
confusion’, as James ([1890] 2007, 488) would later describe the infant’s experience, 
can become intelligible experience, or understanding. In Strawson’s gloss of the 
transcendental schematism of the imagination’s main consequence, ‘The thought is 
echoed in the sight, the concept is alive in the perception’ (2008, 64). Kant’s 
                                                 
91 Coleridge’s phrase (Friend I, 440n.), although I do not suppose that Strawson alludes to The 
Friend. 
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imagination is necessary, then, because it makes intelligible experience possible. But 
why did he call this transcendental schematizing faculty imagination?  
Firstly, Kant calls it imagination because the faculty produces a schema (a kind of 
transcendental template for experience) that combines a concept with what we may call 
a portmanteau image derived from generalized intuitions. Much subconscious work is 
required to get even thus far; hence Kant calls this faculty: 
 
an art [Kunst] concealed in the depths of the human soul whose real modes of activity 
nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover. (CPR, A142, B181) 
 
The schema then works as a rule, and necessarily with other rules, to generate 
experience from the synthesis of concepts of the understanding and the manifold of 
sense intuitions. To extricate images representing objects from the manifold of sense 
intuition, pure concepts (a priori categories of the understanding such as being, non-
being, cause and effect, duration, substance, and so forth) must dissolve the buzzing, 
blooming confusion and conceptualize it into enduring, substantial individuals and the 
process that they undergo.  
Coleridge, however, struggles with Kant’s proposing this obscure extrication of 
objects and processes from the manifold, arguing that if a tree, say, can be extracted 
from the manifold of sense prior to acquiring the empirical concept of tree, then is there 
not a preposterous circularity to Kant’s theory? Annotating his copy of CPR, Coleridge 
describes his ‘Doubts’ and ‘Struggles’ with Kant’s account of how the manifold of 
sense becomes intelligible, concept-soaked experience.
92
 Coleridge asks,  
 
How can that be called ein mannigfaltiges ὕλη [hyle] which yet contains in itself the 
ground why I apply one category to it rather than another? one mathematical form and 
not another? (Marginalia III, 247-8) 
 
He recognizes a serious problem in Kant’s account: 
 
What do you mean by a fact, an empiric Reality, which alone can give solidity (Inhalt 
[content]) to our Conceptions?––It seems from many passages, that this indispensible 
Test is itself previously manufactured by this very conceptive Power, and that the whole 
not of our making is the mere sensation of a mere Manifold––in short, mere influx of 
motion, to use a physical metaphor.––I apply the Categoric forms to a Tree––well! but 
first what is this tree? How do I come by this Tree? (Marginalia III, 248-9) 
  
Kant’s fact that gives content to conceptions, allowing us to keep track of our 
empirically oriented thoughts in a way that, he says, we cannot keep track of Ideas of 
reason, is itself previously manufactured by the conceptive power. Coleridge suggests 
                                                 
92 Strawson’s metaphor. 
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that what Kant calls the manifold already contains the distinctions that Kant would have 
the understanding provide through the schemata. The tree within the manifold has 
already been interpreted as a something that then rightly takes the mantle of the concept 
‘tree’. 
Secondly, Kant calls his mediating, synthesizing faculty that produces the 
transcendental schematism imagination because something corresponding to the schema 
is then seen in the manifold. With this seeing-in we may now find in Kant’s usage a 
widespread, conventional sense of imagination. The power of transcendental schemata 
to project conceptual meaning onto sense impressions accounts for the 
phenomenological force of mistaken seeing-in, or aspectual perception, such as when 
one trips over a beam of light that is really a pine plank, or Coleridge’s keenly observed 
and subtly reflective phenomenological example of seeing two circling Kites 
(Accipiters) become, on noticing an inconsistency with past experience, the leaves on a 
branch that they really were. 
I saw . . . a pair of Kites—floating about—I looked at them for some seconds when it 
occurred to me that I had never before seen two Kites together—instantly the vision 
disappeared—it was neither more nor less than two pairs of Leaves, each pair on a 
separate Stalk, on a young Fruit tree that grew on the other side of the wall, not two yards 
from my eye. The leaves being alternate did, when I looked at them as leaves, strikingly 
resemble wings—& they were the only leaves on the Tree. —The magnitude was given 
by the imagined Distance; that Distance by the former Adjustment of the Eye, which 
remained in consequence of the deep impression, length of time, I had been looking at the 
Kite (Notebooks I, 1668) 
Experiences such as mistaking a beam of light for a plank of wood, or pairs of 
leaves for Kites conform to Kant’s model of perception, whereby conceptual 
suppositions structure how sensations become interpreted. Coleridge nevertheless 
opposes Kant whenever he suggests that sense material must be already meaningful (as 
we examined in detail in Part One, which compares Coleridge’s Sense with Plato’s 
eikasia and aesthesis). Thus, for example, he struggles (in the aforementioned 1801 
Notebook entry) with Kant’s conceiving that transcendental schemata penetrate the 
manifold to reveal discrete elements (such as ‘this tree’).  
If the data within the manifold that allowed the recognition of a tree were already 
isolated as (a) meaningfully coherent, and (b) distinct from its surrounding data (if, that 
is, the something to be seen as a tree could already be distinguished as an it in the first 
place), then the information in the manifold would already be meaningful, and 
experience would already exist, making the transcendental schematism redundant. 
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Coleridge, in my interpretation, implies this line of argument, but does not, in his extant 
writings, pursue the argument to its conclusion.  
In Coleridge’s polar scheme of the faculties, sense is somnambulant reason, and 
reason has the intuitiveness of sense in its ideal pole. Both are nearer to each other, as 
‘octaves’ in the polar field, than they are to understanding. The meaning found in sense 
perception is not a conceptual impress of the understanding; the manifold of sense 
already contains its articulations. Objects and events already stand out from one another 
in sensual, perceptual experience, although they do so in entire or perfect separation, as 
they do in the conceptual clarity of the understanding. Conceptual understanding 
focuses on this manifold only when something is reconsidered, or is taken as 
problematic, as in Heidegger’s ([1927] 1996, 69-70) notion of the hammer taken as a 
collection of present-at-hand qualities only when it is broken or needs adjustment. 
It is therefore mistaken to interpret, as Richards (1960, 58) does, Coleridge’s 
primary imagination as responsible for: 
 
the world of motor buses, beefsteaks, and acquaintances  
 
Richards implies that the primary imagination has nothing poetic about it, and is a 
faculty generating, or at least organizing, perception, much as Kant proposes. I argue 
that Richards is mistaken here. For him, the faculty is to be interpreted as merely the: 
 
normal perception that produces the usual world of the senses . . . the framework of 
things and events within which we maintain our every day existence, the world of the 
routine satisfaction of our minimum exigencies. (Richards, 1960, 58) 
 
 The secondary imagination was proposed as the same power as the primary, but 
superior and subject to more voluntary control, thus creating poetry and other artworks. 
This sameness in kind but superiority in degree of the secondary to the primary 
imagination implies that, for Coleridge, whatever the primary imagination does, the 
secondary imagination does too, but better and more consciously. However, the 
voluntary, reflective, shaping power of the secondary imagination is in no way merely a 
heightened facility in creating rules for applying concepts, and here I argue against 
Richards and Engell. The position asserted by Richards and by Engell (see 3, below), 
and by those who agree with them, contradicts the essential facts (1 and 2, below).  
 
1. Coleridge says that a rule-governed process applying concepts to sense material 
is insufficient for producing poetry. 
2. Kant’s transcendental schematism of the imagination is a rule-governed process 
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applying concepts to sense material. 
3. Richards and Engell say that Coleridge’s primary imagination is Kant’s 
transcendental schematism of the imagination. 
 
Had Coleridge conceived the primary imagination to be a schematizing faculty 
(modelled after the Kantian imagination that unites image and concept into rules for 
synthesizing experience), then the secondary imagination would merely be a superior 
degree of schematism under greater voluntary control. Commentators who read the 
primary imagination as Coleridge translating Kant’s transcendental synthesis will, 
however, find they cannot account for this discrepancy.
93
 An even stranger reading, or 
rather misreading, underlies Worthen’s (2010, 104) statement that the secondary 
imagination is ‘largely unconscious’. Worthen apparently forgets Coleridge’s crucial 
definition of secondary imagination as ‘voluntary’ and ‘co-existing with the conscious 
will’ (Biographia I, 304). 
I suggest that misreadings of Coleridge’s primary and secondary orders of 
imagination often derive from the confusion sown – but felt as clarity because not 
thoroughly checked against Coleridge himself – by Richards, Engell, or the influence of 
both. A lesson to be learned from the fact that divergent and contradictory readings of 
Coleridge’s orders of imagination exist is that the descriptors primary and secondary 
are themselves insufficient. Coleridge might have avoided some simple misreadings had 
he used a parenthetic qualifying classification, such as: primary (original / universal) 
imagination, and secondary (voluntary / artwork-producing) imagination. My 
suggestions here are not meant to be final, and are open to refinement. 
In a less elevated degree (and under less voluntary control) than the secondary 
imagination, the primary imagination relates the order of Ideal value to perceived 
actuality, thus augmenting perception with an evaluative dimension. Primary 
imagination, I suggest, poetizes objects, events, projects, and histories within ordinary 
life, creating vibrancy, beauty, moods, and adding moral and aesthetic qualities. 
Gregory (2003, 64) describes the primary imagination very well as ‘perception precisely 
as irradiated by reason’. 94  This irradiation non-conceptually and vitally confers 
                                                 
93 For another example among many, see Engell (1981, Ch. 21). To reiterate, Richards holds this 
view of the primary imagination as Coleridge’s translation of Kant’s transcendental schematism 
of the imagination. 
94 This alludes to Coleridge’s image of reason by irradiated (Statesman’s Manual, 18-19), 
derived from Plotinus’s interpretation of Plato. 
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significant value, enacting the:  
 
repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM (Biographia 
I, 304) 
 
This creative act is not conceptual and schematic, as Richards and Engell presume in 
holding Coleridge elaborately to follow Kant, and the primary imagination does not, 
therefore, merely stamp concepts into a manifold in a Kantian synthesis of experience. 
Here again, my reading of Coleridge’s primary and secondary degrees of 
imagination clearly opposes that of Richards. Richards holds the value-discerning work 
of creative discovery to be the secondary imagination’s accomplishment. His position, 
which I find to be a misreading, holds that: 
 
The secondary imagination, reforming this world, gives us not only poetry – in the 
limited sense in which literary critics concern themselves with it – but every aspect of the 
routine world in which it is invested with other values than these necessary for our bare 
continuance as living beings; all objects for which we can feel love, awe, admiration, 
every quality beyond the account of physics, chemistry and the physiology of sense-
perception, nutrition, reproduction and locomotion; every awareness for which a civilized 
life is preferred by us to an uncivilized. (Richards, 1960, 59) 
 
I, on the other hand (and I argue I stand with Coleridge here), understand the poiesis of 
usually non-verbal creative discovery to be a universal human facility. The primary 
imagination I therefore take to be the poetizer of everyday experience whereby, as 
Coleridge says, ‘all men are poets in their way’ (Letters II, 768). 
If Richards’ interpretation were right, then only those rare individuals with an 
especially high degree of more voluntarily controlled imagination would experience 
‘love, awe, admiration, and every quality beyond that of physics’, etc., unless Richards 
wished to contradict Coleridge’s statement that the secondary imagination is the same 
power as the primary but superior and under a greater voluntary control. Indeed, 
Coleridge says the secondary imagination is: 
 
identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and the 
mode of its operation. (Biographia Literaria I, 304) 
 
In denuding the Coleridgean primary imagination of its perceptual poetry, Richards 
mutates Coleridge’s anti-reductive, organic, vital view into a foreshadowing of the 
debate that would later involve Richards between Snow’s (1960) ‘two cultures’ 
diagnosis of modern society and academia and the acute though intemperate response it 
provoked from Richards’ former graduate student, Leavis (1962). In misconceiving 
primary imagination, Richards also fails to consider Coleridge’s genuine interest in the 
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profounder reaches of physics, chemistry (note his enthusiasm for his friend Humphry 
Davy’s work), and his own ‘Theory of Life’.  
The passage from Richards concludes that: 
 
the secondary imagination . . . gives us . . . every awareness for which a civilized life is 
preferred by us to an uncivilized (Richards, 1960, 59) 
 
Apparently, Richards forgets Coleridge’s crucial distinction between cultivation and 
civilization, whereby Coleridge argues at length for the superiority of the call to 
permanence provided by cultivation over the civilizing drive for progression. Coleridge 
argues for the value of both, but that cultivation is the profounder, as its activity both is 
and promotes an end in itself, whereas civilization is always a means. Richards’ position 
would have benefited from careful consideration of these passages in The Statesman’s 
Manual, rather than interpreting Coleridge into Richards’ own position. 
Primary imagination’s unwritten poetry of ordinary life, as I propose it, is not the 
transcendental schematism ordering the manifold of sense, and the theory of primary 
imagination that I outline here is not one of merely historical or literary concern with 
what Coleridge meant, but is rather a philosophical concern with the truth that he 
pursued. I take primary imagination to be foremost what Coleridge says imagination is, 
a shaping power,
95
 and in that I agree with Barth’s (2003, 1) general interpretation that 
it is: 
 
the faculty that allows the human person, whether instinctively or consciously, to shape 
the world into meaning  
  
With the primary imagination as I interpret it, ontology emerges: here kinds of being are 
revealed. From a background of iss, oughts emerge. Objectives arise interpretatively as 
having-to-be-done, and are thus infused with value. Other people are observed not 
merely as contingent entities, but as relating to moral and aesthetic values insofar as any 
aims and ideals are ascribed to them. Persons are understood as souls rather than as 
mere things, and their valued possessions, for example, and when recognized as 
possessions, stand out from their surroundings, so that we impulsively apologize when 
we mistakenly fail to respect their property. 
In the theory of primary imagination that I propose, living beings are encountered 
as ontologically different from non-living entities. Actions and objects stand out as 
good or bad, beautiful or hideous, right or wrong, with tremendously powerful effect. 
                                                 
95  ‘Dejection’, 1802: ‘shaping spirit of imagination’.  
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This incipient ontology, or acquaintance with kinds of being, is the creative recognition 
in experience of different orders of essence and existence. This ontology we feel long 
before we can articulate. Some articulations are profoundly and generally resonant, and 
these are works of religious, ethico-legal, and artistic expression that shape entire 
cultures over millennia.  
The emergence of this variously populated ontological landscape requires 
imagination to apply not only concepts but also Ideas to experience. The experience of 
beauty, of the sublime, of the moral aspects of order and mess, of the soothing qualities 
of dripping water and leaves falling, all arise from the poetic ontology of ordinary life, 
and they need primarily to be imagined to exist for us at all. Acts of imagination are not, 
however, utter inventions, but consist in creatively recognizing Ideal and potential 
values in the surrounding world.  
My analysis of Coleridge’s view of the primary imagination accounts for its 
capacity to render not just physical objects but moral values and aesthetic qualities. A 
photographic analogy illustrates the difference between my view of primary 
imagination and the interpretation of it represented by Richards and supported by 
Engell. Although traditional cameras cannot be said to render physical objects (because 
such cameras neither distinguish between objects, nor render them as individuated), 
some computerized photographic processors can differentiate faces, and other object 
kinds, from each other and from other object kinds. This digital processing shows that 
differentiating object kinds by applying rules to visual information can be mechanized.  
However, no artificial intelligence mechanism has successfully identified moral 
values and aesthetic qualities, which values, unlike object kinds, are extramundane, 
intelligible standards. The Richards-Engell interpretation (which we could call the 
buses-and-beefsteaks interpretation, after Richards’ description) of the primary 
imagination is analogous to recent digital photo-processors, whereas my interpretation 
holds such a mechanical process to be unimaginative and unable to recognize moral 
value and aesthetic quality. 
Although Coleridge makes no explicit argument for what I take to be primary 
imagination’s role in experiencing different orders of being (e.g. individuals, 
substances, corporate groups and legal entities, living and non-living kinds, souls, 
qualities, values, and Ideas), this is the most important inference that I extrapolate from 
his theory. Rather than being simply the faculty responsible for revealing desks, trees, 
buses, and beefsteaks from among different entity-kinds, as standardly received, 
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Richards-influenced interpretations imply, I argue that primary imagination creates a 
poetic, lived ontology of values that contextualizes objects, situations, and meanings so 
our ordinary lives may be enlightened through the aesthetic, sensory presentation of 
Ideas.  
Consistently with my interpretation, Coleridge approvingly quotes Plotinus to help 
show that imagination creates not just percepts of object kinds,
96
 as in Kant’s 
transcendental schematism, but reveals moral and aesthetic qualities by aesthetically 
expressing Ideas: 
 
‘To those whose imagination it has never been presented, how beautiful is the 
countenance of justice and wisdom; and that neither the morning nor the evening star are 
so fair. For in order to direct the view aright, it behoves that the beholder should have 
made himself congenerous and similar to the object beheld. Never could the eye have 
beheld the sun, had not its own essence been soliform,’ (i.e. preconfigured to light by a 
similarity of essence with that of light) ‘neither can a soul not beautiful attain to an 
intuition of beauty.’ (Biographia I, 114-5, quoting Ennead I, 6.4 and 1.6.9) 
 
Thus we inhabit worlds of meaning that are possible because we are touched by the 
primary imagination’s creative and symbolic translation of Ideas into aesthetic 
expression.  
According to Engell’s interpretation, primary imagination: 
 
‘unifies’ by bringing together sensory data into larger units of understanding, a process 
that in Coleridge parallels Kant’s ‘unity of the manifold’. (Biographia I, lxxxix) 
 
I dispute this reading on two grounds: Firstly, because what Kant describes as the unity 
of the manifold is a synthetic and spontaneous act of the understanding, and not an act 
of imagination. I grant that the issue is complicated here by Kant himself, because in 
CPR edition A the imagination and the understanding are clearly distinct, whereas in 
edition B, as Heidegger (1962, 166-77) penetratingly explores, Kant retracts the 
imagination’s distinct, mediating, and necessary status by reducing it to a sub-section of 
the understanding. 
Nevertheless, this complication in which Kant integrates imagination within the 
understanding is wholly absent in Coleridge and antithetic to his clear distinction 
between the two faculties which he views as potentially and ideally co-operative but 
radically different. My second objection to Engell’s reading is that even if the 
imagination for Coleridge were, as I argue it cannot be, a replication of Kant’s synthesis 
                                                 
96 He does not specify here whether he means primary or secondary imagination; I take him to 
mean primary, although it is not so important here, as he holds these faculties to differ in degree, 
not kind. 
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of the manifold of intuition, this synthesizing work would still be too rule-bound and 
mechanical a process to describe Coleridge’s essentially creative ‘repetition in the finite 
mind’.  
Primary imagination provides, I argue, an unforced, poetic, yet not entirely 
voluntarily controlled aspectual perception of Ideality in everyday life. Thus primary 
imagination allows a day to be enjoyed as glorious and for that glory to be felt and 
known, instead of the weather being simply noticed according to its material qualities 
and then found by associated impressions, via fancy, to have metaphorical similarities 
with other things. Primary imagination, unlike fancy, does not metaphorize. Instead, it 
aesthetically presents Ideal aspects to be contemplated in its Ideal objects. If 
imagination finds, with Blake’s ‘Auguries of Innocence’, ‘a World in a grain of sand’, 
then the same depth of sensuous infinitude, the same intricacies and importances of a 
world are to be found in a grain of sand ([c. 1803] 1994, 127). 
The primary imagination, in my interpretation, can be termed necessary because it 
is a pre-condition of value-rich experience. It is, I hold, also responsible for creating 
prejudices and pre-conceptions, and the need for aesthetic reflection on our tastes and 
desires is an area that I explore in Part Four. The primary imagination is more 
spontaneous than the secondary, and it initiates the creation of experience rich in moral 
and aesthetic potential, which potential the secondary imagination may consciously and 
reflectively transform into artistic and philosophical works. The secondary imagination 
differs in being voluntary to a greater degree. Its creative power can remain dormant in 
individuals, or it can be stirred to activity, becoming the poetic or the philosophic 
imagination, both of which require a close internal attention, with the latter aimed at 
truth and the former at those truths that also please.  
Coleridge holds this voluntary, secondary imagination to be superior to the primary 
imagination responsible for spontaneous creative perception and as a faculty that is not 
equally developed in all people. It represents the fullest exertion we may achieve, 
controlled by ‘the free-will, our only absolute self’ (Biographia II, 114). Because the 
secondary imagination is voluntary, its creative acts carry personal and social 
responsibility. The secondary imagination uses materials gathered and shaped by the 
primary imagination and is able to idealize and bring these into harmony with the whole 
mind. 
Thus the secondary imagination may create and recreate according to the ‘energies 
of reason’ (Statesman’s Manual, 29). Although not everybody achieves the creative 
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heights of poetic imagination, everybody is more or less able to appreciate the fruits of 
poetic imagination, and this appreciation is itself an exercise of poetic imagination. As 
Coleridge says, to hear a poem as poetry one must become, even if momentarily, a poet 
(Lit. Lects I, 251). Once the artist has created the artwork, be it poetry, visual art, music 
or some other composition, the result can be approached via the senses, energizing the 
public’s imagination and understanding with aesthetically conveyed reason.  
The secondary imagination can work as poetic or philosophic imagination. This 
philosophic imagination is a transcendental power whose ‘sources must be far higher 
and far inward’ (Biographia I, 239) than the ordinary mode of consciousness. It is ‘the 
sacred power of self-intuition’ (Biographia I, 241), able to work from the heaven-
descended Delphic imperative: ‘Know thyself!’ In philosophic imagination, 
consciousness self-intuitively enters into contemplation. Relating this consciousness to 
nature, the thinker:  
 
at once discovers and recoils from the discovery, that the reality, the objective truth, of 
the objects he has been adoring, derives its whole and sole evidence from an obscure 
sensation, which he is alike unable to resist or comprehend, which compels him to 
contemplate as without and independent of himself what yet he could not contemplate at 
all, were it not a modification of his own being (Friend I, 509) 
   
Because the forms and categories of consciousness are constitutive of experience, the 
mind realizes that in self-contemplation it has also already been contemplating nature as 
natura naturans (nature naturing, or the processes of nature, to reiterate, as Ch. 2.6 
explained, pages 121-2 above) and not just the apparent phenomena of nature as natura 
naturata (nature natured, or the outward forms of nature). 
This self we simultaneously are and perceive. Nevertheless, the perceived self is 
not equivalent to the thing-in-itself, but is merely an empirical phenomenon. Kant is 
very cautious about the ramifications of this insight, and he refers to the formal 
condition of the transcendental ego, the ‘I’ in its purely moral consideration beyond the 
laws of phenomena, and it is thus noumenal. Its counterpart, the empirical ego, is the 
phenomenal self subject to psychological laws. Post-Kantian thinkers such as Fichte, 
Schelling, and Schopenhauer seek in the noumenal self an entrance into the wider 
universe of transcendent reality and a return to metaphysics. Coleridge, in similar vein, 
thinks that the self-intuition of the philosophic imagination directly accesses natura 
naturans by virtue of its own existence in this mode of reality.  
The secondary imagination is positioned to convey the non-phenomenal Ideas of 
reason, free from cause and effect, to the higher understanding. As fancy brings the 
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materials of sensation up to the lower understanding, imagination draws down the Ideas 
of reason to the higher understanding.
97
 Fancy mobilizes the stream of association of 
fixities and definites taken from perception, offering them up to the understanding as 
ready-made or found objects. 
 
                                                 
97  Coleridge distinguishes understanding enlightened by Ideas as the higher understanding. 
Unenlightened, the faculty remains the mechanical, or lower understanding. See his sketch 
reproduced at the beginning of the previous chapter, and in a table at the end of Part One. 
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3.4 The Place of Association: the imageable and the conceivable 
From the materials of memory and fancy, then, the understanding may formulate a 
picture model of the world, wherein only the imageable is accepted as the conceivable. 
This was the thinking process, Coleridge noted, as theorized by Empiricists such as 
Locke who insisted that we need distinct images when defining words and concepts. We 
may further note that Locke’s view is in line with Aristotle, who holds, against Plato, 
that ‘the soul never thinks without an image’ (On the Soul, 450a). 
By contrast, Coleridge warns against mistaking distinct images for clear 
conceptions. Fancy presents its fixed and definite visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, and 
olfactory perceptions amid the stream of association. The thinker rests, while in the act 
of composition or in the ordinary act of trying to recollect a name, word, or face. 
Coleridge likens the thinking mind, alternately resting and pulsing on the stream of 
association, to a pond skater, or water strider. Like the water-insect, the thinker uses the 
stream’s currents, those, that is, of the stream of association, rather than resting passive 
in their pull. Thus the mind sometimes actively resists the stream’s current, and at other 
times allows itself to be carried along by it, passively following currents of association, 
winning its way along the stream, until it reaches the sought-for object.  
This process occurs when searching for the right word, for a misplaced object, or in 
trying to work out the best direction for thought to take next. This active-passive 
process also occurs at a higher level of poetic activity. Thus, he carefully observes: 
 
There are . . . two powers at work . . . active and passive . . . [with] an intermediate faculty, 
which is at once both active and passive. In philosophical language, we must denominate 
this intermediate faculty in all its degrees and determinations, the IMAGINATION. But, in 
common language, and especially on the subject of poetry, we appropriate the name to a 
superior degree of the faculty, joined to a superior voluntary control over it. (Biographia I, 
124-5) 
 
Coleridge shows that association can account for effortless streams of consciousness 
and flights of fancy that can be worked into aesthetic value when directed with talent, 
yet themselves barely require exertion. Enjoying the current of association, though an 
indolent activity, is nonetheless amusing enough to be valued in ‘The Eolian Harp’: 
 
I stretch my limbs at noon, 
Whilst through my half-clos’d eye-lids I behold 
The sunbeams dance, like diamonds, on the main. 
And tranquil muse upon tranquillity; 
Full many a thought uncall’d and undetain’d, 
And many idle flitting phantasies, 
Traverse my indolent and passive brain 
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The enjoyment of this idle, fantasying tranquillity is nevertheless checked by a more 
serious concern with the valued actualities of wife and home, the genuinely appreciated 
sources of his restful mood.  
Associationism, syncretically retained in Coleridge’s system, accounts for the 
passive currents available to thought. Imagination, however, becomes the mediator 
between conceptual understanding and the Ideas of reason. From the perception of 
phenomena, or natura naturata, the lower understanding conceives the sum total of the 
facts and phenomena of the senses as ‘nature in the passive sense’ (Phil. Lects II, 851). 
Natura naturans, in contrast, denotes nature as power, not product. It is commonly 
assumed that if something is not a phenomenon, then it must be an abstraction. But the 
referents of natura naturans are no more abstractions, and no less real, than, for 
example, gravity.
98
 The naturata-naturans distinction is active in Coleridge’s emphasis 
that the act of thinking is not itself a thought. Much of our thinking is unconscious, and 
as Coleridge says, in man: 
 
much lies below his own Consciousness (Notebooks I, 1554) 
 
The products of thinking, thoughts, more often achieve consciousness, and are part of 
the: 
spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings. (Biographia I, 164) 
 
Thinking, however, is not so spontaneously conscious. The nature aimed at by 
imagination and reason is natura naturans, analogous with the thinking, and not with its 
product, thought.  
The act of thinking is more adequate to the Idea than the more easily reproduced 
and schematized representation of that act. For example, an imagined line with no 
breadth has a perfection that is the ideal of but is otherwise absent from any physical 
image of a line. A line without breadth between two stars, for example, has the illusory 
aesthetic quality of being almost sensuously present. Similarly, natural laws are neither 
phenomenal things nor abstractions. We may derive working hypotheses of natural laws 
through abstraction from phenomena, but is not equivalent to the laws themselves. 
Because the prevailing Empiricist philosophy of his nation holds that every knowable 
object was either a phenomenon or an abstraction therefrom, Coleridge observes that 
‘we have not yet attained to a SCIENCE of Nature’ (Statesman’s Manual, 49). 
                                                 
98 Cf.  Barfield, [1971] 2006, 24. 
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The understanding processes only phenomena and their relations. Delving into 
phenomena, it is led to other phenomena, until it might then select what Coleridge calls 
a protophenomenon, reminiscent of Goethe’s Ur-phänomenen: 
 
The naturalist, who can not . . . see, that one fact is often worth a thousand, as including 
them all in itself, and that it first makes all the other facts,—who has not the head to 
comprehend, the soul to reverence, a central experiment or observation (what the Greeks 
would perhaps have called a protophaenomenon), —will never receive an auspicious 
answer from the oracle of nature. (Friend I, 481) 
 
At the technical limits of experimental possibility, it is only by means of the 
imagination that the protophenomenon can be recognized as an illustrative case of a 
pattern, tendency, or law.  
For the understanding to seek phenomena in protophenomena would be to revert to 
fancy, inventing picture-theories of turtles all the way down.
99
 Representations of proto-
phenomena would include the salient phenomena of magnetism, electricity, crystal 
formation, and organic growth. Following Bruno, and Böhme, Coleridge deduces from 
these proto-phenomena the law of:  
 
polarity, or the essential dualism of Nature, arising out of its productive unity, and still 
tending to reaffirm it, either as equilibrium, indifference or identity. (SWF, 518) 
 
                                                 
99
 The turtles all the way down reductio ad absurdum of certain kinds of physical 
foundationalism traces to Locke (Essay, Bk 2, Ch. XXIII, §2), probably elaborating a similar 
story in one of Purchas’ volumes of sailors’ narratives; one of Purchas’ accounts also inspired 
Coleridge’s ‘Kubla Khan’. Locke writes that anyone who declares properties to inhere in 
substances is like the Indian who said the world rests on an elephant, which rests on a tortoise, 
‘but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied—
something, he knew not what.’ 
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3.5 The Transcendence of Reason 
This again is the mystery and the dignity of our human nature, that we cannot give up our 
reason, without giving up at the same time our individual personality. (Friend I, 97) 
 
Coleridge regards ‘the mystery and the dignity of our human nature’ as the foundation 
that reason provides for individual personality. Reason, in this view, establishes 
individual personality by transcending it, a view shared with Heraclitus (Fragment 2), 
who believes that: 
 
most men live as if each had a private intelligence of his own 
 
 when in fact, 
 
the Logos is common to all. 
 
The act of thinking individuates the thinker, who ascertains states of affairs and judges 
the veracity of propositions. Thinking involves detachment insofar as it employs 
concepts abstracted from experience. It is also a reattachment insofar as it approaches 
truth. Individuality is intuited in the act of thinking, whose product, the thought, can be 
conveyed to other thinking beings, who may in turn test its verity according to 
experience and the light of reason.  
It is ‘the Queen Bee in the Hive of error,’ Coleridge colourfully cautions, to 
identify ‘universal Reason with each man’s individual Understanding’ (Constitution, 
171), for the individual understanding creates most of its concepts from experience, and 
each such concept is nuanced to the sort of personal history familiar to biographers, 
confessors, and psychoanalysts. Not invariably, but often, Coleridge uses the term 
notion to describe something mental but lower than a Thought. For example, he 
describes notion as below thought in what editors McFarland and Halmi call Fragment 
1 of his Opus Maximum, an edition of Coleridge’s projected magnum opus assembled 
from notes and fragments and published for the first time in 2002. Elsewhere, at 
Notebook 2, 2208, he writes that:  
 
each man will universalize his notions & yet each is variously finite  
 
These notions are equivalent to Locke’s ideas, 100  i.e. sense impressions, atoms of 
remembrances, and the flotsam that sways and jostles in mechanical, mental 
                                                 
100 Because Coleridge writes Idea (often without a capital) for the Platonic eidos or idea, he 
needs another term for what Locke denotes by idea. In the present work, notion conveniently 
and generally stands for concept, sense of something, or Lockean idea, depending on context 
and when using a word such as concept, understanding, or idea might confuse. 
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association. While a notion in two minds becomes two notions (my notion of ‘dog’, or 
‘mother’, or even ‘this dog’ and ‘that mother’, is not your notion of the same), it is 
equally erroneous to believe that the same Idea in two minds is two Ideas and not 
one.
101
 Freedom is freedom, life is life, truth, goodness and beauty, are each one Idea, 
despite our varying notions. As ever, Coleridge confidently articulates his Platonism in 
direct terms.  
The Ideas of reason transform the understanding into a human understanding. If the 
understanding ignores the downshine of reason, then it will remain merely mechanical, 
rather than fully human. By this downshine, I refer to the Neo-Platonic irradiation of 
Intellect, Soul, and Nature by reason, which is present in the lower levels, but not in a 
conscious or reflective sense. The dangers of understanding everything mechanistically, 
including humanity and mind, faced Coleridge’s empirically reductionist 
contemporaries. The mere understanding would never transcend ordering sense data 
according to cause and effect, and to assign concepts to them. The name truth would 
denote nothing beyond sincerity, as each individual would conceive his or her concepts 
as idiosyncratically unique, varying from corresponding concepts in the understandings 
of other individuals. 
Coleridge believed that if the understanding is viewed as the apex of the human 
mind, it would have nothing superior to itself to sustain it at its limits. It is reason that 
confers individuality to a person, and its light: 
 
shines downward into the Understanding. Here it is always more or less refracted, and 
differently in every different individual. (Marginalia I, 123) 
 
At the same time, while reason cures the idiosyncrasy of the unenlightened 
understanding, it must undergo a process of self-correction to dust off false or 
inadequate conceptual accretions and become: 
 
re-converted into Life to rectify itself and regain its universality (Marginalia I, 123) 
 
Maintaining the principle of polarity, Coleridge conceived of reason as two 
modalities, negative and positive. Negative reason operates in the understanding, 
enabling abstraction in terms of universals. While negative reason pertains to the 
understanding and is ruled by the law of contradiction, positive reason is connected with 
the imagination and gives rise to the unity of experienced nature. Negative reason:  
                                                 
101 Insofar, that is, as Ideas are in minds. One can think profitably here of the analogies in 
Plato’s Parmenides of the sail and the day, which consider participation in Ideas. 
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consists wholly in a man’s power of seeing, whether any two conceptions, which happen 
to be in his mind, are, or are not, in contradiction with each other, it follows of necessity, 
not only that all men have reason, but that every man has it in the same degree. (Friend I, 
159) 
 
Negative reason is thus reason unconscious of itself, operating only to the degree with 
which the understanding can cope. The understanding orders its objects according to 
sameness and difference, which ultimately forces that detachment from nature prevalent 
in an age fascinated by mechanical understanding. 
Negative reason, then, retains only the mechanical, separable elements of 
experience. It deals with natura naturata and is not equipped to approach natura 
naturans. Such an understanding, if left alone, unromantically analyses phenomena 
until it conceives a nature bereft of life. The principle of contradiction, as the negative 
reason in the understanding, can only work by calculating within the sphere of fixities 
and definites. With entities considered only in detachment, natura naturans evades the 
net of this stop-start Eleatic reasoning. 
Negative reasoning in the understanding becomes a master of distinction and 
division. Rhees (1998, 23) describes the limits of such technique, skill, and calculation: 
 
The people who argued with Socrates and Plato may have thought that language was just 
a collection of techniques, and that that was what understanding is: knowing the 
technique.  
. . . Is understanding just competence? Is language a skill? Whether speaking is a 
technique; whether thinking is a technique; whether living is. . . . And that would be the 
same as solving problems of life by calculation. 
 
Negative reason categorizes phenomena by understanding what each thing is not, 
relative to other things, yet it remains unable to state positively what anything 
essentially is, as Plato’s Socratic, aporetic dialogues suggest. But even in this stage, a 
glimmer of reason in its positive mode may shine, for the principle of contradiction has 
the quality of universality, which may impress the understanding and awaken the:  
 
unindividual and transcendent character of the Reason as a presence to the mind. (Logic I, 
69) 
 
When the principle of contradiction itself is considered, the understanding turns its 
attention from outward sense and focuses inwards (because attention is forced away 
from outward objects) and upwards (because for Coleridge, reason is above nature).
102
 
While sense, fancy and the understanding are part of nature, and imagination is part of 
                                                 
102 See Letters V, 137-8, discussing reason in its human and trans-human aspects. 
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human nature, reason is independent of natural phenomena, which it irradiates, such 
that, for example, instinct is incipient, somnambulant reason. Considering the principle 
of contradiction itself, the understanding turns from natura naturata to natura naturans.  
Imagination finds itself as nature naturing, vitally mediating between and thus 
harmonizing the polarities. Contemplation of the principle of contradiction has a 
revolutionary effect in Coleridge’s system because therein the understanding begins to 
wonder what indicates contradictions as such. If passive reason can indicate 
contradictions, it must itself transcend them in order to draw them together as 
presentations to the understanding, which may then hold them apart. The first glimpse 
of Coleridgean positive reason is in polarity: 
 
THERE IS, strictly speaking, NO PROPER OPPOSITION BUT BETWEEN THE TWO POLAR 
FORCES OF ONE AND THE SAME POWER. (Friend I, 94) 
 
Polarity, ‘a living and generative interpenetration’, not ‘a mere balance or 
compromise of the two powers’ (Statesman’s Manual, 90) may not be grasped by the 
naked understanding, which conceives of everything in detachment, related by cause 
and effect, but only mechanically related. Where the understanding as negative reason 
wrangles with logical opposites as contradictories, the imagination holds polar 
opposites, which are mutually generative, inclusive and not exclusive, and therefore 
capable of distinction, but not of division. Coleridge therefore situated imagination 
above the understanding and approaching reason, rather than between the understanding 
and intuition, as Kant first places it, revising it into a compartment within the 
conceptual understanding in CPR, B. 
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3.6 Beyond Empiricism: the bridging imagination 
Coleridge’s imagination bridges between understanding and reason, and this is clearly 
seen in the marginal annotation to his copy of Tennemann’s Geschichte. This sketch 
schematizes his system of faculties in terms of the lowest and highest in the human 
scale. That Coleridge drew these scales twice, laying them side by side with the lowest 
to highest on the left and the highest to lowest on the right highlights how the faculties 
are complementarities along a pole. The polarity is emphasized by his inclusion of a 
bar, on both scales, between the higher and lower understanding. When the 
understanding is impregnated with the imagination, then understanding ‘becomes 
intuitive, and a living power’ (Statesman’s Manual, 69). 
The polarity suggests mutual generation. In his writings, as I indicated earlier, 
reason is described as above both nature and the human scale, such that our search for 
wisdom may approach reason, but reason is no faculty. Coleridge consistently denies 
that these powers are discrete faculties. Considered in terms of what we might call the 
epistemological pole, the powers are seen in their proper light, as incapable of separate 
operation, although they can be distinguished theoretically. Nevertheless, while sense, 
fancy, understanding and imagination are human faculties, reason is above the human, 
although it is something that the human mind might approach. 
Coleridge cautions against dividing in order to distinguish, and, which is worse, 
distinguishing in order to divide (Reflection, 33).
103
 Elsewhere, on the same theme, he 
notes that:  
 
in every act of mind the man unites the properties of sense, understanding and reason. 
Nevertheless it is of great practical importance, that these distinctions should be made and 
understood. (Friend I, 177n) 
 
He holds that the primary and secondary imaginations are one power under different 
degrees of voluntary control. The secondary imagination unites the clarity of the 
understanding with the depth of reason. The primary imagination, much less reflectively 
controlled, unites: 
 
the plenitude of the sense with the comprehensibility of the understanding. (Statesman’s 
Manual, 69) 
 
Imagination draws Ideas down to the understanding bringing resonance and depth to the 
                                                 
103 Copy F (1825), has the autograph note: ‘i.e. that distinguishes in matters of opinion in order 
to divide persons, thus converting innocent difference into discord and alienation.’ Cf. Friend II, 
104n. 
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whole mind. It generates symbols to convey Ideas of reason, which symbolic aim 
Coleridge expresses as: 
 
That reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the reason in images of the 
sense, and organizing . . . the flux of the senses by the permanence and self-circling 
energies of reason, gives birth to a system of symbols . . . consubstantial with the truths of 
which they are the conductors. (Statesman’s Manual, 29) 
 
While negative reason in the understanding works with the law of contradiction, 
positive reason in the imagination gives rise to the unity of experienced nature. 
Imagination relates constantly changing and aspect-shifting appearances to the 
permanent energies of reason. This relation allows a consciousness of temporality and 
eternity through awareness of mutable phenomena and the permanence of their 
essences.  
Fancy, in contrast, has no unifying power, and proceeds by mechanical 
association.
104
 At Biographia I, 101, Coleridge begins his history and critique of 
association with Aristotle, ‘the wise Stagyrite’ who delivers a ‘just theory without 
pretending to an hypothesis’. Aristotle’s On Memory surveys facts of association 
without framing these in a guiding fiction or fancied state-of-affairs, unlike the newer 
associationist theories that Coleridge targets.
105
 
Cartesian association, for example, fancied ‘living and intelligent fluids, that etch 
and re-etch engravings on the brain’, as Coleridge glossed it, revealing Descartes’ 
theory of nervous spirits in brain fibres as the model for the Locke-Hartleian brand of 
associationism (Biographia I, 100). Later associationists hypothesized that ether 
oscillating along solid fibres and hollow tubes, or electric light and the elective affinities 
of chemical compositions, were the forces driving association. Coleridge’s threefold 
objection to these hypotheses was that they were: (1) unscientific flights of fancy; (2) 
naïve prejudices of ‘the despotism of the eye’ (Biographia I, 74),106 as if only a more 
powerful microscope were necessary for confirmation; and (3) metaphysically 
materialistic, whereas Aristotle’s theory was ontologically neutral. 
Coleridge did not dismiss association, retaining it within his system as the 
‘universal law of passive fancy’ (Biographia I, 104). Nevertheless, as Sutton (1998, 
                                                 
104 Fancy and imagination are more than poetic modes, they are mental powers necessary for 
experience. 
105  Aristotle, distinguishes memory from recollection. For him, memory relies on sense-
perception and images, while recollection –advanced in ‘fast learners’ – is more intelligent, 
using images only accidentally. 
106 Cf. SWF II, 900 writing of ‘desensualizing the mind, and emancipating it first from the 
tyranny of the Eye’. 
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261) notes, his critique:  
 
reveals a deeply felt rejection of the implications of association for dearly defended 
values and beliefs, significant in understanding the reception and perceived threat of 
neurophilosophical associationism and distributed models then and now. 
 
He rejects the implications of associationism, while syncretically retaining it at the 
lower levels of his system, by arguing that the associationism draws false conclusions in 
presuming that it accounts for all mental functioning and thought: 
 
The image-forming . . . power, the imagination in its passive sense . . . Fancy=Phantasy, 
. . . may . . . be compared to the Gorgon Head, which looked death into every thing––and 
this not by accident, but from the nature of the faculty itself . . . to give consciousness to 
the Subject by presenting to it its conceptions objectively (Notebooks 3, 4066) 
 
Note how he here explains his reason for the necessity to transcend what he elsewhere 
calls the despotism of the eye, which necessity pertains also, by similarity, of the image. 
The drive to image everything, or the physically specular drive, distinguished from 
theoretical (contemplative) speculation, looks a fixity and deadness into things. For this 
fixing gaze, the Gorgon Head image is most apt. The nature of this faculty is not by 
itself, however, bad, because it is required to give rise to self-consciousness in the 
thinking, conceiving subject. From out of fancy’s objectively presented fixities and 
definites, which are conceptions given an imagistic objectivity, i.e. a likeness to external 
objects, arises a consciousness that can attend to and intend its own thinking and 
thoughts as to external things (to which they are like thanks to the fancy’s images of 
them), and hence this consciousness becomes a self-consciousness. Coleridge continues 
in the same note of April 1811: 
 
Life may be inferred, even as intelligence is from black marks on white paper, but the 
black marks themselves are truly ‘the dead letter’. Here then is the error, not in the faculty 
itself, without which there would be no fxation, consequently, no distinct perception or 
conception, but in the gross idolatry of those who abuse it, & make that the goal & end 
which should only be a means of arriving at it. Is it any excuse to him who treats a living 
being as inanimate Body, that we cannot arrive at the knowledge of the living Being but 
thro’ the Body which is its Symbol & outward & visible Sign? (Notebooks 3, 4066) 
 
Empiricism’s chief error, then, is to take fancy, or association, as the highest end of the 
human mind, when it is only a means in the process of forming concepts from 
experience, which process is a fixation on distinct perceptions or conceptions. He 
astutely observes that Empiricist theories truly apply not to the healthy human mind, but 
only to a state of light-headedness:  
 
There is in truth but one state to which this theory applies at all, namely, that of complete 
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light-headedness; and even to this it applies but partially, because the will and reason are 
perhaps never wholly suspended. (Biographia I, 112) 
 
He holds that the result of perception is neither a true subject nor true object but 
rather an original union of both. Imagination blends thoughts and intuitions, allowing us 
to see beyond transitory phenomena and into natura naturans as ‘We see into the life of 
things’.107  Coleridge does not expect his imaginative position, however, to be well 
received, or even understood, by the Empiricists of his day: 
 
Every system, which is under the necessity of using terms not familiarized by the 
metaphysicks in fashion, will be described as written in an unintelligible style, and the 
author must expect the charge of having substituted learned jargon for clear conception; 
while, according to the creed of our modern philosophers, nothing is deemed a clear 
conception, but what is representable by a distinct image. Thus the conceivable is 
reduced within the bounds of the picturable. (Biographia I, 287-8) 
 
Nevertheless, his fancy-imagination distinction retained a necessary place for 
association. Finding associationism unable to account for artistic genius and creativity, 
he presented the transcendental argument that: (A) the genuine creativity of imaginative 
poetry cannot be accounted for by the associationist theory; (B) genuinely creative 
poetry exists; therefore (C) associationism cannot explain the human mind. Retaining 
elements of Empiricism while abandoning Empiricist reductionism, he upholds 
Leibniz’s injunction for a true philosophy: ‘at once to explain and collect the fragments 
of truth scattered through systems apparently the most incongruous’, recommending a 
selective syncretism (quoted at Biographia I, 244). Thus Coleridge describes his 
syncretic system as attempting: 
 
to reduce all knowledges into harmony. It opposes no other system, but shows what was 
true in each; and how that which was true in the particular, in each of them became error, 
because it was only half the truth (Table Talk I, 248) 
 
                                                 
107 Wordsworth, ‘Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey’ (l. 49), the last poem (in 
both original versions) of the Lyrical Ballads, (1798; 1802). 
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3.7 Desynonymizing Fancy and Imagination 
Coleridge’s term ‘desynonymization’ in Biographia helps explain his distinction 
between fancy and imagination. These terms require explanation because he inverts 
their traditional meanings. ‘Fancy’, from the Greek phantasia, connotes a free play of 
the mind not necessarily tied to definite images. The Latin imaginatio traditionally 
referred to the capacity to generate images in the mind. In Coleridge’s use, imagination 
becomes the more creative aptitude and fancy that by which we create fixed and definite 
images. He explains,  
 
It is not, I own, easy to conceive a more apposite translation of the Greek Phantasia than 
the Latin Imaginatio; but it is equally true that in all societies there exists an instinct of 
growth, a certain collective, unconscious good sense working progressively to 
desynonymize those words originally of the same meaning (Biographia I, 82-3) 
 
Examples from English poetry illustrate his distinction. Here is one example of 
fancy, from Butler’s Hudibras: 
 
And like a lobster boyl’d, the Morn 
From black to red began to turn. 
 
No power could sanely fuse the images in this burlesque example of fancy at play. 
Butler’s lines are as burlesque as what Coleridge (Biographia I, 84) quotes as Otway’s 
fanciful: 
 
Lutes, lobsters, seas of milk, and ships of amber,
108
 
 
While Butler’s lobster-boyl’d morn never escapes the ludicrous to repose in the 
thoughtful, Otway’s line successfully expresses his heroine’s madness, and therefore 
brings the reader to intelligent reflection, thereby exaggerating the absurdity. 
Exemplifying unintentionally comic failure, Coleridge (Biographia I, 24) cites,  
 
a ludicrous instance in the poem of a young tradesman: 
 
No more will I endure love’s pleasing pain, 
Or round my heart’s leg tie his galling chain. 
 
Awareness of potential poetic failure cannot always prevent it, as when Coleridge 
describes Mont Blanc below Venus: 
 
Hast thou a charm to stay the morning-star  
In his deep course? So long he seems to pause 
On thy bald awful head, O sovran Blanc. 
                                                 
108 Coleridge misquotes: lobsters reads laurels in Otway’s, Venice Preserv’d, V.i.369. 
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   (Hymn before Sunrise, Poetical Works I.2, 717-22) 
 
Although Coleridge himself crafted the fanciful conceit of a mountain charming a 
planet to pause – thereby expressing an attractive compulsion in the scene – the 
distracting image of the planet perched mosquito-like on the Mount’s ‘bald awful head’ 
must be unintended.  
Fancy in art does not inevitably lead to poetic failure. It can be used to exquisite 
effect, as in this masterly example from William Shakespeare’s Venus and Adonis: 
 
Full gently now she takes him by the hand, 
A lily prison’d in a gaol of snow, 
Or ivory in an alabaster band; 
So white a friend engirts so white a foe. 
 
Aggregated similes represent the goddess’ hand taking her mortal lover’s. In each image 
– lily, gaol, snow, ivory, and alabaster – likeness is shown, but they neither cohere nor 
modify each other. This distancing effect emphasizes the categorical difference between 
Venus and Adonis. The images have ‘no connexion natural or moral, but are yoked 
together . . . by means of some accidental coincidence’ (Table Talk, 489-90: 23 June, 
1834). They ‘remain when put together the same as when apart’ (Richards’ phrase, 
1960, 77), rather than cohering into an interpenetrative fusion altering both to suggest 
an Idea. Coleridge speculates that Shakespeare employed fancy to distance his poetry 
from a cloying subject matter. He explains that Shakespeare does not just write 
passionately about his own passions, but he masters his fancy and becomes: 
 
by power of Imagination another Thing––Proteus, a river, a lion, yet still the God felt to 
be there 
––Then his thinking faculty & thereby perfect abstraction from himself––he writes 
exactly as if as if of an other planet, or as describing the movement of two Butterflies–– 
(Lit. Lects I, 69-70) 
 
Remaining with Venus and Adonis, Coleridge now shows an example of poetic 
imagination: 
 
Look! how bright a star shooteth from the sky 
So glides he in the night from Venus’ eye. 
 
He comments,  
 
How many images and feelings are here brought together without effort and without 
discord, in the beauty of Adonis, the rapidity of his flight, the yearning, yet hopelessness, 
of the enamored gazer, while a shadowy ideal character is thrown over the whole! 
 
Imagination fuses separable meanings into one whole. Importantly, the reader is also 
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active in this process. Coleridge observes that: 
 
You feel him to be a poet, inasmuch as for a time he has made you one––an active 
creative being. (Lit. Lects I, 251) 
 
Imagination thus creates meaningful wholes in its fusions, where fancy provides only 
novel, but separate, conjunctions. With imagination, as Coleridge says of Venus and 
Adonis: 
 
You seem to be told nothing; but to see & hear every thing. (Lit. Lects I, 242) 
 
Illustrating this difference between enlarged, holistic meaning and mere novelty of 
associated images, he suggests,  
 
You may conceive the difference in kind between the Fancy and the Imagination in this 
way, that if the check of the senses and the reason were withdrawn, the first would 
become delirium and the last mania. (Table Talk II, 489, 23 June, 1834) 
 
This delirium is a confused excitement, sometimes hallucinatory. Delirium’s excess of 
associated images is contrasted with mania’s pursuit of ever-encompassing meaning. 
For Coleridge, fancy’s fixities and definites are opaque, in that one cannot see 
through them to what they represent. They simply stand for what they represent. 
Imagination, however, employs the symbol’s translucence. Not only does the symbol 
allow the intended object, often an Idea, to be seen in and through itself, it allows 
contemplation of the non-phenomenal object in the first place, just as light is not clearly 
seen and considered as itself until it is held in a crystal. These non-phenomenal objects 
are Ideas, and now that we have discussed imagination in detail, we can consider how it 
is required to approach these Ideas. 
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3.8 Imagining Ideas: elevating the place and role of imagination 
By his own account, Coleridge was a Platonist. Although Plato illustrated philosophy 
with some of the discipline’s most beautiful and recurrent images, he accords a lowly 
official role to imagination. In the Ion, Socrates, in Plato’s account, diagnoses poetic 
oration, or rhapsode, as magnetism rather than mastery, calling it a divinely inspired 
dunamis, and not a rational technē. Although this divine inspiration indicates poetry’s 
exalted origin, it is presented as a gift from the gods, and not as the hard-won product of 
mastery and expertise that is Philosophy. We cannot all be Sibylline prophets or heroic 
lovers, nor is the fate of inspired truths written on leaves to be scattered by winds likely 
to enlighten or be highly valued, but we may all endeavour to apply reason and to 
become more truthful. 
Imagination’s lowly status in Plato’s system contrasts starkly with its importance 
for Coleridge, for whom it is a divine echo in the human mind. Although one could 
argue, following the divine gift thread, that this is also true in Plato, the place and role of 
imagination in their respective systems diverges. In Coleridge, imagination approaches 
the Ideas, translating them aesthetically so that Ideality informs and enriches existence. 
For Plato, to reiterate, imagination deals explicitly only with reflections, shadows, and 
copies, and it is this position that Coleridge transforms. He modifies Platonic 
epistemology, allowing a contemplation of Ideas approximating the Plotinian model. 
Thus he presents a romanticized Platonism whereby imagination creates a sensuous-
intellectual expression of reality. In the analogy of the Divided Line, Plato distinguishes 
truly real Forms (eide), or Ideas (ideai), from experience’s sensible appearances. 
For Plato, imagination is three removes from reality, i.e. the Forms. With Plotinus, 
however, and with Iamblichus’s and Proclus’s expanded, theurgistic and sacramental 
accounts, one can speculate through the beauty of aesthetic form as an initial, sensuous 
access to the Ideas that would otherwise be inaccessible, or at least exceedingly difficult 
and unlikely, to some otherwise non-theoretical human minds.
109
 Plotinus’s and 
Proclus’s accounts especially inform Coleridge’s view of an aesthetic approach to 
contemplation of Ideas through the symbol.
110
 Elsewhere, Plato describes imagination as 
an ‘inner artist painting pictures in the soul’ (Philebus, 39c). This inner artist provides a 
mnemonic service, because ‘memory is like a block of wax into which our perceptions 
                                                 
109 Cf. Struck, 2010. 
110  Cf. Barth (1977, rev. 2001, esp. Ch. 2) for a sacramental account of Coleridgean symbol 
aestheticizing Ideas. For sacramentalism in the Chaldean Oracles, see Majercik’s Introduction in 
Julianus, ([2nd C. AD] 1989, rev. 2013, 23-5).  
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and thoughts stamp impressions’ (Theaetetus, 191c-d).111 
For Plato, thinking with images involves a lower consciousness of reality than even 
sense perception, as considering shadows in the cave is a lower mental activity than 
perceiving the actual objects. His view that the highest mental activity is contemplation 
of Ideas beyond image and concept is at odds with Aristotle’s aforementioned view that, 
‘the soul never thinks without a mental image (phantasma)’. On this point, Coleridge 
seems nearer to Aristotle’s position than to Plato’s, but Coleridge will in fact contradict 
Aristotle, in saying that there are dangers to thinking without images, thus going against 
Aristotle’s assertion that doing so is impossible. 
Coleridge, like Kant, recognizes the danger of thinking with concepts only, unaided 
by images and especially by empirical intuitions, which imageless thinking Kant 
demonstrated as leading to the antinomies of reason. However, Coleridge does not 
contradict Plato’s view that there is no possibility of our thinking in Ideas, which are 
objective realities that thinking moves towards, rather than tools, as concepts are, with 
which one may think. Ideas are the ultimate ends of thought, and not its means, and thus 
they can be contemplated but never conceptualized.  
Of Josiah Wedgwood II’s late governess, Miss Dennis, an aspiring poet with whom 
Coleridge sometimes conversed, he writes, 
 
She interested me a good deal; she appears . . . to have been injured by going out of the 
common way without any of that Imagination, which if it be a Jack o’Lanthorn to lead us 
out of that way is however at the same time a Torch to light us whither we are going. A 
whole Essay, might be written on the Danger of thinking without Images.
 
(Letters I, 362) 
 
He therefore holds that in any serious thinking, images and concepts should be 
illuminated by Ideas of reason, and deepened by their contemplation. 
He distinguishes Ideas from ‘conceptions of the Understanding’, paralleling Plato’s 
distinction between Ideas, or eide, and the mathemata and theorems of dianoia, or 
conceptual understanding. With this distinction comes the problem of defining the Ideas 
of reason. If Ideas of reason transcend concepts, then their definition appears to be 
impossible. A conception of an Idea could only be an abstract reflection and would 
remain a concept. Coleridge is very much aware of this problem:  
 
Ideas and Conceptions are utterly disparate, and Ideas and Images are the negatives of 
                                                 
111
 Descartes ([1641] 1994, 87), Mediation II describes this image-making faculty’s limitations 
when he imagines the wax ball’s essence: ‘not properly perceived by the senses nor by the faculty 
of imagination, but only by the intellect alone’. 
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each other. (Cited in Muirhead, 1930, 97)
112
 
 
He expresses the same thought annotating a volume of Hooker: 
 
no Idea can be rendered by a conception. An Idea is essentially inconceivable. 
(Marginalia II, 1145) 
 
This problem also exercises the Neo-Platonists, for whom truths about reality cannot be 
adequately disclosed in discursive language, with ordinary propositional forms suited 
only to describing the intermediate reality of appearances and not the fuller reality of 
Ideas, or beyond that, the One. Coleridge, like his Neo-Platonic predecessors, finds no 
convenient access to Ideas through concepts.  
In Ideas, as approached by the symbolizing imagination, Coleridge sees the union 
of the universal with the particular. He describes a particular’s defining universal as its 
Law, which Laws are constitutive of phenomena and ‘In the order of thought necessarily 
antecedent’ to them, revealing an intuition of the Ideas distinguished, ‘not from the real, 
but from the phenomenal’ (Cited in Muirhead, 1930, 98). He presents us with 
experienced objects and asks us to consider their predicates as universals. In the light of 
Ideas, sensible particulars are seen and understood as individualized traces of universals. 
Law is responsible for the antecedent and constitutive universal. Coleridge understands 
Plato’s Ideas as truly objective Living Laws, unlike phenomena, which are necessarily 
perspectival (Friend I, 492). 
The aim of these Living Laws in human life is:  
 
to present that which is necessary as a whole consistently with the moral freedom of each 
particular act. (Cited in Muirhead, 1930, 99)  
 
Coleridge sees evidence of a directing Idea as: 
 
a chain of necessity, the particular links of which are free acts. (Cited in Muirhead, 1930, 
99) 
 
Hence,  
 
You may see an Idea working in a man by watching his tastes and enjoyments, though he 
may hitherto have no consciousness of any other reasoning than that of conception and 
fact. (Notebooks 4, 5409) 
 
Here we have the Romantic notion, derived from Plotinus, of the Idea accessed by 
imagination and working in and through the aesthetic, sensual, and immediate modes of 
                                                 
112  This and the following citations from Muirhead are from the Folio Notebook (which 
Muirhead calls MS. C), which is held at the Huntington Library, Pasadena: CA, which entries 
are published in Notebooks 4 and 5. 
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pleasure, taste, and preference. 
This aesthetic movement towards Ideas is, however, only dimly conscious and 
rarely reflected upon. Thus Coleridge writes, 
 
Hence lastly all the various characters of Ideas––the Fewest among the Few that live in 
their Light, and yet all that live in their power––the Idea working in them (Notebooks, 4, 
5495) 
 
This entry, not intended for publication, Muirhead (1930, 99) elegantly paraphrases as: 
‘All men live in the power of Ideas which work in them, though few live in their light.’ 
Thus for Coleridge, human reason and its relation to Ideas is a largely unconscious affair 
for most people. While Coleridge esteems Aristotle as the undisputed master of the 
Understanding, Plato surveys the Understanding from a higher vantage and: 
 
looked down upon, from the Throne of Actual Ideas, or Living, Inborn, Essential Truths. 
(Table Talk I, 173) 
 
How may we hope to ascend to these Ideas and live in their light? According to 
Coleridge, we all live in their power, but it is another thing to live in, and choose to be 
guided by, their light. For the mind centred on the fixities and definites of fancy’s 
images and the understanding’s concepts, facts exert a pressure that suppresses a desire 
for principles, and for such a mind, iss outweigh oughts by seeming to be the only real 
certainties. One problem such a mind overlooks, however, is how, without logically 
antecedent principles, certain facts are to be esteemed as more important than others. 
Nearing the end of his life, Coleridge reflects on how without the guidance of 
principles, the mind is dragged hither and thither by whatever nearest facts receive our 
attention: 
 
No one seems to have any distinct convictions––right or wrong; the mind is completely at 
sea––rolling and pitching on the waves of Facts and personal Experiences. . . . You say 
Facts give birth to, and are the ground of, Principles. But unless you have a Principle of 
selection, why did you take notice of those particular Facts. You must have a Lantern in 
your hand to give light; otherwise all the materials in the world are useless, for you can 
neither find them, and if you could, you could not arrange them.  
But that principle came from Facts!—To be sure: but there must have been 
antecedent Light again to see those antecedent Facts. The Relapse in imagination may be 
carried back for ever—but you can never imagine a man without a previous Aim or 
Principle. 
Then what do you say to Bacon’s Induction? This––that it is not what is now a days 
so called, but which is in fact Deduction only. (Table Talk I, 191-2)
113
 
 
Not questioning one’s own lights (i.e., the principles behind one’s attentions, selections, 
                                                 
113 He likely recalls a discussion with the young Benthamite MP, Thomas Hyde Villiers: see 
Table Talk, 191-2, n. 13. 
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and ascriptions of importance), and perhaps even denying their very existence in 
asserting that there are only facts and viewpoints, much like Democritean atoms and the 
void, is to place oneself unwittingly and obscurely in the sway of Ideas rather than to 
work in their lights. That is to say, it is to be swayed unconsciously while thinking one 
acts and observes freely. When guiding principles are unacknowledged or even denied, 
then one’s every act and observation can be cited as freely made, which is partly true; 
however, the scope of that freedom is limited by the apparent possibilities illuminated 
by one’s dominant principles. 
Could we be mistaken in identifying the light of an Idea? After all, Coleridge holds 
Aristotle, the genius of the Understanding addressed for centuries as ‘The Philosopher’, 
to be a conceptualist unable to raise himself to the higher state of noesis. How could we 
tell if we had ever been, or failed to be, illuminated by an Idea?  
Although many thinkers appeal to innate Ideas, Coleridge repudiates the doctrine. 
He considers Descartes’ version, for example, to be: 
 
the fanciful hypothesis of material ideas, or certain configurations of the brain which 
were as so many moulds to the influxes of the external world. (Biographia I, 98) 
 
Coleridge’s objective realism, whereby Ideas are real and hence independent of human 
mind, divides his philosophy from Kant’s idealism wherein a priori concepts of the 
understanding and Ideas of reason are held to be necessary elements of the experiencing 
mind, and not necessarily anything beyond that.  
Coleridge does, however, agree that the mind is endowed with instincts and offices 
of Reason. Nevertheless, for him the mind moves towards Ideas beyond itself, which is 
very different from Kant’s notion of Ideas originating in the mind, considering its 
objects as real only in the modes of faith and hope. With Kant, for whom Ideas regulate, 
and thus organize, human knowledge within the ‘architectonic of Reason’, Coleridge 
sees Ideas as necessary to bring: 
 
a unity into all our conceptions and several knowledges. On this all system depends; and 
without this we could reflect connectedly neither in nature nor on our own minds. 
(Reflection, 168) 
 
Against Kant, however, he sees Ideas as having to be brought to mind, and not already 
there as merely mental entities. 
Differing further from Kant, Coleridge insists that the unifying Idea is true, and not 
merely superimposed on experience for the convenient sake of architectonic system. 
Abstractions of thought, as much as perceptions and images, can obstruct the unifying 
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principle and must be surmounted to access Ideas. Ideas such as life, freedom and our 
deeper purposes resonate neither solely as objects given nor as impositions from our 
nature but ‘as deep calling to deep in the self-evolution of truth’ (Muirhead, 1930, 
102).
114
 This unity derives from mind and world’s common ground: the ens 
realissimum. This most real being, equivalent to Plato’s Idea of Ideas, grounds reality 
and Ideas in their unity and truth. 
 
The grand problem, the solution of which forms the final object and distinctive character 
of philosophy, is this: for all that exists conditionally (that is, the existence of which is 
inconceivable except under the conditions of its dependency on some other as its 
antecedent) to find a ground that is unconditioned and absolute, and thereby to reduce the 
aggregate of human knowledge to a system. (Friend I, 461) 
 
For Coleridge, two truths make indisputable this ground’s existence. Firstly, 
scientific inquiry seeks laws as the ground of phenomena. Secondly, we conceive of a 
‘ground common to the world and man’, which forms ‘the link or mordant by which 
philosophy becomes scientific and the sciences philosophical’ (Friend I, 463). This 
ground accounts for the concord of reason and experience. This is the ground that Hume 
(Enquiry, VIII.i) declares inexistent, as if expecting the sun to rise, or a purse of gold 
left in Charing-Cross to fly away like a feather, were merely to infer from constant 
conjunction of similarly associated events, with the mind being merely ‘determined by 
custom to infer the one appearance from the other’.  
Kant, by contrast, defends this ground against Humean scepticism with the 
transcendental unity of apperception. If noumenal causes cannot be observed, then at 
least certain phenomena are necessarily unified in experience (and not just by constant 
conjunction, an accidental unity). Coleridge, however, does not try to demonstrate the 
unity of experience alone. As Hume argues, this ground accounting for the general 
agreement of reason and experience is not reachable by induction. Coleridge 
(Biographia I, 285) reasons that: 
 
Should we attempt it [i.e., to find a principle more fundamental than self-consciousness], 
we must be driven back from ground to ground, each of which would cease to be a 
Ground the moment we pressed on it. We must be whirl’d down the gulf of an infinite 
series. But this would make our make our reason baffle the end and purpose of all reason, 
namely, unity and system. Or we must break off the series arbitrarily, and affirm an 
absolute something that is . . . causa sui.
115
  
 
We know of one causative thing that can assign purpose to itself, and we know it 
                                                 
114 Alluding to Psalms, 42:7: ‘Deep calls to deep in the roar of your waterfalls’.  
115 Clarification in square brackets mine. Coleridge notes here that self-consciousness is ‘not a 
kind of being, but a kind of knowing’. 
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from the inside, because it is the will. Prioritising the will in consciousness, he thus 
approaches the Idea: 
 
It is at once the distinctive and constitutive basis of my philosophy that I place the 
ground and genesis of my system, not, as others, in a fact impressed, much less in a 
generalization from facts collectively, least of all in an abstraction embodied in an 
hypothesis, in which the pretended solution is most often but a repetition of the problem 
in disguise. In contradiction to this, I place my principle in an act. In the language of the 
grammarians, I begin with the verb––but the act involves its reality––it is the act of being 
(Opus Maximum, 72) 
 
Coleridge’s act is his human access to the Idea. The notion stands for contemplated 
counterparts of universal laws of nature and of moral laws. Law and Idea are 
inseparable: 
 
for as the power of seeing is to light, so is an idea in mind to a law in nature. They are 
correlatives that suppose each other. (Lit. Lects II, 148) 
 
This Pythagorean resonance between physical laws and mental qualities harmonizes 
with Schelling’s Natürphilosophie, the great theme of which is that:  
 
Mind is invisible Nature; Nature visible Mind. ([1797] 1988, Introduction)  
 
As Coleridge expresses it, ‘living and life-producing ideas . . . are essentially one with 
the germinal causes in nature’, constituting the generative principles which they 
represent in the realm of awareness (Lit. Lects II, 222). 
To contemplate Ideas is to be directed towards the reality by which all things are 
generated, transformed, and have their being and value. As poetic imagination 
symbolizes these generative ideal processes and values, it is thus ‘an echo of . . . [ 
creation], co-existing with the conscious will’ (Biographia I, 304). Imagination is 
penetratingly insightful, while fancy is superficially observant. Imagination is directed 
towards the Ideas, or Laws, which give being, meaning, value, and purpose to 
phenomena. Fancy manipulates appearances and associations to produce gratifying 
effects rather than to contemplate intrinsic value. 
Coleridge described artistic creation as parallel to natural or divine creation insofar 
as both develop from internal laws, or Ideas. The position derives from Plotinus, who 
Coleridge says provides:  
 
the statement in his most beautiful language of the only possible form of philosophic 
Realism and demonstrates its <conditional> necessity by one of the most masterly pieces 
of exhaustive Logic, found in ancient or modern Writings. . . . Let the attempt of Plotinus 
have ended in a failure––yet who could see the courage and skill with which he seizes the 
reins, and vaults into the Chariot of the Sun, with what elegance he curbs and turns the 
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ethereal Steeds, without sharing in this enthusiasm––and taking honour to the human 
mind even to have fallen from such magnificent Daring? (Marginalia V, 745) 
 
Coleridge defends Plotinus’s principle that whatever is necessary to reality is necessarily 
real itself. This principle derives from the Lycopolean Roman ascetic’s transcendental 
argument that the Forms are prerequisites of a universe in which experience and 
understanding are possible.
116
 Coleridge describes the great Neo-Platonist as 
demonstrating that:  
 
a Knowledge by Ideas is a constant process of Involution and Evolution, different from the 
Conceptions of the Understanding in this respect only––that no reason can be brought for 
the Affirmation, because it is reason––ex. gr. that the Soul contemplate its Principle as the 
Universal in itself as a Particular, i.e. that this truth is involved, & vice versa, evolves itself 
from its principle (Marginalia V, 756) 
 
Here we find the beauty of the poet-philosopher’s quarry: the identity of act and object 
in the mode of contemplation, an act involving the reality of the Idea.
117
 Coleridge’s 
thought is seminal, in parts brilliantly insightful, but also and often frustratingly 
fragmentary.  
 
                                                 
116 Plotinus: born Lycopolis, Lower Egypt, 204 CE; studies eleven years (from age twenty 
seven) under Ammonias Saccas, Alexandria; lives most of his life in Rome. In the two years 
between Alexandria and Rome, he joins Emperor Gordian III’s Persia expedition, hoping to 
reach India and learn its philosophy and religion (Armstrong, 1936, notes coincidences between 
the Enneads and the Upanishads). See Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus: ‘And from that day 
continually staying with Ammonius, [Plotinus] acquired such a mastery of philosophy, that he 
became eager to gain knowledge of the teaching prevailing among the Persians, as also among 
the Indians.’ 
117
 Conceiving the identity of subject and object in contemplation goes back at least to Aristotle 
(De Anima). For discussion, see Philip Merlan (1963). 
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3.9 Imaginative Contemplation in Aesthetic Experience 
Coleridge’s fancy-imagination distinction presents imaginative works as inviting 
contemplation of reality beyond the self, that is, of reality as objective. Coleridge’s 
distinction therefore continues a long Platonic tradition that argues that genuine 
aesthetic experience necessarily involves contemplation.
118
 This basically Neo-Platonic 
position reaches its apex with Schelling, who argues that our experience necessarily 
relates to transcendence, the fullest expression of which must be what I term aesthetic-
ideal and praeter-conceptual. In Schelling’s articulation, adopted from the early 
Romanticism of Friedrich Schegel and Novalis, whom he knew in Jena, that: 
 
Art is the only true and eternal document of Philosophy, which always and continuously 
documents what Philosophy cannot represent externally. ([1800] 1978, 231) 
 
For Schelling, philosophy is an ultimately aesthetic endeavour that is part of nature’s 
movement, as ‘slumbering spirit’, to become fully conscious. In this movement, 
imagination conveys by participating in: 
 
the primordial knowledge of which the visible universe is the image and whose source is 
the fountainhead of eternal power. ([1803] 1966, 11-12) 
 
Contemplation in this tradition longs for and acknowledges the transcendent. In the final 
proposition of his Tractatus, Wittgenstein also acknowledges a contemplative response, 
which for him is a quiet beholding appropriate to an appreciated but ineffable value:  
 
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. 
 
That silence is not banal emptiness: it is quiet, pious even. The appropriate response to 
it involves standing back, giving space, perhaps even taking off one’s shoes before the 
blackberry bush as in Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s aesthetic-contemplative response in 
Aurora Leigh, Book VII: 
 
                             Earth’s crammed with heaven, 
And every common bush afire with God;  
But only he who sees, takes off his shoes, 
The rest sit round it and pluck blackberries 
 
Works of successful contemporary artists such as Tracy Emin, Chris Ofili, and Damien 
Hirst deal in concepts and sensation, in the equally insubstantial extremes of detritus 
and dazzle. Notions of transcendence and contemplation have no work to do here, partly 
because of the dominance of the concept in conceptual art. Is the contemplative model 
                                                 
118 Cf. Scruton (2011, 34ff., and passim). 
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of aesthetic response adequate only to certain types of art and aesthetic experience? Or 
does conceptual art fail to provide a stable aesthetic dimension in the experience it 
creates? Purely conceptual art does not invite contemplation as it is intentionally 
conceptual, rather than praeter-conceptual. It is the intimation of the Idea that invites 
contemplation. 
Merely conceptual artwork cannot be justified as presenting or stimulating any 
further significance than a plain propositional formulation, its main benefit being 
perhaps relative ease of communication or emphasis, rather than its being an artistically 
necessary mode of expression.
 
An unusual visual presentation of the conceptual can 
nevertheless prompt reflection and stir meditation. Conceptual art can prompt one to 
reflect on the more usual conventions and whether those modes of formulation contain 
anything that especially deserves the privilege of being widely accepted. I take 
meditation to be a middle state between reflection (such as when conventions are 
reflexively questioned) and contemplation, a mode wherein a ‘space apart’ is reserved 
for beholding a value, an Idea. Meditation is the making still required to find 
contemplation beyond reflection. Meditation need not become contemplation, but its 
mental ‘standing back’ is always conducive to it. 
McGhee (2000, 114) describes meditation as a ‘site’ to which Ideas may come, 
although they do not necessarily come, and it is not the only such site. Meditation 
brings:  
 
an alert attention, a suspension of normal life, followed by re-orienting ideas, then the 
process of protecting and sustaining this new mental formation, and then its outcome in 
action, fitful and in conflict at first, and finally without conflict.  
 
 McGhee’s thesis is of the philosophical value of meditative and contemplative 
experience, and their aesthetic forms, owing to their potential in transforming the 
subjective states receptive to and operating on ethical and Ideal content. 
 Meditation ‘stands back’ in neither following, nor forcibly ceasing, the chatter of 
ordinary thoughts. Once these thought reflexes cease directing attention and mood, 
contemplation becomes possible. If contemplation is achieved, background thoughts 
dissolve. By contemplation, and the meditation that typically precedes it, I mean no 
elitist conception, but a mode accessible to any rational being. Coleridge even describes 
his four-and-a-half year old son Hartley’s contemplation: 
 
I had a very long conversation with Hartley about Life, Reality, Pictures, & Thinking, this 
evening. He sate on my knee for half an hour at least, & was exceedingly serious. . . . I 
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asked him what he did when he thought of any thing––he answered––I look at it, and then 
go to sleep. To sleep?––said I––you mean, that you shut your eyes. Yes, he replied––I 
shut my eyes . . . and go to sleep––then I WAKE again, and away I run. (Letters II, 379, 
to Dorothy Wordsworth, 9
th
 February, 1801  
 
Coleridge then reflects that: 
 
the notion of that state of mind being Sleep is very striking, & he meant more, I suspect, 
than that People when asleep have their eyes shut––indeed I know it from the tone & leap 
up of Voice with which he uttered the word ‘WAKE’. 
 
Young Hartley first sits calmly on his father’s knee, and is thus able to reflect when 
asked to describe not his thoughts, but his thinking. The child’s answer contrasts 
contemplation, likened to sleep, with ordinary consciousness, when he ‘wakes’ again, 
and away he runs! He draws from the well in silence, drinks in, is refreshed, and then, 
enriched, vigorously returns to his energetic play. 
Contemplation, then, enriches everyday aesthetic experience. It can be momentary 
or prolonged. It always, however, beholds value for its own sake. It involves ‘seeing’ 
something, and ‘seeing’ that it is good. 
This contemplation does not require cultural allusions to be understood, unlike, 
e.g., Eliot’s The Waste Land, which requires wide reading in a long history of English 
Literature, Vedic scriptures, some German references, etc. Neither does contemplation 
require special conceptual recognition, unlike much conceptual art, or, for example, the 
phantasmagoria of Hieronymus Bosch. Concepts in aesthetic experience can bring the 
mind to historical and empirical meanings, and can lead one to consider facts and 
possibilities. Concepts are only deepened and enriched, however, with aesthetic Ideas, 
which provide resonance and depth inaccessible by concepts alone.  
Moreover, contemplation requires no conceptual manipulation or sophistication. 
Consider a child talking with a trusted adult. The understanding is conceptually engaged 
as the child frames questions and assimilates answers. But it is in the moments 
following the conceptualizing that contemplative appreciation occurs. Signs of this 
might be a gentle smile, the head tilted as if to parallel an inner, attentive listening. The 
legs and arms do not twist and strain, nor the fingers fidget, as when thought physically 
analogizes the body to act out complex conceptual links; instead, the contemplative’s 
body becomes still, yet more poised and alert than simply relaxed. 
Such momentary, everyday contemplation is not, however, prolonged in everyday 
experience. Yet the shared silence in smiles after a long journey, for example, maintains 
an environment of real value and not just of instrumental goals. The contemplative 
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response to art gives form and cultivates conventions for the shared acknowledgement 
of essential qualities and universal values. That the value is beheld in the appreciative, 
transformative beholding, and not in the conceptuality and externality of action itself, is 
clearly yet delicately expressed in Armitage’s ‘It Ain’t What You Do, It’s What It Does 
To You’ (1989). The poet describes a contemplative experience far from the impressive 
setting of a Moghul mausoleum, or the conventions of high art, or established religion. 
Far from being elitist, or even showy, Armitage’s contemplative encounter occurs along 
the muddy banks of a Lancashire reservoir: 
 
I have not padded through the Taj Mahal, 
barefoot, listening to the space between 
each footfall picking up and putting down 
its print against the marble floor. But I 
 
skimmed flat stones across Black Moss on a day 
so still I could hear each set of ripples 
as they crossed. I felt each stone’s inertia 
spend itself against the water; then sink. 
 
This contemplative experience is hallmarked by appreciative attention; a pausing of 
worldly concerns and extraneous thoughts; and the sense of beholding. Contemplation 
beholds value in what is encountered, and thus reveres its objects. One is enrapt in the 
value beheld and tranquillity replaces extraneous thought. Engaged, tasked activity 
directs the streams of superfluous associations, which in meditation are neither followed 
nor forcibly blocked; and in contemplation they cease to appear. 
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Part Four. Meditative Experience: Imagination and Idea in Poetic Thought 
 
[A]ll men are poets in their way, tho’ for the most part their ways are damned bad ones. 
(Letters II, p. 768, to Southey, 1801) 
 
4.1 Imaginative, Meditative, and Contemplative Thinking 
An appreciation of Philosophy’s vital, life-changing core is reflected in C. S. Lewis’s 
memoir (1998, 225), where he recalls referring to Philosophy as a ‘subject’ to his friend 
Barfield. ‘It wasn’t a subject to Plato!’ replied Barfield, ‘It was a way.’ In Coleridge 
too, we see the importance of meditative thinking and spiritual transformation as a way 
towards the true, the good, and the beautiful. Part Four will develop my view of 
contemplation arising from meditative experience. To this aim, I select from 
Coleridge’s meditative poetry (see Appendix B); from some more overtly philosophical 
remarks in his nature writing; and from some exquisitely beautiful and reflective 
aesthetic observations in his Notebooks, the latest of which remained unpublished until 
2002.
119
  
Regarding my use of the terms ‘meditation’ and ‘contemplation’, the former refers 
to a state prior to contemplation that can involve reverie, flights of fancy, mindfulness, 
and heightened awareness. Although not in principle excluded from my use, I do not 
mean by meditation a discipline of emptying the mind, as in yoga practice, nor do I 
mean the cognitively processing, intellectual problem-solving found in Descartes’ 
Meditations on First Philosophy, or Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, although what I 
mean by meditation is not necessarily excluded from such activities. More positively, 
then, by meditation I will generally refer to an attending to . . . and a listening to . . . . 
On the theme of attentive ‘listening’, Japanese culture has a tradition of incense 
appreciation whereby practitioners are said to ‘listen to’ (verb: kiku) incense. This 
tradition developed from Zen and its counterpart Chinese traditions through many 
generations of kōdō (lit. the Way of Incense) practitioners, although only a few hundred 
now actively practice to a level where they can name up to several hundred scents. 
During the incense ceremony, the participants submit their answers while ‘listening to’ 
different incenses, and these responses are submitted in the poetic form of haiku, thus 
furthering meditative attention. This discernful ‘listening’ demands the highest level of 
aesthetic concentration, especially because once the ceremony is underway, a smoky 
                                                 
119 Because Coleridge kept so many Notebooks through his life, some of which he returned to 
after many years, sometimes even writing in them upside down, with difficult handwriting, etc., 
these invaluable, highly creative (though sometimes mundane as any diary) document took such 
a long time to be published. 
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haze of intermingling scents fills the room. Understanding the sense of ‘listening to . . .’ 
in this aesthetic-meditative practice should help introduce the discernful or mindful 
listening I will discuss in the present chapter. 
Coleridge twice warns against the ‘despotism of the eye’ whereby visual first 
impressions too often lead to uncorrected prejudices preventing genuine attention and 
careful reflection. Indeed, he remarks that ‘Pythagoras, with his numeral, and Plato, 
with his musical, symbols’ show how we may be liberated from this despotism in 
favour of attending to the invisible essences of mathematics and music (Biographia I, 
74). In this sense, music can be appreciated as the most purely intellectual of the arts, in 
the sense that the movement and patterns of spirit become in music the spirit’s own 
objects.
120
 Form becomes all and content reduces to a bare minimum. In instrumental 
music, content ideally disappears altogether, except for very general and imaginative 
suggestions. That is to say, there is a formal suggestion of content as an Ideal and highly 
general, universal object, and this accounts for the widespread resonance of much music 
that is able to cross borders that academic treatises, for example (and which are not 
purely intellectual in the sense I mean), cannot. 
There is, nevertheless, a sense of more fully seeing that develops through technical 
training and artistic practice. Think, for example, of Claude Monet’s exquisitely 
observed 1892-94 series of paintings superbly depicting the coloured light illuminating 
Rouen Cathedral’s west façade, from which series he selected twenty that he considered 
to be complete and perfect. Heightened emotional engagement, and not only talent, 
training and practice, will also awaken discernful seeing and a degree of poetic 
sensibility, as when young love stirs Romeo to see in his beloved Juliet the radiant and 
world-sustaining qualities of the sun: 
 
But soft! what light through yonder window breaks? 
It is the east, and Juliet is the sun.  
(Romeo and Juliet, II.ii.2-3) 
 
Discernful listening, however, is more generally available to most hearing people, 
and this is reflected in the way words like ‘hark’, ‘harken’, ‘hush’, and ‘listen’ are or 
have been used. Discernful listening symbolizes a sublime contemplative sense in 
Joyce’s ‘The Dead’ (1914), which short story observes the exterior traces of an 
established married couple’s interior lives. Gabriel, the husband, speaks, and indeed has 
                                                 
120 See Hamilton (Ch. 1, 2007) for discussion of how music is nevertheless not intellectual in the 
sense of music being non-discursive and non-thetic. 
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prepared an after-dinner speech. Nevertheless, despite his educated facility with words, 
he is always embarrassedly aware of being forced and pretentious. The wife, Gretta, on 
the other hand, is described as listening. She feels nostalgic at this Feast of the 
Epiphany party when she listens to a man sing a traditional Irish ballad about a young 
man searching for his beloved. She harkens to thoughts of a boy who loved her but died 
when seeking for her in the snow despite being already sick. When Gabriel observes his 
wife listening to music coming from the drawing room, he finds: 
 
grace and mystery in her attitude as if she were a symbol of something. He asked himself 
what is a woman standing on the stairs in the shadow, listening to distant music, a symbol 
of. 
 
I will use the word ‘meditation’, then, in the context of attending to and listening to, 
and not to refer to an emptying of mind, such as often emphasized in the dhyāna 
(meditative) practice of Buddhist traditions, although my sense is conspecific with the 
absorptive meditative states that those traditions also practice and describe.
121
 
Meditation, in this chapter, will therefore refer to states of concentration or absorption, 
but usually not to what Griffiths (1986) calls enstatic. Griffiths identifies two basic 
forms of meditation that co-exist in Buddhist traditions: the analytic and the enstatic. He 
presents the contrast in saying that: 
analytical meditations are designed to remove standard cognitive and perceptual habit-
patterns and . . . teach the practitioner something new about the way things are . . . . In 
contrast, the enstatic meditations are designed to reduce the contents of consciousness, to 
focus awareness upon a single point and ultimately to bring all mental activity to a halt. 
(Griffiths, 1986,13) 
To Coleridge’s meditative, sometimes intensely mindful, listening for the heart of 
the matter during his wholly engaged walks through often-difficult natural terrain we 
may find promising parallels in Daoism and the Zen Buddhism which evolved from the 
encounter of Buddhist dhyāna practice with religious and philosophical Daoism. These 
parallels are exciting insights; nonetheless, after arguing for their existence, I will 
provide reasons for taking care not to become carried away by the aesthetic-meditative 
experience of flow. 
                                                 
121
 The Chinese word ch’an derives from dhyāna: ‘meditation’. Zen (Japanese) derives from 
ch’an, after Buddhism’s adoption in Japan, after scholar-monks, such as Sōtō Zen founder 
Dōgen, reyirned from Chinese monasteries. Dōgen’s favoured zazen means ‘sitting meditation’, 
and ritsuzen means ‘standing meditation’. Both involve focused activity, e.g. kyūdo (archery), 
emphasizing concentration and mindfulness in listening, seeing, breathing, and posture. For 
Dōgen, meditative practice expresses Buddha nature, in which all beings participate. 
Paraphrasing Coleridge, a Sōtō Zen Buddhist might say that enlightenment works in all beings, 
but only few work in its light.  
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Dhyāna is a Sanskrit word meaning ‘to ponder, consider, think closely about’. In 
Buddhism, any discursive sense of the word is dropped. It thereby connotes an altered 
state moving towards a mindfulness or retention (smṛti: undistracted awareness, 
especially of the present moment, also connoting a sense of memory, as in holding onto 
discerned truths) developing from concentration (samādhi). 122  In this sense, then, 
dhyāna is discerned by impartiality and equanimity (upekkha); it gently, mindfully 
retains without obtrusion or prejudice. As such, through dhyāna one is freed from all of 
those obstacles that stand in the way of extending sympathy (karuṇā), compassion 
(maitri: loving kindness, or benevolence), and joy at another’s happiness (mudita) from 
one’s mother, friends and so on to all beings. Hence the traditional exercises in 
meditation where one is supposed to contemplate that one’s worst enemy was, in a 
previous life, one’s mother.123  
We need not be surprised, therefore, at similarities between the Buddhist’s 
meditative notion of compassion for all living beings,
124
 and the Coleridgean shared joy 
and cosmic love of ‘the one Life within us and abroad’, aglow in finding ‘Rhythm in all 
thought, and joyance every where–’ (‘The Eolian Harp’, l. 30, Sibylline Leaves, 1817). 
As we read in ‘This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison’ (1797), Coleridge considers that: 
 
’Tis well to be bereft of promis’d good, 
That we may lift the soul, and contemplate 
With lively joy the joys we cannot share. 
 
From the dhyāna perspective we now consider, this kind of joy in which we 
contemplate another’s feeling, and in which Coleridge contemplates friend and fellow 
poet Charles Lamb’s joy, is indeed shared. Because, however, it is not the sharing of 
side-by-side participation, he says he contemplates ‘With lively joy the joys we cannot 
share’. Nevertheless, the selfless joy he describes is shared because it is joy in another’s 
joy, felt for the other’s sake, and is thus, like a joyful counterpart to pity, inherently 
unselfish. Coleridge continues, 
 
My gentle-hearted Charles! when the last rook 
                                                 
122 See Griffiths, 1995, 37. I use Sanskrit terms unless stating otherwise. 
123 Deriving from Yogācāra (emphasizing meditation and yogic practice) founder  Asaṅga’s 
Teaching of Great Compassion: ‘This one toward whom I feel hostile has been reborn as my 
mother countless times and has cared for me with love. Which one should I like? Which one 
should I hate? I will feel equanimity and free myself from attachment and aversion. Lamas and 
gods, please enable me to do this!’ Wangyal, 1978, 137. 
124 The reader may note a convergence with Heidegger’s favourite Pietist saying that denken ist 
danken, to think is to thank. ‘What is Metaphysics?’, and ‘What Calls For Thinking?’, 
Heidegger, [1929, 1943] 1999, 89-110; [1954] 1999, 365-92. 
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Beat its straight path along the dusky air 
Homewards, I blest it! deeming its black wing 
(Now a dim speck, now vanishing in light) 
Had cross’d the mighty Orb’s dilated glory, 
While thou stood’st gazing; or, when all was still, 
Flew creeking o’er thy head, and had a charm 
For thee, my gentle-hearted Charles, to whom 
No sound is dissonant which tells of Life. 
 
Blessing the rook is a benevolent act performed for his friend’s sake. Here is joy in 
another’s joy, especially considering Lamb’s pain since his sister, in an insane fit, slew 
their mother and was committed to an asylum.  
The poem is implicitly confident that his friend will feel the joy he knows to be 
justified because the experience of the walk is so great. From the blessing of the rook, 
which is neither a typical emblem nor object of affection, we trace the very similar and 
perhaps more powerful blessing pivotal in ‘The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere’ (1797-
8). The Mariner’s momentous blessing of the water-snakes is a gracious mental act that 
wins his salvation and reverses his curse incurred by wounding nature’s good omen, the 
Albatross:  
 
O happy living things! no tongue 
Their beauty might declare: 
A spring of love gusht from my heart, 
And I bless’d them unaware: 
Sure my kind saint took pity on me, 
And I bless’d them unaware. 
 
The selfsame moment I could pray; 
And from my neck so free 
The Albatross fell off, and sank 
Like lead into the sea. 
(Poetical Works I.1, 393-4, ll. 282-291) 
 
The Mariner’s salvation is born of this spontaneous, meditative prayer of blessing: an 
act of effusive shared joy and sympathy, and no self-interested petition, despite his 
burden and suffering. The act of pure benevolence releases him, and is the first act of a 
new, second nature. From our first nature, we express without reflection pain and 
pleasure, disgust and mirth. These expressions are pre-reflective and require no 
explanation. The spiritual conversion is a turning to the good through contemplation 
born of long meditation, often instigated by long suffering and remorse. This turning 
initiates a second nature awakening reason and its universality not wholly or even 
mainly through intellectual reflection, but through a much more biographical, living 
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path. This second nature, although open to reflection, is not itself necessarily, or even 
best, born of conceptual reflection, reminding one of St Paul’s dark notice that: 
 
God chose the foolish things of the world to shame the wise. (Corinthians, 1:27) 
 
And St Luke’s gospel recounts that: 
 
Jesus was filled with the joy of the Holy Spirit, and He said, ‘O Father, Lord of heaven 
and earth, thank you for hiding these things from those who think themselves wise and 
clever, and for revealing them to the childlike’. (Luke 10:21; cf. Matthew 11:25) 
 
Accordingly, the Ancient Mariner’s access to contemplation, joy, and conversion 
comes through a non-intellectual though spiritual act. His blessing the water-snakes, the 
‘slimy things’ that ‘crawl with legs / Upon the slimy sea’, is a turning point initiating 
his new, or second, nature, a spiritual, moral conversion whose expressions include 
universal sympathy, appreciation, contemplation, shared joy, and blessing. The blessing 
is a spontaneous, spiritual act so far from being reflectively intellectual that the Mariner 
says: 
 
A spring of love gusht from my heart, 
And I bless’d them unaware 
  (Part Four, penultimate stanza) 
 
The expressions of this converted nature gather a meaning deeper than our first nature 
can understand or even feel, and its responses aim not at sensation, appetite, and 
survival, but at the goodness, rightness, and beauty of virtues and truths.  
Speaking of a matured human nature, then, Wordsworth can say that such profound 
thoughts lie too deep for tears.  
 
Thanks to the human heart by which we live,  
Thanks to its tenderness, its joys and fears,   
To me the meanest flower that blows can give,  
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears. 
(Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood, final lines) 
 
Wordsworth’s long ode begins singing the memory of joy in childhood, when 
everything seemed lovely, as if dressed in heavenly light. He is now a man, and cannot 
see things in the same way. Nevertheless, he imagines a truth expressed in Plato’s myth 
of the soul’s birth from outside space and time into its human body. While childhood’s 
brighter colours and the pleasure in simple perceptions fade, and although eternal 
moments wane and ordinary time waxes, he accepts that the happy childhood vision is 
replaced, if one retains hope and natural piety in patient maturity.  
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The child’s first nature is aware of life’s strong colours and feelings and perhaps 
helps create them. The adult, however, is more aware of death, and feels for intimations 
of its meaning, which meaning would, being beyond life, illuminate it. Thoughts of 
death and suffering, too deep for tears, thus give deeper meaning to the sunset’s dark 
colours, and to symbols of fragility. And if the child’s powerful, shining emotions 
cannot be revisited, they might nonetheless be replaced with a depth of compassion and 
thought. 
On hearing the recital of another long poem of Wordsworth’s, the ‘Poem (title not 
yet fixed upon) to Coleridge’ (posthumously titled ‘The Prelude’ by Mary Wordsworth 
in 1850), Coleridge responded, composing through the night, with his ‘Poem to a 
Gentleman’, which then becomes ‘To William Wordsworth’. Listening to his friend 
recite the philosophical poem whose inspiration he provided, Coleridge enters unawares 
into a deep contemplation that succeeds a gradual meditation. He can therefore say, 
 
And when I rose, I found myself in prayer. 
 
This contemplative state is unselfconscious. One often enters it unawares, rapt in silent 
attention to an Ideal object, from which state one may act with pure compassion and 
shared joy. This charity born of contemplation is neither the elitist notion of an 
intelligentsia, nor the easy sentimentality of popular truisms. Its sensual access is 
possible through the prolonged stillness of forbearance or remorse, and it is thereby 
intimately related to virtue and the experience of grace. Its intellectual access lies in 
concentrating on ultimate ends, and thus preoccupation with conceptual clarity, 
distinction-making, and conventional rule-following for their own sakes is likely to 
prevent such contemplation. 
The contemplation and related spiritual states I describe are not merely a creative 
invention of various Western cultural, religious, and philosophical traditions, they can 
also be found, mutatis mutandis, in those Indic traditions remarkable for their attention, 
concentration, and insight into attention, concentration, and insight themselves, and for 
their philosophical aim towards wisdom as a kind of higher ‘vision’ that develops from 
insight. The ‘one Life’ experience is, unsurprisingly then, but remarkably, also found in, 
for example, Therevada Buddhists’ adherence to the four states of contemplation 
(karuṇā (compassion), maître (loving kindness), muditā (sympathetic joy), and upekṣā 
(equanimity)) known as the four divine abodes (brahma-vihāra). These states are 
cultivated through meditative practice and result in divine contemplation. They are 
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considered divine because attaining to any one of these states is to be, even if 
momentarily, how the gods always are. Thus the Buddha says, 
 
He keeps pervading the first direction—as well as the second direction, the third, and the 
fourth—with an awareness imbued with compassion. Thus he keeps pervading above, 
below, & all around, everywhere & in every respect the all-encompassing cosmos with an 
awareness imbued with compassion: abundant, expansive, immeasurable, free from 
hostility, free from ill will. (Digha Nikaya 13 – Pali: ‘long discourse’ – the Tejiva Sutta – 
Pali: ‘the discourse on the eel-wrigglers, or the sly equivocators’ – the Buddha [c.500 
BC], trans. Walshe, 1987)  
 
 
Remaining only with their shared objects of attention, and not with contingent 
genealogical differences, we may consider meditative Buddhists and Coleridge as 
sharing an experience of an especially concentrated state of mind, which Buddhist 
traditions calls samādhi (concentration, holding together), whence insight 
(vipaśyanā),125 and thence wisdom (prajñā: higher knowledge) may arise. This raises 
the question of Coleridge’s awareness of Eastern wisdom traditions, and the answer is it 
was quite extensive for his time. We know, for example, that he read Sir Charles 
Wilkins’ translation of the Bhagavad Gita (1785); and that he made many notes on 
Abbé Dubois’ Description of the Character, Manners and Customs of the People of 
India.
126
 For an in-depth study of Coleridge’s Eastern sources, see Riem Natale (2005). 
Etymologically, prajña is formed from superior and knowledge (jñāna: cognate 
with Gk. gnosis). In early Buddhism prajña refers to knowledge of essentials such as 
impermanence, not-self, and suffering. Such wisdom is not merely propositional 
knowledge, and is thus no mere assent to certain truths, but rather requires being deeply 
affected, much as Coleridge aims at ‘the union of deep feeling with profound thought’ 
(Biographia I, 80). As Coleridge writes: 
 
To perceive . . . and to assent . . . as to an abstract proposition––is easy––but it requires 
the most wakeful attentions of the most reflective minds in all moments to bring it into 
practice––it is enough that we have once swallowed it (Letters I, 115, to Southey, 
October 1794) 
 
Prajñā is noetic in that it is a collected insight into the nature of things. As such, it 
may bring about bodhi (enlightenment), equivalent to praeter-conceptual noesis, Plato’s 
ultimate contemplative knowledge to which all goodness returns. Indeed Plotinus 
implies that the truly good never essentially leaves its source, when he describes the 
                                                 
125 In ed.Yoshinori, 1995, 37, Griffiths describes samādhi as: ‘a preliminary practice, one that 
would act as an appropriate propadeutic for vipaśyanā-bhāvanā, “the cultivation of insight”’.  
126 See Marginalia under DUBOIS for Coleridge’s notes on this text. 
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soul’s highest level as the undescended part through which one returns to the post-
contemplative union that he calls henôsis, or return to the divine One.
127
 This calm, 
shimmeringly beautiful, non-discursive realization of original union unites the 
contemplative and the contemplated, and I think we do not go too far to imagine 
Coleridge approaching such union when: 
 
Scarce conscious, and yet conscious of its close 
I sate, my being blended in one thought 
(Thought was it? or aspiration? or resolve?) 
Absorbed, yet hanging still upon the sound— 
And when I rose, I found myself in prayer. 
  (Poetical Works I.1, 815-6, ‘To William Wordsworth’) 
 
And again, when in the very Zen-like image with which ‘Frost at Midnight’ closes, he 
imagines the snow-water on his cottage roof: 
 
            . . . whether the eave-drops fall 
Heard only in the trances of the blast, 
Or if the secret ministry of frost 
Shall hang them up in silent icicles, 
Quietly shining to the quiet Moon. 
 
The contemplative state at the end of ‘To William Wordsworth’ suggests śamatha:  
 
Absorbed, yet hanging still upon the sound–– 
And when I rose I found myself in prayer 
 
 And in ‘Frost at Midnight’, the ‘icicles / Quietly shining to the quiet moon’ suggest 
peacefully resonant samādhi. Śamatha is calm meditation that enables concentration 
(samādhi) by annulling distractedness. When untempered by śamatha (calming) 
meditation, and before reaching the contemplative stillness described above, Coleridge 
often observed in himself a ‘stretched and anxious state’ familiar to any whose thoughts 
and impressions race, flood, and circumvolve, while, literally or metaphorically hiking 
strikingly beautiful and demanding terrain.  
In this chapter, meditative experience can refer to (a) what happens when one ‘does 
meditation’; it can also refer to (b) savouring a sensation; (c) calm observation, such as 
before a waterfall, lake, or other vista, Coleridge describes this kind of meditative 
experience as one in which the mind is ‘off the stretch’ (Notebooks 1, 1489); (d) reverie, 
which sometimes emerges from the latter two states, and which Locke described as 
‘when ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it 
                                                 
127 Basu finds in Platonic noesis and Plotinian henôsis ‘a way of life, what in India is called 
sadhana, a way leading the philosopher to a vision of, and union with what he calls The One’ 
(ed. Gregorios, 2002, 153). 
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is that which the French call rêverie (our language has scarce a name for it)’ (Essay, 
II.XIX);
128
 (e) a ‘stretched and anxious state’ full of significant observations and always 
on the verge of discovery (this state would not be meditative in Buddhist or Christian 
parlance, but I include it in my nuanced notion of meditation as a state preparatory to, 
though not inevitably leading to, contemplation); and, synoptically, (f) the meditative 
moment, deriving from any one of the former, that recovers the mental silence required 
for contemplation.  
Meditative experience, then, can lead to reverie; be worked into a concentrated 
attentiveness; or can develop into contemplation. As indicated in (e) above, my notion 
of meditation connotes a state preparatory to, but not entailing, contemplation. The 
observant stretched and anxious state eddies with thoughts, is intensely flowing and 
invigorating, and is meditative in the old sense of being rich in thought as well as in the 
technical sense of this part of my thesis, i.e. the sense of being preparatory to 
contemplation, despite being quite far from the calm sense of meditation in zazen or 
ritsuzen. Coleridge describes this state in a letter to Thomas Wedgwood:  
 
I never find myself alone within the embracement of rocks & hills, a traveller up an 
alpine road, but my spirit courses, drives, and eddies, like a Leaf in Autumn: a wild 
activity, of thoughts, imaginations, feelings, and impulses of motion, rises up from within 
me––a sort of bottom-wind, that blows to no point of the compass, & comes from I know 
not whence, but agitates the whole of me; my whole Being is filled with waves . . . that 
roll & stumble, one this way, & one that way, like things that have no common master. 
(Letters II, 484, to Thomas Wedgwood, January 14, 1803) 
 
Although meditation need not lead to contemplation, contemplation cannot be 
commenced without some kind of preparatory meditation. In this understanding, I echo 
Huxley’s theory that humans need, at least psychologically, to prepare for 
contemplation with an antecedent procedure ([1945] 2009, 219). For him, as for the 
contemplative Church Doctors such as Aquinas, those antecedent procedures required 
for contemplation, but not guaranteeing its attainment, are the three modes of prayer: 
petition, intercession, and adoration, beyond which contemplation is the fourth and 
highest mode.  
Contemplation aims at the Idea, and is therefore praeter-conceptual. One might 
return from contemplation and hazard a conceptual explication, but the contemplation 
itself will not involve refining concepts, which analytical activity is necessarily post 
hoc, or done afterwards, whereas contemplation is always in media ideas, or in the 
                                                 
128 By ideas, Locke means sensations and recollections, and not Plato’s very different Ideas. 
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midst of Ideas. While analytical activity has its important role of service within the 
contemplative life, it is necessarily not the end. As Plotinus says, knowledge, him is 
ultimately noetic contemplation and an end in itself, and is therefore not: 
 
made up of theorems and a collection of proportions [or propositions]; but this is not true 
even of the sciences here below. (Ennead V, 8.4.49-52) 
 
The sense of contemplation I use is that of the con-templum, the space, cultural or 
psychological, reserved for beholding and appreciating. Here one imaginatively and 
yearningly approaches and contemplates Ideas in what Plotinus calls Intellect (Noûs). 
Contemplation has its positive and Ideal objects, and it is a beholding and an approach, 
and is thus not an emptying of mind. Because of this positive, intellectually active 
aspect of contemplation, which at the same time combines imaginatively with the 
passivity of intuiting the truths and Ideas of reason, Coleridge notes: 
 
One excellence of the Doctrine of Plato, or . . . Plotino-platonic philosophy, is that it 
never suffers, [or] causes . . . its Disciples to forget themselves, lost and scattered . . . and 
. . . instead of lulling the soul into an indolence of mere attention . . . rouses it to acts and 
energies of creative Thought, & Recognition–of conscious reproduction of states of 
Being. (Notebooks 3, 3935) 
 
Contemplation requires a special sense of place and time cut off from the ordinary. 
Examples of this contemplative space and time can be found in a museum; a gallery; a 
stage-production; a temple; a makeshift altar; closed eyes and slowed breath in prayer; 
and contemplative moments in daily secular life might can be found with a chair set 
aside, dimmed lights, and reduced noise for listening to music, reading a novel, or 
savouring a drink while appreciating the good or the beautiful even here, through 
qualities held in mind. Appreciating art, for example, requires a contemplative space, 
without extraneous noise and sensation, and the expectation of a devoted period in 
which everyday duties and concerns are quietened. Hence classical music and jazz is 
artistically devalued when played as background music. The contemplated can only be 
approached and beheld in the con-templum’s unhurried time and space. 
This experience, whether of an exhibition, performance, or worship, occurs in time 
and space, yet accrues an extraordinary transcendence so that the times and places of 
contemplation transform our experience of time and space. This special atmosphere is 
no quality of the spatio-temporal world, but is a quality lent to worldly objects in the 
imagination’s aesthetically expressive symbolism of the Ideal. Thus contemplative art 
enriches and augments the everyday world. 
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By contemplation, then, I refer to an intellectual and aesthetic state progressing 
from meditative experience, and in which value is beheld. In this connection we can 
understand the saying attributed to St Nicholas Cabasilas, Byzantine mystic and 
theologian, that: 
 
Among all visible creatures, human nature can truly be an altar. (Cited in Murray, 2001, 
referring to an Yves Congar talk citing Cabasilas) 
 
We may read Coleridge as a prototypical phenomenologist, sensitive to the 
significance in our lives of even the most seemingly unremarkable experiences.
129
 
Heidegger scholar and translator Krell (1990, 84-5) reads Coleridge as, ‘one of the 
grandparents of contemporary phenomenological and “humanistic” psychological 
critiques’. Coleridge’s phenomenological awareness harmonizes with his theory of 
symbolic imagination, previously discussed. His symbol is consubstantial with its 
universal, rather than metaphorizing it, and it can thereby occasion aesthetic 
contemplation, i.e. an aesthetic, non-conceptual appreciation of the kind Smith (1986) 
later describes as the felt meanings of the world.
130
  
Coleridge and Sartre have an especial talent for communicating what our normally 
taken-for-granted desires and tastes reveal about our relationship to the world. Our 
desires and preferences are very often unreflective aesthetic states that are intentional 
but unexamined. On this theme, Coleridge finds in unreflective or hasty desire a 
demeaning identification with the object desired. He explains that: 
 
All actions . . . which proceed directly from the individual without reflection, as those of 
a hungry beast rushing to its food, all those in which the volition acts singly and 
immediately towards the object to be appropriated, may be classified as selfish but have 
no pretence to the name Self-love. (Opus Maximum, 30) 
 
Presumably they have no pretence to the name self-love because pre-reflective 
consciousness is never its own object, so it can be selfishly appropriative while it lacks 
the reflexivity needed for self-love. Coleridge continues: 
 
Or as far as any reflection is supposed, or as far as the simple perception of the object is 
taken as a substitute for reflection, we ought to say that the food in the trough is the 
temporary self of the hog, i.e. it is that form with which the volition, the thoughts, and the 
sensations of the animal are united without any intermediate. (Opus Maximum, 30-1) 
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 Warnock, as we shall see, indicates an analogy between Coleridge and Sartre. 
130  Smith develops a Schelerian phenomenological metaphysics of appreciation and 
‘importances’. 
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Without proper reflection, desire confronts its object as something to be appropriated to 
materially augment the self. Indeed, the object becomes, in this remarkable thought, ‘the 
temporary self’ uniting will, thoughts, and sensations ‘without any intermediate’.131 In 
this chapter we will consider further observations by Coleridge that suggest him to be a 
subtly discerning phenomenologist of both things and of thinking. In this, his method is 
to direct our attention to the ‘mind’s self-experience in the act of thinking’ (Biographia 
I, 124). These phenomenological, self-reflective meta-observations reach conclusions 
very close to Sartre’s, and both discover in pre-reflective consciousness no self, or ego, 
but only the external object appearing solely in its desired (or feared) aspect or 
interpretation. Thus for Sartre: 
 
When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in 
contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-
be-caught, etc., and non-positional consciousness of that consciousness. ([1936] 1999, 
48-9, transl. adjusted) 
 
Returning to our examination of unreflective-upon desires and preferences, I argue 
that taste and feeling ought to be supplemented with reflection, otherwise one simply 
wallows in feeling without principle. The need for aesthetic education should not, 
however, detract from the important insight that our tastes, preferences, and desires 
connect with initiative Ideas conatively felt in our lives. That is to say, Idea running 
through the aisthesis of taste and preference can educate and lead to one’s becoming 
principled through later reflection on the Ideal in the experience. This reflection is 
assisted by concepts of the understanding that formulate rules to comprehend the 
experiences. The understanding gains, indeed it becomes enlightened, in its relations 
with the depth and timelessness of Ideal value intimated by these half-blind aesthetic 
experiences as utterly yet inexplicably meaningful. 
A danger of imbalance lies in aesthetic states such as desire and seemingly 
harmless preferences, and I ally the need to correct this with McGhee’s requirement that 
immediate feeling ought to become reflective. Coleridge develops Friedrich Schiller’s 
notion of aesthetic education into the need to unite reason, imagination, and 
understanding in the principle. In the principle, Ideas of reason guide aesthetic 
sensibilities, and the understanding then uses conceptual reflection to aim towards 
                                                 
131 Similarly, in Hegelian self-certainty, animals ‘do not just stand idly in front of sensuous 
things as if these possessed intrinsic being, but, despairing of their reality, and completely 
assured of their nothingness, they fall to without ceremony and eat them up’, Hegel, [1807] 
1977, 65.  
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universal, rule-bound application. Thus Ideas stimulate our tastes and preferences, but 
in ways that are wholly unreflective, non-rule-bound, and thus seemingly irrational and 
irregular. This irregular application usually leads to what McGhee refers to as the bias 
towards the near, such that charity is reserved for those closest to home, despite the Idea 
initiating the sentiment calling for universal application.
132
 
From these considerations of aesthetic education, I move to a broadly Coleridgean 
speculation on the art of living as a poetic endeavour. However well or ill achieved, the 
art of living involves the development of principles, the contemplation of Ideas, and the 
appreciation of values. No human life is untouched by principles and ideals misapplied 
and betrayed. Each life is an attempt – however damned bad it may be – to apply rhyme 
and reason in relating appetite and ideal; repetition and innovation; spontaneous feeling 
and regular principle. Bringing reflective understanding to Ideas only obscurely 
acknowledged in mood, aesthetic response, and moral feeling can therefore help achieve 
the Coleridgean ideal of possessing Ideas rather than being possessed by them.  
The possession of Ideas consists in possessing principles. Thus sense, 
understanding, imagination, and reason unite in an ideal authenticity that nourishes 
living practices, enjoyments, goals and relationships by practical connection to ideal 
aims. Principles not only individuate one by uniting faculties and abilities, concerns, 
duties, and enjoyments, they also orient one such that an Idea ‘turns the mind (or soul)’, 
to use Plato’s powerful conception of education (Republic, 479-531). Principle becomes 
second nature, not in Aristotle’s sense of habit born of repetition, but in the sense of 
conversion, a turning or transformation from sarcos phronēma (the mind of the flesh, 
Romans 8:7), and from the conceptual, mechanical understanding, to the enlightenment 
that universal reason provides. 
 
 
Now that we have discussed imaginative, meditative, and contemplative thinking, we 
should outline in brief an important asymmetry between the transition from meditation 
to contemplation, and that from association to imagination. 
Both meditation and free-associative practice can generate material for creative 
expression, as well as be enjoyed for their own sakes. Nevertheless, while both 
processes are generative, I argue that of the two, only meditative experience is 
genuinely creative, and that associative techniques can only be creative when used in 
                                                 
132 This is not Derek Parfit’s (1984) ‘bias towards the near’, i.e. the putatively irrationally 
greater concern about one’s nearer future than distant. 
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the service of a meditative, imaginative approach. Meditative practice involves an 
aesthetic wealth that overflows the conceptual and can lead to contemplation, whereas 
association never transcends the concept, being entirely governed by conceptually 
associative relations of contiguity, opposition, and so on. 
It is well known that artists, especially expressionists, have used methods and 
techniques of association to stimulate their creativity in generating new connections, 
directions, and relations in their material. Gertrude Stein, for example, finds inspiration 
in the automatic writing of the surrealists. James Joyce explores stream of 
consciousness, taking cues from William James and Sigmund Freud. Indeed, Freud’s 
theory and practice of free association has had an inestimable impact on literature and 
the arts in general. 
Although techniques of association are formidable content generators, they can 
only be a preparatory for artistic creation. Genuine meditative experience stands quite 
apart from association, which, in the Coleridgean system, operates on the fixities and 
definites of the empirical concepts, and on the counters of fancy. Thus, 
 
Ideas never recall Ideas, as far as they are Ideas, any more than leaves in a forest create 
each other’s motion. The breeze it is that runs through them––it is the Soul, the state of 
feeling. (Letters II, to Southey, August 7, 1803) 
 
And so Coleridge opposes the temptation to conform our understanding of genuinely 
creative activity, and considered thought in general, to associationist hypotheses. The 
soul, the state of feeling, is like a breeze that stirs Ideas in thought. In this view, Ideas 
do not concatenate associatively, they are awakened or summoned by correspondent 
states of feeling. The aesthetic mood seeks its counterpart in the Ideas of reason, a role 
that concepts and fixed images cannot fulfil. 
In streams of association, fancy is busy with contiguous links of continuity, 
opposition, and so on, accumulating a swell of images and connections. Such 
associative activity can commence meditation by providing material and a wide 
background. However, fancy and association must be left behind if meditation is to 
deepen, and then continue into contemplation. The busy circuitry of association 
involves a picking up and putting down of anything and everything fancied. Association 
is thus incompatible with the prolonged appreciation and beholding of contemplation. 
Concepts of the understanding and images of fancy lack the vitality to resonate with 
‘the Soul, the state of feeling’. Thus the experience is referred to Ideas of reason, as 
occurs in Kant’s description of genius using aesthetic Ideas to harmonize with the 
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unconceptualizable ‘much thought’ that follow intimations of the sublime and the 
beautiful. Aesthetic Ideas strain after Ideas of reason, and thus transcend expression in 
determinate concepts. As Kant puts it, aesthetic Ideas are approaches to Ideas of reason 
that the poet tries to ‘make sensible’ (CJ, §49). When aesthetic Ideas are not quite Ideas 
of reason made sensible, they are representations ‘transgressing the limits of 
experience’ in a way that ‘emulates the display of reason in its attainment of a 
maximum’. Aesthetic Ideas are generated in the imagination and can only be 
appreciated with imagination. They cannot be conceptually articulated, and lack such 
clarity, but their power lies in their emotional and imaginative conveyance. In a 
Notebook entry, Coleridge remarks,  
 
By deep feeling we make our Ideas dim––& this is what we mean by our Life––
ourselves. (Notebooks 1, 921) 
 
If the breeze that runs through and stirs Ideas into activity is indeed the feeling soul, as 
Coleridge proposes, then contemplation aiming through aesthetic objects can never 
attain the brightness of polished concepts or shallow pools. Nor can it, however, attain 
the clarity of more progressed noesis that has ascended a level of generality and 
universality beyond appreciation of this or that beautiful phenomenon, preferring now 
to contemplate the beauty of just acts, institutions, laws, virtues, and beyond. 
In association, different presentations are related through the contiguity of one to 
the next, in a concatenating series. In contemplative experience, on the other hand, there 
is an aesthetic wealth that overflows the inadequacy of concepts. Referred to the Ideas, 
in deference to their transcendence of the concepts of the understanding, the aesthetic 
presentation moves through them in the expectation of their delivering the meaning of 
the felt experience. The aesthetic message is rich and evocative, finding its expression 
and resonance alongside the equally evocative Ideas. 
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4.2 Coleridge’s meditative practice 133 
 
Beauty too is spiritual, the shorthand hieroglyphic of truth––the mediator 
between Truth and Feeling, the Head and the Heart.  
(Notebooks 4, 5428) 
 
The following pages on flow were written in rural Miyazaki, south Japan, where I often 
went fly-fishing along high-mountain rivers and streams, amid powerful currents, 
sometimes wading chest-deep in gullies where I felt myself more pulled by currents 
than pushed by oncoming force. If there is any flow in this chapter, it derives from those 
Miyazaki gorges. I have since moved to the more urban Kyoto, and while pulls and 
currents are still felt figuratively, most of my thinking is now at a desk or on a bicycle 
saddle, and I realize that it is high time to meet the mountain streams that water this 
ancient basin city.
134
  
Contemplation has received recent attention in aesthetics of natural environment 
and art (Carlson and Berleant, 2004; and Cooper, 2006). This chapter is written in the 
hope of contributing a Coleridgean perspective to this discussion, starting from the 
transcendental argument that any theory of human life that cannot account for 
contemplation and poetic creation must be incomplete. I provide an account of 
meditative experience inspired by Coleridge’s writings, but not always directly 
traceable therein. Sometimes his meditation is a practical exercise to stimulate the 
imagination, for example in visualizing forms and patterns in a river. At other times it 
maps and follows trains of thought outside the mind, in the landscape. His thoughts 
most germane to meditative experience are found in the Meditative Poems, some of 
which I discuss in the next chapter, and in the nature writing recorded in letters and 
Notebook entries.  
From reading his richly descriptive, phenomenologically penetrating Notebooks, by 
turns powerfully intense and gently amusing but always remarkably observant, we 
know that Coleridge’s nature walks were vitally integral to his transformative and 
inspirational meditations. Hazlitt (1836, 288), who would later fiercely criticize 
Coleridge for his conservatism, reports that,  
 
                                                 
133 Cheyne, 2013, presents an earlier version of this and the following chapter. 
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 More extremely expressed is Nietsche’s Maxim 34 in Twilight of the Idols ([1895] 1990, 34-
8): ‘On ne peut penser et ecrire qu’assis [One cannot think and write except when seated] (G. 
Flaubert). There I have caught you, nihilist! The sedentary life is the very sin against the Holy 
Spirit. Only thoughts reached by walking have value.’ 
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Coleridge has told me that he himself liked to compose in walking over uneven ground, 
or breaking through the straggling branches of a copsewood.
135
 
 
Coleridge was as well known to his friends as a walker and a talker, striding and 
bounding with little regard for conventional paths and borders. Eleven years after 
Coleridge’s death, and fifty years after the event, Wordsworth bids his wife Mary 
include in her letter to Coleridge’s daughter, Sara, a recollection of Coleridge’s visit in 
the year the young poets first met:
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He did not keep to the high road, but leaped over a gate and bounded down a pathless 
field, by which he cut off an angle. 
 
Rather than the peripatetic epithet that fits Aristotle’s pacing and categorizing, 
Coleridge’s course through thought and nature is thoroughly diapatetic. 
The careful editor of his around seventy Notebooks (their unusual arrangement 
makes precise enumeration impossible), which Coleridge calls his dear companions, 
and kept from age twenty-two until his death forty years later, describes these entries as 
‘meditating on his experiences in the very act of experiencing’ (Coburn, 1974, 3). In 
these Notebooks, she adds, we can: 
 
catch one of the great minds in history in its wide ranges of introspection, observation, 
and analysis, looking at what interests him, and following his eye where his attention and 
imagination direct. (Coburn, 1974, 3) 
 
Here he records many meditations, writing in poetic prose reminiscent of his blank 
verse. His meditations on water, for example, along the River Greta, are particularly 
revealing of his meditative practice. Visiting the town of Barnard Castle, in October 
1799, he walks along the River Greta, a tributary to the River Tees, paying close, 
imaginative attention to ever-flowing, ever-reforming patterns in the water. This 
sustained practice is a reflexive activity, attending to both the rhythmic flow and the 
mind’s processes in the experience. 
 
River Greta near its fall into the Tees––Shootings of water thread down the slope of the 
huge green stone––The white Eddy-rose that blossom’d up against the stream in the 
scollop, by fits & starts, obstinate in resurrection––It is the life that we live (Notebooks I, 
495)
137
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 Cf. Wu (2008, 261), summarizing Hazlitt’s later barbs against Coleridge.  
136 This recollects a visit in late 1795. ‘Mary Wordsworth to Sara Coleridge’, November 7, 
1845, in ed. Thomas de Quincey, 1907, 327. 
137 Cf. lines from the second-century Chaldean Oracles, quoted in Proclus’s Commentary on 
Plato’s Parmenides, trans. Taylor (1818, 249): ‘All fountains and principles rapidly whirl 
round, and perpetually abide in an unsluggish revolution’. 
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Four years later, he revisits both the scene and the image: 
 
Shootings of water threads down the Slope of the huge green Stone.––Varieties of this on 
the Clyde, in my Scotch Tour. 
The white rose of Eddy-foam, where the stream ran into a scooped or scalloped 
hollow of the rock in its channel––this shape, an exact white rose, was for ever 
overpowered by the Stream rushing down in upon it, and still obstinate in resurrection it 
spread up into the Scollop by fits and starts, blossoming in a moment into full Flower.––
Hung over the Bridge, & musing considering how much of this Scene of endless variety 
in Identity was Nature’s––how much the living organ’s! (Notebooks 1, 1589) 
 
In these notes, we observe meditative practice leading to imaginative perception guided 
by aesthetic Ideas. Seeing the life we live in the eddy’s resurrecting rose pattern is no 
mere projective identification, but uses natural pattern symbolizing the persevering 
poiesis, another symbol of which is the self’s holding together through life’s 
vicissitudes. 
Writing to Sara Hutchinson, Coleridge produces an intensely expressive and 
engaging account of a glorious walk from which he has just returned. The walk was not 
without its dangers: the crags could tear the hands, ‘and the gusts came so very sudden 
and so strong’ (Letters II, 25th August, 1802). Often the walk required intense 
concentration for safety’s sake, yet he says he has: 
 
always found this stretched and anxious state of mind favourable to depth of pleasurable 
impression, in the resting places and lownding [sheltering] coves.  
 
The crags and coves of anxiety and peace show us the mountains of the mind in the 
terrain’s relief, and both mind and mount can be known more fully through the walk 
itself. 
Coleridge’s reflection on the ‘stretched and anxious state’ that provides a ‘depth of 
pleasurable impressions’ is prescient of the ‘flow’ described by psychologist Mihaly 
Csíkszentmihályi. This state of spontaneous joy flows from highly skilled activity 
requiring such concentration that action and awareness merge. In flow, the present 
moment becomes foregrounded, and experiencing the activity is intrinsically rewarding 
(Csíkszentmihályi and Nakamura, 2009,195-206). Csíkszentmihályi chooses the term 
‘flow’ after hearing many research interview accounts use water current metaphors. 
Flow not only befits Coleridge’s meditative experience of rivers and waterfalls, but also 
suggests a relation of themes shared with Daoist accounts of peak experience.
138
 
                                                 
138 Cooper (2012) discusses the Way as flow and examines Daoist water imagery. 
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Coleridge expresses appreciative wonder as he contemplates the aesthetic 
perfection in the laws and dynamics of hydraulic force: 
 
the mad water rushes thro’ its sinuous bed, or rather prison of rock, with such rapid 
curves, as if it turned not from the mechanic force, but with foreknowledge, like a fierce 
and skillful driver.
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In the same letter he describes a waterfall, Halse Fall (Moss Force), in the Lake 
District’s Buttermere: 
 
What a sight it is to look down on such a Cataract!––the wheels, that circumvolve in it––
the leaping up and plunging forward of that infinity of Pearls and Glass Bulbs––the 
continual change of the Matter, the perpetual sameness of the Form––it is an aweful 
Image and Shadow of God and the World. (Letters II, 853-4) 
 
Such meditative practice can be physically as well as mentally taxing, exercising and 
strengthening the imaginative faculty with the fullest engagement. Thus Coleridge 
poetically transcends the fixed and dead concepts of the understanding through the 
imaginative processes of direct, meditative experience. The strength of attention 
required in his nature walks, often thirty miles a stretch, he simultaneously applies to 
focused psychological observation and meditations on thinking itself. 
The resonance between natural forms and the thinking mind is not only an 
observation concerning poetic imagery and composition, it is also a general poetic sense 
native to the thinking mind. Resonance between thought and nature, then, occurs as an 
act of primary imagination that poetizes experience and is available to all (although 
obscured by the film of familiarity), and not only as a literary act (although it occurs 
here too) available to a few. 
 
In looking at objects of nature while I am thinking, as at yonder moon dim-glimmering 
through the dewy window-pane, I seem rather to be seeking, as it were asking for, a 
symbolical language for something within me that already and forever exists, than 
observing anything new. Even when the latter is the case, yet still I have always an 
obscure feeling as if that new phenomenon were the dim awaking of a forgotten or 
hidden truth of my inner nature. (Notebooks 2, 2546, 1805) 
 
Here Coleridge, on a hazy April night in Malta, is attuned to the search for symbolic 
meanings in nature. Looking at the ‘moon dim-glimmering thro’ the dewy window 
pane’ is already an image of poetic symbolism. Dim, reflected, celestial light seen 
                                                 
139 Cf. Parks (2011, 189): ‘What was shattering here was standard usage, even common sense. I 
remembered when I had written my first novel on kayaking, Rapids, the tremendous challenge 
of describing mountain rivers. Perhaps Coleridge came to places like this because they stretched 
to the limit his ability to put the world in words.’ Parks gives a highly readable, funny, and 
reflective account of meditative practice used to heal body and soul, discussing Coleridge for 
about thirteen pages. 
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through the window, which distorts with a covering of condensation, communicates 
softly-lit images of seeing and thinking through barriers, transforming media, and 
reflecting surfaces. This observation of seeking a symbolical language in nature for 
something within him is also the mood of his Meditative Poems. The dim-glimmering 
moon seen through the window dew recalls the icicles, ‘quietly shining to the quiet 
moon’ in ‘Frost at Midnight’, sharing a mood of silent longing that is yet content to 
participate by reflecting. This participatory longing is an act of communion, and is 
therefore the look of love and not the watching of a spectator. In a Notebook entry of 
1807, he describes: 
 
the eyes quietly and steadfastly dwelling on an object, not as if looking at it or as in any 
way exerting an act of sight upon it, but as if the whole attention were listening to what 
the heart was feeling and saying about it. (Notebooks 2, 3027) 
 
This entry describes a contemplative attending, respecting the place of the contemplated 
while ‘listening for’ its meaning and value. Coleridge continues this Notebook entry: 
 
As when A is talking to B of C––and B deeply interested listens intensely to A, the eye 
yet steadfastly fixed on C as the subject of the communication– 
 
Here, imagination works within contemplative attending, seeing into and listening for 
the heart of the matter. To access reason one requires a translucent symbol in the 
imagination, rather than a concrete opacity to be processed by the understanding. 
Because the Coleridgean symbol is consubstantial with the power or Idea it symbolizes, 
meditation on natural phenomena can become a contemplation of the powers or Ideas 
they exemplify. This contemplation merges with careful perception of what is before 
one. Thus Coleridge can write, 
 
I seem to myself to behold in the quiet objects, on which I am gazing, more than an 
arbitrary illustration, more than a mere simile, the work of my own Fancy! I feel an awe, 
as if there were before my eyes the same Power as that of the REASON––the same Power 
in a lower dignity, and therefore a symbol established in the truth of things. (Statesman’s 
Manual, 72) 
 
In his meditations on the patterns and power of water, or on a moonlit scene through a 
dewy window, or on the spray of ice as skaters curve, and throughout his Notebooks, 
Coleridge explores contemplative perception originating from meditative observation of 
natural objects and processes. 
His meditative observations of natural phenomena exemplify a direction of 
attentive thought pursued by a twentieth century phenomenologist. Introducing Being 
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and Nothingness, Warnock notes a similarity between Coleridge’s attentive penetration 
into appearances and Sartre’s excitement at the possibilities available to 
phenomenology.
140
 Sartre becomes excited when he realizes that phenomenological 
reflections, for example on viscosity, fire, solidity, even on a cocktail glass, can offer 
profound insights into our imaginative relations with the world. Warnock (in Sartre, 
1996, xiii) notes Sartre’s ‘careful and obsessive absorption in the actual physical 
properties of the world . . . as a source of revelation of the nature of existence itself’, and 
remarks that: 
 
Coleridge perhaps more than any other writer in English demonstrated in his detailed 
description of . . . the movements of water, the same belief that from the sensible 
properties of things one could deduce not only their true nature, but the true nature of the 
universe at large. 
 
Similarly, Sartre presents a revealing phenomenology of substances, such as his 
analysis of viscosity as a threatening, ‘slimy’ compound of qualities ([1943] 1996, 610-
2).  
Phenomenology is more than just patient, poetic observation, and is the attempt to 
approach what Husserl calls ‘eidetic essences’ through careful observation of varying 
examples, so that through imaginative understanding of the series and variations of 
some kind of experience, its essence is better understood. These observations and 
analyses are precisely phenomenological because questions regarding the ontological 
status of the things observed are bracketed. Bracketing these ontological questions is 
central to the phenomenological attitude, which Husserl contrasts with the natural 
attitude. The natural attitude is similar to Santayana’s ‘animal faith’ and Samuel 
Johnson’s ‘common sense’ position, or naive notion, contra Berkeley, of the externality 
to the mind of stones and such. The phenomenological attitude, by contrast attempts to 
perform an eidetic reduction on the phenomena themselves, reducing them to their 
essences by imaginative variation. 
Compelling examples of prototypically phenomenological analysis can be found 
throughout Coleridge, particularly in his Notebooks, which are strikingly prescient of 
the kind of phenomenological description seen in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. In one 
                                                 
140
 Cf. her book-length study (1974, esp. 74-102). Cf. Read (1949, 29-35), which claims 
Coleridge anticipates existentialism in distinguishing (e.g. at Notebooks 4, 4713) Being from 
existence (although this foreshadowing already occurs in Aquinas, and existentialism is 
similarly anticipated in Augustine). 
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entry, Coleridge describes a sensuous-cognitive intimacy as his description immerses 
into the essence of a substance:  
 
when you take a bit of Jelly mass you know, you touch only that bit, and yet you 
somehow or other seem to touch the whole. (Notebooks 3, 4048) 
 
Such descriptive phenomenology mutually enriches senuous-poetic experience’s 
immediacy and our reflective understanding of the world of substances, feelings, and 
their meanings. 
The genius of symbol-making imaginative perception adds richness to life. Without 
this symbolic-imaginative aspect, everything is no more for us than its appearance and 
concept. In Coleridge, the symbol, as opposed to metaphor or analogy, reveals aspects 
of depth and connoted generality in being carefully observed and described in even the 
most literal terms. One of Coleridge’s examples (Friend II, 74; also Biographia I, 81) of 
symbolic imagination’s genius is a couplet from Robert Burns’s ‘Tam O’Shanter’: 
 
Who has not, a thousand times, seen it snow upon water? Who has not seen it with a new 
feeling, since he has read Burns’s comparison of sensual pleasure, 
 
To snow that falls upon a river 
A moment white––then gone forever! 
 
Here is the original, which I display because Coleridge misquotes it, with the preceding 
couplet showing the theme of pleasure’s ephemerality: 
 
But pleasures are like poppies spread,  
You seize the flower, its bloom is shed;  
Or like the snow falls in the river,  
A moment white––then melts for ever 
 
The couplet conveys the Idea’s perennial resonance through a genuine symbol. Not only 
is the Idea aesthetically expressed, the illustrating phenomenon symbolizes it such that 
similar perceptions will continue to resonate with the Idea, appreciation of which should 
then deepen throughout one’s life.  
As the imagination presents translucent symbols, reality is approached through 
appearances, rather than reality being occluded by appearances, which is the conclusion 
that the unaided understanding reaches. Far from repeating the usual gloss of 
Appearance versus Reality especially common in Two-World interpretations of 
Platonism, I present a Coleridgean account of meditative experience showing that rich 
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experience can be felt more fully for what it is: the appearance of reality.
141
 Accounts of 
Platonism that oppose the Two-Worlds interpretation, such as Holger Thesleff’s earlier 
discussed two-level account, resist talk of a realm of appearance utterly separate from a 
realm of reality. Instead, they present an account of appearance as the appearance of 
reality, rather than a mere simulacrum utterly divorced from reality. A poetic 
description fine-tuned to appearances and their subtle changes and inter-relations can 
achieve profound and real resonance when combined with the imaginative use of 
symbols conveying Ideas or, as Kant put it, elements within experience such as ‘death, 
envy . . . and the like’ portrayed as maximums that we do not completely experience, 
although they affect us profoundly, and which strain to approach Ideas. 
For Coleridge, the genius or spirit of imagination is: 
 
that sublime faculty, by which a great mind becomes that which it meditates on. 
(Notebooks 3, 3290) 
 
Imagination thus dissolves the everyday differentiation of subjective and objective such 
that ‘in every work of art there is a reconcilement of the external with the internal’ and 
that this reconcilement will work: 
 
to make the external internal, the internal external, to make nature thought, and thought 
nature––this is the Mystery of Genius in the Fine Arts. (‘On Poesy, or Art’, Lecture XIII, 
1818, ed.  Shawcross, 1907, 253-63)
142
 
 
Whether or not this is necessarily true for all fine art and in any historical period is 
debatable.
143
 For Coleridge, genius in Romantic fine art worked towards overcoming 
the alienation from an increasingly distant external nature. The Romantic return to 
Platonism was a return from evaluations of utility and reductive explanation to values as 
ideals and active physis, not passive product. 
I now pause to balance my account of meditative practice as flow by arguing for the 
importance of thoughtfully resisting the desire to move passively with the current. Were 
we to become carried away with finding in Coleridge the flow of Daoism, or that of 
Csíkszentmihályi, we would have failed to understand with Coleridge the importance of 
knowing when to resist the flow of impulses and associations, both internal and 
external. As Coleridge writes, 
 
                                                 
141 Sayers (1985, 55) discusses the ‘appearance of reality’, relating it to Plato’s Republic. 
142  Cf. Lecture 13, Lit. Lects II, 221, which has only the final clause, transcribed from 
Coleridge’s lecture notes (10th March 1818). Cf. Notebooks 3, 4397-8.  
143 Cf. Gardner, 2002. 
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so long as the mind is entirely passive, so long as there is an habitual submission of the 
Understanding to mere events and images, as such, without any attempt to classify and 
arrange them, so long the Chaos must continue. There may be transition, but there can 
never be progress; there may be sensation, but there cannot be thought; for the total 
absence of Method renders thinking impracticable (Treatise on Method, [1818] SWF, 
631) 
 
The concern is not that Daoist and recent psychological accounts of flow are very 
different from those in Coleridge’s nature writing, but rather that we do not allow this 
real similarity carry us too far and into one extreme, as one is apt to become, amid the 
fluid, powerful current of this theme. Currents must not only be used but also resisted if 
one is to maintain considered direction and concern for truth. Excitement with flow 
must not become a pseudo-mystical device to bypass reflection and due care, and the 
way must not be confusedly thought of as the destination with which we are truly 
concerned. 
St Catherine of Siena is attributed with saying that,  
 
The path to heaven lies through heaven, and all the way to heaven is heaven because He 
said, ‘I am the Way’.144  
 
In this expression, every part of the right way contains, or is metonymous with, its end. 
We can understand this when reflect on how Christianity emphasizes the crucial 
importance of will, that is, of intention and commitment. Catherine does not say that all 
ways are heaven, but only that all the way to heaven is heaven. Believing all 
experiences of flow to be ultimate ends and objects is to lack reflective judgment on 
one’s means and methods and to forget that they are not ends in themselves. 
Counterbalancing the headlong excitement in the foregoing remarks on flow, we 
may recall Coleridge’s observation that the stream of association unchecked by the 
senses or by reason leads to delirium or mania respectively (Table Talk II, 489, 23 June, 
1834). Much earlier, in 1812, he discerns the same cause for caution, namely that the 
theory of the stream of association applies, when at all, only to ‘complete light-
headedness; and even to this . . . but partially, because the will and reason are perhaps 
never wholly suspended.’ (Biographia I, 112) 
With his water-insect image, which we encountered at the start of Ch. 3.4, above 
(page 158), Coleridge indicates a second check against becoming carried away with 
flow. Here we observe: 
                                                 
144 See Day (1948, 167-185). I find a nineteenth-century reference to the same quotation in a 
homily, ‘How to Make Earth Like Heaven’, in Farrar (1888, 33), which provides no source, but 
uses quotation marks.  
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a small water-insect on the surface of rivulets, which throws a cinque-spotted shadow 
fringed with prismatic colours on the sunny bottom of the brook; and . . . [we notice] how 
the little animal wins its way up against the stream, by alternate pulses of active and 
passive motion, now resisting the current, and now yielding to it in order to gather 
strength and a momentary fulcrum for a further propulsion. This is no unapt emblem of 
the mind’s self-experience in the act of thinking. There are evidently two powers at work, 
which relatively to each other are active and passive; and this is not possible without an 
intermediate faculty, which is at once both active and passive. (Biographia I, 124) 
 
Introducing this passage, and establishing the theme of the higher volition subordinating 
powers and forces within and without, he asks us to consider, 
 
what we do when we leap. We first resist the gravitating power by an act purely 
voluntary, and then by another act, voluntary in part, we yield to it in order to light on the 
spot, which we had previously proposed to ourselves. Now let a man watch his mind 
when he is composing; or, to take a still more common case, while trying to recollect a 
name; and he will find the process completely analogous. (Biographia I, 124) 
 
The propelling and resisting water-insect emblemizing the mind at work – tensing and 
relaxing, allowing, welcoming, and using the flow – also emphasizes braking, halting 
the flow, being purposeful, and directed, and hence choosing its right moment.
145
 
Perhaps, then, not everything flows, or even ought to. Coleridge’s water-insect, 
emblemizing the mind, chooses not always to flow with the prevailing currents, but also 
to resist them, letting them flow by. When creatively or philosophically composing, or 
trying to recollect a name, the mind allows the stream of associations to flow until it 
confidently propels itself towards the word or image sought.  
Coleridge evokes a natural phenomenon to grasp the process of thinking and 
understanding in metaphorical language. Winning its way to where it would be, the 
pond skater image perfectly expresses the mind working with and against the flow. 
Thus this image of patiently thoughtful action inspires Yeats’s poem ([1938-9] 2007, 
287), ‘Long-Legged Fly’, whose refrain for each decisive thinker is that:146 
 
Like a long-legged fly upon the stream 
His mind moves upon silence  
 
I do not know if British nature-writer and conservationist Roger Deakin read 
Biographia, but he connects the thinker in the stream of thought with the swimmer in a 
way strikingly reminiscent of Coleridge’s pond skater analogy of the thinker. Thus we 
                                                 
145 Whale (2000, 170) interprets this vibrant image as illustrating ‘how the creative life-force of 
the mind works in conjunction with the recalcitrance of matter.’ 
146 Yeats’ allusion to and influence from Coleridge’s water-insect passage is discussed at least as 
early as Rogers, 1975, and D’Avanzo, 1975. Cf. Gibson (2000, 165-7) for discussion. 
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meet Deakin’s ‘poet / swimmer who allows things to swim “into his ken”’ (2009, 283), 
and who is both active and passive, taking part in nature and largely, but not just, letting 
it affect him. 
Where Deakin emphasizes the passive, Coleridge emphasizes a dynamic movement 
between passivity and action. In Coleridge, the relationship between Ideas and thought 
in philosophy or artistic composition involve what Gregory (personal correspondence, 3 
January, 2014) carefully phrases ‘agency-within-an-embracing-receptivity’. From this 
perspective, reason is essentially the receptive relation of the mind to its source, the 
source of phenomena, and the ultimates of contemplation, that is, to laws of nature, 
truths of mathematics, and the Ideas of Reason. Where understanding is an active 
power, imagination is a dynamic power that mediates between reason and 
understanding (plus the fancy), and so is both receptive and active. Quoting Gregory 
again: 
 
Without imagination, of course, understanding is a merely active power and can only 
‘jerrymander’ material as in the histories of Gibbon or Hume, or in ‘fancy’. (Personal 
correspondence) 
 
The image of Coleridge’s little pond skater147 winning its way, gliding now with 
the current, and now resisting it, visually unites two opposite powers in the act of 
thinking, or rather one power, the active, and one force, the associative stream, whether 
one is recollecting a name or writing poetry. The active phase exerts the will, the 
passive phase surrenders to the current. These stages are active and passive only in 
relation to each other, Coleridge adds, because the moment the pond skater yields to the 
current is still a moment of considered choice. The dialectic of two motions propels the 
process. Concerning the creative process, in the active, self-conscious phase the mind is 
in control. It makes, for instance, compositional decisions, whereas in the passive phase 
concatenating thoughts depend upon associated images for inspiration.  
Engell, the editor who annotated the Bollingen Series’ Biographia vol. I, interprets 
the water-insect metaphor as anticipating the climactic definition of imagination in 
Chapter XIII, with the phrase ‘in all its degrees and determinations’ suggesting, he 
rightly says (Biographia, lxxxv), the differentiation between primary and secondary 
imagination. The relatively passive state of the water-insect analogy they thus interpret 
                                                 
147 Coleridge does not name this species, calling it only ‘a small water insect’, however, his 
epithet ‘cinque-spotted’ allows us to draw the conclusion that it is a pond skater, and not, for 
example, a water boatman, because pond skaters move along the water with their two forelegs 
closely enough together, to make five, not six, spots on the water’s surface. 
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as the primary imagination of perception: the instinctive, mental reflex account 
defended by Richards, against which I argue in Part Three.  
The water-insect yields to the mightier current as the mind yields to a myriad of 
stimuli when it represents the world. This mental representational model of perception, 
however, is one of the things I find questionable about the Richards’ interpretation of 
primary imagination. The active state, continues Engell’s interpretation of the water-
insect passage, would therefore represent the secondary, poetic imagination, which 
higher degree of the faculty is under greater voluntary control. Coleridge explains that:  
 
This power first put in action by the will and understanding, and retained under their 
irremissive, though gentle and unnoticed, controul reveals itself in the balance or 
reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities. (Biographia II, 15-16) 
 
However, I reject Engell’s interpretation because in the water-insect passage, Coleridge 
says that between the active and the passive powers lies the intermediate faculty of 
imagination. The active powers in the water-insect analogy are, I deduce, much more 
likely to be Will and Reason stretching towards noetic intuition, with the passive 
powers being receptive Sense, and mechanical Fancy and Memory, than what Engell 
suggests, namely that the active state is the secondary imagination and the passive state 
is the primary imagination. Imagination as a faculty comprising primary and secondary 
imagination cannot without contradiction be the intermediate between primary and 
secondary imagination, yet this is what Engell, perhaps unwittingly, implies. 
Coleridge asserts that,  
 
the will and . . . all acts of thought and attention are . . . powers, whose function it is to 
control, determine, and modify the phantasmal chaos of association. (Biographia I, 116) 
 
Clearly Coleridge counters more than Hartleyan philosophy here; he is also addressing 
the need to balance the chaos of free, unprincipled consciousness itself. Thus, in his 
Treatise on Method, he argues that true progress unifies the stimuli of instinctive drives 
and external attractions with a ‘leading thought’ and ‘must result from the due mean, or 
balance, between our passive impressions and the mind’s reaction on them’ (SWF I, 
630; 634). 
The water-insect passage emphasizes the importance of counter-balancing flow, 
rather than being, as he warns in his 1818 Treatise on Method, ‘carried hither and 
thither, like the turtle sleeping on the wave, and fancying, because he moves, that he is 
in progress’ (SWF I, 634). This importance given to the balance of active power and 
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passive flow suggests a similarity of concern with Daoism’s yīnyáng inter-dependence. 
Nevertheless, the water-insect passage implies a moral superiority of voluntary 
reflection and directed choice that is absent from Daoist accounts of the Way. Cooper 
(2012, 48) relates how the Daoist accounts describe, 
 
lives that flow like water and develop in the manner of plants, and they are simple and 
undistorted like an uncarved block of wood.  
 
The Daoist sense of the good life as spontaneous, unbridled flow seems to strain after 
the impossible human goal that Sartre ([1943] 1996, 626) identifies as desiring to 
become like God, an in-itself for-itself being. This desire is to realize one’s freedom in 
the effortless way that water is water or a stone is a stone, but with the free and perfect 
transcendence in which God is what He is. 
Coleridge’s water-insect, however, not only employs and participates in the 
processes of flow, much as the Daoist describe, but also resists these processes in 
considered acts of praxis. A connection can be made here with ethical reflection. 
Distinguishing between good and evil brings reflective pause for deeper thought and 
clearer foresight. The ethically concerned thinker does not, therefore, jump trustingly 
into the metaphorical long and rocky waterfall, like Zhuangzi’s sublimely at-one and 
humble sage, content that all water flows to the same end. Zhuanzi tells of a skilled 
swimmer who trusts implicitly in the flow and has come to learn that conscious 
planning is an obstacle to perfecting a skill and to survival itself. Asked to explain his 
ability to dive into perilously rocky waterfalls and emerge unscathed, he replies, 
 
I have no way . . . I go under with the swirls and come out with the eddies, following 
along the way the water flows and never thinking of myself. That’s how I stay afloat. 
(1968, 50: Ch. 19, ll. 49-54) 
 
The Daoists do not consider, in their beautiful, compelling stories, reasons to resist the 
flow. Thus they yearn for an immemorial, mythical past when ‘people lived together 
with the birds and the beasts’ and everything was ‘spontaneous’ and ‘unimpeded’ with 
their inborn natures perfectly realized (Cooper, 2012, 48). 
Cooper follows the Daoist water metaphor as a model for a spontaneous, flowing 
life, noting, for example, that ‘water flows downward to lie at the lowest level of a 
place’ (2012, 51). Daoist similarities with Coleridge’s active, participatory meditations 
in nature notwithstanding, this metaphor of water finding its level is precisely one that 
Coleridge argues against using as a model for humane living. Such hydraulic imagery, 
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he argues, misconceives human freedom after a mechanical model. Thus Coleridge 
opposes the political economists who reduce human interaction to the physical 
dynamics of water finding its level. Even when describing things, as opposed to 
persons, it would be more accurate and telling, he points out, to say things are always 
finding their level: 
 
it would be far less equivocal and far more descriptive of the fact to say, that Things are 
always finding their level: which might be taken as the paraphrase or ironical definition of 
a storm. (Lays Sermons, 206)
148
  
 
It would be unfair, however, to read a hydraulic reductionism into Daoism as Coleridge 
reads reductionism in Adam Smith’s political economics. My point here is to caution 
against finding in Daoism a support for an inert passivity, when really it is the humility 
required by the Way, as ‘It abides in places that men hate’,149 that makes the Daoist 
naturally at home among the lowly, poor, and sick, and hence makes the water simile 
appropriate. As Cooper describes: 
 
The sage’s humility, for instance, is represented by water’s tendency to flow down to the 
lowest places. The benefits that his example brings to others is compared to the manner in 
which water helps plants to grow. (2012, 43) 
 
Cooper, a recent proponent of the Way and its flow, brings active yang to passive yin 
when he goes on to assert that flow needs purposeful balance if it is to be a virtue. Thus, 
 
Spontaneity [Daoist ziran], left by itself, is in danger of decaying into passivity, into a 
way of life that only responds, that is purely reactive – like that of a jelly-fish. To avert 
this danger, spontaneity needs to be balanced with the happiness of someone for whom 
the world waxes as an arena in which to act. The natural responsiveness of the swimmer 
to the sea’s currents and eddies is something to admire, but sometimes at least we want 
the swimmer to be going somewhere, to be in the water for some purpose. (46) 
 
Coleridge’s describing an active process towards contemplated higher purposes and 
ultimate ends continues the hierarchically dyadic, two-levels Platonic tradition (an anti-
Two-Worlds position) that accords with the position on contemplation that this thesis 
supports, rather than Daoism’s non-hierarchical dyad of wú wéi, which always 
recommends a balance of action through non-action. While in the Platonic lineage, low 
is suspended from high (i.e. low depends upon high, or descends from high), the Daoist 
account of the ‘ever-flowing circle’ holds that ‘High and low rest on each other’: 
 
                                                 
148 The saying that people and economic values, like waters, find their level flows from Smith, 
([1776] 1976, 513). 
149 Dao De Jing, Ch. 8: ‘The highest goodness is like water’. 
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Presence and absence produce each other. 
Difficulty and ease bring about each other. 
Long and short delimit each other. 
High and low rest on each other. 
Sound and voice harmonize each other. 
Front and back follow each other. 
   (Laozi, trans. Muller, 1991) 
 
For Coleridge, good poetry always begins in an actively poetic perception, and 
what we thereby make of the world is, as he describes the primary imagination: 
 
an echo in the finite mind of the infinite act of creation in the eternal I AM. (Biographia I, 
304)  
 
As Blake understands, the poet must renew the organs of sense if perception is to 
be restored. Restoring perception involves an activity not associated with experiences of 
sheer flow, but is consistent, rather, with the voluntary oscillation between active and 
passive processes working with and against flow that Coleridge emblematized in his 
image of the water-insect. Coleridge sometimes sets his hand to the tiller to still the 
mental and physical flow while engaged with nature. Thus subordinating flow to 
considered direction, it is still present, but now with conscious reason and not just for 
aesthetic pleasure and intellectual respite. 
I derive from Coleridge the view that beyond meditative, aesthetic flow, and 
emerging from reflection on it, we can discover its final cause or aim in contemplation. 
Contemplation delivers the single-mindedness that aesthetic-meditative experience 
seeks and is the end from which diversions divert. In this stillness is found rest from the 
flow that flowing nature nevertheless restlessly desires, until it becomes content to 
relinquish or redeem desire by fulfilling it in contemplation.  
I agree with Coleridge scholar and Romanticist Modiano’s findings, as she argues 
that: 
 
On the one hand, Coleridge finds that the self needs and profits from a continuous 
engagement with outward objects; on the other hand, he perceives that this activity, while 
stimulating the imagination to seek new forms of expression can cripple man’s 
intellectual progress. (1985, 32) 
 
So, we have found an exciting connection between Coleridge’s meditative practice 
and Classical Asian accounts of flow, especially in Daoism and the Zen that developed 
from the meeting of Buddhism and Daoism.
150
 These connections logically arise from a 
                                                 
150 Coleridge was unaware of Zen Buddhism, and, like A. W. Schlegel (Sedlar, 1982, 35-48), he 
sometimes confuses Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism. However, as Ch’an (China), then Zen 
(Japan) evolved from the synthesis of Buddhism and Taoism in China, it is not surprising to find 
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similarity of concern, thus indicating that their shared subject matter is something 
objective. Nevertheless, we also develop from Coleridge the understanding that flow is 
a means for a rational being, and not an end, which latter is to be found in the 
contemplation that develops from and ultimately subordinates aesthetic-meditative 
experience. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Coleridge to be Zen-like in his most Eastern-inspired moments. Note that Coleridge’s 
understanding of the distinctions between Buddhism and its Vedic sources is by no means 
crudely conflating, and he grasps, for example, that unlike earlier religion in India, ‘the religion 
of Buddha . . . has no castes, at least no compulsory ones, which tend to stop the progression of 
mankind’ (Phil. Lects I, 67). 
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4.3 Contemplation of Idea in Taste, Enjoyment, and Preferences 
In Coleridge we glimpse a very practical notion of Ideas at work in us, a work of which 
we are only dimly and unreflectively aware. Realizing the extent of Ideas at work in us 
is necessary if we are to be more fully responsible beings. Rising to this challenge, 
meditative practice must turn to what we think of as the second nature within us, 
namely our tastes and preferences. Coleridge claims that Ideas are at the heart of 
aesthetic modes of experience and action and therefore: 
 
You may see an Idea working in a man by watching his tastes and enjoyments, though he 
may hitherto have no consciousness of any other reasoning than that of conception and 
fact. (Notebooks 4, 5409) 
 
Sartre made similar suggestions in Being and Nothingness, especially in the chapter 
‘Existential Psychoanalysis’. For him, desires are not contingent matters of fact with 
nothing remaining after all phenomenal aspects, être-en-soi, have been described. 
Desires are meaningful and therefore a free transcendence, even though one may have 
no consciousness of any other reasoning than that of conception and fact. The meaning I 
derive from Coleridge is that tastes and preferences involve Ideas at work in symbols 
writ as preferences. My general point is that taken-for-granted desires can, when 
reflected on, show us a great deal about our relationship to the world and that writers 
who combine phenomenological acumen with literary talent, such as Coleridge, Sartre, 
and Bachelard, can reveal and communicate these significances. 
The symbolic meaning of desire, taste, and preference does not usually receive the 
attention of reflective consciousness. Nevertheless, in pre-reflective aesthetic activity, 
we know what we are doing, we just do not articulate it. Rather than articulating what a 
desire or preference symbolically means, one feels and enacts it. This symbolic meaning 
is not metaphorical, where one kind of thing carries the meaning of a different kind of 
thing. The Coleridgean symbol actively instantiates what it aesthetically conveys. 
Freudian symbolism, on the other hand, is opaque, not translucent, and carries meaning 
over from one type of object to another according to relations of contiguity, similarity, 
opposition, and other such associations that Coleridge locates in the domain of fancy. 
Because awareness of the symbolic meaning of taste and preference is usually 
unreflective, familiarity with this meaning is therefore intimate but unenlightened. In 
the unreflective and ordinary pursuit of taste and preference, one feels and enjoys what 
one is doing, but does not reflectively know what one is doing. Thus prejudices and 
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half-understandings are semi-blindly repeated in non-reflective or poorly-reflected 
community practices. The aesthetic relation with the world can be intensely rich and is 
always filled with significance, but it requires reflective consciousness and questioning 
if it is to become enlightened and responsible.  
Slowly, the Ideas working in tastes and enjoyments may offer a counter to the 
conceptual understanding’s attempts in the project of living well. However, when the 
conceptual understanding is far better educated (that is to say, drawn out into reflective 
self-awareness and social intercourse) and reflective than the aesthetic sense and the 
symbolic imagination, this counterbalance of Ideas working through tastes and 
preferences will fail to add serious weight until it becomes reflective.  
McGhee (1999) examines how our spontaneous, unreflective sympathy is usually 
inconsistently given. ‘Further reflection’, he observes, ‘can sometimes draw it out of 
us’, when we are brought to understand that the same principle behind my sympathy in 
this case can be equally applied in another case which did not receive one’s unreflective 
sympathy. The application of critical judgment to feeling transforms the intuitive, but 
often mistaken, sense of rightness and wrongness in our moral sentiments into a sense 
guided and clarified by conceptual understanding. Lack of reflection, on the other hand, 
continues a want of discernment and an unprincipled, intuitive approach that McGhee 
identifies as an uncorrected sensibility that moves towards universality when ‘the 
immediate becomes reflective.’ 
The unprincipled character of unreflective feeling can be observed in a movie that 
relies on the soundtrack and other associative techniques that invite the audience to 
identify with some characters and distance themselves from others. In such overly 
directive movies, music attempts to rectify a shortcoming of the screenplay by cueing 
the audience’s feelings. Not respecting the rationality and dignity of the audience, 
preferring instead to lull them into being directed, fancy is used in such works to control 
when it should really be subordinate to imagination. As in rhetoric, the effect, rather 
than the principle, dominates. The focus on effect above principle thus destroys the 
exercise of discernment, as feeling becomes the result of prompting, instead of thinking.  
Whether in artistic creation, in moral endeavour, or in the everyday enjoyments of 
tastes and preferences, the exercise of the understanding can educate us towards 
discernment and principle. In forming principles, the understanding applies the values 
of Ideas of reason that have been aesthetically conveyed in imagination. Discernment 
helps ensure that rather than wallow in aesthetic feeling and vague states of 
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imagination, one’s feelings, perspectives, and responses can be taken responsibly and 
made accountable to the rule of principle.  
By now it should be clear that the understanding is neither to be taken as a poor 
stand-in for reason, nor as necessarily opposed to reason. The point is that the 
understanding should be accorded its due role and proportion. The proper place for the 
understanding, in a Coleridgean analysis, is a middle role manipulating concepts and 
managing distinctions, and not as the end and apex of all human thought, which is the 
proper place for reason and its Ideas that transcend the minds which contemplate them. 
Reason exceeds humanity. As Raine (1985, Introduction) glosses, ‘Coleridge’s reason 
. . . is at once the act of knowing, and that which is known.’ Raine’s gloss recalls the 
words of Plotinus, quoted by Coleridge in Biographia I, 251-2, citing Ennead III, 8.4: 
 
the act of contemplation makes the thing contemplated, as the geometricians 
contemplating describe lines correspondent; but I not describing lines but simply 
contemplating, the representative forms of things rise up into existence. 
 
Tracing Plotinus’s thoughts, Kealey (ed. Gregorius, 2002, 184) draws attention to: 
 
An important consequence of perfect contemplation, where the contemplated is the same 
as the contemplation or where thought and being are the same, is that whatever is thought 
“There” necessarily comes into being. Simply by being what it is, contemplation, nous, 
produces. Nous does not intend to choose or create; yet if the intelligibles subsist, the 
sensibles will ensue from a necessity inherent in contemplating intelligibles (Vi.7.8). 
Contemplation, theoria is at the same time production, poiesis. In this respect, nous 
imitates the infinite, supremely active dunamis of the One whose formlessness is 
productive of all Forms and hence of the existence of all things. 
 
In Coleridge’s broadest view, God, Truth, the Soul, etc., as objective Ideas, are not just 
objects for reason: they are reason, in the mode of constituting it. Imagination opens the 
mind to reason and its Ideas, incorporating them in aesthetic expression and response 
through its symbolic capacity. Plato similarly models human openness to the objects of 
reason, whereby poetry, love, and prophecy are gifts of divine madness, bestowing a 
supra-rational wisdom.
151
 These gifts of divine madness bestow a transcendence beyond 
sophrosune (temperance or self-possession). Beyond rational, calmly self-enclosed, 
self-possessed virtue exists the possibility of being ruptured by ultimate truth.  
Encouraging greater mindfulness and self-reflection in everyday consciousness, 
Coleridge aimed: 
 
To refer men’s opinions to their absolute principles, and thence their feelings to the 
appropriate objects, and in their due degrees; and finally, to apply the principles thus 
ascertained, to the formation of steadfast convictions concerning the most important 
                                                 
151 See Phaedrus 244 a ff., and Ion 534 c. 
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questions of Politics, Morality, and Religion. (Friend I, 16) 
 
Referring opinion to Ideas requires a contemplative attitude, and to refer feelings to 
their appropriate objects requires aesthetic self-awareness. This aesthetic self-awareness 
is required if we are to learn the meaning of our aversions and enjoyments, and 
therefore to learn their moral worth.
152
 
Coleridge refers opinions to their principles, testing unreflective notions (including 
tastes and preferences) against their aims and initiating Ideas. Aims go aslant when their 
objects are misconceived. Principles relate Ideas to a context conceived by the 
understanding. The understanding creates conceptions of the current situation, as it 
creates conceptions of any historical situation, and may then apply principles 
connecting to Ideas of reason or maxims derived from experience. He complains that, 
 
So little are even the genuine maxims of expedience likely to be perceived or acted upon 
by those who have been habituated to admit nothing higher than expedience, . . . that in 
the whole Chapter of Contents of European Ruin, every Article might be unanswerably 
deduced from the neglect of some maxim that had been repeatedly laid down, 
demonstrated, and enforced (Friend II, 85) 
 
Principles are needed for enlightened understanding, rather than that which is merely 
mechanical. Because principles unite with Ideas, they can stabilize noble but easily 
misguided feelings such as loyalty, protectiveness, and patriotism. Thus Coleridge 
argues in his Bristol lectures for the: 
 
necessity of bottoming on fixed principles, that so we may not be the unstable Patriots of 
Passion or Accident (Pol. Lects, 33) 
 
When reason enlightens conceptual understanding, it creates the ‘higher understanding’ 
and produces the ‘discourse of reason’ (Friend I, 156-57, quoting Hamlet, I.ii.151). 
With the principle, the deep feeling of imagination-conveyed sublime Ideas connects 
with clear conceptions produced by the understanding and circumscribes a practical 
aim. 
Bringing Ideas of reason to the understanding provides the Romantic union of 
‘head, heart, and hand’ that Coleridge seeks, resulting in ‘those feelings which flow 
forth from principle as from a fountain’ (Friend I, 123). Using principle to convert 
opinion away from expedient maxims and towards Ideas directs feelings toward their 
                                                 
152
 Kooy (1999, 107) studies how Schiller’s notion of aesthetic education influences Coleridge 
themes. Kooy finds Schiller’s Bildung to influence Coleridge’s notion of aesthetic cultivation 
that counterbalances economic-industrial civilization. Kooy suggests that: ‘Schiller’s “aesthetic 
education” would become . . . the conceptual frame for Coleridge’s “imagination”’.  
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appropriate ends, and this is the sense and the end of aesthetic education and reflection 
that this thesis supports. Coleridge observes that,  
 
There seems a tendency in the public mind to shun all thought, and to expect help from 
any quarter rather than from seriousness and reflection: As if some invisible power would 
think for us, when we gave up the pretence of thinking for ourselves. (Friend I, 123) 
 
When thinking for oneself is given up, the impetus is carried by the unreflective 
invisible power in our tastes and opinions. This unreflective force does not, however, 
think for us, and is pushed on by prejudice, rather than pulled forth by ideals. Desires, 
tastes, and preferences may originate from strongly felt but dimly understood Ideas 
conveyed by imagination, but they must be subjected to precise and conscientious 
reflection if their ideal origin is to be reflected in their final aim. Reflective awareness 
and questioning are required to steer vague but powerful aesthetic appetences toward 
their appropriate ends. Thus Coleridge, exhorting his readers to feel with reflective 
aesthetic awareness on the one hand, and to think beyond cool reason on the other, 
asserts that his aim is to embody reason: 
 
to make the reason spread light over our feelings, to make our feelings, with their vital 
warmth, actualize our reason (Friend I, 108) 
 
An example of imagination failing to inform and reform reflective conceptual 
understanding can be seen in Abraham Lincoln’s relation to freed slaves. Lincoln’s 
conceptual understanding of democracy appropriately holds that anyone who would not 
be a slave ought not to be a master of slaves. Here is an example, from 1854, of his 
enlightened, reflective understanding: 
 
If A. can prove, however conclusively, that he may, of right, enslave B.––why may not 
B. snatch the same argument, and prove equally, that he may enslave A?–– 
 
You say A. is white, and B. is black. It is color, then; the lighter, having the right to 
enslave the darker? Take care. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man you meet, 
with a fairer skin than your own.     
 
You do not mean color exactly?––You mean the whites are intellectually the superiors of 
the blacks, and, therefore have the right to enslave them? Take care again. By this rule, 
you are to be slave to the first man you meet, with an intellect superior to your own. 
 
But, say you, it is a question of interest; and, if you can make it your interest, you have 
the right to enslave another. Very well. And if he can make it his interest, he has the right 
to enslave you. (Lincoln, 2009, 48) 
 
Despite Lincoln’s developed, reflective conceptual understanding, his sensibilities at the 
level of tastes and preferences are not so enlightened. He has not, then, discovered in his 
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feelings and tastes the same dangerous and fallacious prejudices he finds easily in 
verbal expressions of opinion. His preference was for the freed slaves to emigrate, for 
example to Liberia, and to pursue the policy of colonization (Jaffa, 1959, 380ff.). In a 
speech of 1857, he describes this as the favourable policy, fallaciously conflating 
ancestral geographical origin with what is morally right, all the while forgetting his own 
non-native-American ancestry: 
 
Let us be brought to believe it is morally right, and, at the same time, favorable to, or, at 
least, not against, our interest, to transfer the African to his native clime, and we shall 
find a way to do it, however great the task may be. (Lincoln, 1990, 398-410) 
 
In fairness to Lincoln, it must be remembered that he was an American politician, 
and that the question of ‘repatriation’ was a widely-canvassed feature not only of some 
abolitionists but also of many Southerners whose votes or at least grudging assent 
Lincoln hoped to get (and thus prevent war) in what was probably party policy. Note 
also that Lincoln skillfully avoids asserting that ‘repatriation’ is morally right, and 
instead delivers a subtler, more guardedly conditional statement: ‘Let us be brought to 
believe it is morally right, and . . . we shall find a way to do it’.  
Notwithstanding how much the ardent emancipator understands racial equality 
before God, he neither feels nor imagines (so far as we can tell from both his public 
speeches and his private letters) this equality as friendship, social equality, and cultural 
harmony. In fact, by 1858, Lincoln confides in a letter that he: 
 
disclaimed all intention to bring about social and political equality between the white and 
black races. (167) 
 
I argue that conceptual understanding can critically transform opinion through 
principle, but sensibilities cannot be reformed until they are acknowledged as amenable 
to, and in serious need of, reflection. Most of the time, people are ready to assert that 
their tastes and enjoyments are based on harmless, idiosyncratic facts. If preferences are 
taken as simple facts about oneself, it will be assumed that they are irrational 
idiosyncrasies of the individual that are beyond being right or wrong. Taken as brute 
facts, preferences and enjoyments cannot be understood as amenable to reflection.  
If obscure aesthetic yearnings are not considered as having ultimate aims, and are 
considered only as relating to conceptions and facts, then they can only feelingly and 
experimentally seek out objects and courses rather than aim for clear fulfilment 
according to principle. These obscure aesthetic yearnings are often inherited, culturally 
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transmitted, and become ingrained as a second nature. We laugh here, smile there, and 
grimace elsewhere because someone influential did so, yet when we follow the 
example, we often miss the principle, if there was one. Great dark regions of our 
understanding are occupied by unexamined aesthetic preferences, the conservative 
tendencies of all minds. 
On the supreme importance of principle, as fount of virtue, Coleridge says: 
 
O that my readers would look round the world . . . and make . . . a faithful catalogue of its 
many miseries!  From what do these proceed, and on what do they depend for their 
continuance? Assuredly for the greater part on the actions of men, and those again on the 
want of a vital principle of action. We live by faith. The essence of virtue consists in the 
principle. And the reality of this, as well as its importance, is believed by all men in fact, 
few as there may be who bring the truth forward into the light of distinct consciousness. 
(Friend I, 100) 
 
Following this thought process for twenty-two pages, and through three essays, he 
discerns how unexamined preferences resemble broad but unenlivened maxims of 
prudence: 
 
The widest maxims of prudence are like arms without hearts, disjoined from those 
feelings which flow forth from principle as from a fountain. (Friend I, 123) 
 
They resemble instincts, unintelligently reacting to objects with more or less fixed and 
unreflective responses. Hence pre-reflective preferences are disjoined not only from 
‘those feelings which flow forth from principle’, but also from each other. Their 
obscurity and apparent naturalness are cited to defend their contradictoriness. 
Taking preferences and attitudes as basic facts is a mode of Plato’s eikasia, the pre-
epistemic mental state of the cave’s unreleased prisoners, and the Divided Line’s lowest 
state of mind. Just as it takes the sensible appearances of the world at face value without 
any reflection on non-phenomenal reality, naïve eikasia takes moral and aesthetic 
notions as nothing more than conceptions and facts. That is to say, this unreflective 
mode accepts aesthetic qualities without question, leaving the deceptive impression of 
moral quality imparted to the object. The impression is deceptive in Sartre’s sense of 
bad faith: Uncritical, eikasia takes moral and aesthetic qualities as factical existence 
rather than as transcendental essence, the former being an attribute of the object, the 
latter of the Idea (or for Sartre, the Hegelian for-itself). 
Reflection on tastes and preferences brings wisdom to appreciation and judgment 
rather than prolonging the prejudices of unreflective enjoyment. However, reflection on 
enjoyment and preference cannot be the same as reflection on conceptual 
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understanding. Transformative reflection on conceptual understanding involves 
discovering fallacies and, ultimately, on discovering conceptual contradiction. 
Reflection on enjoyment, however, is contemplative and only minimally, because 
medially and not finally, conceptually analytic. It involves a focused attention on what it 
is that is being enjoyed and why this esteemed quality or virtue is valuable enough in 
itself to be worthy of beholding. Reflection on enjoyment requires, eventually, a 
contemplation of Ideas. 
As in Plato’s Divided Line, the greatest epistemological difference exists between 
the taken-for-granted appearances of the world in eikasia, and the noetic contemplation 
of their formative reality. Plato proposes that knowledge develops beyond taking 
appearance for granted (eikasia/aisthesis), first by developing pragmatic acquaintance 
with the laws of the things we experience (pistis), then by reflectively grasping that 
experience with concepts manipulated in the understanding (dianoia), before a 
dialectical and contemplative approach is made in noesis. As we saw in the Part Two 
chapters on Plotinus’s and Coleridge’s notions of Ideas, there is also a post-Platonic 
tradition of contemplating Ideas through aisthesis. Plato himself is aware of this 
possibility, when he describes poet, the prophet, and the lover as, however obscurely, 
and in divine madness, contemplatives of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.  
For Coleridge, although the Idea may be ‘asleep’, ‘dreaming’, or ‘somnambulant’ 
in aesthetic awareness,
153
 it is nevertheless the poetic task of personal aesthetic 
development to become self-aware of the symbolic significance of the Ideal in the 
aesthetic. Aware that the course of initiative Ideas may become misguided by an 
understanding that takes aesthetic movements as bare facts and conceptions, Coleridge 
writes that: 
 
progress itself follows the path of the Idea from which it sets out; requiring, however, a 
constant wakefulness of mind to keep it within the due limits of its course. (Treatise on 
Method, SWF I, 633) 
 
Returning to the Sartrean examples of desire, the enjoyment of objects can be seen 
as a process symbolizing our relationship to the whole world, as in his treatment of 
enjoying cigarettes as a way of symbolically consuming the whole world in an 
impression of using it up and drinking it in. In such enjoyments and aesthetic relations, 
we poetize our relations with aspects of the world. Perhaps a traditional recipe is 
                                                 
153 See Friend II, 75, n.3: ‘Plants are Life dormant; Animals = Somnambulists; the mass of 
Mankind Day-dreamers; the Philosopher only awake.’  
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personalized by replacing sweet apple juice with light vinegar, a touch of salt added to 
the sugar, and a family recipe becomes part of the family history, adding savour to 
enjoyments and reflection on even the most apparently basic moments of aesthetic 
pause. A preference for a certain alcoholic drink that no child could ever like might 
express coming to terms with astringency in adult responsibilities and drinking in the 
bitter drafts of life.  
The theme of everyday aesthetics has received considerable attention in recent 
years (see, e.g. Saito, 2007; Scruton, 2011), yet the door into this important area of 
cultural understanding has still barely been opened. Coleridge notes how the profound 
pleasure taken in everyday comforts and ordinary paraphernalia approached 
contemplatively can assuage physical pain: 
 
My enjoyments are so deep, of the fire, of the Candle, of the Thought I am thinking, of 
the old Folio I am reading–and the silence of the silent House is so most & 
very delightful–that upon my soul! The Rheumatism is no such bad thing as people make 
for. (Letters I, 298) 
 
Conceptions and facts cannot explain tastes and enjoyments that run so deep. The 
aesthetic can no more be derived from the empirical fact than can the ethical. Tastes are 
not brute facts. They exhibit the transcending qualities of directedness and rationale, the 
purposes of rhyme and reason. 
We have seen that for Coleridge a far greater number are possessed by Ideas than 
the few who possess them. The working out of Idea in everyday aesthetic experience, 
which working Coleridge claims can be traced in taste, preference, and enjoyment, is 
therefore most usually detected only in vague, unreflective awareness. No specific 
concept contains this Ideality, so most people do not consider it as a subject for 
reflective thought. They do, however, pre-reflectively linger in the meaning-rich and 
value-suggestive shadows of aesthetic sense coloured by its light. Reflective aesthetic 
education is almost non-existent, even today, and it could well be that society in a 
distant future will judge us as charmingly or dangerously primitive with respect to our 
level of reflective aesthetic awareness. Taste and enjoyment is, nevertheless, an 
occasional subject for contemplation and reflection. 
Much aesthetic appreciation lies in the contemplative beholding of experiential 
qualities, involving a kind of basking in its meaning where concepts fail. The 
recalcitrance of aesthetic experience to conceptualization justifies, to a degree, this 
basking. Still, referring aesthetic Ideas to principles, a task for the understanding, does 
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provide some clarification. There is meaning in our everyday tastes and enjoyments, 
but, like Kant’s notion of art as purposiveness without purpose, this meaning 
tantalizingly eludes the grasp of conceptual thought.
154
  Everyday aesthetic enjoyment 
shares an overflowing quality with high art, although more modestly. The jouissance of 
the experience, its play, our enjoyment in it, and our right and ability to feelingly relate 
to the way we live our lives is what can be contemplated. This enjoyment can become 
principled, thus transforming its richly significant tones and sensitivities into virtues 
that stem from fidelity to the ultimate objects of contemplation. 
What I find attractive in Coleridge is his dual recognition that (1) Ideas, if they are 
to mean something to us, must find aesthetic expression; and (2) it is not enough to 
remain unreflective in this aesthetic expression. Aesthetic taste and feeling must be 
supplemented by reflection if one is to be fully conscious of its Ideal direction, and if 
one is therefore to move effectively in this Ideal direction. Without fulfilling the 
criterion of reflection, one is more likely to be an obstruction than an aid to Ideal 
tendency. An appropriate parallel here can be found in Hegel’s criticism of the beautiful 
soul, over-reliant on feeling and sentiment and lacking in active self-awareness.  
Both thinkers recognize that a potent danger in Romanticism is the possibility of 
remaining in the aesthetic mode without recognizing and clarifying the resonance of the 
Ideal intimated in reflection. Aesthetic education therefore involves coming to clearer 
terms with enjoyments and preferences, and with our antipathies too. Schiller’s notion 
of the beautiful soul, in his essay ‘On Grace and Dignity’ (Neue Thalia, June 1793), 
inspired by the unity of aesthetics and ethics in Kant’s CJ, does not suffer from the 
malady later diagnosed by Hegel as a pining for an unattainable Romantic ideal.
155
 
Schiller’s beautiful soul harmonizes Pflicht und Neigung (duty and inclination) in 
recognizing the kinship of the good and the beautiful (Curran, 2008). To unify ethical 
duty and natural inclination is thus to poetize life in ethical-aesthetic creation. Here we 
find the Romantic faith in the deep identity of beauty and goodness, theorized by 
Schiller, developed in Coleridge, and achieving its most succinct expression in Keats’ 
concluding lines in his ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’: 
                                                 
154 I refer to CJ, §44: Fine art . . . is a way of presenting that is purposive on its own and that 
furthers, even though without a purpose, the culture of our mental powers to facilitate social 
communication. 
 
155  Schiller’s beautiful soul notion develops from Wieland’s novel Geschichte des Agathon 
(1766-7), which characterizes the fictional Danae’s beautiful soul. The notion is also treated in 
Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1795-6), in the pivotal chapter, on piety, 
‘Confession’s of a Beautiful Soul’. 
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‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty’,––that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. 
 
The identification of Beauty and Truth originates in Plato’s doctrine of the unity of the 
Forms, akin with the Socratic unity of the virtues, and the ideal of the appetite and the 
enthusiastic spirit being educated and guided by reason. The textual fount of these 
notions is Plato’s kalokagathia, the beautiful goodness central to the Phaedrus and the 
Symposium, especially in Alcibiades’ recognizing the powerfully attractive force of 
Socrates’ virtue, likened to a pot-bellied Silenus statue, an ugly satyr figure on the 
outside, but containing many drawers, each holding a resplendent golden godkin: 
 
so godlike – so bright and beautiful, so utterly amazing (Symposium, 217a) 
 
Ideas must find aesthetic expression if they are to be something and mean 
something to us. As Coleridge explains, 
 
by the Symbol the Idea . . . is rendered cogitable; but by the Idea the symbol is rendered 
intelligible (Marginalia V, 780) 
 
 However, Ideas also require reflective analysis if they are to be expressed in principles 
and continue their transformative effects through the meaningful activities of our lives. 
The Ideal in aesthetic expression aids the elenchos and the self-questioning in critical 
thought, calling for a double reflection. Firstly, how do my life and aesthetic responses 
correspond with the Ideals expressed and implicitly valued in my aesthetic response? 
Secondly, what am I doing agreeing with, or rejecting, in enjoying this activity or 
appreciating this artwork? And is this Ideal reflected throughout my life and dealings 
with others, or do I compartmentalize it, voicing it only in certain aesthetic enjoyments? 
Much in our directly felt tastes and pleasures is not well expressed in our thoughts 
and attitudes towards these enjoyments. A burst of laughter, a pang of desire, a pique of 
interest seems to justify its own existence without need for reflection on its meaning. 
This kind of aesthetic experience gives the impression of somehow speaking for itself 
and being sufficient to itself. The full experience may be ineffable, but the impression 
yet remains that there is no need to express it, even if we could, with a meaning built up 
from clear and distinct concepts. What does this experience mean? It means this. And 
this, the aesthetic experience itself, seems to bring its justification, and a feeling for its 
meaning, immediately with its appearance. When a justification and a deeper 
questioning of its meaning and significance is called for, the request is commonly 
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interpreted as an indication that the enjoyment would be neither accessible nor properly 
appreciated by the inquirer. 
Yet the obscurity and opacity of this aesthetic experience, and the acceptance of its 
value as self-evident, carries with it the risk of allowing experience, and its inherent 
meanings, to become muddled and get carried beyond the bounds of good control. In 
enjoyment, to what extent is one even aware of what it is that one is enjoying? To what 
end is the enjoyment pursued, and what does it mean if one simply acquiesces in the 
mode of enjoyment? In this mode, we live in the power, but do not work in the light, of 
the Ideas and dynamics working through us. 
It may seem unnecessarily harsh to put the enjoyment of tastes and preferences 
enjoyment to interrogation, but this depth of questioning is necessary in an examined 
life. There was a time in recent memory when racist humour could be judged to be 
harmless enjoyment. How deep can the elenchos go? Answer: as deeply as we can 
reflect. The questioning itself awakens this reflection. The questioning, like Socrates’ 
elenchos that stings and benumbs before it orients, must therefore go deeper than our 
unpractised and shallow reflective awareness. Like the perspectival vanishing point, 
Ideas recede from conceptual grasp as far as we pursue, but their direction in our 
behaviour, appreciations, tendencies, and attitudes clarifies with educated attention and 
questioning. 
As in Freud’s objective of transforming obscure motivation with conscious insight 
(where id was, there ego shall be), we can seek awareness of the Ideas and dynamisms 
we muddle through in our abstractly formed lives so that we can then work in their 
lights. This would construe autobiography concrète as poetic endeavour. 
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4.4 Ars biographica poetica 
 
We all have obscure feelings that must be connected with some thing or other––the Miser 
with a guinea––Lord Nelson with a blue Ribbon––Wordsworth’s old Molly with her 
washing Tub––Wordsworth with Hills, Lakes, & Trees–– / all men are poets in their way, 
tho’ for the most part their ways are damned bad ones. (Letters II, 768) 
 
In this chapter, I propose my ideal of the art of poetic life-writing. This ideal views all 
conscious human life as shaped through the poetic art of contemplating values and 
applying them to existence. I hold the ars biographica poetica to be the fundamental art 
basic to all others and the art in which the axiological unity of ethics and aesthetics is 
most clearly felt and readily acknowledged. This chapter develops my view that took 
shape while considering Coleridgean themes, nevertheless, I hope to present here my 
original thoughts, with Coleridge interwoven. 
With Coleridge, I describe imagination as a creative, life-enhancing impulse to 
connect profound but dimly-understood presentiments and Ideas with our surroundings. 
This impulse propels great art and everyday aesthetics alike. I introduce ars biographica 
poetica as the notion that we all use creative freedom in living and shaping our lives, 
and thus engaged in the poetic art of life writing. Always in media res, to use Horace’s 
phrase from Ars poetica (l. 149), and thus necessarily improvisational, most lives 
resemble fragmentary scribbles, or preparatory sketches making do with ill-reflected 
reasons, slipshod rhymes, or worse, compulsive or half-hearted repetition.  
Too-often rough-hewed, the art of living is nonetheless a creative, poetic art. We 
create our autobiographies with varying degrees of consciousness, truthfulness, 
aesthetic sense, and ethical merit. While literary poetry proceeds from the voluntary 
efforts of talent and genius, there is a spontaneous, less reflective poetry of the ordinary 
shaped from the significances accorded to objects, aims, and relations in our lives. This 
poetry of the ordinary aestheticizes the truth on which we are daily nourished: 
 
The Heart should have fed upon the truth, as Insects on a Leaf––till it be tinged with the 
colour, and shew its food in every the minutest fibre. (Letters I, 115, October, 1794) 
 
The poetry of the primary imagination, previously discussed in detail in chapter 3.3, 
gives delight, sorrow, tragedy, and flashes of beauty, to the everyday surroundings and 
experiences of the miser, the admiral, old Molly, the poet walking in nature, and you 
and me. From this primary imagination, Coleridge distinguishes the secondary 
imagination as,  
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still identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and 
in the mode of operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where 
this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealise and unify. 
It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. 
(Biographia I, 304) 
 
The secondary imagination’s poetry, to reiterate from chapter 3.3, consists in verse 
and other forms of art that operate in the absence of their creators and distinctly survive 
their deaths. Such artworks are thus called creations in a fuller sense than the creativity 
of thought and imaginative perception that the primary imagination generates. Primary 
imagination’s creations survive in culture as sentiments, manners, and views nursed in 
families, institutions, and societies, but these are nonetheless things that, although 
capable of resuscitation or resurrection, become extinct the moment they are not 
enacted. These creations are, all the same, profound poetry, and it is the duty and 
privilege of genius to penetrate their depths and discern their meanings in transforming 
them, through the secondary imagination, into works of poetry or philosophy and 
thereby to represent objectively the concerns of the human soul to itself.  
Contemplation benefits more than the mind of the individual contemplative, and its 
wider benefits become clearer when the contemplative concentrates on the power of 
discernment. Discernment allows both (a) a fuller, more engaged experience, and (b) 
theoria’s intellectual and practical virtues to be shared such that well-discerned 
experience is clearly communicated and can cultivate and orient others. There is no 
wisdom, or clarity of vision, without discernment.
156
 Thus Hegel ([1807] 1997, Preface) 
remarks on the Schellingian notion
157
 of an immediately, sensuously intuited Absolute: 
there is no wisdom in standing before an obscure Absolute as ‘the night in which all 
cows are black’. 
More imaginative poetry exists in a person’s ordinary life than in works of fancy or 
fantasy. This is because fancy and fantasy are only rarely poetic, being more concerned 
with entertaining wishes and desires than with imaginatively approaching truths that 
cannot be otherwise approached. Even the basest human life, in contrast, has values, 
however dimly contemplated and vaguely appreciated, when desires are not being 
pursued. Imagination, as a mental effort, holistically engages reality to retain value 
                                                 
156 The progressing contemplative has a duty of cultivation either to remain silent in mystical 
quietism, or to describe the theoria as discernfully as possible, those others, however, who are 
satisfied to remain in obscurities and half-knowledge cannot be called mystics, and are more 
correctly called mystifiers. 
157 Schellingian, because Hegel (1807) politely says in his Preface that while this may not be 
Schelling’s view, certain of his followers express it. 
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beyond fleeting moments. It resists the forces of materialistic concerns, sustaining 
access to Ideas through their aesthetic expression. Here, thinking sees through details 
and facts towards principles and values. Such sustained access can be achieved on 
nature walks, in religious meditation and prayer, and even in a concentrated 
appreciation of sport. They all exemplify an imaginative appreciation of aesthetic, 
moral, and alethic qualities leading the mind, and enabling it to contemplate the Ideals 
of perfection: Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. 
 Through the poetic meaning seen in a gesture, we recognize in another’s life the 
creative discovery of value and purpose, or its tragic curtailment. The worthiness of 
pursuing that Ideal remains, although human life may perish in its pursuit. In being 
moved, we affirm the value of honouring the Ideal, and thus properly dignify the person 
who suffers in its pursuit. Or, if nothing is tragically curtailed, we are moved in finding 
something worthy of admiration and hope, on one side, or of being reviled on the other.  
The sense of aesthetics I mean is very deep, one that can operate between split 
seconds, finding meaning in feelings, and striving, at its best, to find Ideal guides and 
principles to shape life. Whatever moves us, emotionally connects us with Ideals we 
take to be of general and universal value. Or, if the value intuited is not held to be 
universal, then we rightly dismiss the experience as down to tiredness, sickness, or 
illusion. Ideals move us, and operate, though we do not always reflect on this, in our 
every emotion. To move us thus, and hence to have meaning for us, Ideals require 
aesthetic expression. Because this aesthetic work expresses Ideas through sensuous 
experience, Coleridge can call imagination the: 
 
Laboratory in which Thought elaborates Essence into Existence (Notebooks II, 3158) 
 
This aesthetic expression is imagination’s work and play. I suggest that there is a 
sense of poetry at work when we are moved that is absent or unconveyed when we 
remain unmoved. Here, poetry denotes a meaning broader than verse, or fiction, and 
denotes the aesthetic expression of meaning and value in our lives. I suggest that this 
poetry at work in our lives, and in our being moved, is the imagination’s aesthetic 
expression of Ideas. In sum, we are moved by what we value, and those values are 
bound to Ideals, which must be expressed aesthetically, through the imagination, if they 
are to have any meaning in our lives. It is the poetry in real life, its tragedy, its hope, 
and its transformation of the bare event into the aesthetic evocation of value that moves 
us.  
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An admirable person, whether factual or fictional, whose successes and noble 
failures can move us, is commendable because of being a creation, and not because of 
being something naturally formed, like a beautiful face or an unpolished talent. The 
courage of pursuing moral ends has the power to move, and this courage is a creative 
act. As such, the hero is self-made through a committed series of chosen acts. There is a 
sense, then, in ascribing and admiring a poetic quality in those who shape the better part 
of their lives by commitment to Ideals. These Ideals are reflected in their sense of 
honour, justice, tradition, or pattern of community life. Yet no hero invents or redefines 
honour, courage, or any of the virtues, however much our desire to praise these people 
suggests such superlative phrases. The admirable are admired for luminously 
embodying the Ideal, not for its creation. Hence the Ideal and the hero’s commitment to 
it are simultaneously admired. 
We may marvel, reading Homer’s Iliad, at Achilles’ prowess and the glory his 
demigod powers can win, but it is Hector who deserves our admiration. Achilles knows 
he is invincible, except at his heels, so in him we cannot admire courage. Hector, 
however, is the existential hero: fully knowing Achilles’ semi-divine nature, he 
nevertheless exits Ilion’s walls to his fate because he knows it is the honourable action. 
He must fight for his family and his people. We witness his courage. More than death, 
he fears failing his wife and his nation. We hear his prayer to Zeus that his son be a 
greater man to bring joy to his mother. When we admire Hector, it is for his 
commitment to honouring the Ideals by embodying them. This commitment is creative 
because embodying Ideals is a poietic, cultivating act, greater than simply leaving the 
Ideals detached, far away in the heavens, for speculative adoration. The poietic 
embodiment of cultivating principles, then, is at the heart of ars biographica poetica, in 
uniting active with contemplative life. 
Suspecting that Hector never existed need not make it irrational to be moved by his 
fate.
158
 It is the poetry that moves us, after all. By poetry, I do not mean that the 
technical skill in verse is what moves us; I am not primarily referring to admiring the 
artistry. The poetry intended here is the same as that exemplified in real life and 
developed from the primary imagination. By the poetic, then, I mean the active creation 
of meaning and purpose through the aesthetic conveyance of Ideals appreciable by 
others, whether or not they fully understand it. Whether the person considered is 
                                                 
158 I refer to, without directly engaging, to Radford’s (1975) introduction of the paradox of 
fiction to Analytic-style philosophy. 
  231 
historical, contemporary, or fictional, it is the Ideal poetically embodied in aesthetic 
expression that moves us.  
 All people are poets in their way, as Coleridge says in the epigraph to this chapter, 
because we all imbue surrounding things and relations with resonant, symbolic 
meaning. We give a setting and expression to obscure feelings, casting judgements into 
actions, attitudes, tastes, and preferences. There exists an elementary, though 
unexamined, ethics in even the meanest aesthetic taste or preference, because even these 
exercise choice on the basis of appeals to sensibility that feelingly strains after some 
value rather than another. We compose autobiography concrète in our inevitably 
creative lives, however damned bad they may be.  
Life experienced, expressed, and lived onwards, is a poetic act. The rhyme and 
reason in what I call ars biographica poetica is often spontaneous. Such improvisation 
has its virtues, yet it is too often completed under the dim lights of unreflective taste, 
desire, and enjoyment. Life’s themes and methods are too easily repeated as habitual 
patterns, preventing their finest enactment and expression. Too often, doggerel prevents 
poetry, and instead of truthfulness creating beauty, people merely seek the appearance 
of justification. In a notable coincidence of thought, Nietzsche (1878, §610) expresses 
this insight in language strikingly similar to Coleridge’s: 
 
People as bad poets – Just as bad poets in the second half of a line, look for a thought to 
fit their rhyme, so people in the second half of their lives, having become more anxious, 
look for the actions, attitudes, relationships that suit those of their earlier life, so that 
everything will harmonize outwardly. But then they no longer have any powerful thought 
to rule their life and determine it anew; rather in its stead, comes the intention of finding 
a rhyme. 
 
Habitual patterns are marks of style and personality, but they are inauthentic in that 
they repeat, rather than reflect. To reiterate, Coleridge affirms that only a few possess 
Ideas, while most are possessed by them. Insufficient contemplation of a guiding Idea 
condemns one to repeat its bungled, inadequate expression working through the stuff of 
life. If Ideas are not consciously approached, the person is possessed by Ideas as if 
haunted by an obscure fate, blindly moved in an invisible current. 
Repeated mistakes and inadequate expressions occur compulsively, like the return 
of the repressed in Freudian theory. Mays (2013, 52-3; 56) notes a biographical theme 
that Coleridge was compelled to repeat and explore, but never overcome:  
 
Coleridge fixed early on the theme of incompleteness and yearning, bolstering it with a 
sense of buoyancy lost as youth gave way to manhood, and it was never fundamentally 
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revised. [. . .  His] command over what he wrote developed, but the plotline hardly at all 
because it was a situation to come to terms with  
 
In poems that ‘consistently press toward an end just beyond the words’, Mays 
diagnoses an: 
 
obligation continually to rewrite the same story . . .  [a] need for renewal . . . [in] 
dedication to an idea of Reason which a process (Imagination) serves. (2013, 7) 
  
That there is ‘a divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will’ (Hamlet, 
V.ii, l.11) is implicit in Coleridge’s philosophy of the Idea. For Coleridge, obscurely 
intimated Ideas can possess us. More soberly, this means that Ideas often powerfully 
influence thoughts and actions without our recognizing it. Recognition is superior 
because clear-sighted, and hence less prone to ethical and practical mistakes analogous 
to fumbling in the dark. The danger in feelingly moving with powerful Ideas that 
possess us is not a danger originating in the Idea, but in its misconception.  
We are inevitably prone to this danger, because any conception of an Idea is a 
misconception, and any ‘sense’ of it is no sense of it all, but rather an aesthetic 
resonance to its sensuous, material expression, as happens in religious observance, artist 
exhibition, or in many ordinary instances of everyday aesthetics.
159
 Enlightenment, or 
growing from being inchoately possessed by Ideas to rationally possessing them, occurs 
in individuals, but also in cultures and societies. Coleridge agrees with Plato that the 
rule of the wise is the Idea of all governments and therefore is the end to which they 
tend, often blindly, and against the violence of self-interested, materialistic appetite.  
Even ‘the best and the wisest’ among political leaders, Coleridge (Notebooks 1, 
1612) insists, are subject to ‘eyes filmy with drowsy empiricism’, meaning that their 
virtue is limited and ‘akin to certain errors’, with the very passions and instincts acting 
as, I imagine, a hammer and forge, correcting their imperfectly realized virtues. These, 
then, may,  
 
by their folly work out the wisdom of God. (Notebooks 1, 1612) 
 
Coleridge’s romanticized Platonism thus suggests that Ideas can be felt in a sensuous, 
aesthetic modality of mind that is initially unreflective, but is yet a path, low on the 
gradual incline from cave to open sunlight. This ascent is faltering and ever-prone to 
repeated error. As Nietzsche (Maxim 30, TI, [1895] 1990, 34-8) puts it: 
 
                                                 
159 See Saito, 2007, for interesting observations of everyday aesthetics. 
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One rarely falls into a single error. Falling into the first one, one always does too much. 
So one usually perpetrates another one — and now one does too little. 
 
A compulsion to modify and repeat patterns drives an initially somnambulant path 
towards Ideal contemplation and the perfection of virtue. Ideas are thus lived, and deep 
calls to deep. 
Any argument that one holds, any virtue one pursues, and indeed all ends and 
activities ought to be examined, and this is the deeper meaning of the Socratic elenchos 
we discussed in Part One. Most people believe that they already intimately know the 
meaning of their habits, and their aesthetic likes and dislikes. A truly philosophical 
examination therefore requires that one’s ignorance be disclosed at a deep level that 
provides a motivational unease. With this unease, one will then exert his or her mental 
powers to begin to know oneself.  
The revolution in thought and behaviour that this deeply reflective examination 
brings is the practical value of contemplation, which reveals values to live by, rather 
than obscurely felt, powerful Ideas to be misunderstood, or lifeless rules that blindly 
possess and ruin. To sustain responsible, awakened living requires an imaginative 
approach to the life one lives, and to the life abroad, as One Life. Otherwise, one will 
selfishly take one’s own desires and wishes as important truths occasionally distracted 
by the life around us and never think intensely enough how ultimate ends might in fact 
be objective realities much more real than individual fantasies and acquisitive desires. 
Sometimes one may only retrospectively examine, but any worthwhile examination 
will involve contemplation. This can be taken as a maxim toward the greater possession 
of Ideas. To possess Ideas, rather than blindly move in their sway, is to be authentic, i.e. 
to take charge of one’s self and personality in leading a life. Hence the ars biographica 
poetica deepens with praeter-conceptual contemplation. As a cavern forms by an 
underground river coursing through limestone, meditative experience enlarges our 
capacity to echo the transcendent. This deepening, aesthetic application of Ideas 
develops what Coleridge calls ‘the one Life within us and abroad’, and generates 
yearnings beyond conceptually understood experience: 
 
Ideas . . . by means of the IMAGination, by force of which the Man . . . feels Wants . . . 
and proposes to himself Aims & Ends . . . that can be gratified and attained by nothing 
which Experience can offer or suggest. (Notebooks 4, 4692) 
 
We can conceive the primary and secondary imaginations as original and 
secondary poiesis. The primary work configures perception and its poiesis imparts, in 
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my interpretation of Coleridgean imagination, a luminosity of value throughout the 
material of sense, rich in sensuous infinitude. A world in a grain of sand; fun in a 
penguin’s waddle; inevitability in the repeated notes of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony: 
thus fate knocks at the door. The qualitative in these perceptions develops from and 
supervenes upon the physical. Nevertheless, the qualitative construction, as imaginative 
composition, is an everyday work of art, a quotidian wonder.  
Considering profound and intense contemplative experiences, and the ordinary 
intervals of everyday life in between them, I suggested earlier that we have a duty to 
raise, educate, and orient the Here and Now where one is.
160
 This means that 
contemplation is not sufficient if it does not transform oneself and others. The duty, 
often observed by silent example, other times by discernfully careful but clear 
explanation, is to one’s fellow persons, especially to those in one’s care, to family, 
students, and the wider community. A similar duty is also owed to oneself, and to what 
within oneself can be transcended and transformed. As Augustine ([c.390] 1991, 69) 
says, combining Plato and Plotinus with Christianity, and adumbrating existentialist 
commitment to transcendence and authentic, responsible self-making: 
 
Go not abroad. Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth. If you find that 
you are by nature mutable, transcend yourself. But remember in doing so that you must 
also transcend yourself even as a reasoning soul. Make for the place where the light of 
reason is kindled. 
 
One has, in this view of self-transformation, an orienting, educational duty to raise 
oneself as much as to raise others. Plotinus sublimely expresses this, recalling 
Alcibiades’ vision of Socrates’ luminous inner beauty, and suggesting what I call the 
ars biographica poetica: 
 
How then can you see the sort of beauty a good soul has? Go back into yourself and 
look; and if you do not yet see yourself beautiful, then, just as someone making a statue 
which has to be beautiful cuts away here and polishes there and makes one part smooth 
and clears another till ha has given his statue a beautiful face, so you too must cut away 
excess and straighten the crooked and clear the dark and make it bright and never stop 
‘working on your statue’161 till the divine glory of virtue shines out on you, till you see 
‘self-mastery enthroned upon its holy seat’.162  
. . .  [W]hen you see that you have become this, you have become sight; you can 
trust yourself then; you have already ascended and need no one to show you;  
concentrate your gaze and see. (Ennead I, 6.9.5-26) 
 
                                                 
160 Part Two, Ch.9. 
161 Quoting Phaedrus, 252D7, where the lover works on and improves the beloved. 
162 Quoting Phaedrus, 254B7. 
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Understanding this duty of spiritual care to self and surrounding persons raises 
perennial questions surrounding the philosopher’s descent, away from the excellences 
of contemplation, and back down into the shadows of cave, to enlighten, without 
reward, one wonders,
163
 the eikastic ones who might rather murder, says Plato 
(Republic, Bk. VII, 517a), than be removed from the fascinated condition whose chains 
they consider their secure relation to the only true world. The philosopher agreeing to 
turn from the vision of the Good, however, need not lose faith in the eternality of the 
Good that has now been contemplated, and may descend in good faith that it is both the 
right thing to do, and that nothing of the supreme vision is diminished in the new 
descent. As Heraclitus says, 
 
The road up and the road down are one and the same. (Fragment 69) 
 
Making the descent, then, is to replace outer stillness with inner. Nevertheless, it is 
admittedly difficult to remove oneself from the theoretic vision in its outwardly still 
and restful form, and: 
 
you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend 
to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire 
to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted. (Republic, 
516) 
 
Hence, Plato gives the narrator, Socrates, to say that: 
 
they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their 
labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.  
 
But is not this unjust? he [Glaucon, Plato’s brother] said; ought we to give them a worse 
life, when they might have a better?  
 
You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator, who did not 
aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in 
the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making 
them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he 
created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.  
 
Fear of descent, or at least reluctance to leave the vision of contemplation, is 
present also in tales of those Buddhist monks of the Zen and related traditions who 
have attained samādhi (an equanimity preliminary to contemplative insight),164 perhaps 
                                                 
163 Although, as Highet (1950, 16) says, ‘The strangest and best thing about teaching is that a 
seed is dropped into what looks like rocky ground will often stick and take root gradually, and 
spring up years later, sometimes in a bizarre form and oddly hybridized, but still carrying the 
principle of life.’ 
164 See this thesis, 4.1. 
  236 
on a mountain-top, yet will not walk back down to the village for fear of losing this 
state. Nevertheless, as Dōgen says,  
 
Wiping out attachment to satori, we must enter actual society. ([1231-53] 2009, Ch. 1, 
Genjo koan)  
 
I find in Alan Watts’ view on satori (Japanese: enlightenment, awakening, beholding 
true nature), and its relation to the concentration an educator must elicit, good 
explanation of why some are loath to descend into the cave to educate the illusion-
fascinated, non-contemplative community, and if some of these teachers are compelled 
nevertheless to descend, they sometimes do so without sufficient kindness: 
 
what is not understood by many Westerners, and is not understood by many Japanese, is 
that after so many generations every religion undergoes a change because pious 
enthusiasts, or priests, send their children to study at a young age. And the children aren’t 
naturally interested, especially adolescent boys, or college-age boys who would rather be 
over the wall chasing girls. But papa says, ‘You go to the monastery!’ So they get all 
these goofing-off boys in the monastery, and they have to put them into order. (Watts, in 
ed. Monte, 1989, 79) 
 
But those teachers who resort to unkind discipline, or worse, unimaginative exercises 
that impose a mere appearance of order, are, at best, too afraid to lose the peace and 
quiet they believe must necessarily and almost constantly be maintained to ensure 
further contemplation. They as yet lack a certain faith, namely, the confidence that 
epiphanies can appear in the midst of that seemingly chaotic energy of expression and 
exploration in which young minds grow. Such teachers and other professionals know 
the importance of training, but have yet to trust in the assured truth that all persons 
yearn for spiritual growth, and not only a supposedly elite few. As Huxley (1937, 333) 
puts it: 
 
First Shakespeare sonnets seem meaningless; first Bach fugues, a bore; first differential 
equations, sheer torture. But training changes the nature of our spiritual experiences. In 
due course, contact with an obscurely beautiful poem, an elaborate piece of counterpoint 
or of mathematical reasoning, causes us to feel direct intuitions of beauty and 
significance. It is the same in the moral world. 
 
To Coleridge, we can turn for a further example that, though probably fictional, is 
analogous to the philosopher’s or mantic contemplative’s return to the cave. I refer to 
Coleridge’s report of having to attend to the person on business from Porlock, who, he 
says, interrupted his poetic vision in a dream.
165
 Attending respectfully, however, to a 
                                                 
165 De Quincey (1821) says it was Coleridge’s physician, Dr Potter, bringing opium. Whether or 
not a person actually called on business from Porlock, the episode is part of the poem’s mythos, 
and is thus a part of the poem by being included in the prefatory note. I take the note to be of the 
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person knocking at one’s door need not destroy the beauty and goodness of any true 
vision, despite his preface to the great ‘Kubla Khan’ poem that he describes as a 
fragment. Here I quote from the poet’s prefatory note: 
 
On awakening he appeared to himself to have a distinct recollection of the whole, and 
taking his pen, ink, and paper, instantly and eagerly wrote down the lines that are here 
preserved. At this moment he was unfortunately called out by a person on business from 
Porlock, and detained by him above an hour, and on his return to his room, found, to his 
no small surprise and mortification, that though he still retained some vague and dim 
recollection of the general purport of the vision, yet, with the exception of some eight or 
ten scattered lines and images, all the rest had passed away like the images on the surface 
of a stream into which a stone has been cast, but, alas! without the after restoration of the 
latter! (Poetical Works I.1, 511-2) 
 
Its fragmentary appearance is a part of what is marvellous about ‘Kubla Khan’: an 
astonishing work of symbolic imagination that demonstrates and embodies the poiesis 
born of theoria. One can freely imagine, I suggest, the elder Coleridge holding forth in 
his Highgate Circle, influentially enlightening the young minds of London and beyond, 
as not at all afraid of losing the vision in a dream to answer to the business of everyday 
life. Rather, such calls to business are calls for inner celebration, being the practical 
reward of what has been won in contemplation.  
 In the Zen tradition, the state of samādhi (concentrated meditation) is understood 
to be preliminary, a gradual insight that is tenuous because provisional. Because this 
ataraxic state is tenuous and provisional, we can easily understand the adherent’s 
reluctance to relinquish it by descending into the dark cave whose inhabitants fear, 
rather than adore, the bright, clear light. Samādhi does not guarantee satori, which 
enlightenment allows one to descend the mountain, walk among the villagers, and 
participate in daily life while metaphorically remaining a mountain-top contemplative 
because the vision is calmly and clearly retained without any anxiety of loss felt by a 
preliminary state.
166
  
As Coleridge reflects, in ‘This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison’, for the gentle-
hearted, 
 
No sound is dissonant which tells of Life 
                                                                                                                                               
same species of self-referential commentary found in Sterne’s Tristam Shandy; Kierkegaard’s 
‘editorial’ prefaces and notes to his pseudonymous works; and more common in modernist and 
postmodernist works, such as the ludicrously long footnotes in some of Flann O’Brien’s novels. 
166 To reiterate, smṛti (mindfulness), borne of concentrated dhyāna, is a retention of discerned 
truths in the present moment that, if cultivated, can overcome the fear of losing the inner 
treasure of theoretical vision, and can encourage people to share it rather than hide it. For 
discussion using these terms, see eds Fromm, Suzuki, and De Martino ([1974] 1993, passim, 
esp. 46-7). Cf. Abe (1985). 
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and those who confidently contemplate the Good need not lose hope of finding it again 
in the valley, in the village, or even in the marketplace. In this light, I read new 
meaning in Swift’s parodic account of theoretical scientists at the grand Academy of 
Lagado, one of whom: 
 
had been Eight Years upon a Project for extracting Sunbeams out of Cucumbers, which 
were to be put in Vials hermetically sealed, and let out to warm the Air in raw inclement 
Summers. ([1726, 1735] 2010, Ch. 5, 199) 
 
Theoretical science condescending to provide such inefficient service to the community 
may indeed be ludicrous. Nevertheless, the poetic and thus humane value of extracting 
sunbeams, no less, from cucumbers, and storing them in sealed phials, is wonderful to 
imagine.  
The discerning and faithfully remembering mind, as in Zen Buddhist accounts of 
satori, will nevertheless retain the mountain-top vision through the depths of the cave, 
so that while performing the work of the Good, the educating philosopher is still, in one 
sense, on the mountain top, and in that sense has not really left it. The discernful mind, 
then, sees the sun in all its fruits, even in those earthy, silly cucumbers in the shade, and 
not only in the glare of the sun itself. Indeed sunlight is most beautiful for us when 
refracted as rainbows, held in a crystal, diffused through mist or clouds, or reflected, as 
Cooper (2013) revealingly explores, by the surface of the sea.
167
 
Relating to refraction in the cave, Bacon, whom Coleridge calls the British Plato,
168
 
contrasts (a) the Divine Ideas, which include the Universal Laws that leave their 
impressions on nature with (b) the Idols of the Tribe (errors, or obstacles to truth, in 
human nature; of the Cave, on which more below; of the Marketplace (formed by 
intercourse and association of men); and of the Theatre (errors from the various dogmas 
of philosophies). Everyone, he writes, 
 
has a cave or den of his own, which refracts or discolours the light of nature, owing either 
to his own proper or peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others, or 
to the reading of books, and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to 
the differences of impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and 
predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled; or the like. So that the spirit of man 
                                                 
167 Cooper’s phenomenological-aesthetic study draws from philosophy East and West and is 
centrally concerned with aesthetic Idea naturally and expressively found in reflections of 
sunlight on water. Cf. Cheyne, 2014. 
168 Friend I, 488. Coleridge notes differences of style and interest, and that Bacon’s is a reverse 
Platonism of Things not of Words, but also that he is essentially Platonic in his inductive 
approach to the Laws of Nature, which are for him Living Ideas and objective, universal 
principles. 
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(according as it is meted out to different individuals) is in fact a thing variable and full of 
perturbation, and governed as it were by chance. Whence it was well observed by 
Heraclitus that men look for sciences in their own lesser worlds, and not in the greater or 
common world. (1620, Book One, Aphorism XLII) 
 
That the human spirit is full of perturbation, however, is a contingent, reversible, truth, 
and it is precisely for the reversal of exactly this spiritual distress that the philosopher 
must return into the cave. I hope, nevertheless, I have shown reason to be confident that 
in returning to the cave, the theoretical vision need not be lost, and that the 
philosopher’s descent, refracted and diffused though it will be, brings enlightenment, 
like sunbeams smuggled in cucumbers, initiating in obscurely illumined minds a 
longing for and concomitant confidence in a universally comprehending light of reason. 
This faith, however, in the hardiness of theoretical vision in the midst of practical 
engagement is only valid when the contemplative works with a symbolic consciousness 
that remains able to contemplate its theoretic objects on and through everyday 
surroundings. This symbolic consciousness allows inner or potential beauty to shine 
through ordinary objects, and thus cleanse, as Blake instructs, the doors of perception. 
Without this symbolic awareness, one will naturally be diverted and myopically 
fascinated into the eddies and rock-pools of practical life. Though not forgetful of the 
greater theoretic ocean, one will become oblivious that the sounds of the waves, the 
briny tang, the raspy whiffs of kelp, and the seagull’s caws are all signs that one is 
already there, and one must hold all this meaningful being together rather than allow the 
discrete parts to disperse one’s mind in distractions here and there. As Plotinus says, 
 
For everything which is directed to something else is enchanted by something else . . . but 
only that which is self-directed is free from enchantment. For this reason all practical 
action is under enchantment, and the whole life of the practical man . . . . 
Contemplation alone remains incapable of enchantment because no-one who is self-
directed is subject to enchantment: for he is one, and that which he contemplates is 
himself, and his reason is not deluded, but he makes what he ought and makes his own 
life and work. (Ennead IV, 4.43-4) 
 
Making one’s own life and work out of contemplation; contemplating, amid practical 
life, and unenchanted by it: this is what I call the ars biographica poetica, a creative 
discovery sustained in the act of faith. 
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4.5 Contemplation: Useless and the yardstick of every possible use  
A successful expression of aesthetic Idea is compelling. It activates the mind with 
feelings whose profound import is emotionally and aesthetically meaningful and yet 
whose significance remains mysterious. Cage (1973, 12) describes music as 
‘purposeless play’, and was careful to explain this as: 
 
an affirmation of life – not an attempt to bring order out of chaos nor to suggest 
improvements in creation, but simply a way of working up to the very life we’re living. 
 
Music as tone and timbre is capable of expressing aesthetic Ideas to the highest degree. 
This is because no concepts can be sufficiently adequate to the music, just as no 
concepts can ever be adequate to the Idea. Thus music in its most aesthetically 
expressive instances overflows the understanding. The mind is set in motion. The 
breeze stirs and wafts the leaves. The auditor becomes a poet as long as the mind 
awakens to the call. The call is heard from within as much as from afar. The poetic call 
is heard from within, because something profound is recognized which the mind stirs to 
recall, trace, and reminisce. Thus anamnesis, or recollection, is an apt description of the 
process. The poetic call is heard from afar, because the object stimulating aesthetic 
attention is something external. In this call, deep calls to deep in the correspondence of 
Idea to thought. 
Cage’s understanding of music recalls Kant’s criterion of purposiveness without 
purpose, whereby aesthetic contemplation arises: 
 
because we meet with a certain finality in its perception, which, in our estimate of it, is 
not referred to any end whatever. (CJ, §17) 
 
Kant regarded instrumental music as one of the few arts exhibiting only free rather 
than dependent beauty. Free beauty is that which is not dependent on concepts. Thus in 
the admiration of an abstract sculpture, for example, what is admired are the shapes, 
textures, and indistinct evocations, rather than a comparison to any particular thing. 
However, it is here where Kant must part from Cage and Coleridge. For the very reason 
that instrumental music lacks clear concepts, it must, for Kant, join the ranks of the 
merely agreeable, and not the fine, arts. Music, as Kant hears it, provides: 
 
nothing but sensations without concepts, so that unlike poetry it leaves us with nothing to 
meditate about. (CJ, §328)  
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Contrasting Kant’s position, my contemplative position holds that instrumental music 
does indeed specify nothing to meditate about; nonetheless, I argue, it sometimes 
presents meditation itself. Kant has a response to this, however, namely that music: 
 
nevertheless does agitate the mind more diversely and intensely [than poetry], even if 
merely temporarily. However, it is admittedly more a matter of enjoyment than of culture 
(the play of thought that it arouses incidentally is merely the effect of an association that 
is mechanical, as it were). (CJ, §328) 
  
Kant’s position regarding the meditation aroused by instrumental music is that thought 
has merely been agitated by the mechanics of association. Coleridge was both charmed 
and dismissive (regarding seriousness and meditative depth) of the Aeolian harp as 
‘music slumbering on her instrument’ (and of course, not really music), and equally 
charmed and dismissive of this instrument’s human equivalent, which is a kind of 
speculative daydreaming, the play of loosely directed Fancy following trains of 
association. For Kant, instrumental music fits into the same category of the charming 
yet unimportant, and for him it is because the composition is non-conceptual. This non-
conceptual status would, on the other hand, be a merit for Coleridge, with his high 
evaluation of that which evokes the Ideas beyond the conceptual. 
A compelling virtue of instrumental music is that it does not direct the audience, 
unless it is banal and obvious, regarding the content of what is to be meditated on. 
Ideally then, instrumental music encourages meditation without intrusion. I argue, from 
a Coleridgean position, that instrumental music does not merely agitate the mind into 
meditation, with its mechanical associations, for example, but that it presents, if 
successful, its own form of meditative mood. This presentation can be accomplished by 
literal resonance, as in Cage’s ‘Dream’ (1948), or by its use of ‘playing the silences’, by 
the use of a rondo form, which creates the contemplative frame and musical form we 
observed in what Coleridge calls his Meditation Poems. The various meanings of return 
are conveyed in rhythm and in rhyme, and these meanings are given whether the content 
be of meaning constructed by verbal description, visual images, or musical tone.  
Return can mean repetition, or it can mean a similarity that progresses, or regresses; 
elevates, or descends. These meanings include notions of advance or regression in life 
projects, or wisdom, or notions of acceptance, or frustration, and so on. Such 
foundational meditation, which is not overly concerned about content, or precisely what 
to think, but attends to how one attends and appreciates, is a foundation of the ars 
biographica poetica. The fundamental meanings of departure and return, and of 
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expectation and surprise, help comprise our basic comprehension of life, with its 
necessities and contingencies. These fundamental meanings, which are essentially 
musical, invite reflection yet they are more basic than any conceptual assertion. The 
poetic meanings of rhyme and reason are deeper than any concepts of the 
understanding, which latter require the former as a base. 
Such meanings can be conveyed in musical and poetic structure, with elements 
such as tone, tempo, resonance, and pause adding significant nuances to the meaning. 
Contrary to Kant, the ‘sensations without concepts’ in instrumental music allow it the 
possibility of pure meditative expression, the meaning of which comes directly from the 
form and nuance of this expression. To the elevation of instrumental music, and not to 
its denigration, meaning is not dictated in any conceptual progression, for none is 
presented. No formula can be given to guarantee the presentation of meditative mood in 
music, just as no formula can be given to guarantee success in any of the fine arts. 
Nevertheless I have shown that it is possible to approach instrumental music with a 
view to inquiring into what is meditative in the form that it takes, rather than assuming, 
as did Kant, that because it is non-conceptual, any meditation it stirs must be merely 
agitation by mechanical association. 
Cage indicates an ideal possibility open to art, whereby directedness remains 
unconceptualized. Contemplation and the ideas it evokes can be seen as profounder 
values that are the ground of every possible purpose, and are not themselves purposes. 
Thus the Platonist neo-Thomist Pieper (1989, 123) says, 
 
For it is contemplation which preserves in the midst of human society the truth which is 
at one and the same time useless and the yardstick of every possible use. So it is also 
contemplation which keeps the end in sight, gives meaning to every practical act of life.’   
 
Pieper’s evaluation of contemplation as ‘useless and the yardstick of every possible use’ 
sides him with Coleridge, in that Coleridge knows Idea as ‘given by knowledge of its 
ultimate aim’ (Constitution, 12). The beholding in contemplation is thus distinguishable 
from the grasp of the concept and includes a waking up and attending to the worth and 
value that gives meaning and point to all possible purposes. 
This awakening may be attained through dynamic or still meditation, as in the 
ritsuzen, such as in archery, and zazen, sitting meditation, of Dōgen’s Sōtō Zen practice. 
It may also be attained through the stirring of aesthetic Ideas in the experience of high 
art. It may even break into ordinary experience, bicycling around a corner, sun warming 
the skin, reflected in wheel-sprayed puddle water. No concept is adequate to or can 
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contain the much thought occasioned by the experience of the sublime or the beautiful. 
Empirical concepts gain in depth and evocative richness by this mental effort, but to 
reach their mark, to approach their destination, the aesthetic Ideas call upon the Ideas of 
reason to find their resonance. Through aesthetic Ideas, empirical concepts gain in 
evocativeness, but their dynamism is a movement towards the rational ideas. Without 
this compulsion towards the Ideas of reason there would be nothing to be evoked. When 
an aesthetic Idea does not add to the evocativeness of an empirical concept, it has 
merely added a cluster of suggestive empirical associations. 
This resonance is not the adequation between concepts and phenomena that is the 
understanding’s rightful field of expertise. Poetic resonance involves meaning and 
appropriateness that is deeply felt, but which operates otherwise and differently from 
conceptually indicative acts of meaning. The contemplation I am aiming at is not 
assertoric in the sense of asserting a distal object to have some properties and relations 
and not have others. It is not a claim to that sort of knowledge. Trying to present poetic 
resonance, I am drawn to a cluster of metaphors around anamnesis. It is not cognizing, 
but recognizing and ‘waking up to the very life we’re living’.  
The ideal of fine art is in one sense the ideal of Śākyamuni Buddha’s Flower 
Sermon. The white flower is silently held up: a wordless sermon. The disciples are 
untouched, or perhaps bemused, save one, Mahākāśyapa, who gently smiles. In the 
Japanese Zen tradition, the story is known as the nengemisho, literally ‘pick up flower, 
subtle smile’. 169  Was it reception, or recognition that the disciple who smiled 
experienced? Both possibilities are contained in the notion of poetic resonance. 
The meaning achieved in poetic resonance is fulfilling as ideas are awakened. 
Unbound, we feel their shimmering, their musical vibration and appropriateness. For 
Coleridge, as for Plato, an Idea is one, not many. The same Idea in two minds is one, 
and not two. We may have different concepts according to our different and individual 
experiences, but if we share an Idea, we share the same Idea. Were it not the same Idea, 
it would be a concept abstracted from particular experiences, and thus, however subtly, 
different from the next person’s concept.  
Coleridge maintains that Ideas influence thoughts and actions, and that this happens 
for most people, most of the time, with neither a distinct consciousness of it nor an 
                                                 
169
 The story is not in the Pali canon, but Suzuki (1961, 60) calls it an important Zen teaching. 
Harmless’s (2007, 192) more recent study suggests that the influential, apocryphal story was 
probably first told in China by Ch’an Buddhists. 
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ability ‘to express it in definite words’ (Constitution, 12). Art conveying aesthetic Ideas 
is one way to experience this calling to the Idea. Śākyamuni’s dharma transmission of 
prajñā (wisdom) is another, although the term transmission does not quite express the 
reality. Something like ‘intuiting a resonance’ works better, implying more activity on 
both sides than ‘transmission’ connotes. Only one disciple, after all, acknowledged the 
lesson. 
This resonance is a quiet joy, Cage’s vibration ‘to the very life we’re living’. The 
preposition to in that clause (‘a vibration to the very life we’re living’) relates a 
distance, a two-ness, that is overcome in resonance. In poetic resonance, the mind itself 
recognizes that it is no secluded island, and that every intimation and felt yearning 
involves others. Poetic intimations discover their objective reference through resonance. 
The unplayed violin, when played for the first time, realizes – feels in the resonance – 
that its secret yearnings and intimations were never secret after all, and were indeed 
truer and more real than it ever dared to dream. 
Zhuangzi (Ch. 27a) relies on resonance to intimate the ineffable in his Daoist 
writings:  
 
I have spoken without art, naturally, according to . . . impulse . . . . Preliminary to all 
discourses, there pre-exists an innate harmony in all beings. From the fact of this pre-
exisiting harmony, my speech, if it is natural, will make others vibrate. 
 
The communicative effect that stirs and intimates meaning beyond conceptual 
description is, for Zhuangzi, a vibration: a poetic resonance. Thus contemplation is of 
the highest value, not merely in giving rest to conceptual understanding, but to breathe 
in, to be inspired, and to appreciate the connection and resonance with those 
profoundest ideas that shape our ends and aims. As Coleridge writes,  
 
All men live in the power of Ideas which work in them, though few live in their light. 
(Cited in Muirhead, 1954, 99) 
 
This observation implies that unless we live in the light of Ideas, we are condemned to 
repeat their inadequate conceptual misapplication. We would, then, be condemned to 
repeat the same mistakes in unfinished projects urged, like the Freudian return of the 
repressed, by the repetition compulsion that makes us rewrite episodes in the 
biographies we write with our lives. The drive to repeat compels us until we live not 
just under Ideas, but in their light by approaching them. Contemplation brings us to live 
in their light, however easily we may be called out of it again. 
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Conceptual activity will interrupt and disturb contemplative activity, much as a 
visit by a person from Porlock will interrupt and disturb poetic reverie. Contemplative 
activity is no ‘indolent vacuity of thought’, yet it must seem so to one who holds the 
conceptual work of the understanding to be the end and apex of human thinking. I read 
‘Frost at Midnight’ as a positive response, championing contemplative activity, to 
Cowper’s ‘The Winter Evening’, Book IV of ‘The Task’. Cowper recognizes that the 
play of superstition, which for Coleridge is an act of fancy, provides a well-earned rest 
for the conceptual thinker. 
 
’Tis thus the understanding takes repose 
In indolent vacuity of thought, 
And sleeps and is refreshed. 
 
The play of fancy charms and diverts. Cowper’s understanding in repose is like a 
grandparent who gently smiles, solaced and refreshed, observing grandchildren in 
innocent play. For him, the purpose of contemplation is negative; it serves the 
conceptual understanding by giving it respite. The play is innocent, but not nonsensical: 
 
Meanwhile the face 
Conceals a mood lethargic with a mask 
Of deep deliberation, as the man 
Were task’d to his full strength, absorb’d and lost.  
 
Cowper sees the visage of contemplation as shed skin, the sleep mask of a resting 
understanding. The mask of seemingly deep deliberation is, for him, merely a surface 
apparition. It is as if the grandchildren look up from play and fancy to see the elder in 
serious thought, which is yet, for Cowper, an illusion. While children play horses with 
brooms, the mature mind is but resting, filling out the vacant with correspondent 
vacancy. 
 
Thus oft, reclined at ease, I lose an hour 
At evening, till at length the freezing blast 
That sweeps the bottled shutter summons home 
The recollected powers; and snapping short 
The glassy thread with which the fancy weaves 
Her brittle toils, restores me to myself. 
 
Though contemplation may arise at sparks from fancy’s play, its concerns are profound. 
Its deep deliberation is no mask, and its pursuit is no evening hour lost. In 
contemplation, everyday concerns crystallize and hold the light with their bestilled 
form. It is in these contemplative moods that everyday rituals and appearances are 
revealed for what they preserve. Contemplation amid the everyday takes a sabbatical 
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form, with the mind not unreflectively engaged with everyday concerns, but 
appreciating the good that they preserve, which is ordinarily hidden behind the film of 
familiarity (Biographia II, 7). Deeply resonant, contemplation is thus quietly attending, 
appreciative, and outflowing acknowledgement. 
The mind’s working towards a quiet epiphany is truly experienced in ‘Frost at 
Midnight’. The fanciful, idle seeking for companionable forms in the play of soot on the 
fire grate gives way to the circling energies of contemplation proper, taking in its rondo 
the poet’s past and future biography, that of his cradled, sleeping son, and beyond, to 
acknowledge, in communion, forms of nature interpreted as expressing aesthetic Ideas 
intimating divinity, meaningful continuity, and peace. 
 
Whether the eave-drops fall 
Heard only in the trances of the blast, 
Or if the secret ministry of frost 
Shall hang them up in silent icicles, 
Quietly shining to the quiet moon. 
 
In the contemplative movement of his developed meditation, Coleridge, as in Cage’s 
suggestion about music, worked up to the very life we’re living. The import of his quiet 
epiphany is intimately related to the gentle, circular, gathering that develops from 
meditative experience. This contemplative movement is the musical form of Coleridge’s 
meditative poem. Such movement and development can be heard in the best of Cage’s 
musical compositions. From Coleridge’s quiet meditation, ‘inaudible as dreams’, we 
turn to ‘Dream’, Cage’s melody for piano.170 
 
Dream (1948) was written for piano, using the rhythmic structure of a dance by Merce 
Cunningham. The long, unaccompanied melody creates resonances in itself, like a soft and 
meditative mood . . . . The work foreshadows minimalism . . . creating a sense of curving, 
circular time, carrying the listener through organic and celestial landscapes. (Program Note, 
Stolarik, University of Texas, November 15
th
, 2007, italics mine) 
 
This haunting, returning and gathering composition perfectly conveys the soft and 
meditative mood of contemplation by being itself contemplative. In the sheet music 
notes, Cage instructs: 
 
Rubato; Always with resonance; no silence, tones may be freely sustained, manually or 
with pedal, beyond noted durations.  
 
The movement of the piece, essentially one line of melody, invites, and is, a broadening 
of perspective. It is as if the circular time it shapes creates a templum at its centre, an 
                                                 
170 Please listen at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=ExUosomc8Uc. 
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encompassed space for beholding. Even the ordinary, when contemplated here, is deep 
with value, as in Aristotle’s account of Heraclitus’ visitors, like tourists, wishing to see 
a profound philosopher in serious meditation, but were then surprised to see him 
warming by the stove (On the Parts of the Animals, I.5, 645a17). Even here in the 
kitchen, says Heraclitus, encouraging these hesitant visitors over the threshold, gods are 
present. Coleridge’s fireside meditation at the transitional moment of midnight, moves 
beyond the fanciful toying with the sooty film at the hearth grate. The meditation does 
not settle into fancy’s idle play, but rises up to match the reality, life, and reflection 
within and without, ultimately to resonate in the Coleridgean symbol of the icicles, 
‘quietly shining to the quiet moon.’ 
The rondo returns to the initial mood and setting, in what Coleridge calls a ‘rondo 
and return upon itself’.171 The thinker, after contemplative journey, now possesses the 
awakened Idea instead of being obscurely possessed and drawn by its shadows. As 
Plotinus describes it: 
 
The man, then, is alone free from enchantment who when his other parts are trying to 
draw him say that none of the things are good which they declare to be so, but only that 
which he knows himself, not deluded or pursuing, but possessing it. (Ennead IV, 4.44) 
 
Still in awe of the Idea, the thinker may now consciously appreciate and apply it such 
that the true end is kept in sight. The fascinated thinker in meditation is first in fancy’s 
sway, enchanted, then, crucially, moves through it, to imagination, and thence to 
contemplate the meaning and potential value of his biography and its ethical 
significance. This wider social significance redeems his past in gentle remembrance, 
garnering value even from what might seem merely regrettable when judged only 
conceptually. This past is related, in the widening, circling movement, to ‘the 
innumerable goings on of life / Inaudible as dreams’. All of this is gathered still further, 
involving, and giving value and significance, to the poetic, biographic potential of the 
cradled infant. Ultimately, meditation stirs the contemplative rondo, which returns, 
gathers, returns, and then stays, as the soul waxes with what it contemplates. 
 
                                                 
171
 Coleridge’s annotated ‘Frost at Midnight’ in Beaumont’s copy of the MS, quoted in Poetical 
Works I.1, 456. 
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4.6 Concluding Remarks: contemplative practice and Ideas in human life 
The theory of imagination achieves fruition with Coleridge, who, to reiterate, sees 
imagination in its primary and secondary modes. Primary imagination approaches Ideas 
drawing them down to enrich ordinary life, and secondary imagination, under a greater 
degree of voluntarily control, creates art capable of a higher aesthetic order. Because in 
this theory imagination approaches Ideas, I argue that it develops a Platonist, 
contemplative tradition, and argues for an Ideal source of value intimated by aesthetic 
productions. In this view, art and also ordinary life are shaped in pursuit of Ideas. The 
creative goal is not to reflect the obscurity of human understanding and feeling, but to 
enlighten them.  Coleridgean imagination, then, reaches beyond the understanding. It is 
visionary: conveying life-enhancing Ideas worth striving for; creating entire cultures in 
trying to recreate, and aesthetically, materially, represent its vision.  
Understanding, at its very best, serves imagination as its auxiliary, though it only 
seldom grasps the importance of the superior vision, and often denies the existence of 
what it can neither grasp nor or calculate. The medial status of understanding, however, 
does not make imagination something ultimate. Unlike understanding, imagination, 
which accepts its status as an approach, does not deny its own medial nature, and can 
thereby transcend it. Thus when imagination aesthetically conveys meaning by giving 
Ideas tangible expression, it becomes tinged with the Ideality it transports. It is as if in 
serving the Idea, imagination reveals its kinship with it. Imagination is inferior to Idea 
in that the former must approach and discover the latter. Nevertheless, imagination is 
akin to Idea in that it cannot discover anything without itself being able to create a 
likeness of that thing, even if what imagination creates is only the accommodating 
space, the con-templum, able to receive the Idea. 
Understanding, in contrast, is a rule-following faculty, and it is a mistake to let it 
assume the intellectual crown. Indeed, holding up the understanding’s concept-
manipulating skill as the mind’s glory actually hinders intellectual development. This is 
so because the mind cannot aspire beyond the understanding’s medial nature if it is not 
even recognized. Humility, then, suggests itself as a corrective virtue through which the 
understanding can accept its subordinate position. This suggestion runs through Kant’s 
three Critiques, which limit the reach and import of the understanding’s concepts, and 
indicate the space necessary for faith to inhabit a world of value, rather than limiting it 
to a world of facts about appearances. In this axiological space, goodness and beauty 
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have ultimate meaning in, through, and beyond the world of phenomena and facts, 
pleasures and inclinations.  
Yet this is not to suggest two worlds. I have been careful throughout this thesis to 
bring speculation back to the principle that the ‘world of appearances’ is no separate 
world but is rather the appearance of reality to sense, desire, and understanding. Only in 
contemplation is reality considered beyond appearance. As the great ascetic sages 
assert, from Parmenides to Plotinus, and through the Vedantists and the Buddha to 
Laozi and the Eastern meditatives, ordinary desires are destined not for abiding 
satisfaction, but for repetition and confusion. It follows from this meditative view that 
countless ordinary desires are, in fact, diversions from a greater yearning that can only 
be satisfied with contemplation towards abiding peace.  
However, there are those who believe that this ultimate reality, which Aristotle 
(Metaphysics 12, Chs 7 and 9) defines as thought thinking itself (noesis noeseos), is 
reflected in their very selves. After all, if there is anything abidingly real about oneself, 
then it must partake of reality. This conclusion about the noumenal reality of the self is 
the starting point of post-Kantians such as Fichte, and especially Schopenhauer, who 
look hopefully to the self as that which we both are and perceive, and which is thereby 
our direct access to non-phenomenal reality.  
Coleridge is also, I argue, a post-Kantian thinker, but he is more securely placed 
within the tradition of British Platonism, which tradition he helps to identify. His 
important break from Kant lies in his theorizing an imaginative access to objective 
Ideas, rather than, like other post-Kantians, concentrating on the theoretical connections 
of the Ego to noumenal reality. Nevertheless, this sense of the real, rather than 
psychological, ego (as Kant distinguishes the in-itself self from the apparent one) is 
operative in Coleridge. For example, in a paragraph that seems very likely to influence 
Yeats’s ‘For Anne Gregory’172 (his poem for the young woman who wished to be loved 
for herself alone, and not her yellow hair), he proposes that: 
 
it is among the mysteries, and abides in the dark ground-work of our nature, to crave an 
outward confirmation of that something within us, which is our very self, that something, 
not made up of our qualities and relations, but itself the supporter and substantial basis of 
all these.  Love me, and not my qualities may be a vicious and an insane wish, but it is 
not a wish wholly without a meaning.  (Biographia II, 216) 
                                                 
172 That the passage I quote inspired Yeats to write ‘For Anne Gregory’ seems even more likely 
when we remember both how influential Coleridge was on Yeats’ thought and verse, and that 
the water-insect passage, also in Biographia, is undeniably the inspiration behind another Yeats 
poem, ‘Long-Legged Fly’. 
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Consonant with this desire for outward confirmation of our deepest selves’ reality, is the 
imaginative drive towards contemplating the Ideas that: (a) gives Ideas aesthetic 
expression, and (b) discovers them already expressed in deeply meaningful yet only 
obscurely understood aspects of our lives and cultures, perhaps in nature too, and 
certainly in our aesthetic appreciation of it. Coleridge is thus confident that his search 
for meaning simultaneously discovers and creates because he is confident that in its 
highest levels, mind is not only active and passive, but that it both passively acts and 
actively receives. 
Accordingly, in this thesis I have presented Coleridge as profoundly concerned 
with the human search for objective meaning. He thus develops the long tradition of 
Platonic accounts of that search, and study of his works can therefore revive in modern 
thinkers a much-needed concern for contemplation. Developing from Coleridge a case 
for considering contemplation as a fundamental and perennial concern of philosophy, I 
discern two kinds of mental passivity, one hindering contemplation, the other advancing 
it.  
The kind of passivity Coleridge disparages is the passivity central to French 
Mechanist and British Empiricist models of mind. This passivity he finds to be 
reductive and only partially true of no more than the lowest levels of receptive and 
reproductive mind. My thesis has also indicated a counterbalancing higher passivity 
praised by Coleridge, one that is a kind of creative discovery. This creative passivity 
actively attends to Ideas as comprising objective reality. It is creative in anticipating 
Ideas by providing them with a receptive space, and then by clothing them in aesthetic 
forms so that Ideas become transmitted as culturally meaningful, transformative powers. 
Thus Coleridge argues for the superiority of the unifying ‘act of the mind itself, a 
manifestation of intellect, and not a spontaneous and uncertain production of 
circumstances’ (SWF II, 630). Intellect, then, progresses with what he calls a ‘leading 
thought’, which ‘key note’ manifests a ‘captain Idea’, which is a ‘subtile, cementing, 
subterraneous power’ (SWF II, 630). 
Following Plotinus, Coleridge often employs the imagery of the seed to explain the 
educational and cultivating role of Ideas. Thus, for example, his clerisy would 
disseminate, and all genuine creativity is for him an organic growth. The seed, then, is 
for Coleridge, as for Plotinus, a universal and powerful symbol, a principle of existence, 
and not just a convenient metaphor. The Idea itself is like the genetic, shaping 
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information within a seed. The seed with its husk actualized the material and aesthetic 
conveyance, or dissemination, of the Idea. After the Idea-seed germinates, the plant 
grows in all directions at once. Roots penetrate into the cultural past for physical 
security and nourishment. Simultaneously, the stem and leaves strain up for new light, 
air, and water in the air. And then, ‘From the first or initiative idea, as from a seed, 
successive ideas germinate’ (SWF II, 633). 
This image of the Idea taking root in human life, and making cultures grow in an 
almost vegetal way is a very apt one. It shows how cultural growth, scientific and 
artistic, is often not fully conscious, much as Koestler (1959) describes cosmology, 
from Mesopotamian times to Newton, as developing through a series sleepwalking 
geniuses. Often, that is to say, the creative mind is scarcely aware of the full import of 
astonishing discoveries and theories to which they are guided by reason. Thus Coleridge 
says that: 
 
The Idea may exist in a clear, distinct, definite form of an accurate geometrician; or it 
may be a mere instinct, a vague appetency toward something which the mind incessantly 
hunts for but cannot find. . . . In the infancy of the human mind, all our ideas are instincts; 
and language is happily contrived to lead us from the vague to the distinct, from the 
imperfect to the full and finished form. (SWF II, 633) 
 
To this I add that whereas mere instinct towards Idea is vague and prone to stray with 
diversions of desire and misconstruals of meaning, in contemplation, thought merges 
with the Idea contemplated. Like a pool reflecting the sun, contemplation (because calm 
and still) allows very little of the medium to intervene in the clear vision. In ordinary 
life, on the other hand, desire, distraction, diversion, association, and so on, disturb the 
clarity of mind necessary to approach Ideas consciously. 
Related to this contrast between (a) chaotic desires propelling associative thought 
and (b) the clarity of undisturbed contemplation, there is a popular but misconceived 
notion that the life of the creative artistic or scientific genius may be, perhaps even must 
be, unkempt and chaotic if it is to produce elegant, cultivating works. Rousseau, for 
example, abandoned his children to leave him free to educate wealthy parents’ children 
and compose theoretical treatises on the subject. I oppose to this notion the idea of a 
simple perfectionism that seeks always to develop ‘the instinctive approach toward an 
idea’ into a fully reflective, then discerning and contemplative approach. The unkempt, 
sleepwalking genius indeed produces great works, but often the message tragically fails 
to convey effectively to the very author, let alone to society at large. Someone, 
however, whose life and art are in close accord, and fashioned through the same 
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principles, fashions life itself into the bow that fires creative intellect’s arrows. An adept 
of the ars biographica poetica will therefore say with Yeats (1919): ‘Hammer your 
thoughts into unity’! 
It is true that important directions and discoveries emerge from instinctive 
gropings, but the goal is to render this darkness visible, and not to seek its obscurity in 
order to remain hidden. The contemplative’s practical goal is to be a light for others, 
and not to become hidden again, only this time in a cave of higher altitude then the one 
just crawled from. To follow the guiding Idea so that culture progresses: 
 
requires, in short, a constant wakefulness of mind, so that if we wander but in a single 
instance from our path, we cannot reach the goal, but by retracing our steps to the point of 
divergency, and thence beginning progress anew. (SWF II, 633) 
 
As I have emphasized throughout this thesis, if Ideas are to mean anything to us, they 
must be discovered in imagination and given aesthetic expression. Thus: 
 
Events and images, the lively and spirit-stirring machinery of the external world, are like 
light and air, and moisture, to the seed of the mind. . . . In all processes of mental 
evolution the objects of the senses must stimulate the mind; and the mind must in turn 
assimilate and digest the food it thus receives from without. (SWF II, 634) 
 
Life, then, is to be perfected in all its aspects, cultivated by Ideas. It must also give back 
to the cultural soil from which it derived the materials for its own growth and material 
form. This is to acknowledge the practical value of contemplation, as my thesis’ title 
promises. Contemplation, then, is not just a lone, mountain-top activity, but requires a 
two-way participation that both sustains itself with natural and artistic beauty and 
nourishes others by contributing to society.  
On this theme of contemplation descending down to earth without disavowing its 
aim and purpose, I give the last word to Coleridge, who gives persuasive and poetic 
expression to what I call the active-contemplative life. This beautiful, though hitherto 
apparently unquoted passage, alludes to Milton’s Paradise Lost (ll. 742-5). The allusion 
can be detected in the thematic similarity, i.e. the descent from contemplation, and in 
the nearness of phrasing. Milton writes: 
 
                                        . . . from Morn 
To Noon he fell, from Noon to dewy Eve, 
A Summer's day; and with the setting Sun 
Dropt from the Zenith like a falling Star. 
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The descent is, for Milton, Satanic, and the angel is debarred from Heaven. For 
Coleridge, however, descent from the highest atmosphere nourishes, rather than 
forecloses contemplation. He claims, therefore, that: 
 
The mind that is rich and exuberant in this intellectual wealth is apt, like a miser, to dwell 
upon the vain contemplation of its riches, is disposed to generalize and methodize to 
excess, ever philosophising, and never descending to action;––spreading its wings high in 
the air above some beloved spot, but never flying far and wide over earth and sea, to seek 
food, or to enjoy the endless beauties of nature; the fresh morning, the warm noon, and 
the dewy eve. (SWF II, 634) 
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Meditative Poetry: Coleridge’s poetic accounts of meditative experience 
This appendix presents an account of contemplation and meditative experience in three 
of Coleridge’s self-styled ‘Meditative Poems’. Sibylline Leaves (Preface, i), published 
in the same week as Biographia (1817), gathers: 
 
the whole of the author’s poetical compositions, from 1793 to the present date, with the 
exception of a few works not yet finished, and those published in the first edition of his 
juvenile poems, over which he has no control. 
 
Sibylline Leaves (163-213) thus groups thirteen ‘Meditative Poems in Blank 
Verse’.173 I provide philosophical commentary, shaped by the approach of my thesis, to 
three of these, namely ‘The Eolian Harp’, ‘This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison’, and 
‘Frost at Midnight’.  
I will also look to a fourth poem, ‘Dejection: An Ode’ for an aesthetic-meditative 
account of beauty and contemplation. This ode is neither blank verse, nor grouped by 
Coleridge among his Meditative Poems, but is included here for its relevance to 
Coleridge’s aesthetics. For the reader’s convenience, these four poems comprise 
Appendix C, reproduced from Mays’ Reading Text edition (Poetical Works I). I select 
these poems specifically for their meditative form and content, although much of 
Coleridge’s verse throughout his career is meditative in a broader sense. 174  The 
Meditative Poems, like the Notebooks, help situate his approach to imagination and 
Idea applied in his poetic thought. 
The category Conversation Poems is often given to Coleridge’s blank verse, 
following ‘The Nightingale: A Conversation Poem’. This subtitle alludes to Horace’s 
description of his own poetry of daily life and of his gently satirical, reasoning verse as 
perhaps ‘too prosy’. Coleridge uses Horace’s original phrase, Sermoni propriora (lit. 
nearer to conversation: Satires, 1.4.39) as epigraph to his ‘Reflections on Having Left a 
Place of Retirement’. Commentators since Abrams often group these poems for 
thematic reasons, and not only because of their unrhymed iambic pentameter. Calling 
                                                 
173
 Namely, ‘Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouny’; ‘Lines Written in the Album at 
Elbingerode, in the Harz Forest’; ‘On Observing a Blossom’; ‘The Eolian Harp’; ‘Reflections 
on Having Left a Place of Retirement’; ‘To the Rev. George Coleridge’;  ‘Inscription for a 
Fountain on a Heath’; ‘A Tombless Epitaph’; ‘This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison’; ‘To a Friend, 
Who had Declared his Intention of Writing no more Poetry’; ‘To A Gentleman’ (later titled, ‘To 
William Wordsworth’); ‘The Nightingale’; and ‘Frost at Midnight’. Annotating a copy of 
Sibylline Leaves: ‘Let me be excused, if it should seem to others too mere a trifle to justify my 
noticing it––but I have some claim to the thanks of no small number of the readers of poetry in 
having first introduced this species of short blank verse poems––of which Southey, Lamb, 
Wordsworth, and others have since produced so many exquisite specimens.’ 
174 As Mays (2013, 179 ff., and passim) argues. 
Appendix B 
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‘The Nightingale’ a Conversation Poem stresses listening with nature, rather than 
projecting onto it. The sense of conversation as mutual turning cannot have escaped 
Coleridge. Thus, in conversational turning, his nightingales ‘answer and provoke each 
other’s songs’. He regrets that poets have emblemized the nightingale as a melancholy 
bird, likely because:  
 
some night-wandering man whose heart was pierced  
With the remembrance of a grievous wrong, 
Or slow distemper, or neglected love, 
(And so poor Wretch! Fill’d all things with himself 
And made all gentle sounds tell back the tale 
Of his own sorrow) he, and such as he, 
First named these notes a melancholy strain 
 
Now ‘many a poet echoes the conceit’, when it would be better to stretch ‘his limbs 
/ Beside a brook in mossy forest-dell’ and really listen to ‘the merry Nightingale’ ‘with 
fast thick warble’ and ‘delicious tones’. Instead, however, the poet and his kind 
unobservantly, ‘heave their sighs / O’er Philomela’s pity-pleading strains.’175 Here we 
take our meditative theme in Coleridge’s poetry, moving beyond projected fancy to the 
truer listening of contemplation. 
Coleridge was celebrated for his trance-like, and often trance-inducing recitation 
style. Mary Shelley recalls hiding beneath the sofa, frightened and entranced by 
Coleridge’s recitation of ‘The Rime of The Ancient Mariner’ in her father, Godwin’s, 
parlour (Montillo, 2013, 13-17). Coleridge can sometimes embody the mantic poet 
before whom one closes one’s eyes in holy dread. This mood prepares for, and is 
sufficient but not itself necessary for, imaginative contemplation, and is: 
 
that willing suspension of disbelief, which constitutes poetic faith. (Biographia II, 6) 
 
This poetic mood inaugurates a con-templum, much as Heidegger (‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art’, ed. Krell, 1999, 139-212), inspired by Hölderlin, understands the work of 
art as what he calls a propriative event that frames and makes possible the appearance of 
certain truths. Such artworks are world-opening, culturally resonant and formative, in 
that they allow possibilities to be seen, and provide the necessary moods in which such 
appearances can become manifest. One of Heidegger’s examples is the Greek temple in 
the rock-cleft valley:  
 
                                                 
175 Philomela: the mythical Athenian princess whose tongue was excised after her rape. She 
metamorphosed into a nightingale, explaining the muteness of the female and the plaintive, to 
some, song of the male. 
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By means of the temple, the god is present in the temple. This presence of the god is in 
itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct . . . Standing there 
the building rests on rocky ground . . . holds its ground against the storm raging above it 
and so first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence. . . . The temple’s firm 
towering makes visible the invisible space of air. . . . Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake 
and cricket first enter into their distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they 
are. . . . The temple-work opens up a world and at the same time sets this world, which 
only thus emerges as native ground back again on earth . . . The temple, in its standing 
there, first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves. (Heidegger, 
ed. Krell, 1999, 167-8) 
 
Coleridge’s ‘Kubla Khan’ chants the culturally world-forming power of poetry in 
similar terms, which that poem itself both embodies and conjures. In the following 
poems, however, I will trace the forms and content of meditation leading to 
contemplation in four gentler, sometimes domestic, poems by Coleridge. These poems, 
in their more domestic elements, can be aligned with Heidegger’s example of the 
humble but radiantly world-opening peasant shoes by Van Gogh insofar as they reveal 
truths of lived worlds. More than this, however, and transcending Heidegger’s point 
about revealing life-worlds, meditative poetry succeeds when it enhances and frames 
life with values that transcend its material and particular expression. It is this 
transcendence, which we will explore in the following, that contemplative poetry makes 
resonate through its sensuous expressions. 
I read the following poems as the acts and expressions of meditative practice 
moving into contemplation. It is hardly surprising to find in these compositions the 
poetic presentation of aesthetic Idea. Here we find the secondary imagination 
communicating and augmenting the primary imagination’s construction of value-
intimating experience that shimmers with beauty – the transcendence that overflows 
ordinary, concept-led experience. In these Meditative Poems, the poet moves beyond 
self-concentrated egocentrism and its fancies, through meditative experience, and 
circles towards the contemplative beholding of value and resonant meaning. 
 
i. The Eolian Harp
176
 
‘The Eolian Harp’ was first composed in 1795 and titled ‘An Effusion’. In the next year, 
it was expanded and first published, in Poems on Various Subjects, as ‘Effusion 
XXXV’. In its mature, 1817 form, which adds to its tranquil musings the ‘one Life’ 
vision (ll. 26-9), it is a good place to begin examining different kinds and stages of 
                                                 
176 I will refer mainly to the Sibylline Leaves (1817) version of this Meditation Poem, used in 
Poetical Works I (233), and reproduced in Appendix B, below. When quoting Coleridge, I use 
his spelling, otherwise I spell it Aeolian. 
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meditative experience in Coleridge’s verse. Indeed this poem is one of the 
aforementioned thirteen ‘Meditative Poems’ he groups in a chapter of Sibylline Leaves. 
Although ‘Eolian Harp’ reaches a higher vision, the one Life epiphany, Coleridge 
presents the poem’s predominant experience as harmless speculation pushed on by 
fancy. In fact, in a philosophical lecture of 1819 he recalls this poem’s initial 
composition, twenty-four years earlier, and how he mused on: 
 
the bodily world being the result even as the tone between the wind and the Eolian harp I 
remember when I was yet young this fancy struck me wonderfully (Phil. Lects II, 851) 
 
The poem describes a lazy tranquillity allowing, 
 
Full many a thought uncalled and undetained 
 
including,  
 
Bubbles that glitter as they rise and break 
on vain Philosophy’s aye-babbling spring.  
 
The Aeolian harp is a musical instrument, or at least a sound art device, that is pre-
tuned, and is left by an open window, or outdoors, to be played by the wind. It produces 
delicate, flowing, otherworldly sound, uncannily music-like yet through no direct 
human effort. The instrument can represent, as it sometimes does for Coleridge, an 
incomplete, merely mechanical mind, such as that Empiricism conceives, incapable of 
producing genuine poetry. In a marginal note to Kant’s First Critique, Coleridge writes,  
 
The mind does not resemble an Eolian Harp, nor even a barrel-organ turned by a 
stream of water, conceive as many tunes mechanized in it as you like—but 
rather, as far as Objects are concerned, a violin, or other instrument of few 
strings yet vast compass, played on by a musician of Genius. (Marginalia III, 
248, c.1801) 
 
The poem presents a recumbent poet musing as his fancy plays: 
 
And thus, my Love! as on the midway Slope 
Of yonder Hill I stretch my limbs at noon 
Whilst through my half-clos’d eye-lids I behold 
The sunbeams dance, like diamonds, on the main. 
And tranquil muse upon Tranquility  
 
The innocent speculation, the ‘idle flitting phantasies’ of his ‘indolent and passive’ 
mind, then begins to muse: 
 
And what if all of animated nature  
Be but organic harps diversly fram’d,  
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That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps,  
Plastic and vast, one intellectual Breeze,  
At once the Soul of each and God of all? 
 
Writers such as McFarland (1969, see esp. 166-8) read into these lines the poet idly 
spinning an animistic pantheism.
177
 In this stanza for them, the transcendent Deity of 
Christianity becomes a Spinozistic immanent, animating principle. This reading becomes 
much less tenable, however, when we appreciate that the idea expressed here derives 
from Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist and theist. Cudworth writes, employing the 
phrase ‘plastic nature’, which he uses several times in his True Intellectual System of the 
Universe, that: 
 
Mind and understanding is the only cause of orderly regularity, and he that asserts a plastic 
nature asserts mental causality in the world; but the fortuitous mechanists, who, exploding 
final causes, will not allow mind and understanding to have any influence at all upon the 
frame of things can never possibly assign any cause of this grand phenomenon, unless 
confusion may be said to be the cause of order, and fortune or chance of constant 
regularity; and, therefore, themselves must resolve it into an occult quality. Nor, indeed, 
does there appear any great reason, why such men should assert an infinite mind in the 
world, since they do not allow it to act any where at all, and therefore most needs make it 
to be in vain. ([1678] 1975, I, 234) 
 
Read as Coleridge contemplating Cudworth’s Platonism, the ‘Plastic and vast, one 
Intellectual Breeze’ of ‘The Eolian Harp’ becomes a speculation on Platonic Ideas as true 
final causes in an universe where intellect appears not by fortuitous accident but as its 
very structure, although Coleridge was fascinated by Spinozean pantheism, he could not 
assent to it and what he saw as its ultimate atheism despite Spinoza’s  ‘Deus sive Natura’ 
explanations. Explaining how his own distant admiration of Spinoza reconciles with his 
rejection of it, he writes: 
 
Not one man in ten thousand has goodness of heart or strength of mind to be an atheist. 
And, were I not a Christian . . . I should be an atheist with Spinoza . . . . This, it is true, is 
negative atheism; and this is, next to Christianity, the purest spirit of humanity. (Letters, to 
Thomas Allsop, c.1820) 
 
At ease with his gentle and attractive musings, he is carried away with imaginative 
insight: 
 
O! the one Life
178
 within us and abroad, 
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul, 
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light, 
Rhythm in all thought, and joyance every where— 
                                                 
177 McFarland (1969, fn.168) also sees an allusion to Leibniz in Coleridge’s ‘one Intellectual 
breeze’. 
178 See Ennead VI, 5.12.1: ‘How then is it [Form] present? As one life [hos zoe mia]’. 
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Methinks, it should have been impossible 
Not to love all things in a world so fill’d; 
Where the breeze warbles, and the mute still air 
Is Music slumbering on her instrument.  
(ll. 26-33) 
 
These lines on the one Life he adds, as errata, to the Sibylline Leaves version (1817). 
The one Life is the literally energetic, imaginatively expressed Idea of Pythagorean 
harmony and a synaesthetic, cosmic resounding, inspired and exemplified by a wind 
harp’s chords. This inserted passage contrasts panpsychism with the conception of a 
passive, inanimate nature that needs animating from without, just as the instrument 
requires a breeze. 
Less than a year before adding these sublimely poetic lines, Coleridge writes of 
what I call a redemptive process in intellectual and spiritual life, the process I describe 
as ars biographica poetica, the joyous task of poetizing life. For Coleridge: 
 
whatever of good and intellectual Nature worketh in us, it is our appointed task to render 
gradually our own work. For all things that surround us, and all things that happen unto 
us, have . . . all one common final cause: namely, the increase of Consciousness, in such 
wise, that whatever part of the terra incognita of our nature the increased consciousness 
discovers, our will may conquer and bring into subjection to itself under the sovereignty 
of reason. (Statesman’s Manual, 89) 
  
We may read, then, the Sibylline Leaves version of ‘The Eolian Harp’ as the poetry of 
redemptive, expanding consciousness: expanding because awakening, and hence able to 
take into itself the nature within and without, so that it can sing and not only be sung. 
‘The Eolian Harp’ sings beautifully of a blissful life that is so generous in its 
sympathies and so spontaneous in its joys that it cannot help recognizing blessedness, 
life, and joyance everywhere, such that in this Romantic vision nothing is inanimate.  
The four lines added in an errata slip to Sibylline Leaves, from ‘O! the one Life’ to 
‘joyance everywhere’, were composed around the time Coleridge was giving his 
Philosophical Lectures, and in one of these he expands on the one Life vision found in 
joy: 
 
In joy individuality is lost . . .  To have a genius is to live in the universal, to know no self 
but that which is reflected not only from the faces of all around us, our fellow creatures, 
but reflected from the flowers, the trees, the beasts, yea from the very surface of the sands 
of the desert. (Phil. Lects, 179) 
 
This is an eminently attractive vision of things, providing release from the alienation of 
the encroaching machine age. Coleridge’s poetic vision vibrates between being 
fascinated by illusory maya and a reposeful sitting that may delight in the appearances, 
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but is free from fascination because it never accepts appearances as ultimate reality. A 
year after the poem is first published, Coleridge writes in a letter of how the reverie 
accompanying his conception of Indian meditation holds a particular charm over him: 
 
at other times I adopt the Brahman Creed & say––it is better to sit than to stand, it is 
better to lie than to sit, it is better to sleep than to wake––but Death is the best of all!––I 
should much wish, like the Indian Vishna, to float about along an infinite ocean, cradled 
in the flower of the Lotos, & wake once in a million years for a few minutes––just to 
know that I was going to sleep a million years more. (Letters I, 209, 14
th
 October, 
1797)
179
 
 
This view, for Coleridge the Brahman’s creed, he finds charming but ultimately untrue, 
although twenty-one years later he finds in this charm a transcendence in immanent 
immediacy that he describes as the ‘sensual Cosmotheism of the Hindoos’ (Marginalia 
V, 769, c. 1818).
180
 By 1821, translating A. W. Schlegel’s German rendering of a Gita 
passage, he finds the ‘eighth incarnation of Krishna or Vishnu, as Man’ to be ‘a poetic 
Symbol’, and likens the Gita’s poetic expression through myth to Plato, and: ‘Many an 
earnest truth has Plato taught mythically’ (Notebooks 4, 4832). 
Regarding his higher view, superior to floating about and being cradled, he says: 
 
It is but seldom that I raise and spiritualize my Intellect to this height (Letters I, 209) 
 
He exemplifies the higher view with lines 38-43 from ‘This Lime-Tree Bower my 
Prison’, a poem I discuss below. This position of raised and spiritualized intellect, 
superior to what he sees as a meditative but stupefied state, is one in which sense 
swims, silent, while gazing round, and Divinity shines in and through the appearances. I 
will discuss this epiphanic state below, when addressing meditation in ‘This Lime-Tree 
My Prison’. 
Coleridge continues to associate with Brahmanism the meditative state of reverie, 
prominent in ‘The Eolian Harp’, wherein fledgling thoughts are called but undetained as 
‘Bubbles that rise and glitter as they break’. In ‘The Night-Scene’, a dramatic fragment 
from 1800-1, he writes, 
 
Oh! there is a joy above the name of pleasure, 
Deep self-possession an intense repose. 
                                                 
179 Cf. These lines from Coleridge’s five-act tragedy Remorse (1813), a revision of Osorio, 
written sixteen years earlier in 1797: 
It were a blessed lot in some small skiff 
Along some ocean’s boundless solitude 
To float forever with a careless course 
And think myself the only being alive! (IV.iii) 
180 For more of Coleridge’s notes on Indian religion, see Marginalia (II, 339-49) to DUBOIS. 
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No other than as eastern sages paint, 
The God, who floats upon a Lotos leaf; 
Dreams for a thousand ages; then awakening, 
Creates a world, then smiling at the bubble, 
Relapses into bliss. 
(Poetical Works II, 655, ll. 50-6) 
 
The Brahmanic vision, if we may thus call Coleridge’s notion of meditative reverie, 
is a middle state between perceiving phenomena as the fixed and definite facts that are 
the only realities (as the unenlightened understanding of the Empiricists would have it) 
and the natura naturans view that sees through the phenomena, as through a 
translucency, and towards their non-phenomenal Ideas and Laws. The inserted lines, 
addenda to the Sibylline Leaves version,
181
 about ‘the one Life’ rise to a joyful natura 
naturans view, from a meditative vision of interfused natura naturata.  
This middle, meditative view is higher than the empirico-mechanical view of ‘the 
universe itself . . . [as] an immense heap of little things’ (Letters I, 209), i.e. mere matter 
with each object discrete from every other. This spirited, meditative view is lower, 
nevertheless, than the contemplative, noetic vision, or its more joyful aesthetic 
counterpart presented as ‘the one Life within us and abroad’. The one Life vision is an 
infused state, less purely intellectual, because more imaginative and thus capable of 
seeing – not just intellectually, but feelingly – the Ideal in and through the sensual. My 
point here, that meditation in ‘The Eolian Harp’ rises to aesthetically-rich, imaginative 
contemplation with the ‘one Life’ addition, echoes Abrams’s (1972, 474) succinctly 
expressed realization that: 
 
in the lines added in 1817 the poet breaks through sensation to vision. 
 
The one Life vision rises, therefore, from what I call the middle view, which Coleridge 
associates with Brahmanism, and sees as beautiful, but not quite ultimate truth. 
Developing this notion of contemplative theoria as arising from meditative tranquillity 
conforms to a central aim of my thesis, which is to show that although meditation does 
not necessarily lead to contemplation, it is necessary for it, and is thus an intermediate 
intellectual or spiritual state. Meditation as a middle view sees all phenomena as 
interconnected, flowing, beautiful and evanescent. This view is described as flowing, as 
it certainly does in ‘The Eolian Harp’, from a unitary source beyond all phenomena.  
                                                 
181 Commentators on the added ‘one Life’ lines usually say they were added in the Errata, and 
this is what publishers usually call the slip inserted after the front cover, but added lines of 
poetry cannot be properly called errata, so I say ‘addenda’. 
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Bliss notwithstanding, such meditation cannot provide an ultimate view, as it also 
produces illusion, the transitory ‘Bubbles that glitter as they rise and break’. Returning, 
in 1820, to this thought of meditative ease and the kind of lazy metaphysics it suggests, 
he notes, on reading a history of Indian Philosophy, that the account leaves ‘the main 
problems unsolved & unsolvable’ since ‘the passage from the Infinite to the Finite’ is ‘a 
mere Bubble of words and contradictions in a Scheme which makes God all, and all 
God’ (Notebooks 4, 4737).182 
Thus one can find equanimity in this view, which provides rest from busy cares. It 
finds an immensely valuable and Ideal source behind all phenomena and manifestations. 
But it remains an incomplete, medial perspective in that it fails to find solemn reason 
for cherishing and nurturing material nature, which it ultimately sees as illusory 
bubbles, however glisteningly attractive. 
Thus after imagining his beloved Sara gently reproaching his idle, speculative 
fantasies, he praises his incomprehensible God who heals with saving mercies. The 
higher view, then, for Coleridge, is a redemptive one that not only loves the beauty of 
phenomena, but loves and cherishes their very being, a being which is illusory when 
considered as the maya that sways our reveries. And thus Coleridge humbles his own 
mind, bursting the bubble of his pleasant reverie to find joy above pleasure. He finds 
himself: 
 
A sinful and most miserable man 
Wildered and dark, 
 
but one nevertheless redeemed and loved, and given: 
 
. . . to possess 
Peace, and this Cot, and thee, heart-honoured Maid! 
 
These realities are to be cherished and humbly appreciated, not calmly judged at a 
distance through half-closed drowsy lids as ultimately non-existent apparitions. 
To reiterate, the view that ‘The Eolian Harp’ rises from is a middle view, already 
above the natura naturata way of seeing things. Interpreted as natura naturata, natural 
phenomena become fixities and definites in the understanding, analysing experience 
into separable units. Thus Coleridge opposes his holistic, organicist approach to the 
reductionism he sees as prevalent in his day. An application of this approach is seen in 
                                                 
182 Referring to an article by Sanskrit scholar Sir William Jones. Cf. Riem Natale, 2005, and 
Harries, 2013, on Coleridge’s reading of Sir Charles Wilkins’ (1785) translated Bhagvat Geeta, 
and other writings on Indian Philosophy, such as Maurice’s (1795) History of Hindostan. 
  273 
Heidegger’s taking the interpretive, situated, already significant experience as primary, 
and the analytic attitude to experiential basics as derived from and secondary to the 
situated experience. In fancy, for Coleridge, phenomena are imaged as counters to be 
manipulated, whereas the one Life passage replaces passivity with an active principle, 
the Idea: Life, within us and abroad. The ideal correspondence of subject and object 
produces: 
 
Rhythm in all thought, and joyance every where. 
 
The imaginative passage settles down, nevertheless, reverting to the unhurried fancy of 
‘Music slumbering on her instrument.’183 
‘The Eolian Harp’ presents an ornamental flight of fancy, not a genuine 
contemplative experience. For Coleridge, a flight of fancy will always result in a false 
image, which may be used for good or ill to enhance literary effect. In this case the 
tranquil result is a fanciful Spinozistic panpsychism. Acknowledging the detrimental 
effect of such indolence, the poet allows himself to be cut short by his ‘pensive Sara’, 
whom he imagines would not approve these unchristian musings: 
 
But thy more serious eye a mild reproof 
Darts, O belovéd Woman! 
 
The ‘idle and flitting phantasies’ traversing his ‘indolent and passive brain’ critically 
exemplify Newtonian materialism and Lockean Empiricism, which construe the mind as 
‘always passive – a lazy Looker-on’ (Letters, to Thomas Poole, 23 March, 1801). 
Coleridge syncretizes this empirical model of mind into the lower, mechanical strata of 
his own system, which is in part empirico-mechanical but in toto active and creative. 
This lower mind passively and mechanically produces phantasies: 
  
As wild and various, as the random gales  
That swell and flutter on this subject Lute.  
     (ll. 43-4) 
 
 
ii. Frost at Midnight 
                                                 
183
 See Hamilton, 2007. Hamilton wonders whether the Aeolian harp produces music; it is, 
nevertheless sound art, as the instrument is produced for that purpose: ‘The wind-powered 
Aeolian harp produces tones without direct human agency, though the sound-producer itself is 
created intentionally, and it is doubtful whether the result is music. Indeed, the form/matter 
distinction breaks down here, as elsewhere, if pressed hard enough.’ The wind harp does not 
quite make music, although there is artistic intention using sound. Music is here slumbering, as 
Coleridge says. 
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‘The Eolian Harp’s ‘passive and indolent’ speculation contrasts with ‘Frost at 
Midnight’, which aims at, and achieves a gentle and encompassing contemplation. Here 
the poet takes no ironic, distanced stance from his own thoughts, but instead 
authentically follows his imaginative, synthesizing meditation. This meditation spirals 
from his country cottage fireside chair in winter; back to his childhood at a London 
school ‘pent mid cloisters dim’, the only natural sight a patch of sky; then forward, to 
‘the lakes and shores / And mountain crags’ of the Lake District.  
The poem was composed in his Nether Stowey cottage, below Somerset’s 
Quantock Hills. He therefore anticipates the Lake District described to him by 
Wordsworth, where his babe, Hartley Coleridge, would indeed grow up. In these 
yearned-for surroundings his son will ‘see and hear / The lovely sounds intelligible / Of 
that eternal language, which thy God / Utters’. The meditation then spirals back, gaining 
insight from his own nature-deprived yet hopeful past. Circling to the future, he 
prayerfully envisions his son’s natural and spiritual development in the Lake District. 
Finally the meditation returns to the present, his babe slumbering in the cot beside him, 
and the icicles in the eaves,  
 
Quietly shining to the quiet moon. 
 
In ‘Frost at Midnight’, the poet is not content to visit a childhood sad scene, but 
rather folds this episode and mood into a greater movement, winning a life-affirming 
confidence and sense of wonder. The nature in the poem’s symbols is natura naturans, 
nature naturing, described as ‘that eternal language’. He conveys not what nature has 
made, but a sense of the nature’s logos, its ways and deeper laws. The focus is thus on 
the making rather than the made, the process rather than the products. Here ‘clouds 
image in their bulk / Both lakes and shores and mountain crags’, suggesting a symbol 
for Coleridgean symbolism itself. As the clouds image the geography below, they are a 
more transient part of the geographical scene. This echoes the way of the symbol, 
whose particular images represent the universal of which they are consubstantial. The 
symbol can therefore represent those Ideas that are its own laws, and excite more 
thought concerning them. 
I find in the poem the highest symbol of the source of life on earth: the sun, whose 
light is unspoken in the poem, yet radiates, is reflected, and then shines back to its 
source. There is in ‘Frost at Midnight’, then, an unspoken allusion to Plato’s simile of 
the sun and the Idea of the Good, to which intellectual light all mind is indebted, and the 
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debt is repaid by contemplative return of all glory and honour. The unspoken sun in the 
poem illuminates the mediating moon that reflects sunlight to that half of the earth 
otherwise bereft of light. The light, then, symbolizes the Ideas of reason, and the sun the 
Idea of the Good, which for Coleridge is the Divine Idea: God.  
Nine years after composing ‘Frost at Midnight’, Coleridge writes with soul-stirring 
insight of the moon’s symbolizing a dependence on reflected light for principled, 
practical guidance and for enlightening contemplation: 
 
like the moon with all its massy shadows and deceptive gleams, it yet lights us on our 
way, poor travellers as we are, and benighted pilgrims. With all its spots and changes and 
temporary eclipses, with all its vain halos and bedimming vapors, it yet reflects the light 
that is to rise on us, which even now is rising, though intercepted from our immediate 
view by the mountains that enclose and frown over the vale of our mortal life. (Friend I, 
97) 
 
Quietly contemplating Ideas of reason, we are enlightened. It follows from my 
interpretation that the mediating moon symbolizes the imagination that reflects 
otherwise invisible light to illumine our midnight. The icicles then, quietly shining to 
the quiet moon, reflect back to, and therefore symbolically reflect on, the moon. 
Sometimes the snow-water drips from the eaves of our homes to nourish the soil. At 
other times, it is held in silent icicles, and may thus, as translucent beauty, nourish the 
soul. Thus the icicles of the poem are a poetic symbol for the translucent aesthetic 
symbol itself, which creates a sensuous form so that the light of the contemplated Ideas 
of reason (and ultimately the Idea of the Good) may be resonantly felt, and in that 
enlightened feeling the Idea may be contemplated for its own supreme beauty and 
goodness.  
Nature in ‘Frost at Midnight’ is no collection of static harps awaiting a pantheistic 
spirit to blow into them the impression of life. Nature here is an active principle, 
forming the natural scenes by being their law, and promising to formatively guide the 
sleeping babe. The poem meditates nature as power, the Ideas behind phenomena, and 
participatory symbols reflecting quiet, contemplative prayer. The stillness and 
gentleness of this meditative mood is also very much the mood concluding another 
Meditative Poem, ‘To William Wordsworth’, composed the night he heard his friend 
recite ‘The Prelude’: 
 
Scarce conscious, and yet conscious of its close 
I sate, my being blended in one thought 
(Thought was it? Or aspiration? Or resolve?) 
Absorbed, yet hanging still upon the sound – 
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And when I rose, I found myself in prayer. 
 
While the forms of nature naturing resonate with poetic imagination proper, fancy is 
represented in ‘Frost at Midnight’ as the poet finding his gaze charmed by the filmy 
play of soot on the hearth. Fancy animates these shadowy images as companionable 
forms. The:  
 
                                            . . . idling Spirit 
By its own mood interprets, every where 
Echo or mirror seeking of itself 
And makes a toy of Thought. 
 
The idling spirit of the poet is then transported, by fancy’s association, back to 
memories of schooldays at Christ’s Hospital. Here,  
 
in the great city, pent ’mid cloisters dim,  
 
he:  
 
saw nought lovely but the sky and stars  
 
Homesick pupils believed that the sooty hearth film’s puny flaps and freaks presaged a 
friendly visitor. Thus Coleridge, waiting on the hearth’s midnight-dancing forms, 
recalls lonely schooldays fancifully hoping that the fire-grate shapes, the strangers, 
predict a visit from his sister. 
In this masterfully comprehensive passage, the fanciful thought broadens into 
imagination’s more significant work, and the lonely boyhood memory is comprehended 
into the larger pattern of life reflected on and contemplated. Thus the poet’s lonely 
London pupillage transforms from snag of sadness into a meaningful part of the whole 
mind’s meditation, involving his past, present, the next generation’s future, as his babe 
slumbers in the fire-warmed cot.  
In the meditative spiral, after recalling his boyhood yearning for soothing things, he 
can say that: 
 
thou my babe! Shalt wander like a breeze 
By lakes and sandy shores, beneath the crags 
Of ancient mountain, and beneath the clouds, 
Which image in their bulk both lakes and shores 
And mountain crags: so shalt thou hear 
The lovely shapes and sound intelligible 
Of that eternal language, which thy God 
Utters, who from eternity doth teach 
Himself in all, and all things in himself. 
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In Platonic terms, the play of fancy before the hearth film is eikasia fascinating and 
captivating the idling Spirit. In contrast, the contemplation of ‘the lovely shapes and 
sounds intelligible / Of that eternal language’ is noesis, which is to eikasia’s enchanting 
speculation as light is to shadow and reality to reflection. 
The meditation’s comprehensive spiralling poetizes life. Beginning with the 
present, adult meditation, retrieving his boyhood, yearning self, both move to a future 
promising aesthetic fulfilment through freedom in nature. The meditation then 
comprehends his life, concerns, and relations sub specie aeternitatis, intimating the 
values of the true, the good, and the beautiful. The abstruser musings develop into 
meditation, rise above fanciful associations and fixated recollections, to achieve a 
contemplation that finds depth and import for the values signified by imaginatively 
composing life as poetry.  
Around him now; behind him in associated memories; and before him in hope, life 
is poetized. Life’s episodes and higher purposes are reassessed in the broadened, 
deepened comprehension of the meditation pursued into contemplation. Value arises 
from contemplation, felt in the beauty and moral sense evoked. While light-hearted 
meditation can become fancy’s light-headedness, meditation seriously attained opens a 
space for beholding value, that is, it creates a con-templum. Holding open this space is a 
steady act of appreciative attention, freed from fancy’s streams of association. Coleridge 
relates that, 
 
Metaphysics is a word that you, my dear Sir! are no great friend to / but yet you will 
agree, that a great Poet must be, implicitè if not explicitè, a profound Metaphysician. He 
may not have it in logical coherence, in his Brain & Tongue; but he must have it by Tact / 
for all sounds, & all forms of human nature he must have the ear of a wild Arab listening 
in the silent Desart, the eye of a North American Indian tracing the footsteps of an Enemy 
upon the Leaves that strew the Forest—; the Touch of a Blind Man feeling the face of a 
darling Child. (Letters II, 808) 
 
Contemplative attention intensifies, turning inward. Irradiated by reason, the senses 
become translucent with it, straining for the meaning given in the direction of higher 
purposes in the material of sense, vibrating the ends of our antennae. David Ward notes 
that: 
 
Coleridge uses the word ‘Tact’ here in a way very close to its original sense of tactile 
sensation. Thus, the deepest feelings and the deepest truths must be mediated through 
something he would call ‘Tact’ or ‘Touch’; for Coleridge the nearest approach to the 
commonality of sensuous experience, with a seamless continuity between sense 
apprehension, poetics and metaphysics . . . this quality [is] . . .  more a matter of affect 
than percept, something anterior to concept, an imaginative response to experience rather 
than an argument (Ward, 2013, Ch. 1) 
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Feelings corresponding to the deepest truths are in one sense, as Ward says, anterior to 
concept, yet while serving an imagination that enlists them to strain towards Ideas, they 
resonate with something posterior to concept, intimating, that is, an important sense of 
the praeter-conceptual. This sense, however, is indirect, because mediated by the 
imagination stirring and semi-enlightening it with symbols, transforming obscure 
feeling into illumined, aesthetic sense, still dim but now translucent. What this Tact or 
Touch strains to reach and hence be affected by exceeds purely conceptual grasp. 
Therefore, 
 
We can no more understand it than we can taste or smell a conception of the 
understanding (Notebooks 5, 1830) 
 
However, because sense is in polar harmony with reason, aesthetically conveyed Ideas 
may resonate with there, and reason may nourish the understanding from this circuitous 
route so that understanding may begin to feelingly understand. This is, nevertheless, a 
sluggish and murky access to bedimmed reason, and if remaining at this level produces, 
to borrow Coleridge’s phrase: 
 
snails of intellect, who see only with their feelers. (Notebooks I, 328, December 1797)
184
 
 
Such feeling-centered, dimly-understanding states of mind guide conduct by aesthetic 
sense and inclination. While they might have recourse to popular sayings such as 
‘Charity begins at home’, and ‘Everyone is entitled to their her opinion’, thought is 
mainly absent or very dim, and this wallowing obscurity proceeds almost entirely by 
feeling and the popular notion of going with the flow. Although all are bound to lose 
their way sometimes, in this state one is bound to lose one’s way in the same way, 
repeatedly.  
By contrast, intense concentration can be trained in outwardly directed, meditative 
practices, developing sensitivity to change, import, and nuance in outer phenomena. 
Such concentration therefore educates dim, feeling-centred comportment, and is the 
deepest sense of aesthetic education that I so far can fathom. Returning to Coleridge for 
illustration, contemplation as a stretching to hear, whether in appreciating outer music, 
or straining for inner focus, is conveyed in another Meditative Poem, ‘Reflections on 
Having Left a Place of Retirement’: 
 
                                                 
184 Referring specifically to materialist philosophers, so I use his phrase differently. 
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Unearthly minstrelsy! then only heard 
When the soul seeks to hear; when all is hushed, 
And the heart listens!  
 
He suggests that one can only prepare for the object of contemplation with a 
corresponding mood and appropriate silence. This suggestion reappears in the twentieth 
century with Rudolf Otto’s phenomenology of the holy, arguing that the sacred can only 
be revealed in the numinous state of the mysterium tremendum (Otto, 1923), a state, that 
is of fear mingled with fascination before something wholly other that touches one’s 
innermost self. Otto addresses the irrationality that marks the irreducibly qualitative 
aspects of our moods.  By responding to situations with their feeling tones, moods relate 
to the rational, i.e. that which can be logically explicated, without the mood itself being 
reducible to rational conception. For Otto, the Idea of the divine (the numen) translates 
feelingly into awe.  
Because moods are irreducibly qualitative, conceptual accounts cannot convey their 
experience, even though the experiences can be defined. That is, we can create 
definitions to describe what awe, say, is and is not, but the definitions are utterly 
incapable of conveying awe. One reason for this is that some moods and similar states 
are necessarily responses to something external. Reading about a shark attack, for 
example, can conjure thoughts and images with which one may work up a sense of fear. 
The alarm, panic, and intense sensations of the genuine encounter, however, will be 
missing, and these are essential to the real experience. Joy, or any mood, can be 
similarly analysed, insofar as the qualitative, irrational and irreducible aspects of moods 
remain essential to them.  
Calling moods irrational here does not mean that they are meaningless or 
inappropriate. Psychologists, for example, call phobias irrational, such that a fear of 
house spiders is understood as irrational because the response of fear is inappropriate: 
there is no reason to fear the tiny, harmless arthropod. This is not what I mean, 
however, by the irrational element in mood. I mean, rather, a quality irreducible to ratio, 
so that the something felt cannot be rationally conveyed by a system dependent on 
signification by arbitrary signifiers, i.e. by language, its words and its concepts. 
Otto’s numinous is a: 
 
non-rational, non-sensory experience or feeling whose primary and immediate object is 
outside the self. 
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Similarly, considering one’s life from the aspect of ‘the one Life within us and abroad’; 
comprehensively viewing present, past, and future; and evaluating events and meanings 
in terms of Ideals transcending the phenomena that compose the events’ outward forms, 
are three possibilities revealed in contemplative experience in which imagination brings 
Ideas of reason to bear on the meaning of life. 
The secret ministry of frost hanging up silent icicles quietly shining to the quiet 
moon images the symbol as neither opaque, nor transparent, but as translucent. It holds 
and reveals the light it symbolizes, without the light being either occluded, or so 
transparent that it is not seen as light. The secret ministry of frost represents the 
luminous quiet of transformative, contemplative experience. The melted snow-water 
crystalizes, and then shines with the light it holds. The secret ministry represents the oft-
unnoticed working of the symbol, which usually operates below self-consciousness, so 
that: 
 
It is the privilege of the few to possess an Idea: of the generality of men, it might be more 
truly affirmed that they are possessed by it. (Constitution, 13) 
 
In Reflection, Coleridge distinguishes his symbol presenting Idea in nature from 
William Paley’s Lockean natural theology, which aimed to show concrete evidence of a 
Divine Watchmaker by indicating complexity and purpose in natural phenomena.
185
 For 
Coleridge, Paley’s ‘divine fingerprint’ in nature only presents natura naturata. 
However, it is precisely from natura naturata that the Idea, a fortiori the divine Idea, 
must transcend, rather than be immanently and empirically evident in its appearances. 
For Coleridge, the appearance of a rainbow, or the space remarkably left in the chrysalis 
for the unformed butterfly’s wings (Biographia I, 242), with all other appearances of 
nature do not count as evidence of divinity.  
The symbolic aspect of phenomena is the work of the primary imagination, which 
may be taken up by the conscious poetry of the secondary imagination. Both transform 
disparate appearances into the unity of a deeper meaning. This work conveys the 
universal in the particular, providing a sense of something more than, but not other than, 
what is immediate in appearance. To take a prosaic example, a falling apple conveys a 
sense of the gravity with which the event is consubstantial. Gravitation is therefore 
                                                 
185 Coleridge had previously directed his anti-utilitarian critique at Paley’s ethics and theology, 
which ‘reduced’, he argues, ‘all virtue to a selfish prudence’ (Friend I, 108). Hedley (2000, 136) 
notes Paley’s ‘clearly literalist and forensic approach to Scripture . . . as a quarry for particular 
tenets or facts.’ 
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more than, but not other than, the phenomena that symbolize it in Coleridge’s 
consubstantial, participatory sense of the symbol. 
 
iii. Dejection: an Ode 
While ‘Frost at Midnight’ overcomes fancy’s idle attractions to move through 
meditation and begin contemplation, ‘Dejection’ – also set at midnight – does not move 
beyond meditation. Grappling those ‘viper thoughts, that coil round my mind’, 
thought’s progress stops short of contemplation. While the frost in ‘Frost at Midnight’ 
performs its ministry ‘unhelped by any wind’, and the breeze in ‘Eolian Harp’ lulls with 
pleasant notes to fancy’s tune, in ‘Dejection’ ‘the wind, which long has raved 
unnoticed’ becomes ‘as scream of agony by torture lengthened out / That lute sent 
forth!’ Although not achieving contemplation, this poem is a highly poetic sustained 
meditation on – ironic to consider – fearing the loss of poetic sensibility. Following 
Coleridge’s sustained meditation on mood, I will find comparisons with Kant and 
Heidegger.  
Although beauty is seen, it is described as not being felt in the poem, its absence 
occasions a meditation on what is required for beauty to be fully revealed, not only 
intellectually but aesthetically. Elsewhere, Coleridge laments ‘the despotism of the eye’, 
which phrase implicitly involves the false definites of fancy and conceptual 
understanding, and he privileges hearing and touch as more inward, meditative senses. 
Coleridge laments he can ‘see, not feel’ the beauty of the western sky, with crescent 
moon below thin clouds ‘That give away their motion to the stars.’ The poem thus 
meditates on beauty and aesthetic response, or its lack, despite intellectual recognition. 
Although the poet intellectually evaluates the scene’s beauty, he begins the poem unable 
to feel it in any satisfactorily deep and consoling sense.
186
 In contrast to the breeze 
brought pleasant music in ‘Eolian Harp’s idle musing, the wind, in ‘Dejection’, 
becomes, 
 
The dull sobbing draft that moans and rakes 
Upon the strings of this Eolian lute, 
Which better far were mute. 
 
                                                 
186  This is not to say that satisfaction was the goal, but rather that the lack of a feeling 
correspondent to the intellectually discerned beauty indicates, at least in the poet’s conscience, a 
culpable incompleteness, a want of profounder, resonant gratitude, and a prayer for grace. 
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Coleridge indicates a gap between intellectual recognition and aesthetic response, 
adding a level of depth and complexity missing from Kant’s criterion of 
disinterestedness in the moment of aesthetic appreciation. In this poem, it seems that 
Coleridge finds reason to distance himself from Kant’s criterion that the subject must be 
detached from sensual interest in the object of genuine aesthetic experience. For 
Coleridge, aesthetic appreciation must involve the whole mind, and not only, 
transcendental though this is, the intellectual appreciation of beauty, and thence of the 
moral value it intimates. 
In aesthetic appreciation, for Coleridge, we read our wider situation. A comparison 
can be made here with Heidegger, who proposes that we best discover our 
‘situatedness’ (Befindlichkeit) in the qualitative import of mood and attunement. In 
aesthetic experience, insofar as it refers to the Ideas of reason, our situation is revealed 
from the vantage of higher purposes. Aesthetic Ideas thus interpreted relate beauty, the 
sublime, and the morally good, but also situational transcendentals, such as in Kant’s 
examples of ‘death, envy, love, and so forth’, and Heidegger’s examples of Being-with, 
Being-towards-death, and resoluteness.  
These examples open up a world of situated meanings that ‘strain after something 
. . . beyond the confines of experience’ (CJ, §49). In ‘Dejection’, the poet’s mood is 
explored, revealing ‘Reality’s dark dream’. In this frame, beauties can be recognized, 
but only blankly, with no consoling aesthetic response. Thus when the poet sees, but 
does not feel, the beauty of the western sky, he is in the position of Hamlet, wherein ‘it 
goes so heavily / with my disposition that this goodly frame, the / Earth, seems to me a 
sterile promontory’. 
Recalling Kant’s genius, or Geist, in the phrase ‘genial spirits’, Coleridge, in 
‘Dejection’, complains that, ‘My genial spirits fail’. His ‘genial spirits’ comprise the 
genius of the poetic shaper of aesthetic Ideas who, if these fail, can no longer feel the 
value that exceeds the understanding. Dejected, everything before the eye deflates into 
empirical concepts, as if the air of feeling were removed through puncture, and beauty 
becomes an empty category intellectually ‘seen’ but not aesthetically felt. Nevertheless, 
intellectual appreciation brings awareness of a lack, and that one ought to feel the 
overflow of Idea and its resonance beyond the concept’s ken.  
Truly to feel beauty, rather than just to see it intellectually, requires the activity of 
the whole mind. Only to conceptually recognize the beauty is to apply of rules of 
judgment, such as purposiveness without purpose. But just as the poet involves the 
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whole mind in acts of creativity, every experiencing individual is poetizing, in a primary 
imagination sense, when they open themselves to be fully touched in the experience of 
beauty. Hence the poet can declare,  
 
O Lady! We receive but what we give, 
And in our life alone does Nature live: 
Ours is her wedding garment, ours her shroud! 
 
Receiving what we give is no mere projection, but one that acknowledges resonance and 
reverberation. Sartre shows, 
 
the error which we would make by believing that we ‘project’ our affective dispositions 
on the thing, to illuminate or colour it. First, . . . a feeling is not an inner disposition, but 
an objective, transcending relation which has as its object to learn what it is. But this is not 
all. The explanation by projection, which is found in such trite sayings as “A landscape is 
a spiritual state”, always begs the question. (Sartre, [1943] 1996, Part Four, Ch. Two, III) 
 
For Sartre, to explain a landscape as being a spiritual state is a petitio principii in 
presuming that we explicitly know what a spiritual state is. The relation between feelings 
and surroundings is an area of experience that raises some very delicate questions. Sartre 
consummately discerns that feelings are not inner dispositions but transcending, self-
relating relations. Coleridge, exploring how feelings are ways of knowing, adumbrates 
him in pursuing how feelings reveal value in the world, self, and others. In the year after 
he composes ‘Dejection’, Coleridge writes: 
 
O there are Truths below the surface in the subject of Sympathy, & how we become that 
which we understandingly behold & hear, having, how much perhaps God only knows, 
created part even of the Form. (Notebooks 2, 2806) 
 
Aesthetic Ideas are no mere projections. Imagination must discern aesthetic Ideas in 
nature in order to appreciate nature symbolically, and not allegorically. Using nature 
allegorically would be to map our human concerns onto it, whereas symbolic relation 
finds mutual energies, discerning the scene as nature naturing, rather than as ‘that 
inanimate cold world’ which, perceived only as natura naturata, is insufficient to invite 
an active response from ‘the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd.’ The poet’s self-
prescribed remedy, then, is that: 
 
Ah! from the soul itself must issue forth 
A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud 
Enveloping the Earth–– 
And from the soul itself must there be sent 
A sweet and potent voice, of its own birth, 
Of all sweet sounds the life and element!  
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Coleridge is not anticipating Ruskin’s (1856, vol. III, pt 4) pathetic fallacy, which 
projects thought and emotion onto inanimate nature. In saying ‘we receive but what we 
give, / And in our life alone does Nature live’ he encourages the hearer to experience 
more actively. He is not advocating a relativistic, personifying projection that uses 
nature to amplify one’s self. In order to receive symbolic import from natural forms, we 
must engage the imagination in symbolically relating it to Ideas. This connection with 
concept-exceeding Ideas adds the shimmer of beauty and transcendent meaning to 
appearance taken symbolically. This transcendent meaning is not a propositional 
sequence, which would lead to antinomies of reason, but is rather a deepening and 
beholding of values and resonances. It is an aesthetic, not an epistemological, response. 
Remember that for Coleridge, to take nature, or anything for that matter, 
symbolically is to eschew allegory, which represents something different from itself by 
becoming burdened with another meaning. Coleridge himself writes allegorical poems, 
but stresses that only the symbol, and not allegory or metaphor, expresses transcendence. 
Allegory restates with pictorial language, but it parallels, unlike symbols, which go 
beyond, providing a gradient from the lower to the higher. That is to say, allegory 
restates, using a new image placed adjacently to the first and on the same level as it, 
whereas symbol indicates a transcendence, moving beyond the original image or 
meaning. Thus, as W. B. Yeats conveys in explicitly Coleridgean terms, 
 
A symbol is indeed the only possible expression of some invisible essence, a transparent 
lamp about a spiritual flame; while allegory is one of many possible representations of an 
embodied thing, and belongs to fancy and not to imagination (Yeats, [1924] 2007, 88) 
 
The Coleridgean symbol is consubstantial with what it symbolizes. A crashing wave 
might symbolize nature’s power, or power in general, or, imagined in another direction, 
it could symbolize dissipation. Consubstantial with what it symbolizes, the symbol does 
not represent, as a stand-in, something different, separate and apart from itself.
187
 The 
wave itself has power, which it represents. The wave also dissipates, while 
simultaneously representing dissipation. How appearances are to be symbolically 
interpreted is imagination’s creative task, and it is in the sense of this creative discovery 
that ‘We receive but what we give’ and ‘become that which we understandingly behold 
and hear.’ 
                                                 
187 I suspect a solution to the Platonic chôrismos problem exists through Coleridgean symbol, 
itself a Neo-Platonic device. 
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Imagination’s symbolic interpretation is indeed a task, and is not in free play to 
generate any meanings without restriction, as would be the case for fancy. Twelve years 
after composing ‘Dejection’, Coleridge writes that he faintly represents a passage from 
Plotinus (I.6.3, ‘On the Beautiful’) with his stanzas 4 and 5 (ll. 47-75), i.e. from ‘O 
Lady! We receive but what we give,’ to ‘All colours a suffusion from that light!’ Here is 
the passage, which Coleridge quotes in Greek, and which Taylor renders as: 
 
When therefore sense [aisthesis] beholds the form [eidos] in bodies [somata] at strife with 
matter (phusios), binding and vanquishing its contrary nature, and sees form gracefully 
shining forth in other forms, it collects together the scattered whole, and introduces it to 
itself, and to the invisible form within; and renders it consonant, congruous and friendly to 
its own intimate form. (SWF, Principles of Genial Criticism, Coleridge’s fn.) 
 
Plotinus says here that sense beholds Form in bodies (which we can take to be natural 
forms, living bodies, and artworks); that Form and matter are contraries; and that when 
Form thoroughly orders a body, it gracefully shines through the matter (foreshadowing 
the Romantic notion of the symbol being a translucence whereby Idea is aesthetically 
conveyed). Form thoroughly ordering a body could be Justice in a law of state; virtue in 
a human being; ratio in a building or proportion in music, etc. Form, then, collects 
together, we might say internally organizes, the body, such that all parts and motions 
synergize to a unitary and Ideal end. 
This intellectually beautiful unity is similar to a person being calm and collected due 
to a self-possession coming from the mind’s eye fixing on a higher principle188 that 
unifies feelings, aims, and actions and safeguards against scattering diversions. The 
process Plotinus describes is self-reflective as the Form introduces the beautiful body to 
itself and to the indivisible Form within, rendering the whole body self-intimate and 
consonant within its ordering Form. Previously, this matter resisted the Form, as marble 
resists the sculptor, yet now vanquished by the Form its dignity is elevated, not debased 
in the defeat, because being ruled by Form provides an ordination into greater meaning 
and participation, rather than demeaning subordination. 
Coleridge, poetizing this process, proposes that to fully appreciate natural beauty, 
one must appreciate the Laws behind the phenomena. These Laws, or Ideas, give the 
Form, and the phenomena are their signs and results. Thus the experiencing mind more 
fully open to aesthetic experience will not passively receive phenomena as an Aeolian 
harp receives the breeze, responding mechanically. Rather, the phenomena will be 
                                                 
188 Cf. Republic, 592a. 
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interpreted as aesthetic Ideas, symbolizing nature naturing. This interpretative process 
involves admitting the inadequacy of the concepts of the understanding, then deferring 
to the Ideas of reason. Thus people are responsible for their own aesthetic sensitivities, 
insofar as they are conceived not only as passions, but also as actions bringing with them 
their own rewards. 
 
iv. This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison 
 
Charles Lamb has been with me for a week―he left me Friday morning.― / The second 
day after Wordsworth came to me, dear Sara accidently emptied a skillet of boiling milk 
on my foot, which confined me during the whole time of C. Lamb’s stay & still prevents 
me from all walks longer than a furlong.― While Wordsworth, his Sister, & C. Lamb 
were out one evening; / sitting in the arbour of T. Poole’s garden, which communicates 
with mine, I wrote these lines, with which I am pleased― (Letters I, 334, July (?) 1797) 
 
In ‘This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison’, the poet is forced – due to his foot’s being 
scalded by boiling milk in a domestic accident, or so he says – to wait while his friends 
continue a walk that he has enjoyed many times. This Conversation Poem addresses 
itself to Charles Lamb, fellow poet and old school-friend from Christ’s Hospital days. 
Lamb is up from London and in dark spirits, sorely needing this Lakeland walk.  
Coleridge does not mention what caused Lamb’s deep grief, namely that his sister 
slew their mother in a fit of lunacy, as the court termed it. He does, however, describe 
Lamb’s need for natural vistas as he:  
 
. . . hast pined 
And hunger’d after Nature, many a year, 
In the great City pent, winning thy way 
With sad yet patient soul, through evil and pain 
And strange calamity! 
 
 Sympathy for his friend is underscored in the phrase describing Lamb in London -
as bing ‘in the great City pent’ –the very words Coleridge uses in ‘Frost at Midnight’ 
to relate his own London schooldays. Reusing this phrase highlights Coleridge’s 
fraternal feeling toward Lamb, recalling their days together ‘pent mid cloisters dim’.  
The poem begins in a state of gentle-heartedly exaggerated self-pity. As in 
‘Dejection’, ‘This Lime-Tree’ bemoans the loss of aesthetic joys: ‘I have lost / Beauties 
and feelings, such as would have been / Most sweet to my remembrance even when age 
/ Had dimm’d mine eyes to Blindness!’ However, in ‘This Lime-Tree’ he regrets being 
physically forced to forgo the pleasures of a walk with friends, while the later poem, 
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‘Dejection’, is a sublimely poetic description of a psychological barrier to experiencing 
beauty in its fullness.  
The lime tree he calls his prison, though it really provides a resting place as he 
exaggerates, poking fun at himself, that he ‘never more may meet again’ his friends, 
though they have only gone for an afternoon walk. Sympathy for his friend, and the 
expectation that the walk, familiar to him but new to Lamb, will make his friend ‘most 
glad’. He then overcomes self-pity, and imagines the walk and its effect on his comrade. 
Thus he imagines Lamb: 
 
Struck with deep joy 
 
such that he may stand: 
 
                                   . . . as I have stood, 
Silent with swimming sense; yea, gazing round 
On the wide landscape, gaze till all doth seem 
Less gross than bodily; and of such hues 
As veil the Almighty Spirit, when yet he makes 
Spirits perceive his presence. 
 
These are the lines that Coleridge sends Thelwell, as mentioned above, in the discussion 
of meditative states in ‘The Eolian Harp’, lines that he says represent those rare times 
when he stands: 
 
Struck with the deepest calm of Joy (Letters I, 209) 
 
and can thus, though seldom, ‘raise and spiritualize my intellect’. More common 
meditative periods are a poorer second best, which latter he inaccurately describes, in 
the same letter, as adopting the Brahman Creed – sitting or lying in a soporific state. 
What is important here, concerning meditative states, is Coleridge’s pointing out the 
intellectual and spiritual superiority of a state that is very sensuously aware, yet utterly 
calm, rather than in any way excited. Instead of excitement, the relation to perceived 
beauty and to life becomes deep, calm joy. Coleridge is careful to distinguish this joyful 
calm from the dreamy tranquillity he ill-advisedly associates with Brahmanism, and we 
can see that the superior state is much more energized. Thus we can say this deep, calm 
joy is an energized state of heightened awareness that is keenly attentive to the 
surroundings without being excited by desires of material appropriation.  
With sympathy for his friend, his situation turns from self-pity at missing out on 
shared enjoyment, to a deeper sharing, beyond first-hand witness, of deep joy 
contemplated. An act of will, involving the whole, active mind, its memory, 
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expectation, anticipation, sympathy, and aesthetic openness, creates a meaningful 
shared experience from a separation that, perceived passively, invokes self-pity. His 
perception changes with a voluntary, poetic act of imagination, presenting a sublimely 
beautiful wide landscape that invites a meditative response ‘Silent with swimming 
sense; yea gazing round.’ Once he has overcome his self-pity at shared pleasures 
missed, he is free to appreciate the less spectacular, yet no less impressive, beauties of 
the modest forms surrounding his bower. Blessing a rook beating its path above him, 
soon perhaps to fly near his friend, he can appreciate that,  
 
No sound is dissonant which tells of Life. 
 
And thus the poem returns upon itself, to where it started, but now, like ‘Frost at 
Midnight’, and other of Coleridge’s Meditative Poems, with broader perspective that 
approaches contemplation sub specie aeternitatis. In the rounding return, egotism is 
overcome, consideration is elevated, and the poet acknowledges, where at first he 
belittled, the soothing consolations offered by his humble spot by the bower. Thus the 
third and last stanza begins the return of the widened gyre to initial point of departure, 
humbled like a returning prodigal son: 
 
                                               A delight 
Comes sudden on my heart, and I am glad 
As I myself were there! Nor in this bower, 
This little lime-tree bower, have I not mark’d 
Much that has sooth’d me. . . .  
 
Gérard (1967) identifies certain of Coleridge’s Meditative Poems, including ‘Frost’ and 
‘Lime-Tree’, as having a systolic-diastolic rhythm. This is a fitting expression in that it 
provides an image of the expanding and contracting movements in these poems and 
relates it to the heart’s vitality. Nevertheless, the rhythmic circling and returning, 
opening and beholding movement and then stilling of thought in these poems is far 
slower than any heartbeat. Of this circularity in ‘Frost’, Coleridge says, ‘Poems of this 
kind & length ought to lie coiled with its tail round its head’ (Poetical Works I.1, 
456),
189
 suggesting the serpentine image of the ouroboros, or even, befitting the 
domesticity of these poems, but not their subdued grandeur, fried whiting. 
In this expanding-contracting, opening and beholding, what begins in the mind as 
local and particular concerns initially carried here and there by fancy becomes part of an 
enlightened vision that begins in the stillness of recognizing the mind’s infusion by 
                                                 
189 Originally in Coleridge’s annotated ‘Frost at Midnight’ in Beaumont’s copy of the MS. 
  289 
Ideas. These Meditative Poems, and other Coleridgean observations, thus express and 
embody contemplative, poetic vision. The sleeping babe in humble cot, the rook beating 
over a Lime-Tree, the moon dim-glimmering through dewy window pane, smoke 
curling from an ember,
190
 and many images like this in the Notebooks, though humble 
and domestic, are all participants in the symbolic sublime.
191
 
                                                 
190 An image of sublimity and grandeur, when seeing even small things in the appropriate frame, 
in the poem ‘Apologia pro vita sua’ (Poetical Works I). 
191 Littleness does not prevent insights into the sublime for Coleridge, as he demonstrates in 
‘Frost’, ‘Lime-Tree’, ‘Apologia’, and many other poems, letters, and Notebook entries. He 
therefore cautions against mistaking ‘Bigness for Greatness (Notebooks II, 3157). Elsewhere he 
remarks that Milton ‘never passes off bigness for greatness . . . as the poets of India do’ (Opus 
Maximum, 281). 
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Appendix C: Poems 
 
Coleridge often revised his major poems, sometimes after intervals of many years. The 
versions used below follow the selections made by J. C. C. Mays in his two-volume 
edition (the current standard) of Poems (Reading Text), other versions can be found in 
Mays’s third volume, Poems (Varioria), and in Coleridge’s original volumes and 
collected works. 
 
The Eolian Harp: Composed at Clevedon, Somersetshire 
[Aug-Oct 1795; also Feb? 1796] 
 
My pensive Sara! thy soft cheek reclined 
Thus on mine arm, most soothing sweet it is 
To sit beside our cot, our cot o’ergrown 
With white-flowered Jasmin, and the broad-leaved Myrtle, 
(Meet emblems they of Innocence and Love!) 
And watch the clouds, that late were rich with light, 
Slow saddening round, and mark the star of eve 
Serenely brilliant (such would Wisdom be) 
Shine opposite! How exquisite the scents 
Snatched from yon bean-field! and the world so hushed! 
The stilly murmur of the distant Sea 
Tells us of Silence. 
 
                            And that simplest Lute, 
Placed length-ways in the clasping casement, hark! 
How by the desultory breeze caressed, 
Like some coy maid half yielding to her lover, 
It pours such sweet upbraiding, as must needs 
Tempt to repeat the wrong! And now, its strings 
Boldlier swept, the long sequacious
*
 notes      
Over delicious surges sink and rise, 
Such a soft floating witchery of sound 
As twilight Elfins make, when they at eve 
Voyage on gentle gales from Fairy-Land, 
Where Melodies round honey-dropping flowers, 
Footless and wild, like birds of Paradise, 
Nor pause, nor perch, hovering on untamed wing! 
O! the one Life within us and abroad, 
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul, 
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light, 
Rhythm in all thought, and joyance every where— 
Methinks, it should have been impossible 
Not to love all things in a world so filled; 
Where the breeze warbles, and the mute still air, 
Is Music slumbering on her instrument. 
 
                                                 
*
 sequacious = lacking original thought [Coleridge’s note]. 
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    And thus, my Love! as on the midway slope 
Of yonder hill I stretch my limbs at noon, 
Whilst through my half-closed eyelids I behold 
The sunbeams dance, like diamonds, on the main, 
And tranquil muse upon tranquility: 
Full many a thought uncalled and undetained, 
And many idle flitting phantasies, 
Traverse my indolent and passive brain, 
As wild and various as the random gales 
That swell and flutter on this subject lute! 
 
    And what if all of animated nature 
Be but organic Harps diversely framed, 
That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze, 
At once the Soul of each, and God of All? 
 
    But thy more serious eye a mild reproof 
Darts, O beloved Woman! nor such thoughts 
Dim and unhallowed dost thou not reject, 
And biddest me walk humbly with my God. 
Meek daughter in the family of Christ! 
Well hast thou said and holily dispraised 
These shapings of the unregenerate mind; 
Bubbles that glitter as they rise and break 
On vain Philosophy’s aye-babbling spring. 
For never guiltless may I speak of him, 
The Incomprehensible! save when with awe 
I praise him, and with Faith that inly feels; 
Who with his saving mercies healed me, 
A sinful and most miserable Man, 
Wildered and dark, and gave me to possess 
Peace, and this Cot, and thee, heart-honoured Maid! 
 
 
Dejection: an Ode 
[July 1802?] 
 
Late, late yestreen I saw the new Moon,  
With the old Moon in her arms;  
And I fear, I fear, my Master dear!  
We shall have a deadly storm.  
 Ballad of Sir PATRICK SPENCE  
 
I. 
Well! If the Bard was weather-wise, who made 
       The grand old ballad of Sir Patrick Spence, 
       This night, so tranquil now, will not go hence 
Unrous’d by winds, that ply a busier trade 
Than those which mould yon cloud in lazy flakes, 
Or the dull sobbing draft, that moans and rakes 
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Upon the strings of this Æolian lute, 
                Which better far were mute. 
         For lo! the New-moon winter-bright! 
         And overspread with phantom light, 
         (With swimming phantom light o’erspread 
         But rimm’d and circled by a silver thread) 
I see the old Moon in her lap, foretelling 
         The coming-on of rain and squally blast. 
And oh! that even now the gust were swelling, 
         And the slant night-shower driving loud and fast! 
Those sounds which oft have raised me, whilst they awed, 
                And sent my soul abroad, 
Might now perhaps their wonted impulse give, 
Might startle this dull pain, and make it move and live! 
 
II. 
A grief without a pang, void, dark, and drear, 
         A stifled, drowsy, unimpassioned grief, 
         Which finds no natural outlet, no relief, 
                In word, or sigh, or tear— 
O Lady! in this wan and heartless mood, 
To other thoughts by yonder throstle
*
 woo’d,           
         All this long eve, so balmy and serene, 
Have I been gazing on the western sky, 
         And its peculiar tint of yellow green: 
And still I gaze—and with how blank an eye! 
And those thin clouds above, in flakes and bars, 
That give away their motion to the stars; 
Those stars, that glide behind them or between, 
Now sparkling, now bedimmed, but always seen: 
Yon crescent Moon, as fix’d as if it grew 
In its own cloudless, starless lake of blue; 
I see them all so excellently fair, 
I see, not feel, how beautiful they are! 
 
                            III. 
                My genial spirits fail; 
                And what can these avail, 
To lift the smoth’ring weight from off my breast? 
                It were a vain endeavor, 
                Though I should gaze for ever 
On that green light that lingers in the west: 
I may not hope from outward forms to win 
The passion and the life, whose fountains are within. 
 
IV. 
O Lady! we receive but what we give, 
And in our life alone does Nature live: 
                                                 
*
 throstle = song thrush [Coleridge’s note]. 
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Ours is her wedding-garment, ours her shroud! 
         And would we aught behold, of higher worth, 
Than that inanimate cold world allow’d 
To the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd, 
         Ah! from the soul itself must issue forth 
A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud 
                Enveloping the Earth— 
And from the soul itself must there be sent 
         A sweet and potent voice, of its own birth, 
Of all sweet sounds the life and element! 
 
V. 
O pure of heart! thou need’st not ask of me 
What this strong music in the soul may be! 
What, and wherein it doth exist, 
This light, this glory, this fair luminous mist, 
This beautiful and beauty-making power. 
         Joy, virtuous Lady! Joy that ne’er was given, 
Save to the pure, and in their purest hour, 
Life, and Life’s Effluence, Cloud at once and Shower, 
Joy, Lady! is the spirit and the power, 
Which wedding Nature to us gives in dow’r 
         A new Earth and new Heaven, 
Undreamt of by the sensual and the proud— 
Joy is the sweet voice, Joy the luminous cloud— 
                We in ourselves rejoice! 
And thence flows all that charms or ear or sight, 
         All melodies the echoes of that voice, 
All colours a suffusion from that light. 
 
VI. 
There was a time when, though my path was rough, 
         This joy within me dallied with distress, 
And all misfortunes were but as the stuff 
         Whence Fancy made me dreams of happiness: 
For hope grew round me, like the twining vine, 
And fruits, and foliage, not my own, seem’d mine. 
But now afflictions bow me down to earth: 
Nor care I that they rob me of my mirth; 
                But oh! each visitation 
Suspends what nature gave me at my birth, 
         My shaping spirit of Imagination. 
For not to think of what I needs must feel, 
         But to be still and patient, all I can; 
And haply by abstruse research to steal 
         From my own nature all the natural man— 
         This was my sole resource, my only plan: 
Till that which suits a part infects the whole, 
And now is almost grown the habit of my soul. 
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VII. 
Hence, viper thoughts, that coil around my mind, 
                Reality’s dark dream! 
I turn from you, and listen to the wind, 
         Which long has rav’d unnoticed. What a scream 
Of agony by torture lengthen’d out 
That lute sent forth! Thou Wind, that rav’st without, 
         Bare crag, or mountain-tairn,
*
 or blasted tree,         
Or pine-grove whither woodman never clomb, 
Or lonely house, long held the witches’ home, 
         Methinks were fitter instruments for thee, 
Mad Lutanist! who in this month of show’rs, 
Of dark-brown gardens, and of peeping flow’rs, 
Mak’st Devils’ yule, with worse than wint’ry song, 
The blossoms, buds, and tim’rous leaves among. 
         Thou Actor, perfect in all tragic sounds! 
Thou mighty Poet, e’en to frenzy bold! 
                What tell’st thou now about? 
                ’Tis of the rushing of an host in rout, 
         With groans, of trampled men, with smarting wounds— 
At once they groan with pain, and shudder with the cold! 
But hush! there is a pause of deepest silence! 
         And all that noise, as of a rushing crowd, 
With groans, and tremulous shudderings—all is over— 
         It tells another tale, with sounds less deep and loud! 
                A tale of less affright, 
                And tempered with delight, 
As Otway’s self had framed the tender lay— 
                ’Tis of a little child 
                Upon a lonesome wild, 
Nor far from home, but she hath lost her way: 
And now moans low in bitter grief and fear, 
And now screams loud, and hopes to make her mother hear. 
 
VIII. 
’Tis midnight, but small thoughts have I of sleep: 
Full seldom may my friend such vigils keep! 
Visit her, gentle Sleep! with wings of healing, 
         And may this storm be but a mountain-birth, 
May all the stars hang bright above her dwelling, 
         Silent as though they watched the sleeping Earth! 
                With light heart may she rise, 
                Gay fancy, cheerful eyes, 
         Joy lift her spirit, joy attune her voice; 
To her may all things live, from Pole to Pole, 
Their life the eddying of her living soul! 
         O simple spirit, guided from above, 
                                                 
*
 tairn = small lake 
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Dear Lady! friend devoutest of my choice, 
Thus may’st thou ever, evermore rejoice. 
 
 
This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison 
[Addressed to Charles Lamb, of the India House, London, July 
1797] 
 
Well, they are gone, and here must I remain, 
This Lime-Tree Bower my prison! I have lost 
Beauties and Feelings, such as would have been 
Most sweet to my remembrance even when age 
Had dimm’d mine eyes to blindness! They, meanwhile, 
Friends, whom I never more may meet again, 
On springy heath, along the hill-top edge, 
Wander in gladness, and wind down, perchance, 
To that still roaring dell, of which I told; 
The roaring dell, o’erwooded, narrow, deep, 
And only speckled by the mid-day Sun; 
Where its slim trunk the Ash from rock to rock 
Flings arching like a bridge;—that branchless Ash, 
Unsunn’d and damp, whose few poor yellow leaves 
Ne’er tremble in the gale, yet tremble still, 
Fann’d by the water-fall! and there my friends 
Behold the dark green file of long lank Weeds, 
That all at once (a most fantastic sight!) 
Still nod and drip beneath the dripping edge 
Of the blue clay-stone. 
 
                                      Now, my friends emerge 
Beneath the wide wide Heaven—and view again 
The many-steepled tract magnificent 
Of hilly fields and meadows, and the sea, 
With some fair bark, perhaps, whose Sails light up 
The slip of smooth clear blue betwixt two Isles 
Of purple shadow! Yes! they wander on 
In gladness all; but thou, methinks, most glad, 
My gentle-hearted Charles! for thou hast pined 
And hunger’d after Nature, many a year, 
In the great City pent, winning thy way 
With sad yet patient soul, through evil and pain 
And strange calamity! Ah! slowly sink 
Behind the western ridge, thou glorious Sun! 
Shine in the slant beams of the sinking orb, 
Ye purple heath-flowers! richlier burn, ye clouds! 
Live in the yellow light, ye distant groves! 
And kindle, thou blue Ocean! So my Friend 
Struck with deep joy may stand, as I have stood, 
Silent with swimming sense; yea, gazing round 
On the wide landscape, gaze till all doth seem 
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Less gross than bodily; and of such hues 
As veil the Almighty Spirit, when yet he makes 
Spirits perceive his presence. 
 
                                                 A delight 
Comes sudden on my heart, and I am glad 
As I myself were there! Nor in this bower, 
This little lime-tree bower, have I not mark’d 
Much that has sooth’d me. Pale beneath the blaze 
Hung the transparent foliage; and I watch’d 
Some broad and sunny leaf, and lov’d to see 
The shadow of the leaf and stem above 
Dappling its sunshine! And that Walnut-tree 
Was richly ting’d, and a deep radiance lay 
Full on the ancient Ivy, which usurps 
Those fronting elms, and now, with blackest mass 
Makes their dark branches gleam a lighter hue 
Through the late twilight: and though now the Bat 
Wheels silent by, and not a Swallow twitters, 
Yet still the solitary humble Bee 
Sings in the bean-flower! Henceforth I shall know 
That Nature ne’er deserts the wise and pure; 
No Plot so narrow, be but Nature there, 
No waste so vacant, but may well employ 
Each faculty of sense, and keep the heart 
Awake to Love and Beauty! and sometimes 
’Tis well to be bereft of promis’d good, 
That we may lift the Soul, and contemplate 
With lively joy the joys we cannot share. 
My gentle-hearted Charles! when the last Rook 
Beat its straight path along the dusky air 
Homewards, I blest it! deeming its black wing 
(Now a dim speck, now vanishing in light) 
Had cross’d the mighty Orb’s dilated glory, 
While thou stood’st gazing; or, when all was still, 
Flew creeking o’er thy head, and had a charm 
For thee, my gentle-hearted Charles, to whom 
No Sound is dissonant which tells of Life. 
 
 
Frost at Midnight 
[Feb 1798] 
 
The Frost performs its secret ministry, 
Unhelped by any wind. The owlet’s cry 
Came loud—and hark, again! loud as before. 
The inmates of my cottage, all at rest, 
Have left me to that solitude, which suits 
Abstruser musings: save that at my side 
My cradled infant slumbers peacefully. 
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’Tis calm indeed! so calm, that it disturbs 
And vexes meditation with its strange 
And extreme silentness. Sea, hill, and wood, 
This populous village! Sea, and hill, and wood, 
With all the numberless goings on of life, 
Inaudible as dreams! the thin blue flame 
Lies on my low burnt fire, and quivers not; 
Only that film, which fluttered on the grate, 
Still flutters there, the sole unquiet thing. 
Methinks, its motion in this hush of nature 
Gives it dim sympathies with me who live, 
Making it a companionable form, 
Whose puny flaps and freaks the idling Spirit 
By its own moods interprets, every where 
Echo or mirror seeking of itself, 
And makes a toy of Thought. 
 
                                             But O! how oft, 
   How oft, at school, with most believing mind, 
Presageful, have I gazed upon the bars, 
To watch that fluttering stranger!
*
 and as of      
With unclosed lids, already had I dreamt                      
Of my sweet birth-place, and the old church-tower, 
Whose bells, the poor man’s only music, rang 
From morn to evening, all the hot Fair-day, 
So sweetly, that they stirred and haunted me 
With a wild pleasure, falling on mine ear 
Most like articulate sounds of things to come! 
So gazed I, till the soothing things, I dreamt, 
Lulled me to sleep, and sleep prolonged my dreams! 
And so I brooded all the following morn, 
Awed by the stern preceptor's face, mine eye 
Fixed with mock study on my swimming book: 
Save if the door half opened, and I snatched 
A hasty glance, and still my heart leaped up, 
For still I hoped to see the stranger’s face, 
Townsman, or aunt, or sister more beloved, 
My play-mate when we both were clothed alike! 
 
    Dear Babe, that sleepest cradled by my side, 
Whose gentle breathings, heard in this deep calm, 
Fill up the interspersed vacancies 
And momentary pauses of the thought! 
My babe so beautiful! it thrills my heart 
With tender gladness, thus to look at thee, 
And think that thou shalt learn far other lore, 
And in far other scenes! For I was reared 
                                                 
*
 stranger = sooty film, auguring a visitor [Coleridge’s note] 
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In the great city, pent ’mid cloisters dim, 
And saw nought lovely but the sky and stars. 
But thou, my babe! shalt wander like a breeze 
By lakes and sandy shores, beneath the crags 
Of ancient mountain, and beneath the clouds, 
Which image in their bulk both lakes and shores 
And mountain crags: so shalt thou see and hear 
The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible 
Of that eternal language, which thy God 
Utters, who from eternity doth teach 
Himself in all, and all things in himself. 
Great universal Teacher! he shall mould 
Thy spirit, and by giving make it ask. 
 
    Therefore all seasons shall be sweet to thee, 
Whether the summer clothe the general earth 
With greenness, or the redbreast sit and sing 
Betwixt the tufts of snow on the bare branch 
Of mossy apple-tree, while the nigh thatch 
Smokes in the sun-thaw; whether the eave-drops fall 
Heard only in the trances of the blast, 
Or if the secret ministry of frost 
Shall hang them up in silent icicles, 
Quietly shining to the quiet Moon. 
 
 
